WE JUST AREN'T FREE: URBAN REFUGEES AND
INTEGRATION IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

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Dedicated to the refugees of Lusaka, Zambia.
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the local integration of refugees in Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. The Zambian government, like the majority of host countries in southern Africa, has instituted policies that discourage the long-term integration of refugees by isolating them in camps and settlements until they can be returned to their country of origin and strictly limiting the number of refugees allowed to live in urban areas. However, acting contrary to government policies and even the structures of international refugee assistance programs, refugees themselves assert the right to remain in Lusaka by simply ignoring policy and staying. Particularly in the dynamic and often weakly structured space of urban areas, this leads to questions about how refugees are being incorporated into local communities. In the absence of legal mechanisms and rights, what economic, social and cultural processes and means are available to accommodate refugees, and alternatively, what processes and means exist to increase their exclusion and insecurity?

This dissertation considers the integration of refugees in cities by evaluating the mechanisms that both facilitate and obstruct the process of settling into and becoming part of the local community. It also examines levels of integration through evaluation of urban refugees’ livelihoods and standards of living; access to housing, markets and social services; conflict and discrimination; and social and cultural connections. The refugee’s choice of local integration is carried out through a variety of strategies to create a sense of belonging in Zambian society. In
the context of protracted refugee situations and over 50 percent of the world’s refugee population living in urban areas, this dissertation considers the extent to which such strategies have been successful as a challenge to dominant understandings of local integration and durable solutions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Anti-Corruption Commission…………………………………………………………………. ACC
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome…………………………………………………….. AIDS
African National Congress…………………………………………………………………… ANC
British South Africa Company…………………………………………………………… BSAC
Catholic Relief Services……………………………………………………………………. CRS
Central Statistical Office…………………………………………………………………… CSO
Commissioner for Refugees……………………………………………………………….. COR
Democratic Republic of Congo……………………………………………………………. DRC
Human Immunodeficiency Virus…………………………………………………………… HIV
Inter-Church Refugee Committee………………………………………………………….. ICRC
Internally Displaced People………………………………………………………………… IDP
International Monetary Fund…………………………………………………………….. IMF
Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection………………………………………………… JCTR
Jesuit Refugee Service………………………………………………………………………. JRS
Lusaka City Council………………………………………………………………………… LCC
Legal Resources Foundation……………………………………………………………… LRF
Movement for Multiparty Democracy………………………………………………….. MMD
Member of Parliament………………………………………………………………………. MP
National Eligibility Committee……………………………………………………………. NEC
Non-Governmental Organization…………………………………………………………… NGO
Organization of African Unity……………………………………………………………. OAU
Popular Front………………………………………………………………………………… PF
Structural Adjustment Program……………………………………………………………. SAP
United National Independence Party.........................................................UNIP
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees....................................UNHCR
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.................................UNITA
Zambia Open Community School.............................................................ZOCS
CHAPTER 1

TIRED OF THIS REFUGEE NAME: PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS, LOCAL INTEGRATION, AND URBAN SPACES

Major crises around the world have displaced millions of people, while chronic conflicts and insecurity have created a quasi-permanent refugee population (Guterres 2010:3). Over two-thirds of the world’s refugees are in protracted situations where they have lived in exile for more than five years with no immediate prospects of resolving their situation (Loescher et al. 2008:3; Crisp 2003:1). For example, of the refugees registered in camps, settlements and urban areas in Zambia, about 47 percent were born in Zambia and about 12 percent fled to Zambia more than fifteen years ago (National Assembly of Zambia 2011:2). Refugees in these protracted circumstances often face significant restrictions on a wide range of rights and serious threats to their welfare. In addition, their continuing presence frequently causes political and security concerns in host states and the region. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international governing body for refugees, argues, “The consequences of having so many human beings in a static state include wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security” (UNHCR 2004c:2).

The dominant response to refugee influxes by both host states and the international community has been to require refugees to live in camps or settlements on government-designated land. Often host governments put into place additional restrictions, including on freedom of movement, the right to own property, and the right to seek wage-earning

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1 In most literature, the terms “camps” and “settlements” tend to be used interchangeably when referring to a structured setting to receive and support refugees. In Zambia, how camps and settlements provided assistance generally distinguished between the two. Camps were designed to offer temporary shelter and provide full assistance, while settlements expected residents to be self-sustaining and engage in subsistence farming or other economic activities for the long-term.
employment, in order to isolate the refugee population until they are able to return to their country of origin. While camps focus attention on and provide a safety net for refugees, the restrictions and protracted situations perpetuate a state of limbo and permanent transition for exiled populations.

Yet even as these settings are the focus of media attention, donor funding and construction of policy, the majority of the world’s displaced people are self-settled outside of camps and settlements (UNHCR 2009b). They reside in local rural communities and more than 50 percent live in growing cities (UNHCR 2009b). These refugees live with the local population and often support themselves without international assistance or host state permission. However, acting contrary to government policies and the structures of international refugee assistance programs often leave refugees facing “dangerous and unstable situations” due to their insecure and temporary legal status (Jacobsen 2001:10).

This leads to questions about how refugees are being incorporated into local communities, particularly in the dynamic and often weakly structured space of urban areas. In the absence of legal mechanisms and rights, what economic, social and cultural processes and means are available to accommodate these migrants and alternatively, to increase their exclusion and insecurity? This dissertation considers the integration of refugees in cities by evaluating the mechanisms that both facilitate and obstruct the process of settling into and becoming part of the local community. While many of these mechanisms are relevant to all urban residents, refugees are unique due to their internationally recognized position. Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986:7) provides a simple definition of refugee integration as “a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources—both economic and social—with
no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community.” As a starting point, this definition acknowledges the role of both refugees and the host society within the process of integration.

This dissertation uses the situation of refugees living in Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia, to examine the process of integration in urban areas. To situate the analysis, this chapter presents the scholarly literature to break down definitional concepts regarding the nature of integration, the dynamics of refugee hosting, and the characteristics of urban space. This chapter is divided into four sections; I lay the groundwork for this discussion by first considering the concept of integration and establishing the definitions and measurements pertinent for this dissertation. Second, I focus on the barriers, in particular the resistance on the part of host states to allow refugees to reside in urban areas. Third, I consider what factors facilitate integration in the context of the dynamic and complex space of urban areas. Finally I present the site of this research and outline the direction of this dissertation.

The Concept of Integration

Frustrated by fears of arrest and harassment by Immigration officers who limited his ability to move and pursue work freely in Lusaka, Zambia, Sam, a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), threw up his hands and exclaimed, “We are just tired of this refugee name.” The “refugee” is at the center of the global refugee regime, composed of the formal international organization of UNHCR, as well as many other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), various legal conventions and international structures...

> Persons who are, or prior to their entry in Zambia were, ordinarily resident outside of Zambia and who have sought asylum in Zambia owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion are declared to be refugees for the purposes of the Refugee (Control) Act, 1970 (Government of Zambia 1970).

Sam became part of a legal and administrative category at the global level, which has been interpreted and enforced locally by Zambia’s own refugee policy and various state actors. As Katharina Inhetveen (2006:1) points out, “here, a legal label institutionalized on a macro-level meets the micro-level of action and interpretation.”

This section focuses on solutions to protracted refugee situations as outlined at the international level to understand the underlying assumptions that inform the refugee-related actions by states and organizations, as well as the position and definition of integration in this perspective. This section is followed by discussion of expansion of the concept of integration to include the actions of refugees themselves. After Sam complained that all he could do was a few cell phone repairs here and there to make money, he said simply, “but I like Zambia.” The connections Sam finds in Zambia despite the restrictions due to his refugee status contradict legal definitions and expectations. This leads to the framework used to understand integration in the context of Lusaka and this dissertation.
Definition of Durable Solutions

For thousands of years, local integration had been a common choice for migrating individuals, whether fleeing conflict or economic or environmental conditions. It was even endorsed as an ideal solution at the inception of the international refugee regime. The 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention encouraged states to incorporate refugees fully into the social, economic, legal and political framework of their society stating that, “contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings” (UN General Assembly 1951).

Local integration into the receiving state has been one of the three durable solutions proposed by UNHCR. The other two are voluntary repatriation to country of origin and resettlement to a third country. However, repatriation gradually assumed precedence over the other durable solutions. In 1983, governments were called on to facilitate the work of UNHCR “in creating conditions favorable to and promoting voluntary repatriation, which whenever appropriate and feasible is the most desirable solution for refugee problems” (UNHCR 1983). A decade later, UNHCR declared 1992 as the first year of a decade for voluntary repatriation (Allen and Morsink 1994; Toft 2007). Repatriation as the optimal and most feasible durable solution became the discourse that dominated refugee policy (Harrell-Bond 1989).

Allen and Turton (1996:10) contend that the “idea that return represents the most desirable solution to refugee movement contains an implicit assumption that a given population has its own proper place, territory or homeland.” Refugees are a predictable consequence of the international system, which partitions the world’s population and decides who is responsible for individuals inside and outside national borders and who “belongs” where (Arendt 1951; Haddad 2008; Malkki 1992; 1995; Monsutti 2006; 2008). The simple device of a map visually represents
the world of nations “as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory with no ‘bleeding boundaries’: Each nation is sovereign and limited in its membership” (Malkki 1992:55). This fixed notion of the nation-state and national identity becomes “almost a ‘natural’ marker of cultural and social difference” (Gupta 1997:179). Refugees challenge those markers by being “out of place” in both the conceptual and empirical senses.

The global refugee regime relies on the concept of a “refugee cycle,” in which those who have been displaced will eventually return to their place of origin to be re-rooted in their native soil (Kunz 1981; Black and Koser 1999). The simplistic narrative of refugees eventually going “home” fails to recognize the root causes of displacement, which include the breakdown of the supposed protective relationship between citizen and state, existing conditions in countries of origin, and even refugees’ willingness to return (Khiddu-Makubuya 1994; McSpadden 1999; Pottier 1988; Rogge 1994). It is assumed that:

once the root causes that prompt population movements are eliminated the affected population “vote with their feet” homewards in order to re-establish themselves in their former areas of origin or habitual residence. Thus, since repatriation is expected to happen automatically in response to changed political and social conditions in countries of origin, research into the factors that influence refugees’ decisions concerning repatriation has not been considered worthwhile (Kibreab 1996:6).

In practical terms, the development of the repatriation discourse and assumptions of return followed shifts in the politics of asylum. In previous decades, Western host nations widely practiced resettlement and permanent asylum of refugees from the well-publicized persecution in Communist countries.4 A move towards increasingly restrictive asylum policies grew out of the economic recession of the 1980s, the election of conservative governments in many Western states, and vastly larger numbers of people traveling from the developing countries to Western

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4 For example, until the mid-1980s, 90 percent of all refugees in the United States were from the Eastern bloc (Spijkerboer 2000:197).
Europe and North America seeking asylum (Betts et al. 2012: 34-35). Though superpower rivalry and regional conflicts led to massive refugee movements in Africa, Asia, and Central America, the compelling political and ideological reasons for Western countries to accept and resettle large numbers of refugees were absent. Third-country resettlement was available to only a small portion of the world’s refugees, about five percent of the total number of refugees and asylum seekers (USCRI 2007). Between 1992 and 2001, some 90,000 African refugees were resettled in other parts of the world, but this number represents only a tiny fraction of the continent’s refugee population (Crisp 2003:4). Many states cite the cost involved in absorbing a large number of refugees, but also fear that opening borders to foreigners would increase economic competition with its citizens or threaten national identity.

Border states continued to shoulder a disproportionate share of the global refugee burden. With the post-cold war geopolitical shifts and increasing restrictions on asylum in developed countries, these frontline states have also stepped back from fundamental principles of asylum and reduced the utilization of integration as a durable solution (Jacobsen 2001). The segregation of refugees in camps and settlements was motivated by concerns about national security; limiting competition with nationals over employment, resources and services; ensuring burden sharing with the international donor community, and public perceptions. More restrictive refugee policy has also resulted in closed borders, forced the return of refugees, and almost universal abdication of “responsibility for refugees to international agencies such as UNHCR” (Loescher and Milner 2012:159).

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5 The move from a generous, open-door policy for refugees in African countries to a limited commitment to asylum is discussed more fully in Chapter 4.

6 There was a 21 percent drop in international assistance for refugees from 1992 to 1997 (Loescher 2001:321). UNHCR had no permanent funding, which makes fully funding all programs unpredictable and dependent on donor relations. By 1995, UNHCR became increasingly aware of donor fatigue.
Despite this context, UNHCR began to reconsider local integration as a solution for long-staying refugee populations. UNHCR acknowledged that a significant proportion of the world’s refugees are unable to repatriate safely due to ongoing conflict and that “it has become equally clear that confining refugees to camps for years on end, deprived of the right to freedom of movement and without access to educational and incoming generating opportunities has many negative consequences” (UNHCR 2002b:4). In addition, there were cases where local integration had the potential to succeed, where “refugees shared a language, a culture or ethnic origin with the host community” and were capable of settling peacefully and productively in countries where they found asylum (UNHCR 2002b: 4-5). Policy-level processes were discussed in Convention Plus (UNHCR 2004b), the Agenda for Protection (UNHCR 2003a), the Framework for Durable Solutions (UNHCR 2003b), and the Executive Committee Conclusion on Local integration (UNCHR 2002b).

UNHCR considers three interrelated aspects of local integration:

1. Legal Process: The host state grants refugees a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements that are broadly commensurate with those enjoyed by its citizens.

2. Economic Process: Refugees become less reliant on state aid or humanitarian assistance and become more self-reliant and establish a sustainable livelihood, and subsequently contribute to the economic life of the host country.

3. Social and Cultural Process: Refugees undergo a process of acclimatization and accommodation in the local communities that enables them to live among or alongside the host population. This comes without discrimination and allows refugees to actively contribute to the social life of their country of asylum (Crisp 2004:1, UNHCR 2002b:2).
This definition emphasizes returning to the 1951 Refugee Convention that encouraged host states to incorporate and naturalize refugees. If refugees are eventually granted legal status and the various civil, socioeconomic, cultural and political rights associated with national belonging, they will no longer need international protection and will have reached a durable solution.

In 2005, UNHCR concluded that local integration should not only be the burden of the host country and clarified “UNHCR’s catalytic role in assisting and supporting countries receiving refugees… and in mobilizing financial assistance and other forms of support, including development assistance from the international community” (2005c:12). UNHCR launched a series of initiatives in 2002-2004, which sought to improve the material circumstances, reinforce their rights, and ensure the self-reliance of refugees (Slaughter 2009). However, these efforts were hampered by UNHCR budget constraints and host governments who viewed international donor community pressure for local integration as merely additional “burden shifting” and an infringement on their sovereignty (Loescher and Milner 2011:6). Due to host states’ insistence, the recognition of sovereignty was included in the 2009 conclusions adopted by the UNHCR Executive Committee, which stated that, “local integration is a sovereign decision” (Loescher and Milner 2011:6; UNHCR 2009b).

From the durable solution perspective, local integration is completely dependent on host states’ permission; as a result “opportunities for local integration in countries of asylum are limited” (UNHCR 2004c:10). Containing refugees in camps and settlements until repatriation continues to be the policy of choice for many states despite the weight of protracted situations and the possibility of productive integration.

The next section expands the definition of integration to involve those refugees who move outside of humanitarian interventions and are, as Jacobsen (2001) classifies, “de facto”
integrated. These are refugees who have become “unofficially integrated after they have lived in and been accepted by the community, and have attained self-sufficiency” (Jacobsen 2001:9). Many refugees, faced with a tightly controlled environment, accept the risks of living outside the camps, preferring to break the law and live on their own terms (Kuhlman 1994; Sommers 2000). How this process of integration can be examined empirically concludes this section.

Integration in Practice

Protracted refugee situations have brought revitalized interest in local integration and increased the amount of research and analysis. Researchers such as Crisp (2004), Jacobsen (2001), and Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2003) have argued for broader understanding of integration as a way to address these situations, in particular considering refugees who are outside of formal structures and policy interventions as defined by UNHCR.

Jacobsen (2001:4) noted that the preoccupation of the international community with repatriation as the preferred refugee solution meant that there had been "little research on the process of local integration and its consequences for refugees and their hosts.” There have been only a handful of empirical studies on self-settlement and local integration in countries of asylum in sub-Saharan Africa independent of formal host state policies (A. Hansen 1982; Bakewell 2000; Malkki 1995; Banki 2004; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003; Goetz 2003). Notable examples are Bakewell’s (1999) research carried out among self-settled Angolan refugees in western Zambia, Sommers’s (2001) exploration of Burundi refugee youth in Dar es Salaam, and Andrews’s (2003) focus on the relations between residents of a refugee camp and neighboring Guinean villages.

Until around 2001, those self-settled refugees living in urban areas were almost entirely invisible to both practitioners and academics (Landau 2004). Kibreab (1995:2), who has written
about Eritrean women refugees in Khartoum, noted that “the condition of urban refugees is a poorly documented phenomenon.” He found that they were often swallowed up and remained anonymous in the crowded city, often because their position was in defiance of government policy. Due to their “invisibility” in rapidly urbanizing spaces where their legal status is often undetermined, refugees in urban areas of the global South are a particularly understudied population (Dryden-Peterson 2006:382). Refugees have been the focus of studies in Khartoum (Karadawi 1987; Kibreab 1996; Rogge 1986), Dar es Salaam (Sommers 2001; Willems 2003), Cairo (Briant and Kennedy 2004; Sperl 2001), and Johannesburg (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). Advocacy groups have also drawn attention to the vulnerability of refugee populations in Nairobi (Parker 2002) and Kampala (Parker 2002; Bernstein 2005).

These studies have yielded refugee perspectives on local integration and the process, challenges, and opportunities of settling into and becoming part of the local host community. A number of scholars have attempted to outline the exact components involved in local integration. Returning to Harrell-Bond’s (1986:7) definition, she considered integration to be simply “a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources—both economic and social—with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community.” However, Harrell-Bond, herself, rejects this definition as too simple as there may be uneven access to resources, exploitation by one group over another, and increased conflict in the host society due to the increased presence of refugees (1987:7). Kuhlman (1991) made the definition more explicit by outlining indices that could be used to gauge refugee integration into a host community. He identified the following characteristics of successful integration:
If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements (standard of living is taken here as meaning not only income from economic activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public utilities, health services, and education); if the social-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situations; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than with the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society (Kuhlman 1991:7).

Even more simply, Jacobsen (2001:15) argued that refugees are de facto integrated when they are living without fearing physical attack or deportation, free to settle and move as they choose, able to sustain a livelihood, able to access social services such as education, health and social security, and able to socially interact and intermarry with locals. A clear example of widespread de facto integration is of Angolans in Zambian villages, despite the Zambian government’s consistent refusal to accept integration of refugees as a possible durable solution (Bakewell 2000; 2008).

Since protracted conflicts keep refugees in limbo where they are neither able to resettle in a third country nor to return home, local integration solutions are needed in the short and intermediate term. Some refugees reside in settlements and are separated from the local population, while others are integrated, which Banki defined as “the ability of the refugee to participate with relative freedom in the economic and communal life of the host region” (2004:2). The following indicators characterize high levels of integration available to locally integrated refugees:

Refugees are not restricted in their movements; own land or appear to have official access to it, participate in the local economy, are moving in the direction of self-sufficiency, are able to utilize local services such as health facilities, are dispersed among the population and attend local schools (Banki 2004:2).
These definitions of de facto integration are helpful in their emphasis on relations with local community members and presentation of a framework that captures the reality of many self-settled refugees (Meyer 2008:8).

Bascom (1995:207) argued that “the integration of urban refugees” is “one of the two main refugee issues that remain relatively un-researched and poorly understood” (repatriation being the other). From a practical perspective, considering the kind of ethno-linguistic, national and economic variety found in cities, examining of the friction between host populations and refugees, the ability of refugees to maintain an identity of their own, or the assessment of cultural values is much more complex (Kuhlman 1991:7; Landau 2004:26). However, this research on refugees living in Lusaka, Zambia draws upon the definitions of de facto integration described above as a useful way to delineate the key legal, economic and social processes involved.

Beginning with legal integration, Crisp (2004) argued that it is possible for a refugee to become entirely self-reliant and to develop close ties with the host community without becoming a naturalized citizen. However, the legal aspects of integration are significant. For example, official papers are important in finding work, accessing social services, and preventing arbitrary arrest and deportation. From the legal perspective, refugees gain a wider range of rights in the host state that are broadly in line with those enjoyed by its own people. These are defined by UNHCR as the rights “to seek employment, to engage in other income-generating activities, to own and dispose of property, to enjoy freedom of movement and to have access to public services such as education” (Crisp 2004:1). Examining what rights are available or not and how they are enforced provides entry into the type and level of the legal integration of refugees in urban areas.
The key to successful economic integration is if refugees are able to participate in the host economy and if they attain a standard of living equal to that of the surrounding community, which includes both adequate income from economic activities and access to housing, public utilities, health services, and education. The poor in any urban environment face considerable challenges in meeting their material needs, particularly in the rapidly growing cities of the developing world. Refugees are likely to encounter a range of additional challenges not faced by host nationals. Assessing the level of economic integration and self-reliance involves aspects such as refugee livelihoods and standards of living vis-à-vis local host community members, access to markets, and income generating activities.

The social and cultural process of integration allows refugees to live among the host population without discrimination or exploitation and to contribute to the social life of their country of asylum. Jacobsen sees this as refugees being “socially networked into the host community, so that intermarriage is common, ceremonies like weddings and funerals are attended by everyone, and there is little distinction between the standard of living of refugees and the host community” (Jacobsen 2001:9). This can be significantly eased by cultural links such as kinship and language ties. The development of social and cultural belonging in the host countries relies on the quality and type of interactions with the local community in neighborhoods, churches, markets, and work places. Such connections and supportive social networks can even overcome a hostile national environment (Polzer 2004:5).

Even in the complex environment of cities, breaking down local integration by these legal, economic and social parameters provides a framework for examining the lives of refugees in Lusaka. Analytical entry in this dissertation will be based on consideration of refugees’:
Livelihoods and standards of living,
Access to housing, markets and social services,
Levels of conflict and discrimination, and
Levels of social and cultural connections.

Through this lens, local integration becomes a continuum with varying degrees and forms of acceptance, participation, and change in which both the refugees and host society are involved (Frechette 1994).

Local integration as defined at the policy-level response contrasts sharply with the de facto integration of self-settled urban refugees and what this process looks like for them in practice. Many institutions and assumptions of the international refugee regime obscure the understanding of local integration as a “fundamentally refugee- and host-driven process” (Polzer 2008:2). Much analysis has been undertaken from a policy perspective, rather than acknowledging refugees themselves as primary social actors in making a “home” in their new environment (Griffiths et al. 2005; Korac 2009).

The following section, however, acknowledges the context in which integration occurs. Factors, such as the “refugee label”, actions of state actors, and the dynamic tensions in urban space create an environment that can both facilitate and obstruct the process of integration.

Refugee Integration in an Urban Context

In the midst of celebrations during the 2007 World Refugee Day and praises of Zambia’s continued commitment to refugee hosting, a government spokesman took the podium during an ecumenical service held at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka. His speech included a request for additional donor funding for repatriation efforts, but as he explained the protection
environment in Lusaka, he said with exasperation, “Refugees should not just ignore the laws of Zambia.” Refugees arriving in Lusaka encounter a government struggling to manage increasing demands on land, housing, services and infrastructure with a weak resource base, while also trying to control and counteract growing urbanization from rural-urban migration. The efforts to control the movement of urban refugees in particular reveal this struggle.

This section examines the barriers to refugee integration in the context of cities, the laws and enforcement procedures states enact specifically to resist the movement of refugees, and the ways in which broad formal regulatory efforts to control urban space equally constrain possibilities for integration. As Landau (2010a:171) pointed out, inclusion and exclusion in African cities is often negotiated outside “official state interest, regulation or capacities, although state agents are often key actors in both official and unofficial roles.” Therefore examination of the mechanisms that facilitate the integration of refugees involves considering the nature of urban space as well. Can states fully control cities? Why or why not? What is the impact on urban residents?

**Barriers to Integration**

The discussion of durable solutions above explored the resistance of host states to considering the local integration of refugees. Migration, whether voluntary or forced, challenges the traditional jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state. Refugees, as involuntary migrants, are evidence of a breach of the state of origin/citizenship relationship (Aleinikoff 1995:257). The usually unplanned and unexpected movement of people threatens the state’s control of territorial boundaries and its authority in defining “internal” cultural boundaries (Marfleet 2007:36).
The refugee problem simultaneously allows international humanitarian intervention in host countries. Under international law, recognized refugees and asylum seekers fall under the protection of the host state, which is charged with providing them a set of rights specified in the 1951 Convention and other international instruments, no matter where refugees are located (Jacobsen 2006:276).

The 1951 Convention (1951) requires countries to allow refugees to be self-employed, to practice professions, and to own property, on terms “as favourable as possible” (Articles 18, 19, and 13). They are entitled to the same treatment as nationals of the host country with regard to wage-earning employment and intellectual property (Articles 17 and 14). Hosts must allow refugees freedom of movement and residence at least equal to what they permit foreign nationals generally (Article 26), and issue them international travel documents (Article 28). Other important rights, including those of nondiscrimination, access to courts, and identity documents (Articles 3, 16, and 27, respectively), are unconditional; and the Convention permits no reservations on Articles 3 and 16(1). Despite the majority of host states abdicating responsibility for refugees to UNHCR, many nevertheless insist on imposing limitations on refugee rights that reflect continuing efforts to control the movement of people within state borders. Rutinwa (1999:15) outlines the practical motivations for this phenomenon:

The reasons for Africa’s abandonment of the open door policy may be summarized as the pressure exerted on them by the sheer magnitude of the refugee problem, the impact of refugees on host communities, security concerns, the economic crisis...and the failure of the international community to provide adequate assistance to refugee hosting

As a definitional point, an asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking asylum under the 1951 Convention, but whose claim has not yet been definitely evaluated. In this context, a refugee is an asylum seeker whose application has been successful. In Zambia, there is no legal distinction between refugees and asylum seekers, which may result in individuals seeking asylum being mistaken for prohibited immigrants and making it difficult to apply for refugee status (discussed in Chapter 5). As a recent development not evaluated in this dissertation, the Zambian Immigration and Deportation Act 2010 included a provision for a temporary permit to be granted to asylum seekers or “to any person seeking refuge or asylum in Zambia in accordance with the Refugees (Control) Act” (Chitupila 2010:7). Prior to 2010, asylum seekers were given a report order, a document accorded the same value as an entry permit, during refugee status determination procedures.
countries... Another reason is the growing xenophobia in some countries coinciding with a democratization process in Africa, which compels governments to take public opinion into account in the formulation of their refugee policies.

Host country responses to the influx of refugees are constructed in such a way to discourage the process of integration (Kibreab 2003:59). The majority of states often go to great lengths to isolate newcomers geographically, socially and economically from the host society.\(^8\) Kuhlman (1994:122) noted that “whenever African governments have recognized the existence of a refugee problem, they have favored organized settlement” over allowing refugees to settle where they choose. In spatially segregated camps and settlements, refugees are registered, counted and monitored under national and international bureaucratic structures. Refugees restricted to these sites generally lack significant rights, including freedom of movement and residence and the right to access wage-earning employment, and must seek permission if they want to leave.

However, the strategy of isolation is lost if refugees settle in urban areas. Camps and even the self-settled refugees in rural areas are easy for governments to ignore and leave to the purview of humanitarian agencies. In urban areas, the state is more actively present and authority is more clearly exerted through state institutions. Ministries and bureaus structure transactions and local decision making, issue judgments, licenses, documents and certificates, and often provide a conduit for development assistance and foreign investment. Capital cities, in particular, are the administrative centers and seats of national power, the locations of international banks and businesses, and the hosts for regional meetings, summits, and peace negotiations. State power is often exerted, contested and negotiated in the space of the city (Ferguson and Gupta

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\(^8\) South Africa and Egypt are exceptions; they have not instituted spatially segregated sites designated for refugees. See Al-Sharmani (2007) and Belvedere (2007).
2002). As urban refugees encounter and challenge urban governance, their presence is more difficult for governments to ignore.

While host governments are rarely able to prevent the arrival of urban refugees, host governments are able to deny refugees permission to work or study, refuse any form of assistance, and identify them as illegal migrants. The resulting lack of secure legal status has left urban refugees vulnerable and their basic human rights open to violation (Karadawi 1987; Kibreab 1996). Jacobsen (2006:276) highlights a range of protection problems refugees face, “including arbitrary arrest and detention, exploitation by employers, discrimination and physical abuse.” Those living without proper documentation, or in areas where refugee documents are not widely recognized, are unlikely to access public services effectively.

Urban refugees are even more vulnerable to “poor governance through the predatory behavior on the part of government officials, particularly the police, and the frequent lack of basic services” (World Bank 2007:vi) and are often unable to respond to mistreatment by claiming their rights or accessing justice (Jacobsen 2006). For example, in Nairobi, bribery is particularly rampant and poses a significant challenge for low-income or unemployed urban refugees who cannot afford both bribes and daily staples (Campbell 2005). In South Africa, police confiscate or destroy identity documents to pressure refugees into paying bribes to avoid deportation (Jacobsen 2004; Jacobsen and Landau 2003). The ultimate result of systemic harassment and abuse by authorities is that many urban refugees live in a constant state of fear (Alexander 2008; Jacobsen 2006; Grabska 2006).

Host government sanctioned harassment and abuse is not the only challenge refugees face in urban areas. As the following paragraphs will explore, rapid urbanization and government inability to accommodate this growth facilitates the creation of large, informal sectors that
operate outside the realms of the government. Urban refugees turn to the informal sector for employment and housing, yet also encounter government efforts to control this unregulated urban space, which further hinder their position in the city.

Africa’s cities have grown at a faster pace than anywhere else in the world since the 1960s. The substantial rise of population growth has outpaced the growth of basic infrastructure and services, resulting in lack of adequate shelter, clean water, and basic sanitation. Access to employment is precarious. It is estimated that roughly 75 percent of basic needs are provided informally in the majority of African cities and that processes of informalization are expanding across all domains of urban life (Van Arkadie 1995; King 1996). Informal activities are “small-scale, low-technology manufacturing, small scale wholesale trading, and informal service provision, for basic needs and daily life” (Myers 2005:5). In addition, “land is purchased, transferred, developed, houses are built, commodities produced and consumed, and garbage collected and disposed of outside of the purview of the state and often in technically illegal ways by nearly everyone in many of these cities” (Myers 2005:5). A striking example of this process is that sub-Saharan Africa’s informal squatter population has nearly doubled within the last 15 years, prompting the United Nations to claim that urbanization in Africa is “virtually synonymous with slum growth” (UNFPA 2007:16).

Instead of creating comprehensive urban policies to deal with rapid growth, Tostensen et al. (2001:7) noted that national governments have either “tacitly accepted the colonial legacy of urban containment, or embraced donor agencies’ sometimes ill founded warnings about ‘urban bias.’” Urban bias means a partiality against rural areas in favor of cities in development and aid moneys. Additionally, states have sought to regulate the proliferation of informal activities. In

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9 The current urban growth in Africa is 3.3 percent per annum, while Asia is growing 2.6 percent. In both regions, the urban population is just under 40 percent (UN Habitat 2006).
contrast to the informal sector, the formal city is composed of the urban government and its agents, institutions, rules, and regulations that have been put in place to control urban space and economic life (K. Hansen and Vaa 2004:8). There tends to be confrontation when authorities from the formal sector meet with those living and working informally.

For example, a survey conducted between 2003-2006 estimated that 1.97 million Africans had been forcibly evicted from their homes, most of these in urban areas (COHRE 2006). In terms of individual state action, the Egyptian state has sought to control and counteract urbanization in Cairo by denying permission for house building, slum-clearing, and relocating of wholesale markets (Fabos and Kibreab 2007:4). In Lusaka, the Zambian government conducted a massive crackdown on street vendors in the late 1990s and early 2000s (K. Hansen 2004). The operation went on for weeks, removing many thousands of street vendors from the downtown areas. Another major operation was carried out in March 2007 to demolish street vendor stalls and remove illegal housing throughout the city (Lusaka Times 2007).

As a group with restricted rights and privileges, refugees end up becoming part of other marginalized groups, such as migrants, unemployed, squatters and street children, and as such often encounter government actions against the informal sector. On a broader level, these groups tend to “challenge the notions of order, the modern city and urban governance espoused by Third World political elites” (Bayat 2004:41).

Facilitating Integration

A large and varied portion of Africa’s urban population is housed in unauthorized and unserviced settlements and increasing numbers find their livelihood in the informal economy. People continue to come to and remain in urban areas, despite failing services and inadequate local government structures, shortage of housing and jobs, severe environmental problems,
widespread poverty, and increasing inequalities. These difficulties and even the outward appearance of exclusion and marginalization experienced by refugees and migrants have not reduced the rate of urbanization. While state institutions are crucial frameworks to consider, they are not only contested by refugees, but by all urban residents (Polzer 2004:4).

Africa’s colonial and postcolonial cities have been the geographic sites where state power is most clear (Herbst 2000; Bratton 2006). However, an effective, centralized authority has rarely been evident. Most residents live in areas where there is only indirect or partial state influence. In control of the formal city, state power “rarely extends systematically beyond the central business districts, government bureaucracies, and wealthy residential suburbs” (Landau 2010b:176).

As the precarious situation of many states in Africa makes clear, the state does not have claims to autonomy or sole governance of urban spaces (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Neoliberal reforms and several decades of structural adjustment programs (SAP) have transformed urban space, affecting both the distribution of social groups and activities through specific cities in Africa and globally (Guyer et al. 2002; C. Mulenga 2001; Zeleza 1999). In order to give priority to market forces to promote growth and reshape political institutions, drastic cuts in public spending caused the collapse of government programs in social welfare provision. The state’s lack of finance and institutional capacity limits its relative autonomy.

Theorists of the African city have noted the layered intersections of different technologies of power, producing different spaces for political engagement and claims-making and different webs of inclusion and exclusion (Brodie 2000:111). The actual urban specificity depends on “the particularity of the social interactions which intersect at that location, and of what people make of them, in their interpretations and in their lives” (Massey 1994:117). Landau (2010a) raised an important question about what it means for migrants to become integrated into African cities.
These cities are not necessarily characterized by strong social coherence but instead ethnic heterogeneity and economic disparity (Larkin 2004; Mbembe 2004; Simone 2004). It is not possible to assume that there is any longstanding, dominant host community and political order with identifiable values and institutions into which migrants become integrated (Landau 2010b).

Urban settings pose dramatic challenges for survival, yet also offer ways of hiding illegality and social insecurity and creating alternate forms of belonging. The illegality of refugees “can prevent capture by the state enabling a kind of invisibility that, though dangerous, allows them to elude obligations and, occasionally, exploit the state for resources to which they are not legally entitled” (Landau 2010a:179).

Equally important is the realization that the state is not a monolithic entity. The agencies making up the public institutions of governance remain heterogeneous in their orientation, pursuing different goals. Evans (2002:20) pointed out “within any jurisdiction and often cutting across them, agencies are divided by sector and function and have competing responsibilities and interests. The role of the state is really a variety of roles, often played out in contradictory ways” (Evans 2002:20). While the presence and effects of the state can be found in public discourse (Gupta 1995; Mbembe 2001), in practice the state is a highly fragmented and contested conglomeration of individuals and institutions (Li 1999; Nugent 1994).

As a counterweight to the view of a coherent “seeing” state (Scott 1998), a number of scholars have started to examine the everyday workings of state bureaucratic institutions (Hoag 2011; Sandvik 2011). Veena Das’s (2004) work has examined the experiences of migrants and other displaced persons who must evade or seek out the protection, sanction, or services of government functionaries, who have ulterior motives and discretionary power. Hoag’s (2011) ethnography of the Immigration Services Branch of the South African Department of Home
Affairs found that the perceptions and practices of officials were highly consequential in the public’s access to the legal protections afforded by Home Affairs-issued documents. The result of tensions between upper and lower management and mistrust of the public by officials led to “a commoditization of legal status, a systematization of disorder and corruption, and the preclusion of Departmental reform” (Hoag 2011:20). On one hand, this can lead to the systemic harassment and abuse by authorities as discussed above. Alternatively it creates a site of negotiation and a means to facilitate integration, despite a negative policy environment.

This dissertation focuses on actual interactions between individuals and state representatives, relying on the assumption that the state is not a coherent entity. Thus, it will take an actor-oriented approach that views integration as a function of local relationships. Through applying Giddon’s concept of structuration to migration (Richmond 1993), the notion that refugees are social actors who have the capacity to process social experiences and devise ways of coping with life has become more prominent in refugee research. Giddens (1984:173) pointed out that social structures not only constrain behavior and peoples’ social lives, but also enable action. While he argued that the constitution of social structures cannot be understood without allowing for human agency, he viewed agency as embedded within institutional structures and processes (Giddens 1984:11).

This leaves important questions about the relationships between state and local actors and the strategies used by refugees to negotiate those relationships. Under what conditions is the integration of refugee likely? What does integration look like in the context of Lusaka?

Challenges to Integration: The Case of Lusaka, Zambia

In late 1999, I first met refugees living in Lusaka, Zambia at the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Urban Refugee Peace Centre. The Peace Centre was first established in 1997 to serve the
growing numbers of refugees residing in Lusaka and provide a community center of sorts, offering language and vocational courses, support and advocacy services and a space to bring together both refugees and Zambians. I spent eight months there facilitating advanced English language discussion groups on topics of peace and conflict transformation, while collecting refugee stories and poems for a quarterly newsletter to distribute to churches and organizations working with the refugee community. As our small groups of 10 to 15 refugees discussed concepts like conflict, justice, and power in a tiny classroom twice a week, concern and insecurity was growing among the approximately 15,000 refugees living in Lusaka.

Zambia had a long tradition of hosting individuals who had fled political and civil strife in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement located in Western Province and established two years after Zambia gained its independence from Great Britain in 1966, is the oldest refugee settlement in Africa. The government responded to the independence struggles and wars of liberation of its neighbors with generous refugee provisions, setting a positive example for the rest of the region (Crisp 2000:161). The emerging state granted immediate refugee status to the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, establishing safe refugee camps and settlements and allowing some local integration, particularly along the Angolan border.

As the refugee burden increased in magnitude and complexity in the 1990s, there was a shift in attitudes and policies towards refugees, including less openness and more suspicion and restriction (Rutinwa 2002:1). Civil wars in neighboring DRC and Angola predominantly contributed to the peak of refugee hosting in 2001 with more than 300,000 refugees living in camps and settlements and self-settled in Zambia’s rural areas and cities. Thousands of additional refugees arrived from Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Uganda. In response to this
influx, Zambia decided to place stricter limits on the rights and freedoms of refugees residing within its borders.

Zambia’s government also began to focus on controlling refugees outside of camps and settlements, specifically, in urban areas, by enforcing restrictions on movement and right to work.10 The number of refugees living in Lusaka grew significantly in the 1990s, but had been tolerated as many of them previously resided in urban areas in their country of origin and had promise of legal employment as professionals or businessmen and women. This led many to settle themselves and their families in Lusaka, establish small businesses, and marry Zambian citizens. In 1999, with the help of UNHCR, the Zambian government declared that it would register all urban refugees. Those who met the strict new requirements would receive a new urban residency card and permission to stay in Lusaka for at least three years, subject to renewal.

Anti-foreigner and anti-refugee sentiment became increasingly part of the Zambian political discourse. Refugees were feeling pressure from Immigration officers, in the form of arrest and harassment in markets and neighborhoods around Lusaka. While UNHCR claimed that the registration and new identification cards would aid in the protection of refugees, only 4,000 out of the approximately 15,000 refugees living in Lusaka were finally given permission to live in urban areas. This was followed by concentrated efforts by Zambia’s Department of Immigration to push refugees back to settlements. Many families were suddenly uprooted and taken to a refugee settlement, forcing them to leave their homes and personal possessions. Others were imprisoned in one of Lusaka’s life threatening jails with convicted criminals, sometimes waiting years for transport to camps or to be deported.

10 While Zambia is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol of 1967, many of the provisions guaranteed under the Convention are not addressed in the Zambian 1970 Refugee (Control) Act and the Convention is not explicitly adopted by the legislation. Zambia’s reservations to the Geneva Convention include refugees’ rights to employment, education, and freedom of movement.
I left Zambia in October 2000 in the midst of this insecurity. When I returned seven years later to conduct 12 months of ethnographic research with the refugee population, instead of finding a significant reduction in the number of refugees in Lusaka, there were some 10,000 refugees living in Lusaka illegally with an additional 5,000 who were legally allowed there (UNHCR 2007c). Legal restrictions on refugees’ opportunities to work, hold property, move freely, and even gain Zambian citizenship for themselves and their children remained. Yet rather than pushing individuals to leave, these limitations, fears of arrest and deportation, and experiences of xenophobia were not significant barriers to remaining in the city.

The situation in Lusaka presents a paradox. On the one hand, the Zambian government has instituted and claims to implement a policy that discourages the long-term integration of refugees into the nation. Repatriation has been prioritized as the preferred solution for refugees in Zambia. On the other hand, refugees themselves assert the right to remain by simply remaining. The choice of local integration is carried out through a variety of strategies to create a sense of belonging in Zambian society. This dissertation will look at the extent to which such strategies have been successful. It will examine the nature of refugee integration in Lusaka and its legal, economic and social forms. By drawing out the contradictions in Zambian policy and how it is practiced, this dissertation will examine why individuals still come to Lusaka despite the barriers to integration put in place.

Chapter Overview

To situate this research, Chapter 2 explores Lusaka as the site of study, providing a brief historical description of its spatial layout and the nature of informality in the city. Understanding these aspects is key to recognizing how refugees are able to use urban space, often in spite of legal restrictions. Urban refugees in this context are dispersed, unmanaged and semi-clandestine,
which makes identification and study particularly challenging. Chapter 3 discusses my data collection methods, study population, and the impact of my research choices, specifically the use of research assistants, issues with translation, and the influence of my own position on the research process. The chapter ends with a basic profile of the urban refugee population examined in this research.

The remaining four chapters cover two issues: Chapters 4 and 5 consider barriers to integration and Chapters 6 and 7 examine the structures that facilitate integration. Chapter 4 focuses on the history of refugee hosting in Zambia to understand the evolution of policies and practices toward urban refugees and the legal and political frameworks that structure the type of integration available to refugees. Part of this discussion is the dramatic economic challenges and political changes faced by Zambia and the role of UNHCR in defining policy and practice towards refugees.

Zambia’s policies towards refugees, which limit local integration, are put into practice through representatives of the state. Refugees must negotiate with Department of Immigration officials and representatives of the Zambian Commissioner for Refugees (COR) to challenge the limits placed on freedom of movement and the right to seek employment or engage in income-generating activities. Chapter 5 explores the arrival of refugees into Lusaka and limited capacity of state institutions to control that arrival, followed by enforcement efforts of state agents and how urban refugees have learned to negotiate, counteract, or avoid those efforts and stay in Lusaka.

Chapter 6 considers what structures exist to help remove the barriers to integration. A number of national and international organizations work on refugees issues in Lusaka, including UNHCR, the Zambian Red Cross, JRS and the Peace Centre, and various churches, church
leaders and religious organizations. This chapter considers the success of supporting individual refugees and challenging national policy and rhetoric to provide a more welcoming environment and shift the discourses around urban refugees. The final section considers how refugees themselves have advocated for their continued presence in Lusaka and various rights.

The final data chapter explores levels of economic and social integration in this context. The lived, everyday experiences of refugees as part of the local community define forms of integration even within a hostile national environment. By comparing refugees and Zambians, I assess livelihoods and standards of living; access to housing, markets and social services; levels of conflict and discrimination; and levels of social and cultural connection. The last section of Chapter 7 examines the specific conflicts and connections that exist between refugees and the host population. The purpose of this chapter is to fully evaluate the legal, social and economic components of local integration and the extent to which integration is possible for refugees in Lusaka.

In conclusion, Chapter 8 revisits the characteristics of refugee integration and broadly considers what is possible and available to refugees in Lusaka. This discussion is followed by recent developments in Zambia regarding the policies of integration for long-staying refugees. From this vantage point, I draw out broad critiques of current protection models for urban refugees in Zambia and highlight concerns about their future.
I walked down a wide ungraded dirt road in George compound, one of the informal, low-income settlements in the city. My refugee companion ruefully noted the remnants of asphalt on its undulating surface stating, “when Kaunda was president all of these roads were paved.” This reflected a common sentiment about Zambia’s decline. Its prosperity in the first ten years of independence during the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda contrasted sharply with its more recent severe economic downturn, leaving Lusaka a dilapidated version of its earlier years. Zambia is one of the least developed countries in Africa,\(^{11}\) with approximately 64 percent of the population living below the international poverty line in 2006 (CSO 2011). Yet since its independence in 1964, Zambia has also became one of the most urbanized countries in southern Africa with over 40 percent of its population living in urban areas.\(^{12}\) Lusaka, centrally located and easily accessible from all parts of the country, accounts for 32 percent of the total urban population (UN Habitat 2007:6). The city has drawn migrants from Zambia’s vast, sparsely populated rural areas and other urban centers with opportunities for work, education, health care, housing, clean water, and sanitation, as well as transportation. Similarly, refugees have sought a better standard of living in the city than what they experienced in rural areas.

Urban space is not neutral background against which social life unfolds. It is actively implicated in “creating context-dependent meanings, constituting physical, social, and moral frames that condition” residents’ opportunities and restrictions (Valentin et al. 2007:37). This

\(^{11}\) Zambia is one of the 48 countries designated by the United Nations as “least developed countries.” This is based on three criteria: per capita income, human assets, and economic vulnerability (UNCTAD 2012).

\(^{12}\) See Chapter 4 for further exploration into the historical causes of urbanization in Zambia.
chapter first examines the colonial and post-colonial development of the spatial outline of the city. The legacy of Lusaka’s colonial-built environment is still visible today (K. Hansen 1997:13). Second, it discusses the extensive squatting and informal-sector developments in Lusaka and their impact on urban residents. Understanding the spatial landscape and informality is key to recognizing how refugees are able to use urban space, often in spite of legal restrictions.

History of Lusaka: The Spatial Layout

In 1905 a railway made its way from Livingstone to Broken Hill, now Kabwe, the location of lead and zinc deposits and the largest mine in the surrounding areas. As it approached the small village known as Lusaka, the railway engineer decided to build a siding, a short sidetrack to store, load or unload vehicles (Kay 1967:109). As the area developed slowly into a commercial and service center for the surrounding area, it became an official township known as Lusaka. The town name was reference to the African society that was part of the town’s early life, particularly the large number of African men in employment (K. Hansen 1997:23). Lusaka (Figure 1) might have remained a small railway stop if the Northern Rhodesia colonial government had not chosen it to be the site of the new capital city in 1935 (Myers 2005:105). It was hardly a suitable site for the future capital with an overabundance of water during the rainy season and the lack of readily available water during the dry season. Despite complaints about flooding and the resulting health hazards, Lusaka was chosen due its relatively central location and proximity to major roads (Kay 1967:109-112). Known more for maize and beef production rather than minerals, Lusaka, as the capital, could also remain independent from the powerful mining companies.

Chapter 4 will go into more detail about the political and economic context of these changes.
The 1930s planning of Lusaka was inspired by the British garden-city vision of interconnected neighborhoods and communities laid out with wide-open spaces adorned with greenery. It had large building plots for European residences and businesses (Gough 2008:246). Lusaka’s planning did not question the prevailing social order and the assumption that Europeans and Africans would require separation and differential treatment. The European residences were divided into three subzones that varied in aesthetic appeal and housed different income groups (K. Hansen 1982:120). Plans for African housing in the new capital were added as an afterthought and were placed out of sight from the town center, at the extreme southwest corner of the city (Figure 2). However, the planners’ efforts to restrict African settlement to one area were unrealistic as the population grew.
Figure 2. Land Use Within and Around Lusaka, 1963 (Source: Kay 1967:116)
Africans lived in a variety of settlements both inside and outside of official locations. Such residential areas were then, as they are still today, called compounds, which reflected racially segregated housing tied to employment. The majority of Lusaka’s population, namely its African residents, was either tucked away in compounds or living in residential areas as domestic servants on their employers’ premises. The first planned African township, Kabwata, was copied after the African compounds in Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia (Thogersen and Anderson 1983:32-33). It consisted of round one-room brick huts without windows, surrounded by small garden plots. Cooking took place outdoors, and there were communal bathing and sanitation facilities (K. Hansen 1997:24).

The colonial government in Northern Rhodesia viewed African workers living in towns as temporary residents for a long time. However it did not have the resources to repatriate men who remained in cities once they completed work contracts or to send back women and children who arrived to join them. Thus, from the earliest years of Lusaka’s existence, the number of unauthorized dwellings grew exponentially to accommodate these unauthorized residents. There were areas where European and Indian landlords let Africans build in return for a monthly fee and other areas where Africans began building without permission on European-occupied land. These both became known as squatter compounds (K. Hansen 1997:28). The authorities mostly tolerated the squatter compounds because Lusaka never had sufficient housing stock for its rapidly growing African population. Of all towns in Northern Rhodesia, Lusaka experienced the greatest proliferation of unauthorized compounds (Martin 1974:74). Table 1 shows the rapid growth of African and European populations in Lusaka. However, urban census numbers only counted African men in employment and not the numbers of African women or children also living in Lusaka.
Table 1. African and European Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of European Residents</th>
<th>Number of African Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4,656</td>
<td>14,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>9,449</td>
<td>22,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>11,810</td>
<td>24,942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kay 1967:118

In 1963 one out of five Northern Rhodesian Africans lived in urban areas, and the population of towns was growing more rapidly than that of the country as a whole (Kay 1967:109). During World War II, the construction of Old Chilenje and Kanyama residential areas began in Lusaka, after the passage of a housing ordinance granted African workers urban residency and a house if they were married. The building of the new suburbs, New Chilenje in 1950 and Matero in 1951, followed (K. Hansen 1982:123). These new suburbs included schools, churches, welfare halls, recreational facilities, beer halls, and stores. The formal inclusion of the African population not only gave them a stake in the city, but also began to challenge Lusaka’s original plans as a solely European and administrative center.

Compared to Copperbelt towns,14 Lusaka’s African population was always more ethnically heterogeneous, including persons from nearly all of Zambia’s more than seventy ethnic groups, as well as nonlocal Africans. The completion of the Great East Road in the late 1920s facilitated this diversity by providing a major conveyor of rural-urban interaction (Hobson 1979:131).

Independence in 1964 triggered substantial growth in all of Zambia’s urban areas, most spectacularly in Lusaka, the new nation’s capital. As political and administrative center of

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14 The Copperbelt, a mining area, was historically the economic heartland of Zambia. Main towns in the area are Kitwe, Ndola, Chingola, Luanshya, and Mufulira.

Migrants from the Eastern Province, comprising 36 percent of all migrants in Lusaka in both 1969 and 1980, constitute the largest proportion of persons not born in Lusaka’s urban district (K. Hansen 1997:50). Migrants from the Copperbelt Province increased as a proportion of Lusaka’s migrants from 7.6 percent in 1969 to 12 percent in 1980 (Wood 1989:167). International migrants, principally from other countries in Africa—especially Zimbabwe and Malawi—grew numerically, yet decreased proportionally from 16 percent to seven percent of Lusaka’s total population between 1969 and 1980 (K. Hansen 1997:50). In terms of the non-African population, the largest group of migrants originated from the United Kingdom, followed by a longtime resident population from the Indian subcontinent, many of whom were involved in trade and commerce (Wood 1989).

Upon independence in 1964, Lusaka faced a severe housing shortage, especially for the population with limited economic means. The colonial labels for Lusaka’s built environment were changed from first, second and third class to low, medium and high-density. While this change in terminology erased the former racial labels, it still contained a considerable degree of separation, only now in socioeconomic terms (Kay 1967:188-32). Lusaka remained a divided
city, even though the divide was more of a jigsaw puzzle of disparity between the rich and poor (Myers 2005:107). There was a direct link between income levels and population density; often terms of high-density and low-income were used interchangeably. The colonial period’s attempt to link housing with employment had only led to a growth in the informal employment sector and shortages in medium- and low-cost housing. While employment opportunities initially kept pace with the population growth, housing did not, which lead to the proliferation of squatter settlements (K. Hansen 1997:53).

Bettison (1959:91-94), in his survey of Lusaka’s African residential areas in the last half of the 1950s, noted that the majority of workers earned too little to afford to pay rent, let alone buy their own houses. Two developments in low-income housing, aimed at harnessing the ability of squatters to house themselves, took place during the 1960s and 1970s in an effort to meet the rapidly increasing housing needs. One was a policy of establishing low-cost, serviced plots on which people could construct houses within a set of established specifications. When this proved too costly, requiring higher and more stable incomes than most residents could afford, housing policy shifted toward upgrading squatter areas (K. Hansen 1997:53).

When Zambia became a one-party participatory democracy in 1972, the government and its parastatal companies faced pressing concerns resulting from an economic slowdown created by the decline of world market prices for copper and the oil crisis of the early 1970s. There was little money to finance development of any sort in cities. All rural and urban development projects, including the upgrading squatter settlements, became increasingly dependent on international grants and loans. As a result, Zambia’s foreign debt grew throughout the 1970s and afterward, and the upgrading process was riddled with problems. Many planned services, such as
clinics, primary schools, markets, and community centers, were not completed, and there were problems with the building of roads and the installation of water and sanitation (Government of Zambia 1981). The 1980s and 1990s saw no development of a clear national housing policy, and apart from political exhortations, no steps were taken to confront the increasing need for urban housing for the growing low-income population (Mulwanda and Mutale 1994).

Meanwhile, housing access became increasingly skewed. Housing subsidies increased as a proportion of income for the relatively wealthy urban Zambians who resided in high-cost employer-provided housing. By contrast, low-income urban households received rental allowances that were barely sufficient to pay for rents even in squatter settlements (Sanyal 1981:436). Eviction and demolition continued to take place, particularly as space was cleared for commercial and industrial developments (Weekly Post 1992). Recent years have seen investment in retail activities by both South African and local capital resulting in construction of two shopping centers, Manda Hill and Arcades. This investment contributed to a further reconfiguring of Lusaka’s spatial layout as small-scale trade and services were being pushed farther to the periphery in order to make space for new shopping malls and stores (K. Hansen 2005:8).

The imprint of colonial planning on Lusaka is still evident in the physical layout and built environment. However, income, rather than race differentiates residential areas and the kinds of service provision and infrastructure residents enjoy. Land-use activities were and are rigidly zoned with informal settlements rarely tolerated in the city center. This resulted in increasing sprawl and has made the location of markets and availability of transportation critical to the daily survival of Lusaka’s residents (K. Hansen 2005:6).
Life in the Compounds and Informality

With a population of almost 1.3 million in an area of 360 square kilometers, Lusaka is fairly spread out, but population density in some areas of the city can reach 1,500 people per hectare (UN Habitat 2007:9). There are about 37 informal settlements within the city, including Kanyama, George, Chawama, and Mandevu where much of this research took place (Figure 3). Most of these have been regularized as “Improvement Areas” by the city government. Although development plans have been approved, the settlements are still largely characterized by insecure land tenure, inadequate shelter and lack of services (UN Habitat 2007:25). By contrast, neighborhoods such as Kabulonga house some of Zambia’s wealthiest citizens, as well as many expatriates and offices of international organizations, such as UNHCR, in expensive homes with tall walls and 24-hour security. After independence, the government built housing in areas such as Kamwala, Kabwata, Libala, and Chilenge South to house middle- to lower middle-income households, but with the economic downturn and inability to reinvest in infrastructure, these medium density townships have since deteriorated (Taylor 2006:72).
Figure 3. Map of Lusaka Showing Study Key Locations and Density of Residential Areas
While ten percent of housing is formal housing, such as individual homes and apartment flats, the remaining 90 percent is informal housing or squatter units (World Bank 2002:8). These units usually consist of concrete block walls and corrugated iron or asbestos sheet roofs, often made of sub-standard materials. Compounds are largely lacking in public services, such as water, electricity and waste management, and their inhabitants are more vulnerable to diseases, including tuberculosis, due to overcrowding. The rainy season often brings flooding and new outbreaks of cholera and impassable roads (World Bank 2002:9; K. Hansen 2002:85; UN Habitat 2007:14). Many communities shared pit latrines and communal water taps (Taylor 2006:73).

Accompanying these settlements is an active, large-scale urban informal economy. On one hand, the north-south Cairo Road runs through Lusaka’s principal business, retail and services center. A wide tree-lined avenue, its name is a reminder of Zambia’s colonial past and Cecil Rhodes’s grand plan to link the British colonies in Africa from the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt. Well-dressed professionals hurry between high-rise buildings housing Barclays Bank, Zambian National Building Society Headquarters, and Findeco House, Lusaka tallest building at 25 floors, which leases office and retail space. South African fast food places, such as Pizza Inn, Nando’s Chicken Inn, and Creamy Inn, line the street. Several streets west of Cairo Road runs Lumumba Road, a broad, four-lane street lined with warehouses and wholesale stores. Along this road a bustle of activity converges in front of the New City Market, a modern, huge one-roof marketplace built by the Lusaka City Council (LCC) to replace the old Soweto market of ramshackle stalls.

However, small scale traders and marketers set up great piles of used clothing and stacks of vegetables to sell in the median as people, minibuses, and taxis gridlock at the intersection into City Market’s bus station—even though they are often run off by the LCC. Although illegal,
the old Soweto Market reemerged behind the new market and grew to massive proportions, a maze of stalls often flooded in the rainy season. Lined with small shops and taxis waiting for passengers, the road down the left side of City Market passes through old Soweto market and onto Chibolya and Kanyama compounds. Pedestrians, bicycles, and wheelbarrows hauling luggage from incoming travelers or goods to be resold in the compounds, weave their way through honking minibuses.

In addition to these large-scale informal markets, smaller markets and stands line the dirt roads further inside the compounds, selling necessities like oil, beans, *kapenta* (small dried fish) or meali-meal, the ground corn staple, in small quantities. Small makeshift market stalls crafted out of wood and plastic are called *ntembas* and reflect what K. Hansen (2010:14) considered the “ongoing struggles over access to, use of, and control of trading spaces.” Small-scale traders and marketers throughout the city center and the townships widely ignore existing legal regulations, which were put in place to control the location and type of economic activities in the city (K. Hansen 2004:63).

A total of 69 percent of Lusaka’s population works in the informal sector (World Bank 2007:81; CSO 2007:46). Informality connotes subsistence and economic activities that are not protected by law and formal contracts. Zambians work in a variety of informal activities ranging from producing and selling building materials, to trading petty commodities, farming, and renting out houses or rooms. Housing-related activities provide jobs to many: unskilled workers produce crushed stones, sand and bricks, while skilled artisans manufacture fittings such as door and window frames, and offer services in plumbing, electrical work or carpentry. Most people working in the informal sector combine several activities, including the cultivation of undeveloped urban or peri-urban land to supplement their incomes and food intake (World Bank 2007:82).

The LCC, as well as the central government, has struggled to control the expanding city with a “legal framework for urban development that was designed to contain settlement rather than deal with rapid growth” (K. Hansen and Vaa 2004:9). Often the streets are cleared of street
vendors and illegal marketers. For example, in mid-2007, Freedom Way, which runs parallel to Cairo Road, was cleared of street vendors who were accused of worsening traffic congestion and street littering. Later in 2008, 400 makeshift stalls in the Town Centre Market just off Freedom Way were razed by the LCC without warning and without offering alternative space (Times of Zambia 2008). Similar crackdowns have extended to illegal shanty compounds in Lusaka even though they have been in existence for decades (Resnick 2010).

From Lusaka’s earliest days, African residents developed work and housing initiatives to provide the goods and services the colonial and post-colonial government did not supply (K. Hansen 1997:34). Much like the way that colonial statutes guided the placement and type of economic activity Africans could pursue, post-colonial regulation of markets, trade licensing, town and country planning, and public health restricted trading and small-scale manufacturing to designated market places (Mulwila and Turner 1982). However, informalization continued after independence and even gained momentum through the move to multi-party democracy and economic liberalization. Small-scale traders and marketers throughout the city center and the townships widely ignored these regulations. Although they were chased away from city streets occasionally, traders usually returned.

For refugees, this created space to access housing and find means for income generation without needing to engage formal structures. Alternatively, as the state continued to try to regulate and control parts of the city, these spaces were not entirely beyond the reach of local authority (discussed in Chapter 5), which shapes the location of refugees in the city. The next chapter delves into the many challenges created by researching refugees in this context, as well as beginning to construct a profile of refugees living in Lusaka.
CHAPTER 3

FINDING REFUGEES IN LUSAKA: RESEARCH METHODS

On an average day, I drove my rented white 1991 Toyota Corolla with purple seat covers between the high walls that surrounded the Peace Centre and a large warehouse. Lawrence, a refugee from DRC, shouted from his little tailoring shop near the entrance “Rebecca, my sweet, come and greet me!” He and several other refugees ran the small tailoring business, occasionally participating in the Peace Centre’s vocational trainings offered to interested refugees and Zambians. People milled around the large rectangular hut that served as a restaurant. Various refugee women alternated cooking, generating income for themselves and paying a small rental fee to the Peace Centre for use of the space. Joy, who was working, worriedly stopped and asked me if I thought her daughter was okay. We had recently found a small Catholic home for disabled children where her young daughter, born with severe cerebral palsy, could live. In the mornings I sat in a small office, chatting with Peace Centre staff and refugees participating in classes and meeting with refugees seeking advice about legal issues. I spent the afternoons in the compounds visiting refugee homes with one refugee and one Zambian staff member from the Zambian Red Cross Urban Refugee Project. Sitting on the small stools in the doorsteps of small concrete homes, meeting children and grandchildren as they were called from their play, seeing neighbors stop by to borrow meali-meal, and hearing stories of flight and loss provided insight into refugee daily life.

Even with the support of the Peace Centre and the Red Cross, conducting research in an urban location and with a semi-clandestine population produced a number of challenges. This chapter outlines these challenges in detail and discusses my data collection methods and strategies to counteract the realities of studying a population that is often characterized as “hidden,” “invisible” and “forgotten” (HRW 2002; Landau 2004; Marfleet 2007). Part of this
discussion includes the impact of my research choices, such as working at the Peace Centre and with Red Cross staff and how my use of research assistants, issues with translation, and my own position influenced the research process and findings. This chapter ends with a profile of the refugee population involved in this study, on which the findings are based.

Research Challenges

Refugees arrived in Lusaka, from camps within Zambia or from directly across the border, searching for employment, educational opportunities, higher standards of living and, for some, security not found in rural refugees settlement settings. Lusaka had been a destination for refugees ever since Zambia began hosting them shortly after its independence in 1964. Some of the earliest refugees to the city were freedom fighters from South Africa and Zimbabwe, while others were from Mayukwayukwa, Africa’s first refugee settlement founded in 1966, in rural Western Province (Pitterman 1984:43-44). Refugees settled in compounds across Lusaka, accessing the same markets and social services available to the average Zambian, often with limited support provided by the UNHCR. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

Refugees in urban locations make for a difficult research setting and have remained largely understudied (UNHCR 2009b). As Jacobsen and Landau (2003:9) pointed out, the “existing research is sparse and unsystematic in design,” largely due to the distinct challenges that exist in conducting research among this population, specifically in collecting representative data. Research questions and findings have naturally been skewed towards refugees who are easily identifiable and usually less integrated (Meyer 2008:3). Refugees in camps and settlements are often carefully monitored; as A. Hansen (2001b:xi) noted, “their identity and location are known. They live in locations that are supervised and managed by the national
government or by international organizations.” For example, Meheba refugee settlement is located in the North-Western Province of Zambia on 278 square miles of farmland. It is divided into 8 blocks from A to H and into villages with clusters of different national or ethnic groups interspersed by unused bushland. Most large-scale survey data, usually on public health or nutritional issues, are collected in these easily quantifiable settings (Jacobsen and Landau 2003:9).

By contrast, urban refugees are usually dispersed and unmanaged in cities, resulting in very little information from states, agencies, or researchers. In Lusaka, only around 5,000 refugees had formal permission to live there in 2007; for them basic data on individual backgrounds and households were available. However, UNHCR recently acknowledged that some 10,000 additional refugees were likely to be living in the city illegally (UNHCR 2007c). This number is at least partially derived from the last count of urban refugees in 2002 before the instigation of restrictions on urban residency, making estimates since that time mostly speculative.

The director of the Zambian Red Cross Urban Refugee Project, UNHCR’s implementing partner, confirmed that there were probably 15,000 refugees living in Lusaka, based on his many years working directly with the refugee population. However, several refugees actively engaging with UNHCR and various refugee committees claimed that the Zambian government had been artificially inflating these numbers to supply an excuse for not providing more assistance to urban refugees. Edward, an outspoken refugee leader, asserted there were no more than 1,000 refugees illegally living in Lusaka. From my own research, 1,000 was an unrealistically low estimate. Considering the both the size of Lusaka and the ability of many refugees to remain
anonymous, I believe 15,000 was a more reasonable number. However, the lack of refugee registration and census numbers make the size and distribution of this population impossible to determine.

Additionally urban refugees often preferred to keep a low profile to avoid attracting the attention of the state authorities or even their neighbors. While the Zambian Red Cross Urban Refugee Project did outreach with four posts in Kanyama, George, Chawama, and Mandevu compounds, the organization covered only a portion of the city, and those who desired to remain hidden could be easily avoid outreach staff. While known refugees and NGOs might have been able to provide guidance to the location and numbers of people in a given area, these were still general estimates.

Both displaced people and the urban host populations among whom they have settled often faced similar challenges in confronting health, crime and poverty problems, and accessing social services (Landau 2004; Pantuliano et al. 2012). These day-to-day problems increased the challenges of locating urban refugees; not only were many urban refugees swallowed up by the densely populated areas hosting them, but insecure living conditions and anti-foreigner sentiment within the compounds made identifying refugees and household units even more difficult. Additionally, households were often fluid in size and composition with multiple families or individuals sharing a residence. This compact living arrangement made speaking to individuals alone and creating a space for openness complicated. Refugees with serious security concerns actively sought anonymity, which made discovering their histories and stories nearly impossible.

People with diverse backgrounds and concerns sought refuge in towns and cities for equally diverse reasons. Exploring different ethnic or national groups posed methodological issues and necessitated recognizing multiple communities, languages, cultural norms, and
political pressures, all of which may affect respondents’ willingness to be interviewed (Landau 2004:14). Congolese refugees were the most visible in Lusaka and were considered the largest group. However, other refugees from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and Sudan also came to the city at various points in time and for a number of reasons. Equal variability existed in terms of ethnic groups, gender, age, and socioeconomic status.

An additional challenge exists in that a wide range of displaced people in urban settings may not have legal refugee status, a population that includes those denied status, prima facie refugees and so on (Jacobsen and Nichols 2011:10).\textsuperscript{15} Migrants, who have come by choice from refugee-producing countries, as well as those who could apply for refugee status but do not, further blur definitional boundaries. In Zambia, even legally recognized refugees may not have proper documentation to “prove” their position; this is particularly true for those living in Lusaka without government permission. In this context, the study population can be characterized by a more expansive definition including all persons coming from a refugee producing country or a more narrow legal definition including only those classified by state institutions. For the purposes of this research, the study population included only persons who identified themselves as refugees.

As Polzer points out, the very real methodological and practical challenges posed by self-settled refugees “should not be an excuse for ignoring a theoretically important population” (2008:494). The very embeddedness of refugees living in Lusaka and the difficulties and variability it produced provided the opportunity to examine the nature of integration and its various forms.

\textsuperscript{15} Large groups who enter a host country en masse are often given prima facie refugee status collectively based on their nationality, rather than having to undergo individual status determination. In Zambia this has been used in cases of mass influxes from Angola and DRC.
How to Find Refugees in the City

Considering the difficulties in identifying and accessing self-settled urban refugee communities, I began my research by utilizing the two main NGOs working with urban refugees in Lusaka: the Zambian Red Cross Urban Refugee Project and the Urban Refugee Peace Centre (See Figure 3 above). The Red Cross Refugee Centre was located in Kamwala, a major commercial center in Lusaka at the south end of Cairo Road. Tucked behind the maze of market stalls, the tall crisp white walls with a closed brown gate accommodate a trim building. The guard opened the gate for incoming cars, which were usually UNHCR vehicles arriving to interview potential resettlement cases, and a small door allowed refugees to pass through to meet with the nurse or scholarship officer for primary school age children. As UNHCR’s implementing partner, the Red Cross Urban Refugee Project focused on “the efforts of the urban refugees to attain self-sufficiency and to realize their local integration in the medium-term” (UNHCR 2006b). Since there was no possibility for naturalization of refugees in Zambia, UNHCR emphasized integration as a protection mechanism, but not as a long-term durable solution.

The Red Cross also served four outreach centers based in Kanyama, George, Chawama, and Mandevu compounds. These were one-room centers staffed by two Zambians and two refugees. Since many refugees were hiding among the local population, the outreach centers, located in small rooms of churches or schools, were easy to visit and accessible. A nurse went to the centers regularly to administer first aid and would send serious cases to the University Teaching Hospital. The staff members performed home visits, learned where particularly vulnerable refugees were living, and passed on that information to protection officers at UNCHR.
UNHCR’s express policy was to not go against the Zambian Government by directly or indirectly encouraging refugees to stay in urban areas without appropriate permits. In 2006, UNHCR instructed the Red Cross to serve only those with an urban residency card, limiting the organization’s official service to only 5,000 refugees in the city (Table 2). However, the outreach staff had intimate knowledge of the refugee population, often assisting refugees without electronic cards when they could (see Chapter 6). About 250 families were registered at each center with an average of six individuals per family. The four centers had identified a total of 362 individuals as very vulnerable. Most had no residency card and many were without any type of documentation.

Table 2. Refugees Served by the Zambian Red Cross Refugee Project in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>1,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-59</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>3,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and &lt;</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>5,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Urban Refugee Peace Centre served a different purpose for refugees in Lusaka. The JRS originally established the Peace Centre in 1997 to respond to the growing needs of the refugee population in Lusaka. Its role was to empower refugees to meet their material, intellectual, social, and spiritual needs and to promote a culture of hospitality among the local population. The Peace Centre staff, of both refugees and Zambians, offered language and training courses for refugees, as well as scholarships, pastoral activity, advocacy, and protection to foster self-sustainability and community (Table 3). To assist in the integration of refugees and the creation of social connections and networks in Lusaka, the Centre provided programs that allowed refugees and citizens to experience positive interaction.
Table 3. Peace Centre Activities in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Locals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English, French and Computer literacy classes</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring, Tie-Dye and Catering courses</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-credit and Business Counseling</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication, Information, Advocacy</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services/ Community Building: Clubs, sports, choir, church services, prayer groups</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Peace Centre was located off a side road, across from the large enclosed City Market, a major hub of activity in Lusaka. Near the wide-open brown gates, “Archdiocese of Lusaka Urban Refugee Peace Centre” was written in crisp large letters along the tall white washed cement wall. When JRS pulled out of Zambia in 2006, the archdiocese took over the project. A low building was situated against the far wall, full of classrooms and a large meeting and training room. A circular hut sat at the far end used as an open space to meet and socialize, but was also used for choir practices, refugee leader meetings, and Rwandan church services during the weekend. Behind the warehouse sat a tiny chapel with a thatched hut, filled with plastic chairs and benches and a small altar for weekly mass and special services. A door in the back of the warehouse led to the King’s Beat Studio, a recording studio that worked closely with the Centre on the Voices of Refugee Radio Programme and other activities. Near the gate sat a tiny tailoring shop and an open hut restaurant run by refugee women that served lunch to both Zambians and refugees.

While the Peace Centre served a smaller number of refugees than the Red Cross, it did not restrict access by documentation or even refugee status. However, the necessity for refugees to pay transport fees to reach the Peace Centre and to pay the minor costs for the classes indicated that the Peace Centre served a particular segment of the refugee population, more
likely those that were wealthier than most. Despite the limited number of refugees served by the Peace Centre, JRS nevertheless created an important foundation of coordination with local churches and religious leaders, particularly in regard to advocating for refugees in prison, advocating for better treatment by Immigration officers, and bringing positive attention to urban refugees. The multiple efforts through radio, newsletters, training materials, and coordination to reach a broad refugee and Zambian population were difficult to quantify, but provided an excellent foundation to network with those working with and interested in refugees issues.

While conducting my research, each of these organizations and their staff provided a knowledgeable entry into the lives of urban refugees living in Lusaka and important sources for contacts, translations, advice, insights, and research assistants. However there were also limitations. Jacobsen and Landau (2003:98) have complained that much of the current research in forced migration is methodologically unsound, particularly considering “representativeness, bias, causal inference and the shortage of statistically analyzable data.” Current qualitative research was just too localized and limited to truly critique or support policies and practices directed towards refugees (Jacobsen and Landau 2003:5). However, I agree with Rodgers’s (2004:48) contention that small-scale qualitative approaches are necessary for research conducted in the often-chaotic worlds of refugees, where neatly constructed surveys may miss defining features of the social experience. The realities in Lusaka did not make statically representative samples possible.

There has been equal criticism of the relatively common practice of conducting research through an NGO, which can lead to biased sampling (Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Bloch 2007). Bakewell (2008:433) further noted that a dependence on the “visible” refugee category may limit the possibilities for inquiry by “constraining the type of questions asked, the objects of study and
the methods and analysis adopted.” Integrated or non-vulnerable refugees were often invisible to institutions, academics, and within social contexts due to the ways they have been categorized (Polzer 2008). The refugees I interviewed and surveyed were identified from the approximately 6,000 – 7,000 individuals known by the Peace Centre and Red Cross only and not from the total 15,000 refugees rumored to be in Lusaka. This research sample thus immediately excluded refugees unknown to these organizations or at least unknown to their staff, eliminating perhaps the most interesting individuals in the study of integration. Reliance on my research assistants and some self-selection, discussed below, further shaped my access even within this sample. It is worth acknowledging that my association with these NGOs framed my interactions with individuals from the outset. However, the use of multiple NGOs provided the most logical and realistic entry into lives of refugees within the context of Lusaka and the time and resource limits of my research.

My own fieldwork utilized a combination of methods, including interviews, focus groups, surveys, and participant observation, as well as published and unpublished archival and current documents. These were carried out using various techniques to mitigate bias in sampling and responses, but also to connect to the everyday lives of refugees. For example, I used the NGOs in specific ways to gain access to different portions of the refugee population, intentionally ensuring variability in age, gender, nationality, and socioeconomic position, while providing an opportunity to compare and validate data. Ultimately, this research was based on people’s voices and their point of view, illustrating the sheer diversity of the ways that urban refugees were living in Lusaka.
Learning about Refugees

When I arrived in Lusaka at the end of 2006 to conduct my fieldwork, JRS was in the process of pulling out of Zambia to focus on higher crisis areas. The director of the Peace Centre was searching for new funders for the project. The arrangement being negotiated was that the Urban Refugee Peace Centre would fall under the auspices of the archdiocese and would be funded by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). As JRS prepared to leave and the new CRS project proposal was discussed, budgets were cut. Entering into this time of flux, I was given ample opportunity and flexibility to use the premises and resources for my own research.

Over time I also became an integral part of the Peace Centre. Spending time regularly at the Centre allowed me to get to know those refugees who came on a regular basis to read newspapers, meet friends, attend meetings, and use the computer lab. I often chatted with women taking cooking classes and with the leaders of the Lusaka Refugee Community Coordination and Congolese Refugee Association of Lusaka, who met regularly at the Peace Centre, as they aired grievances against Zambian policies. My position within the Peace Centre was often as an intermediary, assisting the director and spending most of my time with the Zambian and refugee staff, listening to their complaints, concerns, and advice. When budget cuts eliminated a vehicle, I let staff members borrow my car to deliver the sausages made by an income-generating group.16

In order to interact directly with those refugees who only came to the Centre for assistance, I revived the advocacy department, which had been absent since the previous advocacy officer had been let go due to budget cuts. I counseled refugees and asylum seekers on legal matters, assessed and advocated for detained individuals, networked with UNHCR and

16 The French Embassy had donated a sausage-making machine to the Peace Centre. A large group of refugees and Zambians, who helped get around the lack of work permits, began producing sausages and selling them to local stores.
other refugee stakeholders, and presented seminars on refugee and human rights issues. Working as an advocacy officer and having an office at the Peace Centre allowed me directly interact with refugees, meeting with them individually and attending group meetings and programs. Later, through my individual interviews with refugees in the field, I helped identify vulnerable individuals for emergency assistance and traveled with the Social Coordinator to distribute aid. Working closely with the Peace Centre was beneficial to my research in terms of access, but my position as an advocate certainly shaped how refugees presented themselves and their stories to me. Ultimately, I felt that my work with the Peace Centre would not significantly alter how refugees perceived me, particularly as white, female American doctoral student. The reality of my identity needed to be considered in my analysis and work, with the Peace Centre merely gave me sources of additional information and means to make my research immediately relevant.

I found myself assisting in writing the project proposal, attending meetings between JRS, the archdiocese, and CRS; conducting stakeholder meetings with refugees and key government and UNHCR officers; identifying ways to expand and improve the Peace Centre; and developing monitoring and evaluation tools. These actions also became part of my fieldwork by discussing, in various contexts, urban refugees issues and the struggles to meet their needs. The stakeholder meetings in particular illuminated major issues facing refugees and various perspectives on solutions.

My work with the Peace Centre greatly helped me in facilitating meetings with the major NGOs and individuals involved in refugee issues in Zambia (See Annex 1 for a relational chart and description of the major groups involved with urban refugees). I was able to approach individuals with a dual purpose, my own research and networking for the Peace Centre. I gathered a broad understanding of the refugee context, particularly in Lusaka, and created
important contacts and sources of information. I interviewed Zambian Red Cross staff, UNHCR protection officers and resettlement officers, representatives from other international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and the Red Cross/Red Crescent, Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) lawyers who understood current legal cases challenging Zambian refugee law, COR staff, and many church leaders. These interviews particularly addressed the legal context of refugees, the perspectives and actions of COR, and the contradictions between policy and practice. Alternatively, refugee advocates revealed their responses to and interaction with specific state actors and how they challenged state action. These interviews illuminated types of social services offered and how they interacted with or replaced public services and negotiations between refugee needs and state expectations.

Survey Data

After spending several months at the Peace Centre, I created a questionnaire to submit to refugees currently using the Centre. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gather data on fundamental aspects of integration, including how individuals participated in the local economy, their standard of living, and their experiences of inclusion and exclusion. An initial open-ended version was tested on nine individuals. After working on the details with the Peace Centre staff, the final version collected basic demographic and background information, particularly related to refugee status and documentation, and asked closed and open-ended questions regarding standard of living, economic viability, access to social services, social integration, and security concerns. The close-answered questions ensured a quick collection of quantitative data, and the smaller number of open-ended questions drew out opinions, priorities, and perceptions. The open-ended questions increased ethnographic detail and reduced the assumptions that I, as the researcher, would bring to analysis.
A total of 180 questionnaires were distributed to three English language classes, two computer classes, families applying for primary school scholarships for their children, and those using the Centre socially. Staff administered the survey after explaining to refugees that responses would be completely anonymous and have no bearing on resettlement possibilities, distribution of scholarships, or treatment at the Peace Centre. Individuals could choose an English or French version, which had been translated by one of the Congolese instructors. The majority of questionnaires were self-completed, but a small number were finished verbally with the assistance from the Social Coordinator due to lack of literacy. Given over the course of the month of July 2007, the questionnaire sample was a snapshot of Peace Centre participants (Table 4). I personally translated the responses from French and consolidated the final data.

Table 4. Questionnaire Sample by Sex and Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia/ Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Semi-Structured Interviews

My initial research plan was to use snowball sampling with my contacts at the Peace Centre to identify additional refugees for in-depth interviews and home visits. However it became apparent that this plan would limit the scope and diversity of my contacts within the
urban refugee population. As Jacobsen and Landau (2003:16) point out, snowball selection has a high chance of producing a biased sample, since it is drawn from a particular segment of the community.

Through the Red Cross outreach centers, I was able to access a different population, the majority of whom had never heard of the Peace Centre. This access created a broader cross section of urban refugees. I regularly visited the centers in four different outlying compounds: Kanyama, Chawama, George, and Mandavu. From there, I visited refugee homes in the surrounding areas, often extending into other compounds, with one refugee and one Zambian staff member. These staff, four Zambians and four refugees, acted as my guides, research assistants and translators, and often provided valuable insights, background information, and context.

I met with over 70 individuals of varying age, gender and nationality. After first conducting informal interviews in 17 homes in Kanyama and Chawama, I began more structured interviews that followed a basic interview guide, but also allowed for additional conversation and questions. I recorded 43 of these interviews for transcription and translation (Table 5). The purpose of these interviews was to 1) outline the history of refugees’ arrival to Zambia and the process of securing livelihoods; and 2) understand current struggles and social connections within Lusaka.

Table 5. Transcribed and Translated Refugee Interviews by Sex and Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While collected data revealed much about how refugees live in Lusaka, language differences often created significant difficulties in conducting the interviews. Unlike at the Peace Centre where many refugees knew English or French, we met with individuals who only spoke a language of their country of origin, such as Luanda or Swahili, and some Nyanja, the local Zambian language. By working with two translators, refugees could be asked and respond to questions in the language with which they were most comfortable. For example, my refugee assistant would translate the questions I asked into Luba, a local language from DRC, and translate the answers into Nyanja, which my Zambian assistant would translate back into English for me to record.

These multiple translations undoubtedly affected the quality and accuracy of responses. There were significant risks of intentional or unintentional mistranslation, summarizing, or editorializing by my assistants. As a way to address this concern and prepare to code interviews, an independent Zambian company translated and transcribed the recorded interviews. The company was only able to translate Nyanja, but considering that Nyanja was often the most common language between refugees and my research assistants, the translations became an excellent means to cross check my own field notes and fill in gaps.

There were a number of additional concerns associated with using local translators and agency staff, including concerns about confidentiality, security, and trust (Jacobsen and Landau 2003:8). Some refugees may mistrust the motives of researchers and be suspicious about how the information they provide will be used. These reservations can motivate refugees to portray a specific version of their story, particularly if they believe it will positively influence resettlement prospects or provision of aid. In fact, my position as a white, female American associated with the Peace Centre certainly increased the risk of “reactivity,” “where the active presence of the
researcher potentially influences the behavior and responses of informants, thereby compromising the research findings” (Jacobsen and Landau 2003:192). To some degree this was unavoidable and needed to be factored into my analysis. I also relied heavily upon my research assistants to clearly explain my position and purpose of my research, as well as provide background information when relevant.

The Red Cross staff described the purpose of the interviews to refugees and answered any questions, assuring anonymity. Their knowledge of refugee fears also ensured sensitivity to security issues. For example, the Rwandan population was particularly concerned about anonymity, due to continuing tensions and violence between Hutus and Tutsis after the 1994 genocide. We often met Rwandans at their place of work, rather than their homes and often did not record the interview. The multiple languages used, power relations, and even the ability to establish boundaries for an interview when other household members would join the conversation with their own comments added to the challenges.

**Profiling Urban Refugees: Who is Living in Lusaka?**

Widespread poverty among the general population meant that the refugees in Lusaka faced struggles similar to the local urban poor. Both Zambians and refugees alike confronted the problems associated with urban poverty, struggling to meet physical necessities and to access education and health care. However, refugees’ displacement experiences factored into the reasons they came to the city and how they settled there, highlighting a significant difference from other migrant groups and local residents. Basic demographic research can explore other ways refugees differ from or are similar to the local host population, as well as means for social and economic integration.
The Zambian refugee caseload that had been registered and given permission to live in urban areas was a population that had a slightly higher male percentage compared to refugees living in camps and settlements (Table 6). In Lusaka specifically, UNHCR (2007c:12) noted that almost 60 percent of the refugee population were adults, aged between 18 and 59 years, 38 percent were children under 18 years old, and the remaining 2 percent were persons above 60 years of age. The higher representation of both men and adults among the urban refugee population was at least partially attributed to government policy and the difficulty in securing an urban residency permit without the necessary skills and financial assets to also obtain a permit for work or self-employment (UNHCR 2007c:12).

Table 6. Demographic Composition of Populations of Concern to UNHCR in Zambia, end of 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Share of age group total</th>
<th>Percentage female per age group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-4  5-11  12-17  &lt;18 18-59 60+&gt;</td>
<td>0-4  5-11  12-17  &lt;18 18-59 60+&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kala</td>
<td>17% 15% 27% 59% 39% 2% 49% 52% 51% 51% 49% 49% 50% 16,877</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayukwayukwa</td>
<td>24% 11% 19% 54% 41% 6% 58% 59% 54% 56% 52% 62% 55% 10,660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meheba</td>
<td>17% 14% 20% 51% 42% 7% 56% 54% 51% 54% 51% 47% 52% 13,892</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwange</td>
<td>16% 14% 22% 52% 45% 3% 49% 47% 55% 51% 49% 51% 50% 17,911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Settled</td>
<td>-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 48,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>14% 15% 20% 50% 49% 1% 48% 47% 56% 51% 45% 46% 48% 5,591</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR 2007a

Similarly, my survey data of refugees at the Peace Centre was 75% male and overwhelmingly from an urban background (Table 7).

Table 7. Gender and Age Group of Refugee Survey Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>&lt;25</th>
<th>26-35</th>
<th>36-45</th>
<th>46-55</th>
<th>56-65</th>
<th>66-75</th>
<th>&gt;76</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By 1996, there were some 16,000 refugees settled in Lusaka, representing a huge increase in the population since 1992 (UNHCR 1996). Those who arrived during this period comprised the largest group in both my survey sample and of those interviewed, and they were mainly from the DRC (Table 8). This group predominantly arrived from larger cities such as Lubumbashi and Likasai and from areas of South Kivu with high population densities. However, after 1997, a slightly larger number of refugees who arrived in Lusaka had a rural background. This trend reflected migration from refugee settlements to Lusaka by the many long-staying rural refugees.

Table 8. Date of Arrival in Zambia of Refugee Survey Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, education levels among urban refugees were slightly higher than those of the Zambians citizens who also filled out the questionnaire (Table 9). A total of 54 percent of surveyed refugees had completed secondary school and 14 percent had finished primary, while an additional 32 percent that had participated in some university or advanced training. Compared to the total population of Lusaka, these refugees were generally better educated. Refugees with higher education and a professional background, such as journalists, politicians or doctors, were very active at the Peace Centre and more vocal in refugee affairs. They were also very active in refugee organizations, advocating with UNHCR and the government for better treatment (see Chapter 6). The Peace Centre was often the location of meetings as well as a place to access information.
Table 9. Percentage of Education Levels by Sex and Nationality in Survey Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Grade 1-7</th>
<th>Grade 8-12</th>
<th>Above grade 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost 70 percent of refugees left their country of origin with at least someone from their immediate or extended family, indicating that the refugees settling in Zambia were not solitary individuals seeking economic advantages for themselves. In 2007, 75 percent of survey respondents were married or had been married, and 60 percent lived in a household with six or more. There were 12 percent whose households included only 1-2 individuals.

Through my interviews and home visits with refugees in the compounds, I came to know a more diverse population than just those who frequented the Peace Centre. At least 70 percent of the refugees I interviewed had fled DRC between 1992 and 1996, again from Lubumbashi and Kananga, a city located in the Kasai region. I encountered a much older refugee population, both male and female, who arrived during this period, as well as their families and extended families (Table 10). Refugees who arrived later also fled from Lubumbashi and the region of South Kivu, the centers of conflict in eastern DRC. Female-headed households were more common. In some cases, husbands were lost during the flight or abandoned the family once in Lusaka.

Table 10. Composition of Recorded Refugee Interview Sample by Sex and Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>&lt;25</th>
<th>26-35</th>
<th>36-45</th>
<th>45-55</th>
<th>55-65</th>
<th>65-75</th>
<th>75&lt;</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

My research focused on being with refugees as they were taking computer classes at the Peace Centre, listening to the UNHCR Senior Protection officer, walking through the compounds, participating in focus groups for the new Peace Centre project proposal, or sitting under a tree outside their homes as a means to consider the nature of refugee integration in Lusaka. However, finding and collecting these data from a diverse and often hidden population had major challenges. Through the Peace Centre and the Red Cross, as well as other multiple sources, I made an effort to draw from a diverse refugee population and to take into account the difficulties that arise in researching in an urban setting. The result was a collection of data about where and how refugees lived and worked in Lusaka, how they interacted with their neighbors, their feelings of security, and who taught their children. These data provided the foundation for assessment of the refugees’ social and economic integration and the range found in the urban refugee population. The next chapter places these details about urban refugees within a larger context by considering the evolution of the Zambian government’s policies and practices towards refugees and their impact on those living in Lusaka.
CHAPTER 4
BOUNDARIES OF LEGAL INTEGRATION: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
OF REFUGEE HOSTING IN ZAMBIA

In 1999, President Fredrick Chiluba outlined Zambia’s position of solidarity with refugees:

We must find urgent and lasting solutions… our contributions include: hosting peace talks between warring parties [such as] the historic Lusaka Protocols in 1994… Zambia is presently at the forefront of finding… a political solution to the conflict in the DRC… Until such time as this peace is achieved, my government is fully committed to meetings its international obligations to all… who seek asylum in Zambia. We cannot undo [refugees’] suffering… the least we can do is make them feel welcome in our communities” (UNHCR 1999).

Zambia had a long tradition of hosting individuals fleeing violent conflict and civil strife in Sub-Saharan Africa. It began just two years after Zambia’s independence when the new president, Kenneth Kaunda, responded to the independence struggles and wars of liberation of neighboring countries with generous refugee provisions, setting a positive example for the rest of the region (Crisp 2000:161). Refugee hosting increased in magnitude and complexity in 1990s. Civil wars in neighboring DRC and Angola were the predominant cause for the peak of refugee hosting in 2001 with more than 260,000 refugees living in camps and settlements and self-settled in Zambia’s rural areas and cities. Thousands of additional refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and Uganda resided in Zambia at this time as well (IRIN 2001). Even as concerns grew about the lack of meaningful burden sharing with the international community and the socioeconomic pressures of refugee hosting, Zambia continued to accept the vast majority of refugees who crossed its borders.

This chapter focuses on the history of refugee hosting in Zambia to understand the evolution of policies and practices towards urban refugees and the legal and political frameworks
that structure the type of integration available to refugees. As the Zambian government continued to verbally reaffirm its commitment to bringing peace to the region and making refugees “feel welcome in our communities,” it struggled with both its own dramatic economic and political changes and international obligations. Its policies and practices toward refugees were deeply embedded in a broader international context and its own evolving national identity. As such, contradictions in refugee policy revealed Zambian political motivations, international influences through UNHCR, and spaces created for and by refugee action. The final section of this chapter explores urban refugees and the impact of the national environment on their lives.

**Nation Building, One Party Rule and Refugees: 1964-1991**

Kenneth Kaunda and the 1st and 2nd Republic

Zambia received little European attention until the 1850s when the travels of Dr. Livingstone, Scottish missionary and explorer, became widely reported in London (Wills 1964). Even then, a significant number of Europeans did not arrive in the region until five years after the Berlin Conference of 1885. While the “scramble for Africa” was the impetus, the ambitions of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) finally brought European rule to Zambia in 1890. The British government granted a charter to the BSAC, which then signed treaties with various local chiefs as the basis of the company’s subsequent claim to mineral rights in the region (Hall 1966). The BSAC ruled Zambia from the 1890s until 1924, when, for mainly economic reasons, it handed over the administration to the British Colonial Office (Tordoff and Molteno 1974:3).

The characteristics of the colonial absorption of Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, had lasting impacts on the development of the Zambian state. Tordoff and Molteno (1974:2) point out:
First the new colony encompassed not one traditional State, but a large number of often rival polities of varying sizes and with different State systems, languages and cultures. The period of colonial rule was too short for the members of these pre-colonial polities to be fully integrated into a single national community. Second, the imposition of European rule did not involve the prolonged and destructive wars, which characterized the spread of colonial rule in other parts of southern Africa. This helped the traditional authority systems to survive, although in an increasingly modified and weakened way… Thirdly and finally, the BSA Company, although chartered in London, was really a South African enterprise. Colonial rule came to Northern Rhodesia from the already white minority-ruled and racialist south so that the country was, and continued to be, the major northernmost outpost of the southern Africa European settler rule… this had enduring consequences which continue to hamper the Zambian government’s freedom of action.

The imposition of colonialism did, by definition, form the basis of the Zambian nation and evoked a type of nationalist response that integrated these disparate groups. However, the colonial authorities took some measures to counter national consciousness with the imposition of indirect rule after 1929, which prolonged some degree of loyalty to pre-colonial authorities. In fact, although sentiment against colonial rule was growing in Zambia, the resistance movement nevertheless ran into opposition from chiefs in many areas when it tried to mobilize the rural people (Tordoff and Molteno 1974:8).

On October 24, 1964, Northern Rhodesia became the newly independent Republic of Zambia. The move toward independence began 20 years earlier, but anti-colonial agitation and the nationalist struggle culminated in the Cha Cha Cha campaign of civil disobedience in 1962 (Marten and Kula 2008:14; Tordoff and Molteno 1974:5,9). The chaos it produced in three rural provinces finally forced the British government to revise the constitution and allow for majority rule. Compared to the violence in Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), Zambia’s transition to political independence was fairly peaceful. Zambia always had a smaller settler population than other states in the region and the colonial government had maintained relatively more liberal social and political policies toward the African population (Bauer and Taylor 2005:50). One of Zambia’s most prominent leaders in the campaign for independence, Kenneth Kaunda, founded
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1959 (Makasa 1981). UNIP won a clear majority in pre-independence elections and formed the first government of Zambia in 1964 under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, affectionately known as KK.

Zambia had known only limited violent unrest before, during, and after independence. The country’s stability has often been attributed to the vision of the new president and his goal of national unity in the face of ethnic loyalties and divisions (Bauer and Taylor 2005:52). UNIP’s slogan during the struggle for independence of “One Zambia—One Nation” became the motto of the new nation. The policies and tools used by Kaunda were strikingly successful, illustrated by the minor role ethnicity and race played in Zambian politics over the past four decades. No one ethnic group had numerical superiority in Zambia. President Kaunda ensured balanced ethnic representation and support in his cabinet to help suppress any nascent tensions (Bauer and Taylor 2005:52).

The popular slogan laid the foundation for the future state and national identity, but it also laid roots for a one-party state and totalitarian authority of the new government. The conflation of party and nation in UNIP thought was clearly stated by Kaunda in January 1961, “…to save the people of Zambia […]. We must forget our individualism and put the Nation first before us. The party is supreme” (Macola 2008:23).

Kaunda’s strategy for uniting Zambia’s 72 ethnic groups and building a unified nation began with creating a state ideology. Kaunda advocated the nationalist-socialist ideology of Zambian Humanism, which was similar to other forms of “African socialism” proposed by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (Roberts 1976; Tordoff and Molteno 1974). In terms of domestic policy, how the state might implement what Kaunda considered

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17 Very few people in Zambia actually understood what Humanism was or really did, but it was an important instrument for Kaunda and his party in exerting ideological control, building a personality cult around Kaunda, portraying him as leader, teacher, and father, and informing a certain version of Zambia’s history.
basic African values, such as mutual aid, trust, and loyalty to the community, was less clear and more randomly applied. However, it did become a rationale for state domination, ultimately resulting in the establishment of a one party state in 1972 and an increasingly authoritarian response to rising political opposition and instability in the region (Ihonvbere 1996). Like many other leaders in the region, Kaunda claimed that an authentic African model of unity and communal decision-making, along with the importance of chiefly authority, made competing political parties inappropriate and even dangerous, possibly leading to tribal-based conflict (Larmer 2006:236). Moreover, Kaunda’s ideology of Humanism was met with increasing cynicism on the national level due to the disparity between ideals and the reality of the widening gap between the poor and privileged in Zambia.

Over the first five years after independence, Zambia established government control over a large part of the economy. Major industries, such as the mines, banks, industrial and commercial enterprises, and agricultural marketing and pricing were all controlled by government parastatals (Ihonvbere 1996; Saasa 2002). Kaunda’s government pursued a development model in line with African socialism, which saw the state as the primary engine of economic development. By the mid-1970s, some 80 percent of the Zambian economy was state controlled (Rakner 2003:46). The Zambian government did little to diversify its export base; it instead depended on copper revenues from the vast mineral wealth in the Central and Copperbelt Provinces. However, this dependence made the Zambian economy very vulnerable to fluctuations in the global price of copper (Rakner 2003; Burdette 1988).

The dependence on the mining industry was in part due to the lack of trained or educated citizens and created a reliance on the existing foreign technical expertise. At independence, only 109 Zambians had university degrees, and only 1,200 had completed secondary school (Tordoff
and Molteno 1974:18). As such, there was a push to open secondary schools at independence and Kaunda sought to bring more Zambians into middle and upper level positions. Zambianization was a primary goal set down by Kaunda just after independence in which European, Asian, and African expatriates were replaced by Zambian citizens in employment of all kinds—industry, business, civil service, defense forces, the judiciary, and professions (Baylies 1980). While Zambian citizens of Asian origin were not excluded, the policy clearly favored the placement of black Africans (Macmillan 2008:195; Baylies 1980).

As a country rich in copper deposits and agricultural potential, the economic prospects of the new state appeared auspicious. While there were still socioeconomic inequalities, many Zambians assumed these would be reversed by the enlightened social policies of Kaunda and UNIP. In the years following independence, Zambian economic growth was evident. Zambia soon derived more than 90 percent of its export revenue from the copper mines and in 1969, its gross domestic product was not only the highest in Africa, but also not far behind developing European countries such as Portugal and Turkey (Ferguson 1999:6; K. Hansen 1997:5). Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Zambia had excellent prospects for full industrialization and even ultimate admission to the ranks of the “developed” world (Ferguson 1999:6; Larmer 2006:236). Economic growth, educational expansion, and Zambianization convinced ordinary Zambians of the possibility of upward mobility (Ferguson 1999). Its prosperity from 1964-74 made it possible to develop modern educational and medical facilities across Zambia. The country had its highest per capita income in 1976 when it was almost double what it was in 2006 (UNDP 2006).

From independence to 1980 the population that lived in urban areas increased from 21 percent to 40 percent of the total population, a figure twice that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
The urban areas and mines became a magnet for any Zambian, regardless of ethnic group, seeking employment. During this increase in urbanization, UNIP sought to dominate public life in the city by, for example, allocating plots for buildings and providing urban services. However, extending the central government to the local level in this manner increased bureaucracy and patronage, and it later became a means to oppose political opposition and public dissatisfaction with economic and social changes (Myers 2005:107-108). An important point to note is that during this time the formal housing and economic sectors could not keep up with the expansive urban population growth. Residents therefore sought extra-legal and illegal avenues to build homes and maintain livelihoods, creating tensions between the local populace and the government as it sought to control urban influx, discussed in Chapter 2.

Zambia’s initial economic successes momentarily obscured mismanagement and corruption. A massive and inefficient parastatal sector had grown to include government-controlled mines, banks, industrial and commercial enterprises, and agricultural marketing and prices (Harbeson 1999:50). The location of powerful mining sectors in the growing Copperbelt towns ensured economic development focused on urban areas at the expense of rural, agricultural areas. This parastatal inefficiency and corruption became more apparent as the world price for copper collapsed in 1974, the cost of imported oil rose dramatically in the 1970s, and economic hardship increased. The economic downturn had far-reaching effects on the government’s ability to pay wages, meet basic needs, keep development projects afloat, and import essential goods (Ihonybere 1996:59). During this time, the prevalence of urban poverty in Zambia increased from four percent in 1975 to just below 50 percent in 1994 (World Bank 1996a). In addition, the years of economic prosperity had significantly increased urban incomes and standards of living.

Local government was largely viewed as an extension of the administrative structure of the ruling party through the 1980 Local Administration Act (Chikulo 2009:100).
The extreme disparity that had existed between rural and urban areas was narrowed due to the sharp and rapid economic decline in urban areas with per capita income dropping more than 50 percent from 1974 to 1994 (World Bank 1996a:562). In a span of 20 years, Zambia had gone from one of the most promising countries in the world to one of the most indebted with one of the worst economies (Taylor 2006:16).

The sharp decline in the standard of living increased popular opposition to Kaunda and UNIP. Labor disputes over wages began in early 1980 and organized labor became a significant challenge to UNIP, even as Kaunda imposed more draconian labor laws and sought to control protests. As the gap between the poor and privileged few increased, more and more people began to blame Kaunda and UNIP for the problems in the country and became disillusioned with his rhetoric. They demanded democratization, change and accountability.

The decline of copper prices and the resulting collapse of the economy required the government to depend heavily on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for loans. In 1983, the Zambian government began its first SAP, which was designed to stabilize the economy and reduce dependency on copper. In addition, from 1976, the IMF imposed strict conditions on the country as a requisite to access further financial assistance, and a more comprehensive and radical reform program became necessary by 1980. The Zambian government was compelled to introduce a 40 percent devaluation of currency as well as to eliminate subsidies and price controls (UN Habitat 2005:30). This resulted in urban food riots in 1986, which left more than 30 people dead and moved Kaunda to quickly restore subsidies and suspend the structural adjustment temporarily (Joseph 1992; Bratton 1992).⁹ According to Chan and Clancy, the “uprising was expressed in violence precisely because no other means sufficed.

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⁹ Structural adjustment was not fully reinstated until the election of the next administration in 1991 under President Fredrick Chiluba.
The rise in food prices, while real income dropped, contrasted sharply with the very visible wealth of party leaders” (2000:124).

Protests grew more vocal as the domestic situation grew more disastrous. Churches became outspoken opponents of the regime, and media outlets ran stories about declining public confidence in the government and corruption. Kaunda was forced to legalize opposition parties and announce full presidential and parliamentary elections in October 1991. The main challenger to UNIP was Fredrick Chiluba, a former trade union leader, and the head of a new party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The MMD was born out of an urban protest movement and “skillfully used the far-flung teachers’ and civil servants’ unions to mobilize support in the countryside and, through its own multi-ethnic leadership, drew followers with diverse tribal, linguistic and regional identities” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:199). Chiluba and the MMD posed a distinct alternative to the ideology of Kaunda and Humanism. In their platform, they promised a revitalization of the economy through expanding the private sector; limiting the role of the government; and extolling capitalism, the free market, privatization, and liberal democracy (Ihonvbere 1996).

Chiluba soundly defeated Kaunda during the election and became Zambia’s second elected president with 73 percent of the vote (Kabwe 1997). Kaunda stepped down without complaint and gracefully turned the government over to Chiluba and MMD. With such a peaceful, civilian transfer of power, Zambia emerged as a model for the rest of the continent.

Liberation Wars and Refugee Hosting

Zambia’s economic decline was not completely domestically driven. It was exacerbated by the country’s support of the southern Africa liberation movements against colonial and racist regimes and also by being surrounded by four unfriendly neighbors: the Portuguese colonies of
Angola and Mozambique, South-African occupied Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia, which after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 became Rhodesia under white minority rule. Its geographic and ideological position made Zambia the subject of armed retaliation and active efforts to disrupt its trade routes, particularly by Rhodesia and South Africa (Sklar 1974). As a landlocked country, Zambia was (and is) deeply dependent on trade links with its neighbors to reach the outside world (Johnson and Martin 1988; Tordoff and Molteno 1974). In Zambia’s first year of independence it was completely dependent on Rhodesia for energy and trade; all of its copper exports and 95 percent of its imports crossed Victoria Falls Bridge via Rhodesia Railways (Good 1973). By supporting forces opposing colonial and white-dominated rule, Zambia lost its natural trade partners, main source of imports, and the means to export vital copper (Good 1987). Zambia thus turned to Tanzania, one of the few border states not hostile to the Zambian government, as its main trading partner, yet it still struggled to create new trade routes to reduce dependence on rail lines to South Africa and increasingly war ravaged Angola (Pettman 1974:118; Good 1987). A promising development occurred when China constructed the Tanzania-Zambia Railway between 1965 and 1975, linking the Copperbelt to the port city of Dar es Salaam and liberating landlocked Zambia (Monson 2009). However, this railroad did not fully compensate for the loss of the more economically powerful and efficient trading partner of South Africa. By the late 1970s, Zambia faced severe shortages of basic foodstuffs, further evidence of the excessive dependence on copper mining at the expense of rural agricultural investments.

Despite the considerable challenges that the regional context created, Zambia became one of the frontline states committed to the support of the “freedom fighters” and political refugees. It served as an external base of operations for many resistance groups, including the African
National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Southwest African People’s Organization of Namibia, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union of Rhodesia, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Kaunda became a strong diplomatic voice pressuring Western states and international and transnational organizations to support the liberation movements, as well as to support Zambia’s own national and economic security as a frontline state (Mtshali 1971; Anglin 1975).

Zambia’s foreign policy also incorporated the values of Kaunda’s Humanism and supporting nonalignment, Pan-Africanism, nonracialism, and anticolonialism (Mwaanga 1972, 1974). The preamble to UNIP’s constitution includes a declaration on Zambia's foreign policy:

The Party pledges to support for all people waging just struggles for national liberation from colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racism; and ... the Party shall work to enhance the development of Pan-Africanism, African Unity and non-alignment (UNIP Constitution quoted in Shaw 1976:48).

While economic and national security concerns also factored into Zambia’s foreign policy decisions, its ideological basis created a strong theme for Zambian history and national identity. References to Zambia’s commitment to liberation movements and its hospitality significantly influenced its discourse on refugees and refugee policy. In this context, continual hosting of refugees became a source of national pride, resulting in a continued tolerance for refugees yet also an uneven implementation of policy, particularly discussed later in this chapter.

Zambia, like virtually all independent countries in southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, received waves of refugees from countries that were still struggling against racism, colonialism, and apartheid. The liberal attitude towards the admission of refugees during this era came to be known as an “open door policy,” a position that was echoed across other southern African countries until 1990 (Rutinwa 1999:1). Refugees were almost never rejected at the border or returned to a country where they could face persecution. The Zambian government’s
position was that, “even though our finances and personnel have been taxed to the full, we have no option but to shelter our persecuted brothers and sisters in our traditional spirit of Humanism” (Beyani 1986:4).

The first influx of refugees began at the end of 1965 as thousands of Angolans and Mozambicans fled armed conflict with Portugal. Zambia initially received a relatively small number of refugees, an estimated 5,800 at the end of 1966 (Ohadike 1974:403). However the gravity of the refugee situation became clearer as numbers increased substantially over time. In 1968, refugees numbered fewer than 15,000, but by 1974 there were 103,000 refugees and 150,000 by 1988 (Mwanza and Seshamani 1988:3). The government established the 1970 Refugee (Control) Act “to make provisions for the control of refugees and for matters connected thereto” (Government of Zambia 1970). Similar to laws in the surrounding countries, the refugee legislation was quite restrictive, giving the Minister of Home Affairs broad powers to determine who was a refugee and order the expulsion of refugees to their country of origin. The act also permitted the use of force against refugees by authorized officers, required refugees to remain in camps and settlements for reasons of national security, and restricted refugee movement. While Zambia was signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol of 1967, many of the provisions guaranteed under the Convention were not addressed in the Refugee (Control) Act and the Convention were not explicitly adopted by the legislation.

Despite the absence of refugee protections within the Refugee (Control) Act, these laws were rarely fully enforced, given the liberal admission policies and the inability to keep refugees

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20 The Acts permitted expulsion of refugees back to counties of origin in a manner that could amount to refoulement (Section 10). The laws also permitted the confiscation and slaughter of animals belonging to refugees (Section 8) and the detention and use of vehicles belonging to refugees for refugee work, (Section 9) without a guarantee for compensation. The laws also permitted restricting movement of refugees (Section 12) (Government of Zambia 1970).
in camps. The majority of individuals seeking refuge were accepted and issued prima facie refugee status, also known as group determination of status to mass influxes of people. The Minister of Home Affairs said:

I wish to remind the House that the refugee problem is one that will be with us for a long time. Its solution will not come until the minority-controlled countries have been liberated. That will be the only time when such refugees will be able to return to their homes and live peaceful lives as human beings…” (National Assembly of Zambia 1970:84).

Clearly, the government still expected that the southern African liberation wars would eventually end and that refugees would return home. The focus was placed on giving the government powers to maintain law and order in the face of so many refugees residing in the country for the short term. Consistent with the prevailing authoritarian rule, little consideration was given to refugee rights and protections or durable solutions. The legislation did not indicate how refugees should be treated, which then left considerable room for interpretation as refugee hosting stretched into decades.

The growth in the number of refugees led the Zambian government to create two refugee settlements, Mayukwayukwa in Western Province and Lwatembo in North Western Province. As mentioned in Chapter 1, settlements were considered a more long-term solution, where refugees were expected to eventually become self-sufficient by engaging in subsistence farming or other economic activities. This was unlike refugee camps, which provide only temporary shelter and where food and supplies were regularly distributed to residents. They were designed as agricultural settlements where each refugee household was allocated a plot of land and expected to be self-supporting. Unfortunately, both of these early settlements were poorly planned, due to the lack of soil and water surveys and adequate consultation with the local authorities (Pitterman
1984). Lwatembo quickly closed and Mayukwayukwa, Zambia’s first official refugee camp and now the oldest refugee settlement in Africa, only proved viable after two-thirds of its population were transferred to another camp.

In 1971, the majority of Angolan refugees, as well as a smaller number of refugees from Namibia and South Africa, were moved to the newly opened Meheba Refugee Settlement, located in Solwezi District (Veroff 2010:8). Meheba was more purposefully designed. It was located in an area of 580 square kilometers with excellent agricultural prospects, and it provided an opportunity to develop some of Zambia’s vast rural expanses. In fact, the conscious intention was to open up a relatively unpopulated area for further development (Bakewell 2002). Given the rather poor record of refugee settlements in Africa, both Meheba and Mayukwayukwa were fairly successful in agricultural production, becoming the main suppliers of vegetables in the region (Wilson 1986:111). In 1977, it was Meheba’s production that gave Zambia a food surplus (Betts and Pitterman 1984:16). Despite this, many refugees complained about the hardships faced due to lack of food, the struggle to sell their crops and inability to pay school fees. Nonetheless, as Bakewell (1999) noted, these hardships were no different from those faced by the surrounding villages and in fact, particularly in Meheba, refugees had better access to markets and better services such as health and education.

Despite the relatively good welfare conditions in the settlements, considerable problems persisted in locating and removing refugees from border areas and then preventing refugees from leaving the refugee settlement once they were sent there (Wilson 1986). The national borders established during the colonial period were drawn through existing communities and kin groups, and the flow of people between Angola and Zambia, as well as between Mozambique and Zambia, was common. Many times, refugees tried to keep a low profile in villages, and Zambian
hosts aided them in avoiding detection. Refugees clearly wanted to retain their freedom of movement and the economic and social advantages they perceived available outside of settlements. According to A. Hansen’s (1982:26) study of Angolan refugees, 65 percent of refugees in 1972 were self-settled.

Zambia quickly experienced difficulties in obtaining accurate numbers of refugees. It should be noted that during 1968 the number of refugees fluctuated greatly as some 8,000 new refugees arrived, while thousands of others were either voluntarily repatriated to their country of origin or have disappeared from their settlements. It must be assumed that the latter ones have left their camps in order to live together with the indigenous population in nearby Zambian villages (Wilson 1986:110).

This was referred to as “temporary absconding” and the government constantly worked to round up refugees and bring them back to the official settlements (Wilson 1986:110).

In fact, the transfer of refugees to Meheba when it opened was really a concentrated effort by the police and immigration authorities to identify and collect self-settled refugees who did not want to move to the settlement (A. Hansen 2001a:37). These efforts were not very successful and the government decided to stop actively searching for refugees in villages. Only refugees arriving after October 1985 were required to go to camps (A. Hansen 1979). The policy allowed them to stay in villages with the stipulation that they officially register as refugees. However, Wilson (1986:22) noted that this was hampered by the fact that many refugees had already obtained Zambian identity cards and were liable to be charged with obtaining these fraudulently. In addition, they likely did not trust the government’s policy.

With its growing economic wealth from copper exports, Zambia could afford to host incoming refugee groups. Unfortunately, the accelerated economic decline during the 1980s coincided with even greater influxes of refugees. By the late 1970s, the liberation wars appeared to be coming to a close; Angola and Mozambique won their independence from Portugal and the
1979 Lancaster House agreement ensured the independence of Zambia’s southern neighbor, Rhodesia, which was re-named Zimbabwe. By this time, guerilla raids and economic pressures had taken a toll on Zambia’s already shaky economy. When violence and civil war erupted in Angola and Mozambique immediately after independence, Zambia’s trade route problems and violence in border areas continued and the majority of Angolan refugees remained in Zambia.

Most Mozambican refugees who had settled in Nyimba Refugee Camp in Eastern Province returned to their country in 1975. However, some 30,000 Mozambicans returned to Eastern, Province in 1987, resulting in the construction of Ukwimi refugee settlement. Zairians (Congolese) came to Zambia in 1978 and 1979 following the Katangese revolts in Shaba province. South Africa also continued to create security problems by raiding ANC headquarters in Zambia, and this action exacerbated regional wars. The continuing civil wars led to the flight of persons on an even greater scale than during the wars of liberation. By January 1988, Zambia had at least 150,000 refugees (Table 11), both located in three camps and self-settled (Figure 4).

Table 11. Refugee Population as of December 31, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meheba Refugee Settlement: Angolans, Zaireans, Ugandans</td>
<td>14,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement: Angolans</td>
<td>2,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukwimi Refugee Settlement: Mozambicans</td>
<td>3,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest African People’s Organization: Nambians</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC: South Africans</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Refugees</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneously Settled:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolans (North Western/ Western Province)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaireans (Luapula Province)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambicans (Eastern Province)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>147,613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Catholic Secretariat 1988:9*
Figure 4. UNHCR Map of Refugee Locations, 1993 (Source: Wilson 1986)
While the 1980s were comparatively calm, concerns about threats and incursions from rebel movements and the South African government caused Zambia to enforce new, stricter measures regarding refugees. Newly arrived unregistered and unidentified refugees were no longer allowed to settle in Zambian villages. Instead, they would be taken to the new Ukwimi settlement and to the newly expanded Meheba. Despite the still generous admittance policy, the lack of a clearly articulated national policy towards refugees was becoming more apparent. Freund and Kalumba’s (1986:308) study of self-settled refugees in Northwest Province found that many Immigration officers and local government leaders believed that all refugees constituted a threat to national security and should be treated as illegal aliens.

Toward the end of the decade, a general shift away from the open door policy was occurring across refugee hosting countries as the magnitude of the refugee problem, continent-wide economic crises, security concerns, and the failure of the international community to provide adequate assistance was felt. These and even the democratization process played a role in Zambia’s changing views of refugees in the coming decades, explored more fully in the next section. Interestingly this occurred as a new generation of protection oriented refugee legislation was developed across the region, which included “provisions on the definition of a refugee which accorded with the relevant international instruments, institutions and procedures for refugee status determination, non-refoulement, and standards of treatment” (Rutinwa 2002:1). However, Zambia was one of the few countries that did not update its refugee legislation, adding to the continuing confusion and arbitrary implementation of policy across Zambia.

The legacy of Zambia’s support for liberation wars and refugee hosting was an important feature of Zambian history and identity. Despite the economic troubles and even violence that Kaunda’s overt support of groups opposing colonial and white-dominated rule brought to
Zambia, it was seen as a policy that Zambia had to pursue for the sake of southern Africa. Kaunda was considered responsible for keeping Zambia relatively stable in a time of great conflict, and he remains an immensely popular figure in Zambia. However, the early years of refugee hosting demonstrated Zambia’s struggle to control refugee movement and residence. As clearly shown Table 11 above, 114,000 refugees out of 147,613 were spontaneously settled across Zambia in 1987. They were living with the local Zambian population and without government permission. In the next two sections, the move from authoritarian rule to political liberalization revealed tensions between the influence of UNHCR on how the refugee population was managed and political manipulations of the refugee situation.


Democratization and Liberalization

During his first term in office, Chiluba followed a program of economic liberalization, once again focused on the World Bank and IMF-backed structural adjustment. The range of measures required a shift from a state oriented to a market based economy, including elimination of exchange-rate controls and devaluation of the kwacha, Zambia’s currency; reductions in government spending through cuts on consumer subsidies and social welfare and reform of the civil service; and privatization of state owned enterprises (Taylor 2006). The pace of economic liberalization is noted as one of the government’s most remarkable achievements (Seshamani 1996; World Bank 1996b; 1996c). However, the record on structural reforms in government institutions was much more mixed (Rakner 2003:70).

At the outset, the MMD had been very candid about the need for fiscal austerity and the challenges facing the nation, but these measures produced extreme hardships for the average Zambian (Ihonvbere 1996). The end of currency controls and price subsidies on staple foods led
to soaring prices on food and consumer goods. Privatization of industries, beginning with the copper mines, led to a 40 percent decrease in formal, government-regulated employment between 1991 and 1998 (McCulloch et al. 2000:10). Huge job losses resulted from major restructuring in mining and quarrying, severe decline in formal manufacturing and collapse of the construction industry (McCulloch et al. 2000:4). The job losses created the second largest internal migration to Lusaka in Zambia’s history, as many living in the Copperbelt region moved in hopes of finding new employment opportunities. High mobility in Zambia has been identified as one of the key drivers of the AIDS epidemic (IOM 2005). Severe droughts, nation-wide epidemics of cholera and AIDS, and the continued downward slide of the copper mining industry added to Zambia’s struggles.

With the mobilization of civil society to oust Kaunda, it appeared that multi-party democracy was indeed underway in Zambia. However, as Callaghy argued, “older political logics… do not disappear just because authoritarian regimes are being challenged by resurgent societies” (1994:235-236). The MMD was able to exploit the power and resources of the state and in many ways to continue and even expand the political practices of UNIP. Charges of corruption plagued Chiluba throughout his term, particularly surrounding the privatization of state assets. Decision-making lacked transparency. Chiluba was surrounded by a small group of advisers; he quickly added MMD sympathizers to the High Court (Taylor 2006:20). Restrictions were placed on opposition groups and civil society, and Chiluba refused demands to reduce the power of the presidency, while simultaneously clamping down on protests and enforcing two states of emergency (Fraser 2010:11).

Former President Kaunda, noting the lack of visible change in Zambia, decided to launch a political comeback in the next elections. However, one strategy used by President Chiluba and
the MMD to retain power was to investigate the nationalities of prominent opposition leaders to disqualify and deport them as foreigners. In early 1996, Chiluba changed the constitution to require the parents of presidential candidates be Zambian citizens by birth or descent in a move to prohibit Kaunda, whose parents were from what is now Malawi, from running. In the legal battle that followed, the High Court ruled that the president of Zambia from 1964 to 1991 was not a Zambian citizen, making Kaunda effectively stateless (McNeil 1999). The Post, a privately owned Zambian newspaper, commented that Chiluba’s repeated manipulation of citizenship throughout his years in office created "a tendency in MMD circles to treat all critics of government… as foreigners" (Jurist 2001).

There was widespread public outrage both at home and among donors abroad about the new constitution and antidemocratic measures, which included a national voter registration drive that was widely seen as secretive and corrupt, repression of the independent press, and restrictions of civil liberties (Taylor 2006:21). In response to the government’s heavy-handed tactics, UNIP and many opposition parties boycotted the elections and most of the international community refused to participate as election observers. Although Chiluba won the election by a large margin, it was with a small voter turnout. In an ironic twist, the opposition parties filed a court petition that alleged that Chilubu was actually born in the DRC (Whitaker 2005). However, the final ruling of the High Court was that Chiluba was a Zambian citizen because anyone who was a formal resident of Northern Rhodesia at the time of independence in 1964 automatically became a Zambian citizen, a logic that should have been applied to Kaunda (Whitaker 2005:114).

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21 The MMD was repeatedly accused of giving Angolan refugees National Registration Cards and registering them to vote.
For Chiluba, the citizenship debates were merely redirecting the focus from the economy and unemployment. However, when Chiluba attempted to change the constitution to allow him to seek a third term, Zambia’s civil society of churches, NGOs, businesses, labor unions, students, and others took to the streets in a massive “No Third Term” campaign. The churches and religious organizations were very vocal challengers of the government. Christian churches were deeply rooted in Zambian society and had often used their influence to address social issues. Chiluba eventually backed down. Even though the MMD candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, won the 2001 election, the “No Third Term” campaign issued in a resurgence of civil society.

Civil society became more and more vocal about the negative impact of privatization and what it considered a disastrous Zambian socioeconomic record (Rakner 2003:16). The anti-debt NGO, Jubilee-Zambia, criticized the “radical privatization program under structural reforms” for its failure to “address the economic and social impacts on the poor and vulnerable people,” including “massive job losses through retrenchments… [and] user fees in schools and hospitals” (J. Banda 2004:5). The Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) conducted a monthly Basic Needs Basket for Lusaka, assessing the cost of living for a family of six. In July 2007, it was $383. However, the average monthly income was less than half of that amount (JCTR 2007c). The privatization of basic social services meant that most people went without them (Myers 2005:117). An editorial in the Post summed up the situation:

The economy is still in the doldrums; our people continue to die in droves from hunger, joblessness, poverty and HIV/AIDS. Mwanawasa’s government continues to be weak, ineffective manager of IMF, World Bank and donor neo-liberal social and economic prescriptions, to our national determent (A. Banda 2004:10).

The new President Mwanawasa quickly sought to prove that he was independent of his predecessor. He launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign in 2002 that was first directed at President Chiluba and his financial improprieties while in office. This campaign won
Mwanawasa some popular support, and higher-levels corruption continued to be a major focus of political debates. However, petty corruption within public sector institutions was the most common and visible form, affecting an estimated 40 percent of households (Kaela 2004). The poor were the most vulnerable to poor governance due to the predatory behavior of officials, particularly the police. At yet higher levels, resources intended for the poor were diverted for the use of the wealthy or politically connected, which resulted in the frequent lack of basic services (World Bank 2007:vi).

While Mwanawasa made the fight against corruption the centerpiece of his administration, Larmer (2005:41) argued that there was “an increasing tendency [for Mwanawasa] to reflect Kaunda’s nationalist mode of government, stylistically and in more substantive ways.” His populist rhetoric suggested a return to the past, but Mwanawasa only brought slight changes in the direction of the country’s economic policy. The slowed pace of privatization and lack of monitoring systems under Mwanawasa did bring criticism from donors. The IMF complained about the “extra budgetary spending” outside of the liberalization priorities. However, a reporter from the Zambian Mail pointed that much of this spending was targeting health, education and social welfare (Chonya 2004:1). Mwanawasa’s limited improvements to the economy and his neoliberal policies continued to cause anger in Lusaka’s compounds.

Zambia qualified for full debt cancellation under World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries in 2005 (Mphuka 2002). External debt relief and improved copper prices helped the country’s inflation rate drop to single digits, and economic growth averaged approximately five percent annually in Mwanawasa’s first term (Economist 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007:619). Despite these positive economic advancements, life did not improve for the urban poor.
Opposition party leader, Michael Sata of the Popular Front (PF), became an outspoken critic of IMF-influenced policies and called for a return to national economic control by Zambians (Larmer 2005:42). Sata capitalized on urban dissatisfaction in the 2006 elections by articulating many popular concerns like “health and safety standards in Chinese-owned mines, the shortage of market stalls for informal traders, inadequate urban housing, and the disorganized nature of bus stations” (Larmer and Fraser 2007:613). Sata’s populist “Zambia for Zambians” campaign identified foreign investors and traders as the real winners of liberalization (Fraiser 2010: 18). He even threatened to deport foreigners, including Chinese, Indians, and Lebanese, whom he accused of mistreating their Zambian workers (BBC 2006).

In September 2006, President Mwanawasa legitimately won the elections by securing 43 percent of the vote, but the MMD failed to obtain an overall majority in the legislature. The 2006 elections represent a significant break in Zambian politics. The PF was able to directly appeal to the urban vote, borrowing from the broader civil society protest movements that emerged in reaction to economic liberalization (Larmer and Fraser 2007:612). PF politicians won every urban parliamentary seat in Lusaka and the mining towns of the Copperbelt, as well as a majority of seats in the Lusaka City Council (LCC) (Myers 2005:127). Particularly significant was the high turnout of 70 percent of the registered electorate and the lack of violence by Sata’s supporters (Larmer and Fraser 2007:621). Despite MMD’s authoritarian tendencies in the past, the strength of politically active civil society organizations and the independent media continued to grow (Larmer 2005:281).

Role of UNHCR and Durable Solutions

During an interview with the legal representative of COR, Zambia’s office in charge of refugee affairs, she asked “what do we get?” for having effectively provided for refugees and
having supplied good management and policy. The economic hardships caused many to question refugee obligations and whether the few available resources should be channeled towards refugee welfare. Financial constraints within Zambia dictated an increased role for UNHCR in technical and logistical assistance and humanitarian aid. Yet at the same time, international donors, growing tired of prolonged assistance to the waves of refugees, began to review and cut back on programs (LRF 2002). The transition to democracy also amplified the importance of public opinion and new forms of nationalist rhetoric to secure political support as many politicians played on anti-foreigner and anti-refugee sentiments. This section considers how the Zambian government sought to balance its humanitarian obligations to refugees and internal political and economic pressures. It also examines the role of UNHCR in developing durable solutions for refugees in Zambia.

Camps, Settlements and Rural Integration

Intensifying conflicts among Zambia’s neighbors brought even more refugees at the new century’s outset. The new government played a prominent role in sponsoring Angolan peace talks in 1991—1994, which led to the Lusaka Protocol, signed on November 20, 1994. This increased hopes that conditions in Angola would improve and enable UNHCR to provide refugees returning to Angola transport and reintegration packages (Bakewell 1999:7). Some even expected that those staying in border areas within the local population would return, despite Art Hansen’s (1990) research, which suggested that very few self-settled refugees expressed any interest in returning and many would deny even being refugees. However, the peace process collapsed in 1998, resulting in renewed fighting and the first mass influx of refugees from Angola into Zambia since the mid-1980s (Bakewell 2002:1).
A less well-known conflict occurred in the Katanga region of DRC bordering Zambia from 1992 to 1994, in which individuals originally from the Kasai region of DRC were targeted and attacked as outsiders. There are reports that up to one million Kasaians, many of whom held skilled positions in the mining and railway industries, were expelled from cities and towns. A large number fled to Zambia, particularly from the nearby city of Lubumbashi. In 1993, UNHCR noted that a group of “mainly young, educated and urban Zairians (Congolese) continue to Zambia seeking asylum, number 1,924 new arrivals in 1993 alone” (1994:5). Several years later, the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, the president from 1965 to 1997, led to a resumption of civil war that led to cross border movements of people, which peaked in 1999. Also the dramatic events in the Great Lakes region starting with the 1993 coup in Burundi, and later the Rwandan genocide, were preceded by vast dislocation and migrations of people, some of whom trickled into Zambia.

This led to the opening of Kala and Mwanga refugee camps located in Northern and Luapula Provinces, near the border of DRC. Nangweshi camp was also opened in 2000 to serve the new influxes from Angola. These camps were temporary, emergency relief centers, as opposed to long-term settlements where refugees were expected to be self-sufficient. Ukwimi was reopened in Eastern Province to house former fighters seeking asylum away from the regular refugee population and border, particularly ex-rebel combatants and their families from Angola. UNHCR and the Zambian government engaged in screening exercises to separate the combatants and ensure that Zambian territories were not being used to launch attacks against Angola.

The height of refugee hosting occurred at the end of 2001 with a conservative estimate of nearly 300,000 refugees living in Zambia (USCRI 2002). Despite these dramatic increases, Zambia continued to be very generous in the acceptance of refugees. Although it insisted on
camp-only settlement, Zambia has not been involved in the forced return of refugees to their country of origin, like some of its southern African neighbors. The protection of refugees was the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs and COR, based on the Refugee (Control) Act 1970 and international legal instruments. Yet refugee protection has long benefited from the significant presence of independent NGOs and those operating as UNHCR partners to augment Zambia’s limited economic and institutional resources. UNHCR had become the de facto custodian of refugees, given its long history of cooperation with the Zambian government (LRF 2002).

However to ensure control over camps and settlements by the state, a Refugee Officer from COR held authority over all Zambian government officials as well as NGO staff and refugees. Refugees who wanted to leave the camp to visit relatives, trade, or work on Zambian farms were required to obtain permission from the Refugee Officer, although many people left without permission (Bakewell 2002:9). UNHCR and international aid agencies assisted the government in providing these services, while also playing a lead role in the management of settlements. For example, in 1997 the Lutheran World Federation was the largest NGO supporting the management of Meheba.

It was responsible for the maintenance of the infrastructure, such as roads, the allocation of plots of land, the distribution of rations to those unable to produce sufficient food, and also to provide some technical support to the health, education and agricultural sectors (Bakewell 2000:367).

The cooperation between UNHCR, NGOs, and the Zambian government increased the state’s capacity to control border areas, address security threats, manage aid agencies, and control refugee resources (Jacobsen 2002:589). However the interests of the state and those of the donor agencies often differed in significant ways.
The state's interests are to ensure (1) that the international community sees the refugees as their responsibility and keeps assistance flowing into the country; (2) that refugee assistance benefits its citizens and the state itself; and (3) that the state is not sidelined by international relief agencies, or it will lose legitimacy. The state must be seen by its citizens to be actively involved in bringing benefits and addressing security problems. The donor agencies' interests are to ensure that: (1) the state continues to allow refugees to enter its territory; and (2) over time the state takes more responsibility for refugees, especially their security and protection (Jacobsen 2002:589).

The tensions between the two became more apparent as UNHCR built the capacity of COR, but encountered resistance from politicians and others in the government as to the nature of security and protection of refugees. Under the Refugee (Control) Act 1970, a person who entered the country as a refugee remained a refugee, passed refugee status through generations, and was required to remain in official settlements unless granted permission by the government to stay elsewhere. In 1998 when it became clear that many Angolan refugees would stay in Zambia indefinitely, UNHCR began to push for more durable solutions, including integration and naturalization, and for updated refugee legislation that recognized Zambia’s international obligations towards refugees and clarified how refugees should be treated.

UNHCR worked for the desired impact “to sustain tolerance for refugee presence and minimize xenophobia against asylum seekers, as well as the inclusion of refugees in the development agenda of Zambia” (2004a:2). They advocated for the recognition of refugees as agents of change and the conversion of longstanding settlements like Meheba and Mayukwayukwa into “development oriented interventions” (LRF 2002:100). Despite some government reticence, the first outcome of this effort was the Zambian Initiative in 2002. Its main objective was “to alleviate the combined efforts of food deficit, poor infrastructure, limited access to public services and economic activities and in the process [find] durable solutions for refugees” (UNHCR 2004e:3).
Focused on the refugee-affected areas in Western Province, the project’s goal was to integrate refugees into their host community while helping the local region develop. The Zambian Initiative involved small-scale projects in agriculture, health, education and infrastructure identified jointly by the government and members of local communities. The project got off to a promising start. In 2002, the Home Affairs Minister even encouraged local authorities to release more land to the government for the purpose of refugee settlement and requested the general public to welcome refugees with “open hands” (LRF 2002:101). However, the end of the war in Angola and mass repatriation of Angolans in 2002 hampered the project. Local traditional authorities indicated that their preference was for Angolan refugees to return to their home country, rather than integrated into Zambia. Government authorities also expressed concern that the remaining number of Angolan refugees was far too large for local integration (UNHCR 2007b:11). Additionally, the Initiative faced continued funding challenges despite the fact that it was regularly touted as a success story for local integration and cooperation with the host government. Despite its setbacks, the Initiative did reveal that Zambia was open to the idea of rural integration.

**Repatriation and Cessation Clause**

In 2007, urban refugee leaders and UNHCR staff met on the lawn of the UNHCR Zambia branch office on the outskirts of Lusaka to welcome the new UNHCR Senior Protection Officer. Depreciatingly, the outgoing Senior Protection Officer laughingly said there were probably many things he had done badly during his time as head of UNHCR Zambia. The thrust of his speech focused on encouraging refugees to return to settlements and repatriation prospects. Due to the persistent resistance of many urban refugees to repatriation, he ended with this: “What is stopping you from talking about repatriation is fear, maybe well founded, maybe not. There are
maybe false stories from radio, TV, or from countrymen. Fear is dangerous for you, your children and grandchildren. Don’t let it become like a virus to infect other refugees. The decision to go home, let it be individual.” Similarly, speaking ahead of the 2006 World Refugee Day, Home Affairs Deputy Minister Justine Chilufya remarked that Zambia remained committed to providing international protection for refugees and appreciated the actions “taken by the international community and respective governments to bring to an end situations that cause and create refugees thereby creating a concrete opportunity for a large number of refugees to be returned home” (The Post Zambia 2006b).

The comments of both the Senior Protection Officer and Home Affairs Deputy Minister indicated that repatriation was the preferred durable solution, particularly since the mid-1980s when both refugee resettlement and integration solutions began declining (Aleinkoff 1995; Chimi 1998; 1999; Crisp 2004; Rutinwa 1999; 2002; Stein 1986; UNHCR 1995a). Since that time, the Zambian government clearly stated that the most viable solution for refugees was voluntary repatriation. The UNHCR Senior Protection Officer reassured the urban refugee leaders that “repatriation is not forcing people to return and we won’t allow the Zambian government or your government to force repatriation. However, repatriation happens when this government, UNHCR and countries, such as Angola and Congo, [agree] and when the conditions are no longer there, no civil war.”

Zambia is a signatory to the 1969 OAU Convention, which specified, “the essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will.” However, the pressure on refugees residing in Zambia to return was evident in the lack of viable alternatives such as local integration. In response to resistance to repatriation among Congolese refugees, the Minister of Home Affairs, Lameck Mangani stated
firmly, “it is not up to the refugees to decide whether they want to remain in Zambia or be repatriated. All that these refugees need to do is to psychologically prepare before the repatriation commences…” (Chitupila 2010:10). However, in practice return was often less straightforward.

When the 27-year civil war in Angola ended in April 2002 and conditions stabilized, a tripartite agreement was made between the government of Zambia, the government of Angola and UNHCR to facilitate voluntary repatriation and ensure that refugees return “in safety and with dignity” (UNHCR 2004a). UNHCR coordinated a four-year program, from July 2003 through January 2007, to support Angolan refugees who wanted to return. A total of 74,064 refugees were assisted to return from Nangweshi, Mayukwayukwa, and Meheba, as well as some self-settled refugees (Table 12).

Table 12. Refugees Repatriated from Zambia by Year

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51,283</td>
<td>43,507</td>
<td>46,499</td>
<td>29,758</td>
<td>21,941</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>275</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>7,826</td>
<td>9,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5,966</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>54,293</td>
<td>43,761</td>
<td>46,560</td>
<td>29,843</td>
<td>26,759</td>
<td>10,341</td>
<td>10,123</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR n.d.

Repatriation had a large impact on the economic productivity of Zambia’s sparsely populated areas and the success of the Zambian Initiative. A Zambian farmer near Meheba commented, “I am not happy that they are going back—we have lived long with these colleagues of ours” (IRIN 2005). Interactions between the local community and refugees had been encouraged through sharing of public utilities and services that were rehabilitated by donor
funds, participating in training programs together and relying on refugee food production (IRIN 2005). Recent severe food shortages in the refugee settlements and surrounding areas that resulted from the large number of repatriating Angolans revealed their positive agricultural contributions (UNHCR 2007c:15).

About 42,000 Angolan refugees were left in Zambia in 2007, 18,000 in designated sites and another 24,000 self-settled in border villages and towns (UNHCR-WFP 2007:9). To keep the possibility of return open, UNHCR implemented an “assisted spontaneous return program” to facilitate the return of smaller numbers of Angolan refugees remaining in asylum countries (National Assembly of Zambia 2011:3). However, many of the remaining refugees were resistant to repatriation due to fears of insecurity in Angola. Effects of long-term war and instability, including poor infrastructure, limited primary healthcare and education, and food shortages were common in the areas of return and a valid refugee concern when compared to their lives in Zambia.

A more important reason for resisting repatriation was refugees’ well-established social networks in Zambia. During Bakewell’s study of self-settled refugees and the prospect of repatriation, he found that Angolan refugees were no longer considered refugees, but were now part of local villages and indistinguishable from Zambians (2000:370). Peace in Angola was merely a new opportunity in a long history of cross border migration, a sharp contrast to the official solution of return and rebuilding. Even in refugee settlements, a 2008 UNHCR survey of Angolan refugees on repatriation found that willingness to return was lowest in Mayukwayukwa where refugees have lived the longest, some for over 40 years (UNHCR 2009a). The threat of repatriation even led some Angolan refugees, many born and educated in Zambia and married to locals, to flee settlements and settle in nearby communities (Xinhau 2006; Shimo 2009).
Angolan refugees were not the only group who resisted repatriation efforts. A tripartite agreement was signed by Rwanda, Zambia, and UNHCR to initiate the formal repatriation of Rwandan refugees in January 2003. Unconvinced by assurances from the Rwandan government and UNHCR on security and safety available upon return, fewer than 250 refugees had presented themselves for voluntary repatriation since 2003. In January 2006, around 3,500 Rwandan refugees lived Meheba, 90 in Mayukwayukwa, 1,100 in urban areas, and an estimated 900 in rural areas, generally self-settled (UNHCR 2007c:49).

Despite information campaigns to increase awareness of an inclusive new constitution in Rwanda, and peaceful presidential elections, Rwandan refugees took a negative view of repatriation (UNHCR 2005a). Resistance was rooted in fears of persecution upon return, on the part of Tutsis who differed with the policies of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front and Hutus who were afraid they would accused of participating in the genocide (Veroff 2010:29). One man commented to the Times of Zambia, “I don't think there is reconciliation in Rwanda because we hear most people returning home have been arrested and detained in various prisons for allegedly taking part in the genocide. What we know is that people are being killed upon arrival from their countries of asylum” (Kapembwa 2004).

The UNHCR Senior Protection Officer tried to address these persistent rumors when he stated to urban refugees, “fear is dangerous for you, your children and grandchildren. Don’t let it become like a virus to infect other refugees.” Despite “go-and-see” visits by a few refugees, pressures from international groups, and threats of removal of the refugee status, Rwandan refugees remained vocally opposed to return. A refugee who had recently returned to Rwanda from Zambia blamed refugee leaders for the reticence, “I believe if we strategize and remove those top groups that are blocking others, refugees will be free to come back home” (Kabeera
A Zambian delegate at a meeting with Rwandan government officials supported this belief: “Some of these refugee leaders are intellectuals; many are doctors and lecturers. They know what they’re doing though. However, we have to intervene and pave way for the refugees to return” (Kabeera 2012).

A tripartite agreement was also signed for the voluntary repatriation of refugees from the DRC on November 28, 2006 (UNHCR-WFP 2007:10). In light of the successful parliamentary and presidential elections in July 2006, it was felt that repatriation could begin in the next year. The DRC Ambassador to Zambia appealed to Congolese refugees, “The president needs you, the land needs you for development, the soil needs you” (Xinhua 2007).

Despite delays due to funding and renewed insecurity in Moba, one of the sites of return in southeastern DRC, the UNHCR facilitated the return of 43,244 Congolese refugees between 2007 and 2010. The majority of returnees were from Kala and Mwange camps in Northern and Luapula province, leading to their closure in 2010 (National Assembly of Zambia 2011:3). The Zambian Home Affairs Permanent Secretary warned Congolese refugees, “Mwange and Kala will be closed by the end of the year and you have to take advantage of the voluntary repatriation and return to your country. The reasons why you left your country are known but now there is peace in Congo. We have been there before and we know what we are talking about. Once the refugee status has ceased, you will not be able to meet the immigration criteria” (Times of Zambia 2010).

In the end, the approximately 2,000 individuals who did not want to return were transferred to Meheba. With the end of formal repatriation, Congolese refugees in settlements and urban areas could still be assisted to return by UNHCR, through funds for transport and a cash grant (National Assembly of Zambia 2011:3). However, Mushata Bobo, a Congolese
refugee in Meheba, described a common sentiment, "children have been born here in this camp. They are now in secondary school. Why should we go back?" (Kaunda 2008).

The Permanent Secretary suggested invocation of the cessation clause, which was discussed in all major repatriation efforts. The 1951 Refugee Convention described “Cessation Clauses,” which, when invoked, end the international protection of a specific group of refugees. “He [the refugee] can no longer, because of circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality” (UN General Assembly 1951:137). If invoked in Zambia, this would cause the formal loss of refugee status and refugees would then be considered illegal immigrants.

The UNHCR, in consultation with the governments hosting Angolan refugees, considered applying the clause by the end of 2007 (UNHCR-WFP 2007; Darwin 2005). While repeated assurances have been made that the repatriation of Rwandans is strictly voluntary, the UNHCR handout on voluntary repatriation stated, “a time may come when UNHCR will invoke the cessation clause” (Williams 2004:5). Indicating that Zambia was indeed torn about its commitment to refugees yet unwilling to take drastic measures against them, the cessation clause has never been invoked for any refugee group, and, so far, dates set for its implementation have been continually delayed.

The delay in firm implementation of the Cessation Clause was due in part to logistical difficulties in its application. To comply with international law, the Zambian government would have to process every individual petition claim for exception from the Cessation Clause and the right to stay in Zambia, a process that would require significant resources and personnel and would be nearly equivalent to conducting a second refugee status determination (Darwin
2005:22). In addition, refugees would be required to prove that they still needed international protection or to regularize their stay in Zambia according to existing local immigration regulations. For Zambia, the possibility of local legal integration was still unclear for refugees, undoubtedly contributing to the UNHCR’s hesitancy in pushing for invocation of the Cessation Clause.

However, discussion of cessation is certainly a motivational tool to encourage repatriation and, for some, perceived as akin to forced repatriation. During a meeting with the refugee leaders in Lusaka, the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer tried to prepare urban refugees for the possibility that Zambia would invoke the Cessation Clause, saying, “the coat of ‘refugee’ has to come off sometime. It is not for all time.” When the time comes, “you are no longer refugees. You don’t have to go back, but maybe you can start a new life in Zambia or another country.” He followed with the emphasis on repatriation, assuring refugees that this was a feasible option and not something to fear.

The Senior Protection Officer later explained in an interview that as a result of strong urban refugee resistance, they would be the last group to be prepared for repatriation, after refugees located in settlements and even those self-settled in rural areas. Many urban refugees had lived in Lusaka for over 15 years with established family links with local Zambians, and considered Zambia their home, similar to their long-staying Angolan counterparts in Western and North Western provinces. Families resulting from intermarriage between Zambians and refugees would risk separation, since marriage does not confer Zambian citizenship or residency rights.

Deeply rooted fear of return among the urban refugees was equally prevalent. Direct experience with violence impacted the refugees’ views of their countries of origin. Over 80
percent of refugees said that the main reason they fled was due to the fact that members of their immediate family or they themselves had been attacked or arrested. Some refugees were part of political opposition groups and were directly targeted by those currently in power or who remained in what would be “home”.

For example, Luba-Kasai refugees who fled urban areas in the Katanga province in the DRC\(^{22}\) were also part of larger expulsion of Kasaians in the region. Not only did they have no home or family to return to in the area, cities such as Lubumbashi continued to discriminate against outsiders. Kabwe-Segatti and Landau’s recent analysis of Lubumbashi and the treatment of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) found that,

> Rhetoric and formal policy suggest a progressive and inclusive city, yet Lubumbashi has a repeated history of sometimes violent xenophobia against both IDPs and long-term residents with origins elsewhere in Congo—particularly those from the country’s Kasai Province (2007:72).

Furthermore, DRC government officials emphasized that repatriation exercises from Kala and Mwange did not include movement to urban areas. The Congolese Ministry of Home Affairs Permanent Secretary said,

> Our towns have already problems in their surroundings. We have a big number of unemployed people. If some refugees return and go and settle on the surroundings of the town and settle themselves there then we risk having urban tumor that will result into criminal activities. We will have a lot of children without families and if those children won’t have families they turn into street children (Kalaluka 2009).

At the end of June 2007, Zambia still hosted some 117,000 refugees despite repatriation efforts. Approximately 54 percent of the refugees lived in refugee settlements and five percent were in urban areas, while the rest settled spontaneously in different parts of the country (UNHCR 2007c:194). The UNHCR Senior Protection Officer commented, "Some of the

\(^{22}\) The Katanga Province borders Zambia and its regional capital, Lubumbashi, is located 355 miles north of Lusaka. The Luba immigrated to the region during the colonial period from a neighboring province to the north, Kasai Oriental Province.
refugees tend to beat the system by staying away, others lack knowledge about the law, but in most cases it's a calculated attempt to break the rules and later stay in urban areas" (IRIN 2006). Ultimately UNHCR was unable to monitor and include these refugees in repatriation programs.

UNHCR’s analysis of gaps in refugee protection in Zambia recommended local integration as the best possible solution for long-staying refugees, particularly Angolans:

Durable solutions strategies should take into account the situation of those who have been in Zambia for as long as three decades; those who were born in Zambia and consider it their home; and those have established family links with the local Zambians. Voluntary repatriation is not the preferred durable solution for these categories of refugees (UNHCR 2007c:47).

**Resettlement**

Resettlement to a third country, mainly the United States, Canada, Australia and the Nordic countries, reflects the principle of burden sharing and is a way to support host countries in their efforts to cope with mass flows of refugees (Crisp et al. 2009). However, it was a realistic durable solution for a limited few. From 1999-2008, the total number of resettled refugees from Zambia was slightly higher than Table 13 shows, as some refugees achieved resettlement independent of UNHCR, but in comparison to the total numbers of refugees living in Zambia, the number was negligible.

**Table 13. Number of UNHCR Assisted Resettled Refugees From Zambia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR n.d.*

102
Maureen, a UNHCR Resettlement Officer, noted that, in the past, Zambia had been plagued with problems during the resettlement process, including false information given by refugees. Zambia now provided high quality, well-researched cases, which helped increase the number of resettled cases. The Red Cross, its outreach centers, and other NGOs often recommended vulnerable refugees to the resettlement unit for investigation. The integrated reliance on referrals from trusted sources was to the exclusion of unsolicited requests from refugees. UNHCR resettlement officers announced to the refugee leaders in mid-2007 that UNHCR would no longer accept individual letters from refugees requesting resettlement. They emphasized that a specific unit in UNHCR that handled protection, community services, and resettlement, which would identify refugees. The new policy was summed up as “don’t come to us. We will come to you. Put it out of your head that if you remain in Zambia, you will eventually be resettled.”

In light of resettlement demands and additional fears of a “pull” to urban areas from camps, UNHCR consistently emphasized the limited opportunity to resettle.

In cases not related to immediate protection concerns, particularly those falling under the criteria of lack of local integration prospects, a decision to refer for resettlement may be influenced by the availability of places. Without reasonable assurances that cases will be considered, UNHCR abstains from referring cases because doing so may raise expectations, create an unmanageable demand, and in turn even lead to security problems (UNHCR 2004d:IV/2 [original emphasis]).

The process of reviewing cases was rigorous and often very slow, due to UNHCR’s investigation process, but also that of the accepting country. The lack of speed and flexibility led to administrative delays and general ambiguity for refugees interviewed by the UNHCR. During my research, a number of refugees asked me for help in finding out what was going on with their resettlement cases. Fear and caution, rather than hope, characterized their view of the
resettlement possibility. For example, Mark and his family, refugees from DRC, had been waiting years to hear a decision. He had even gone through United States orientation and medical check-ups twice, since his first set expired as he waited. Even though others in his group had been resettled already, there was a hold up with his case. He cautioned me to be delicate when inquiring at UNHCR so as not to somehow upset his chances; he was eventually resettled to the United States a year after I left.

The mystery around resettlement was due to the slow, unclear process that was open only to a select few, which led to an overall skepticism in Lusaka. One refugee commented, “UNHCR is resettling criminals,” reflecting a belief that those lying to get through the system were fundamentally undeserving. Among the Rwandan population in Meheba, there was mistrust of resettlement due to persistent rumors that those promised resettlement in the United States or Europe were diverted mid-flight and returned to Kigali (Veroff 2010:29). These perceptions made refugees attending resettlement interviews with UNHCR very cautious and quiet. More educated urban refugees placed unrealistically high expectations on UNHCR and resettlement prospects, similarly documented by Horst (2002). During my interviews, the active pursuit of resettlement options seemed confined to those with some resources, whether education, knowledge of English, or even transport money. Alternatively, UNHCR actively sought only those particularly vulnerable, often single women. When asked their plans for the future, a number of refugees commented that they were frustrated with Zambia, but had no intention of returning to their country of origin and would be open to resettlement to a third country. However, this did not seem to be a particular strategy the majority of urban refugees were actively pursuing, nor was it the defining factor in remaining in Lusaka.
Refugee Burden and Urban Refugees

As apparent from the above discussion, the presence of refugees in rural areas was relatively tolerated in Zambia. The Zambian Initiative proved that even government officials were open to some local integration as a long-term solution and many self-settled refugees in rural communities were left alone. However, economic decline and the resulting poverty of many Zambians caused tensions to surface where they had not previously existed, particularly in urban areas. These became apparent with the large increase of urban asylum seekers, making refugees a more visible population in an increasingly urbanized country. The result was the development of specific policies to address the urban refugee population.

Like the self-settled refugees in Zambia’s rural areas, many refugees tried to stay out of official camps and settlements and moved to urban areas. Pitterman (1984) commented that the early decrease in size of the Mayukwayukwa settlement in 1969 was because refugees found ways to fend for themselves elsewhere in Zambia. “The elsewhere was Lusaka; within a short while, the Zambian authorities admitted having a major urban refugee problem” (Pitterman 1984:44). While refugees who settled near the borders of Angola and DRC were often left undisturbed, the government has always been concerned about refugees congregating in urban areas of Lusaka or in Zambia’s mining region. In 1988, there were 2,660 urban refugees. However, by 1996, UNHCR (1996:20-21) reported that Zambia hosted some 16,000 urban refugees from various countries, the largest group originating from DRC, but also including a number of asylum seekers from Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia.

Lodging and support for early urban refugee arrivals was provided at a Lusaka-based refugee camp, Makeni Refugee Transit Centre, in Makeni compound, on the outskirts of town.

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23 Makeni Refugee Camp was originally host to African National Congress refugees from South Africa and was subjected to attacks by the South African government in 1986.
UNHCR encouraged many to integrate into Zambian society “through education sponsorship, job placement, income-generating opportunities, and where all urban-based options fail, placement in an agricultural settlement where farming is the main occupation” (UNHCR 1994:5). However the government became more concerned about urban refugees, particularly as Zambian in-migration rose significantly and stretched the limits of urban social services (UNHCR 1994:3). Tensions increased between refugees, particularly with the influx of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, and with members of the local community (UNHCR 1994:3).

In 1995, the Zambian government decided to close Makeni and move all urban refugees to the rural settlement in Meheba (UNHCR 1995b:3). Some were transferred, but many refugees settled into the surrounding compounds. For the time being, refugees of urban background and with promise of legal employment, such as professionals or businessmen and women, were allowed to remain in urban areas. Makeni eventually evolved into a residential transit center strictly dedicated for those awaiting resettlement to a third country or repatriation to their country of origin. It also served as a resource center for urban refugees.

As part of an extensive effort by UNHCR to improve the refugee status determination process and hand over full control to COR, UNHCR and COR began discussing a program to regularize the status of urban refugees. Standard operating procedures for the determination of refugee status and eligibility for urban residency status were drafted. Through extensive training and workshops, the overall coherence and effectiveness of eligibility status determination procedures was improved. UNHCR also funded legal advisors to help clear the considerable backlog in refugee applications and to increase COR’s overall capacity to dictate and enforce refugee policy.
According to Ms. Chaiwila, the Senior Legal Officer for COR, Zambia had a very liberal interpretation of its refugee law prior to the large-scale influx of refugees that began in 1999. At that point, the government started to follow the letter of the law, enforcing the criteria on residency and ensuring that refugees stay in camps. As Ms. Chaiwila explained it, “once the social and economic impact was felt, the government had the will to implement the law and enforce its measures.” This led to the 2000 creation of the Residency Sub-Committee to review and adjudicate refugee requests for urban residency.

In 1999, the Zambian government asked UNHCR for assistance in registering about 15,000 refugees who lived and worked in urban areas. UNHCR spokesman Kelvin Shimo said: "We handed over electronic equipment worth US $150,000 to the Ministry on Sunday after signing a memorandum of understanding." The equipment "will allow the Zambian authorities to issue all bona fide refugees living in towns and cities with a bar-coded identification document about the size of a credit card" (IRIN 2000b).

As a backdrop to this support, UNHCR finally adopted a policy related to urban refugees in 1997. It focused on establishing that, “as a rule, UNHCR’s assistance should be reduced to a minimum,” in urban areas, to encourage self-reliance and reduce dependency (Obi and Crisp 2001:15). It was suggested that UNHCR “may no longer be prepared to support long-term care and maintenance of urban cases” (UNHCR 1995c:4). However, the document was very skeptical of urban refugees in general, characterizing them as “problems,” an unreasonable burden on UNHCR assistance programs, overly demanding, and even violent (HRW 2002:20).

24 Microsoft donated the equipment to UNHCR. It was field-tested in the Balkans before being used to register urban refugees in both New Delhi and Lusaka in 2000. It was originally advertised as “restoring a sense of self” and “reconnecting families.” In the Balkans, demographic data were never made publicly available to connect family and friends and, as in Lusaka, just over 10% of names entered in the database were ever given refugee cards (Nyers 2006).
The 1997 Policy and Practice Regarding Urban Refugees was immediately criticized as taking an essentially negative perspective towards urban refugees (Obi and Crisp 2000:22). The strongest condemnation came from Human Rights Watch, which attacked the policy as “misguided,” and recommended that it be replaced with a new policy that would “avoid generalizations, derogatory depictions, or incorrect assumptions about urban refugees… that undermine efforts to address their protection concerns” (HRW 2002:11). Although widely criticized by those inside the UNHCR and its NGO partners, UNHCR’s rural camp bias was evident. A UNHCR Uganda representative articulated this position: “It is easier for [UN]HCR to deal with refugees in the camp setting. At some point we have to stop paying rent of refugees. We recommend to refugees that they should go to settlements” (HRW 2002:79).

Five new criteria for residency status were agreed upon by the government and UNHCR. They included (1) having a permit for employment, self-employment, or study issued by the Immigration Department, (2) needing medical care unavailable in the camps, (3) establishing family connections with refugees already in urban areas, (4) having special security problems, or (5) awaiting resettlement to a third country. The electronic cards were valid from one to three years and available for renewal. UNHCR organized seminars to ensure that police and immigration authorities would recognize the electronic cards across the country. The implementation of the government’s new urban residency policy finally institutionalized Zambia’s previously noted reservations to the Geneva Convention concerning refugees’ rights to employment, education, and freedom of movement.

The impact of this registration of urban refugees was not that 15,000 refugees now held cards that ensured their safe residency in Lusaka, but rather that the strict criteria severely limited the number of refugees who could legally live outside of camps. At the end of 2001, UNHCR
reported assisting 654 Angolans, 10,248 Congolese, 627 Burundians, 1,795 Rwandans and 1,044 refugees from other countries who lived in urban areas, the majority in Lusaka (UNHCR 2002a). After the exercise ended in 2002, around 4,000 urban refugees were issued electronic cards that permitted them to settle legally in urban areas. Those who did not meet the set criteria were requested to relocate to camps and settlements. Failure to comply was a violation of both the prevailing Immigration Act and the 1970 Refugee (Control) Act.

UNHCR claimed that the regularization program of urban refugees had greatly reduced the quantity of arbitrary detentions of refugees and asylum seekers (Field 2006; UNHCR 2001; 2002b). The electronic cards contained 30 UNHCR hallmarks, an imprinted signature, and a photograph of the bearer so that they could not be copied or forged. Since the electronic cards contained biometric data backed up on a central database, it reduced the likelihood that refugees would be erroneously returned to camps if their cards were lost or stolen. It also allowed for swift release if mistakenly detained. A research paper commissioned by the UNHCR endorsed the program as a “clear demonstration that the regularization/registration of urban refugees, using an effective electronic system, can reduce the incidence of detention” (UNHCR 2006a:255). It also reassured the Zambian government that others were not misusing the benefits the program offered a few refugees.

More broadly, the strict application of residency standards reflected a growing anti-foreigner and anti-refugee sentiment. Multi-party elections and increased freedom of the press in many countries amplified exclusionary nationalist rhetoric as politicians sought to secure public support and limit political competition. A new political tactic of investigating the nationalities of prominent opposition leaders sought to use the “foreigner” label to exclude and delegitimize.
Yet, the crackdown on foreigners extended beyond political figures. Citizens and government officials were increasingly hostile towards refugees, blaming them for resource shortages and rising crime (Whitaker 2005:118). One refugee living in Lusaka commented, “If there is problem between [the two major political parties in Zambia] refugees are attacked.”

McDonald and Jacobs’ (2005:320) research on xenophobia in the press in southern Africa found that anti-foreigner rhetoric often came from state-owned media, which was increasingly used as a propaganda machine for the ruling party. Analyzing the relatively small sample size of news media available from 2000-2005, they found that Zambian media coverage was:

replete with references to illegal immigrants, conflating all migrants with refugees, singling out certain nationalities, blaming foreigners for crime waves, and using metaphors such as “swarming masses” to describe migration into the country. The media regularly repeat anti-foreigner rhetoric by government officials (McDonald and Jacob 2005:32).


A Department of Immigration spokesperson, Danny Lungu justified the government’s decision to remove refugees to settlements because of the increase in crime, which he associated with the high presence of aliens in urban areas (Mwiinga 2000). In October 2000, a police spokesperson commented that refugees were a serious threat to the security of the country. Residents were cautioned and requested to work with police “so that refugees do not make Zambia a haven for crime” (Zambia Daily Mail 2000). Shortly after the new residency standards went into effect, Immigration officers began raiding areas, frequently late at night, where large numbers of refugees were known to live and rounding up people who could not produce valid residence permits.
According to many refugee sources, Immigration officers conducting raids demanded bribes and, if not produced, refugees were arrested (Gallagher 2005:9). Many families were suddenly uprooted from Lusaka, forced to leave their homes and possessions, and taken to a refugee settlement. Others were imprisoned in one of Lusaka’s life threatening jails alongside convicted criminal prisoners, where some languished for years waiting for transport to camps or to be deported. The Department of Immigration defended these sweeps, accusing urban refugees of masquerading as workers or students, forging refugee identity cards, absconding from settlements, and possessing expired gate passes (Mwiinga 2000).

To augment the implementation of new residency standards and registration exercise, UNHCR also pursued updated refugee legislation. The Refugee (Control) Act of 1970 only focused on how and where refugees could reside in Zambia and did not detail the process for status determination or the rights and benefits associated with that status. UNHCR sought to remove these limitations, and, in 2002, it worked with the Zambian government to draft a new Refugee Bill to enhance the overall protection environment.

In 2001, three workshops on international refugee law and related issues were held with government officials and NGOs to for presenting the Bill to Parliament (UNHCR 2001). On December 18, 2002, the Bill was opened for discussion and introduced by the acting Minister of Home Affairs. He emphasized the need to uphold international standards and noted that the government had been working with UNHCR, specifically through the Zambian Initiative, to extend assistance to local communities to mitigate any negative impacts of large refugee settlements. He also reassured the Members of Parliament (MPs) that the new bill continued many of Zambia’s restrictions on refugees and possibilities for integration, but regularized the administration of refugees.
The reaction of the MPs to the bill revealed some misperceptions about the refugee situation and the details of the new bill, as well as strong xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments. An MP near Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement, led the attack stating,

we are not going to support this move because this law is not in the interest of the people of Zambia. You have not convinced us, as people of Zambia and representatives of Zambians as to the problems that the refugees have encountered. They move freely and are all over. Go to Soweto Market [in Lusaka], most of those stands are occupied by refugees. Who is harassing them? None, they even have shops in compounds, so what is your problem? You want them to become village headmen? We are saying the issue of becoming a village headman or Chief is a privilege of a Zambian and we shall not surrender that because that is what makes us what we are and we are not going to support you to bring settlers here to outnumber us and bring confusion... (National Assembly of Zambia 2002).

The opposition MPs complained that the overwhelming numbers of refugees had destroyed Zambia’s forests and rivers, brought guns and violence, and taken resources and jobs from Zambians. MP Princess Nakatindi Wina said that already some 1,300 refugees were crossing the Zambian borders every week and 270 families had been displaced in Lukulu, located in Western Province near the border of Angola, by rampaging asylum seekers (National Assembly of Zambia 2002). Several MPs called for mass repatriation; refugees should “pack up and go.”

Outrage particularly centered on the idea of naturalization, which was described as “national suicide.” Mr. Sibetta, from Northern Province, asked, “Why give citizenship to people who will later use your country as base to destabilise your country and the countries they come from” (National Assembly of Zambia 2002)? A repeated perception of refugees was that they were fundamentally different from Zambians, unable to accept the law and order in an essentially peaceful Zambian society because “they were born in war, participated in war and ran away from war” (National Assembly of Zambia 2002). Refugees were considered destructive by nature. The
new bill would bring “people who will cause more problems for our people culturally, socially, economically, morally, and even politically. We do not want these people” (National Assembly of Zambia 2002). The responses of the MPs reflected deep skepticism over the possibility of refugees changing their national allegiance and honoring what it meant to be a Zambian. The comparison was made, “a gorilla is a gorilla” and “a refugee is a refugee,” amid laughter.

Finally many MPs questioned the motivations of the government in submitting this bill, whether it was just a ploy to create citizens so that they would vote for the ruling MMD party. This reflected continuous rumors that National Registration Cards were distributed to refugees in Western Province to get votes, particularly following the 2001 election.

The acting Minister of Home Affairs asked the Speaker to withdraw the Bill, so that it could be saved for later resubmission, noting that there was “obvious misunderstanding and failure to have sufficient time to understand the Bill” (National Assembly of Zambia 2002). Refugee advocates remained hopeful that the Bill could be resubmitted. COR and UNHCR ran a number of workshops to enhance sensitivity about refugee issues. Repatriation continued and refugee numbers began to decline significantly with the closing of several camps. Advocates hoped that this would relieve security concerns and allow politicians to consider integration for the residual caseloads of refugees. Father Gallagher of the Jesuit Refugee Service noted that, "it is much easier for a country, say Zambia, to think about absorbing 20,000 people who have been there most of their lives than it was to think about absorbing 200,000 Angolans” (JRS 2007).

In August 2007, UNHCR met with MPs to propose the integration of Angolan refugees who remained in Zambia at the end of the repatriation exercise and to discuss the Refugee Bill. In a closed-door session, the MPs again angrily protested that the number was still too high and
that such a number would cause future problems for Zambian communities, protesting “No! They should go back to their countries” (Silwamba 2007). MPs of districts that experienced protracted refugee hosting particularly objected to the Bill.

The Home Affairs Permanent Secretary Peter Mumba felt that the MPs were against local integration of refugees due to insufficient information on the refugee situation. This debate revealed tensions and contradictions within the Zambian government. The Ministry of Home Affairs and COR were directly involved with refugees and UNHCR and had invested much time and effort in creating long-term solutions. Alternatively politicians were more concerned with the political ramifications of the new refugee legislation. During an interview with me, one UNHCR staff member expressed doubts about the success of passing any legislation, noting a comment made during the workshop, that “refugees eat our dogs.”

In 2008 a new Refugee Bill was drafted that again contained positive implications for the refugee situation, which had not been passed as of January 2013. However the new bill did not address the important issue of durable solutions for refugees, specifically legal integration, since it completely removed any mention of naturalization. If passed, this new legislation would still not address the large refugee population affected by protracted conflict, such as Congolese refugees, and many Angolan and urban refugees who are reluctant to return despite restoration of peace. As of July 2007, there were still 114,928 refugees in Zambia (Table 14), not including the large number of urban refugees not provided official urban residency who had become part of uncounted self-settled refugees.
Table 14. Zambian Refugee Population as of July 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp location</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meheba</td>
<td>8,472</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayukwayukwa</td>
<td>10,067</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kala</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17,125</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwange</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19,905</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Camps</strong></td>
<td>18,539</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>40,436</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Urban</strong></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>5,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-settled</strong></td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>40,627</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>57,580</td>
<td>4,035</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>8,804</td>
<td>114,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: COR 2007b*

**Conclusion**

The international community often praised Zambia for its extreme hospitality and generosity and for having a deep-rooted culture of receiving refugees despite limited economic resources. At the height of the refugee burden, a new urban residency policy was put in place as part of an effort to improve the overall coherence and effectiveness of refugee management and to give the Zambian government more control over individuals entering the country. It reflected very real concerns over the arrival of combatants, proliferation of arms, limited resources, and burden sharing with the international community. The policy institutionalized Zambia’s reservation to the Geneva Convention concerning refugees’ rights to employment, education, and freedom of movement. The very limited way in which the policy was put in place, by making many long-term refugee residents of Lusaka illegal and limiting durable solutions to repatriation only, reflected growing anti-foreigner sentiments. The virulent reaction of MPs to the possibility of citizenship for refugees reflected not only political manipulations, but also national anxieties brought on by SAPs and their devastating impact on the Zambia.

Despite the various efforts of the Zambian government to keep refugee populations isolated in camps and settlements until they could be repatriated, many refugees continued to
find ways to live outside of designated sites with the local population, both in urban and rural areas, and many continued to resist repatriation, even when pressured by UNHCR. While there was no legal option for integration into Zambia through naturalization, refugees found ways to undermine official policy and structures. The next chapter explores the reception of refugees in Lusaka, the registration process, and encounters with state actors who attempted to enforce Zambian policy. How refugees negotiated the political and legal framework of refugee hosting in Zambia reveal both options for social and economic integration in Lusaka and also the limitations of those efforts.
CHAPTER 5
WE JUST AREN’T FREE: CONSTRAINTS
ON URBAN REFUGEES

During a stakeholder meeting regarding the future of the Peace Centre, Ms. Chaiwila, the Senior Legal Advisor of COR, explained to representatives from UNHCR, COR, Immigration, Legal Resources, the Peace Centre, and CRS the steps the Zambian government has taken to address urban refugees. She emphasized the current refugee registration exercise going on in Lusaka and the repatriation programs in refugee camps and settlements. The acting director of the Peace Centre tried express how these steps had affected the urban refugee population, “Refugees are afraid. The tone of discussion in Zambia scares them.” Refugees were afraid of being forced into refugee settlements or back to their country of origin and loosing their families, friends and lives in Lusaka. Ms. Chaiwila shrugged and responded practically, “It is dangerous to refugees if they don’t register [with the government]… They are exposing themselves more to Immigration, and refugees have been found to break the law.” She did not deny the threat of detention. The solution she suggested was to focus more on how to improve life in refugee settlements as a means to reduce the number of refugees wanting to stay Lusaka.

As the starting point, Zambian government believed that refugees should be in camps and settlements and not in urban areas. Yet how this position was actually enforced shaped its real impact on urban refugees. This chapter considers not only how power is exercised through the state, but also how and why systems of control fail to work effectively or efficiently in keeping refugees out of Lusaka. The first section considers experiences of refugees as they arrive in Lusaka and the government structures they encounter. Refugees must negotiate with Immigration officials, representatives of COR, and police to challenge the limits placed on their freedom of movement and right to seek employment or engage in income-generating activities. How
refugees learn to survive in the city also challenges those limits. The later half of the chapter considers the everyday actions of state representatives to enforce its measures to control urban refugees. Considering how refugees have learned to negotiate, counteract or avoid those efforts and remain in Lusaka completes this chapter.

Coming to Lusaka

Edmond and his family were targeted as Congolese Tutsi, or Banyamulenge, a group that was perceived as responsible for the last two wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2002) in DRC and as spies for the rebel movement. For most Banyamulenge this stigma led to exclusion, hostility and abuse by both the government and other ethnic groups in eastern DRC, as well as in the major cities of Lubumbashi and Kinshasa. Edmond and his family had fled their home in Lubumbashi and traveled, southeast through the bush and away from main roads for 60 miles to reach the busy border town of Kasumbalesa. The shared copper wealth of the southern region of DRC and Zambia’s Copperbelt and long history of trade between the two countries meant that Edmond could easily find transport into Zambia from Kasumbalesa and away from the border. Edmond and his family rode seven hours on a lorry that was transporting goods directly to Lusaka. Many refugees who came to Lusaka were like Edmond; it was the primary destination directly from their country or origin. For others, Lusaka was a secondary location after leaving a refugee settlement in the rural areas of Zambia. Who arrived in Lusaka and how exactly they settled into the urban space shaped local connections in Zambia and revealed the context of encountering state actors.

Types of Refugees in Lusaka

One category of urban refugee in arriving in Lusaka comprised educated refugees who had resided in cities in their country of origin, similar to Edmond. These individuals were often
civil servants or professionals and came to Lusaka in an attempt to resume a life similar to the one they had left behind. They did not want to move to the refugee settlement where they were expected to live as subsistence farmers. In my survey sample, over 50 percent of urban refugees had completed some secondary school, and over 30 percent had some tertiary education. Another connected category was refugees coming to attend school in Lusaka. Discussed below, enrolling in an education program was often a way to obtain an urban residency permit. While these might be the primary reasons why both these groups came to Lusaka, it was possible for them to have additional reasons as well, such as the desire to stay with extended family or to improve security, particularly important for refugees from the Great Lakes region.

Alternatively, a number of refugees in Lusaka were vulnerable, sick, elderly or single females trying to care for extended family. They had realized that the hard work of rural life was impossible alone. Some had travelled from camps to seek medical care or visit family members in Lusaka and decided to remain. The Refugee Officer in the camp or settlement issued gate passes for short-term use to visit family, study, sell farm products, or seek medical assistance. Passes specified the reasons for leaving the camp and could be valid for up to 60 days for travel to anywhere in Zambia, except border areas. Once these passes were secured, some refugees decided not to return. One respondent noted that her mother was sick, so the whole family traveled to Lusaka to look for medical help. However, they decided not to return to the camp because life proved better in Lusaka with more access to income-generating activities, schools, transportation, and even the wide variety of consumer goods, like clothing and cell phones.

Many refugees also moved to urban areas because their physical and material security was at risk in the camps, and urban areas provided some anonymity (Buscher 2003). Almost all Rwandan refugees interviewed had fled directly to Lusaka upon arrival in Zambia due to
concerns with security. Others felt insecure in camp settings due to tensions between different clans and ethnic or political groups. Richard, a Congolese refugee, lived in Meheba for 18 years. He began working with the Zambian authorities to help identify recruitment and training activities by a DRC rebel leader that were occurring in Meheba. This ultimately created a number of enemies and forced him to move to Lusaka. Some refugees had relatives or connections in Lusaka and used those networks to find work and accommodation. These connections provided much needed support as asylum seekers waited for the outcome of their refugee status applications and then integrated into city life.

Direct to Lusaka

Refugees left their place of origin for reasons related to conflict and violence; some fled after being subjected to horrific treatment, while others fled in anticipation of imminent danger (Kunz 1981). Despite the urgency and trauma that conflict creates, choosing a particular destination was not dependent solely on the larger political situation. For example, Charlotte’s husband had already fled north to his home village in the Kasai region of DRC when a group of men showed up at her door looking for him. After being raped and seeing her firstborn son killed, she concluded, “So I saw that the problems were too many and I had no one to help me; that is when I ran away to Zambia,” a direction opposite of her husband. While a number of refugees transited through refugee camps before arriving in Lusaka, decisions to go directly to Lusaka and subsequently apply for refugee status in the city often had to do with the availability of transportation, lack of knowledge about the registration processes, security concerns, and urban backgrounds.

Like Edmond, many individuals and families had to search out transportation wherever possible, often walking long distances. Refugees begged or bargained with commercial truck
drivers whose destination was Lusaka’s markets or industrial areas. Those with money purchased
tickets on buses or trains. Security was also a main motivator. Regina and her children arrived at
the Zambian border in 1993 and found a truck driver to give them a ride. “The owner of the
truck, after we had explained [our situation] to him, he said that I would be safer if we came to
the capital unlike being near the border side. The driver of the truck left us in town near the trade
fair.” Many refugees feared going through border checkpoints and remaining at the border,
particularly vocal journalists, politicians, or students who had recently and directly experienced
violence in a nearby city. Often refugees entered Zambia illegally by following bush paths, for
fear of being detained at Department of Immigration posts upon arrival (Beyani 1986:12).
During the process, refugees had to rely on the goodwill and compassion of those they met, both
fellow citizens and Zambians.

As discussed above, many refugees who resided in cities in their countries of origin
sought out Lusaka to continue that way of life. A Sudanese refugee explained,” If there was no
other option I would go to the camp, but going to the camp is like doing the opposite of what I
went to school to do.” Even if refugees were aware of registration options at entry points into
Zambia, which was not often the case, those from urban areas tended to travel long distances to
the capital where they expected to lead a similar lifestyle to that they had enjoyed in their
countries of origin. Those from the southern region of DRC, in particular, often found that direct
color travel to Lusaka made the most sense.

Despite the concentration of NGOs and government officials in urban areas, there were
only a few dedicated to protecting and guiding refugees through the registration process.
Extensive focus had been placed on refugees arriving in rural areas. Usually with little organized
intervention on their behalf, asylum seekers found their own way to Lusaka. Sitting at the bus
station in Lusaka, Edmond and his family were unsure where to go or what to do; they searched the crowds for a familiar face or the sound of Lingala or French being spoken. For two days they slept at the bus station. Finally they overheard a man speaking their native language. The man kindly invited them to stay with him at his home in the nearby Chiboyla compound, one of the oldest townships in Lusaka. He helped them visit the Red Cross Urban Refugee Project, where staff instructed them how to apply for refugee status.

Many refugees coming directly to Lusaka from their country of origin did not have friends or relatives in the city to provide them initial support, nor were identification processes or support systems put in place by UNHCR or COR. One refugee woman commented that, when she arrived, “there was no one to help me. I was just there at the train station because I had nowhere to go to.” Instead many of the refugees randomly inquired at bus or train stations and on the street to find other people of the same nationality or, more importantly, someone who spoke the same language.

Jacob arrived from DRC when he was 15 years old with only his young brother and sister. They were sleeping outside at the large City Market when a Zambian woman asked if they needed help. Realizing they couldn’t speak Nyanja, the local language, or English, she found a Congolese businesswoman at a stand in the market to assist them. When sister churches existed in both countries, congregations sometimes provided a link in the new city. Often these congregants, both Zambian and refugee, provided assistance to the newly arrived asylum seekers. For example, Mulumbu recognized members of his denomination by their long beards and approached them on the street. They helped him settle in Lusaka. Even for those with friends or relatives in Lusaka, quickly fleeing their homes meant that arrangements for their arrival were not always made, and finding their contacts in a large city was very difficult. It was through the
kindness of strangers that refugees were directed to COR or NGOs to learn the process of applying for refugee status and ensure they were protected from imprisonment or deportation.

Prior to 2000, there were significant delays in the refugee status determination process. When Bombo arrived in 1993, she waited for her claim to be processed, “but they just told me, ‘come tomorrow, come tomorrow.’” She finally received her Refugee Identity Card over a year later. Those awaiting refugee status determination faced serious problems in the new city. Most continued to rely on initial contacts they made in the city to access food and shelter. Others spent their time as vagrants, sleeping at the bus or train stations where they risked arrest despite holding report orders or temporary documents giving them permission to stay in Lusaka. These situations often necessitated the development of local connections and livelihood strategies.

There was only limited assistance available from NGOs for those awaiting refugee status determination, and children were not permitted to attend public schools until formally granted refugee status. In 2005, the Red Cross provided vulnerable asylum seekers some temporary housing and basic food, but no other means of subsistence (JRS n.d.). The assistance offered in Lusaka terminated once refugee status had been given, and in some cases even before, depending on the availability of resources. As an encouragement for refugees to go to a settlement as soon as they had been given refugee status, the Red Cross would then only assist with transport to the settlement referred to by COR. Upon arrival in the settlement, refugees were given a refugee identity card. If authorized by Zambian authorities to reside in Lusaka, the refugee identity card, otherwise known as an electronic card, was issued at COR after the National Eligibility Committee (NEC) approved the asylum application and the Residency Sub-Committee provided approval for residency in town.
As discussed, there was a large increase of urban asylum seekers in the early 1990s when Zambian refugee policy was initially more tolerant towards urban refugees. This group of early urban refugees was provided much more support than later refugees and was assisted in their integration efforts. Onokoko arrived in Lusaka in 1993 and stayed at Makeni for 2 years. After it closed, he and other refugees moved into the surrounding compounds of Chawama and Kanyama and were given housing allowances from UNHCR for six months. The object of UNHCR support was to create self-sufficiency in the urban refugee population.

Leaving the Refugee Settlement

A number of refugees arrived in Lusaka after first living in a refugee resettlement. Refugees who moved to urban areas from these very rural refugee settlements cite the camp conditions as the number one reason they wanted to live in Lusaka. As one urban refugee commented, “Meheba to me is an open prison where people are indirectly sentenced for seeking asylum in Zambia. I would not return. Eighteen years [spent in Meheba] is enough, and it has ruined my life. I have no future at all.” Almost 55 percent of the survey respondents had spent some time in a camp or settlement, even if it was after being arrested in Lusaka and sent to the refugee settlement by UNHCR.

Zambia’s long-term settlements were often touted as unique among refugee populations in Africa, reaching decent levels of self-sufficiency, especially in good harvest years, and reducing dependence on international aid. Refugees were provided with a plot of land, a tent, kitchen utensils, farming tools and seeds, and food rations for two years; they were expected to be self-sufficient after those two years. Some refugees in Meheba had success selling their produce in Solwezi and as far away as Lusaka, either securing 30 to 90-day gate passes to sell their vegetables or partnering with Zambians who sold on their behalf.
However, conditions in the settlements were difficult. Farmers struggled with poor soil quality and expensive fertilizers. In some years, inconsistent provision of seeds by camp administrators, particularly for new arrivals, and lack of water pumps led many to be unable to farm their lands. Recent funding shortfalls have jeopardized food supplies for the most vulnerable refugees, including the elderly, unaccompanied minors, the chronically ill, female-headed households, the severely handicapped, and newly arrived refugees (IRIN 2008). One refugee complained, “in Meheba there are many problems. To do farming they need to give you food, but they do not provide it, even things like soap or cooking oil. Now how can you live like that? Maize does not give good yield.”

Government clinics and schools provided health and education services in camps and settlements. However, they were generally overcrowded and undersupplied due to lack of capacity of both the government and UNHCR. The huge size of the settlements also left some areas underserved because of the distance from medical clinics and schools. Only a very few were able to afford the fees to attend secondary school. Inhetveen’s (2006:8) research on refugees in Meheba Refugee Settlement and Nangweshi Refugee Camp (now closed) found that refugees often felt trapped by the limitations on movement and the inability to earn money or food outside the camps. They viewed food and health services as insufficient and felt a lack of respect from Zambians and aid staff because of their refugee status (Inhetveen 2006:8).

Life in the camps was a particular struggle for those without rural experience. One refugee said that “life was difficult, no accommodation, poor health centre, and no food. Only farmers could make it.” Angolan refugees tended to have rural backgrounds with the skills necessary to farm. However, those from the Great Lakes area were often urban professionals or men and women with business backgrounds, which made the adjustment to rural conditions
much more difficult. Understandably there were far fewer Angolans in urban areas, reflected in both registered urban refugees numbers and the survey conducted during this research.

The movement to Lusaka also reflected larger urbanization trends in which individuals sought a better life for themselves through access to more economic and educational opportunities found in cities. This occurred even though there was very limited humanitarian assistance available in Lusaka, as compared to camps and settlements. Urban refugees were also vulnerable to exploitation, arrest, and detention, and they often vied with the poorest Zambian workers for the worst jobs. Yet city life offered greater independence and opportunities for self-sufficiency and, consequently, often a greater sense of self-worth and dignity.

Even when refugees were registered in Lusaka, COR and the UNHCR were not able to fully control their movement and residence within the city. Refugees who first registered in Lusaka found it easier to stay despite the directives of COR to move to settlements. While conditions in camps pushed to Lusaka, opportunities in Lusaka pulled them there. As a refugee angrily stated to the UNHCR senior protection officer, “You can’t integrate doctors and lawyers in the bush. Put intellectuals and tillers of the ground where they should be. It is form of social psyche torture to curtail our liberty.” People came to Lusaka and sought out ways to survive through existing connections or by developing new connections.

**Government Structures**

Asylum seekers arriving in Lusaka had to build their own support networks by using connections to family, friends and churches from their country of origin or creating new local contacts to ease their transition into Lusaka. Local connections quickly become more important than any protection that UNHCR offered, particularly in a distant refugee settlement. The following section explores the government structures refugees encounter and their efforts to
enforce its camp-only policy and counteract these new and growing connections to Lusaka. This begins with their attempt to register refugees and regulate their work and movement in Zambia.

Commissioner for Refugees

Refugee Status Determination

Officially, asylum seekers were required to report to the closest Department of Immigration office or police station within seven days of arrival in Zambia. According to the Refugee (Control) Act section 11, “no refugee shall remain in Zambia unless within seven days of his entering Zambia he is issued with a permit to remain by an authorised officer” (Government of Zambia 1970). From there, refugees were directed to a place where they could formally apply for refugee status, enter the refugee status determination process, and receive a report order to temporarily stay in Zambia. However as refugees moved to Zambia and some continued on to Lusaka, they made intentional and unintentional choices that impacted their type of entry in Zambia’s registration process.

Zambia had a dual system of refugee status determination based on where the asylum seekers applied and which treaty pertained to their case. In the provinces, District and Provincial Joint Operations committees screened refugees and provided prima facie status based on the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention for those fleeing generalized violence. Particularly if refugees arrived in large groups, UNHCR often opened a transit center to facilitate transfer to nearby refugee camp or settlements for registration. The vast majority of Angolan and Congolese refugees in Zambia were granted prima facie refugee status.

The provincial committees may refer cases to the Lusaka-based COR. Individual refugee status determination was conducted in Lusaka for those sent there and for those who had not approached authorities in border areas. Individuals who fall under the definition of a refugee
under the 1951 Convention and claim individual fear of persecution, as opposed to generalized violence, must go through a specific procedure. Over 80 percent of the refugees surveyed had experienced direct violence, either themselves or members of their immediate family, and would be eligible for individual status determination.

The task of deciding who is a refugee rested with the NEC, which includes representatives from the police, the Department of Immigration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President (Special Division), the Ministry of Labor and Social Services, and a legal advisor from COR. A representative from UNHCR acted as an observer. The NEC met every two weeks to interview, examine the case of each asylum seeker, and recommend to the Minister of Home Affairs who should be granted refugee status in Zambia.

UNHCR worked closely with COR to standardize these procedures and financed and trained three lawyers to take over the refugee status determination process (Darwin 2005:14). As discussed in Chapter 4, there was no single reference text on the application of refugee law in Zambia despite the fact that Zambia had been one of the main refugee hosting nations in the region. However, standard operating procedures for the determination of refugee status and eligibility for urban residency status were eventually drafted in 2000. The outcome of this process was a more clearly articulated Zambian policy that stated that all refugees, once recognized individually or on a group basis, must reside in the designated refugee camps or settlements unless they obtain special permission in writing from COR.

In practice, reception and the status determination remained highly variable. For example, if UNHCR set up a transit center to respond to a large influx of people, the collection of aid workers, government officials, and humanitarian organizations could guide prospective asylum claimants and ensure their cases were handled properly, as well as provide material assistance
while refugees waited for the outcome (Landau 2004:8). Alternatively, a potential refugee who arrives in Lusaka alone may simply not apply for asylum due to lack of knowledge and guidance. The majority of the refugees I surveyed came directly to Lusaka, as opposed to applying in the provinces, and almost 80 percent arrived before 2000 when the more streamlined systems were put into place.

The actual refugee status determination process felt unclear and intimidating to those seeking asylum in Lusaka. Applicants were not allowed legal representation and rarely received assistance in presenting their claims. The services of an interpreter, provided by UNHCR, were called when needed. The decision was presented in writing in English without translation. As they waited for the result of status determination or appeal, refugees were given a Report Order by the Department of Immigration. Report Orders were documents given the same value as entry permits and should, in theory, have guaranteed protection from arrest during refugee status determination procedures and appeals. Even though the process has improved, it can still last for up to two months or longer for some, due to the limited staff of COR (UNHCR 2007c:24).

In 2007, the NEC granted refugee status to 47 of the 163 cases it reviewed (USCRI 2008). Those rejected should have been informed of the appeal process. However this was not always done or done clearly, leaving room for misunderstanding, and the appeal merely went back to the NEC for re-review. According to COR, only one percent of those who appealed were granted a reversal of the original decision (UNHCR 2007c:24). Rejected asylum seekers were then under the purview of the Department of Immigration and required to leave the country. However, it was unknown how many rejected asylum seekers were still living in Zambia (Darwin 2005:17).
When later requests were issued to come to COR to reregister or update family information, refugees were skeptical, due to these initial experiences with bureaucracy.

Urban Residency and the Electronic Card

In an attempt to more fully regulate refugees in urban areas, part of the improvements made to refugee registration was the institution of urban residency requirements and a new residency card in 2000 to replace various other forms of identification carried by refugees (see Table 15 below for types of documentation carried by the refugee survey sample). Prior to 2000, many refugees carried a basic “green card” made of cardboard with personal data such as date and place of entry into Zambia; these were clearly labeled “Office of the Commissioner of Refugees, Refugee Identity Card.” Some held a piece of paper with COR letterhead giving them permission to reside in Lusaka with no expiration date. Others held a report order issued by the Department of Immigration, renewable as long as their asylum case was pending before Home Affairs. A report order could also be given when refugees waited for decisions on urban residency.

UNHCR and the government claimed that previously issued cards were often forged or copied, which impeded protection management. Their goal was to “strengthen the existing procedures/ criteria for the identification of refugees authorized or eligible to reside in urban areas,” while also providing assistance to refugees in need of special protection and medical evaluation referrals (UNHCR 2002c:127). More importantly, police needed to be able to distinguish “genuine” refugees from “illegal immigrants.” The new electronic cards and registration were a more systematic way to keep the majority of refugees in camps and out of urban areas.
The Residency Sub-Committee was created, under the umbrella of the NEC, to decide which refugees were to be permitted to reside in urban areas. Providing the equipment and software to the registration project for the issuance of refugee identity cards, UNHCR organized seminars and workshops for the government, police, and Immigration officers on refugee law and protection, ensuring ID cards would be recognized across the country. The committee met twice a week to hear applications for urban residency based on set criteria.

The new criteria for residency status included employment, study, health, security, and resettlement, and the electronic cards were valid from one to three years, available for renewal. Only 20% of the refugees surveyed had a valid electronic card (Table 15). In my interview group of refugees, the number was closer to 10%. Highlighted in Table 15, only those with a valid electronic card or report order were allowed to be in Lusaka.

Table 15. Documentation of Refugee Survey Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Temporary Card</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Electronic</th>
<th>Expired Electronic</th>
<th>Report Order</th>
<th>Expired Report Order</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>10 7%</td>
<td>61 44%</td>
<td>20 14%</td>
<td>4 3%</td>
<td>20 14%</td>
<td>4 3%</td>
<td>119 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>4 3%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3 2%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13 9%</td>
<td>64 46%</td>
<td>28 20%</td>
<td>5 4%</td>
<td>23 17%</td>
<td>5 4%</td>
<td>138 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Immigration and Deportation Act of 1967, refugees were technically considered foreigners and required to obtain a permit to engage in any gainful employment, prescribed trade, business or other occupation or to study at an educational institution (Government of Zambia 1967). For refugees in an urban area to be legally self-employed, they
had to show a substantial amount of investment (US $25,000 in assets) like any other foreign investor, a prohibitive amount for most refugees. Refugees were permitted to invest only in manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, or mining, but not in commerce. The law required refugees to apply for and obtain a job offer from an employer before they could receive a work permit, which cost $500. Employers, however, often categorically rejected refugees’ requests for jobs, mistakenly thinking that the law prohibited them from hiring refugees.

In addition, applying for the permit at the Department of Immigration, even with a supporting letter from COR, was lengthy, complex, and expensive. Refugees were required to show that no Zambian was qualified for the job (Government of Zambia 1967). Very few refugees could meet this requirement, except doctors, nurses, teachers, or other professions where there were national labor market shortages due to the brain drain and the HIV/AIDS crisis. A refugee from DRC was a pastor at a church with a mixed nationality congregation offering services in Swahili, Nyanja, French, and English. The church paid for his work permit, but the Department of Immigration refused to grant it, claiming that his post, as a pastor, had to be Zambianized. The work permit process frustrated even those who should be qualified for a position. A doctor who worked for Care International in Meheba refugee resettlement was instructed to go to Lusaka, learn English, and be registered by the medical council. Unable to make headway, he opened a small drug store saying “when I go look for employment as a doctor, they say bring registration, when I go look for registration, they say first go and look for employment, so I get confused. Then I said, ‘no,’ since I am doing my small drug shop, I am doing fine so I said let me continue.”

The Zambian labor laws should protect refugees who obtain a work permit and find employment in urban areas. However, refugees’ reliance on the renewal of both work permits
and electronic cards put them at the mercy of their employers and in little position to ensure safe
and fair work conditions. A study permit to register at an educational institution recognized by
the Ministry of Education was $100 with an acceptance letter (Government of Zambia 1967). If a
refugee can find sponsorship by a church, relative, or NGO, the study permit became an easier
way to access an electronic card, at least for the duration of study. Trying to find work as a
professional usually moved refugees quickly into illegal status in Lusaka and subsequently into
the informal sector.

Residency status could also be issued on additional grounds that include: needing medical
care not available in camps, establishing family links with refugees already residing in urban
areas, being processed for resettlement with a short timeframe for departure, and having special
physical security problems. Additional focus was placed on women at risk, unaccompanied
minors, unaccompanied elders, or otherwise vulnerable groups. UNHCR and its implementing
partner, the Zambian Red Cross, identified these individuals, but it was unclear what criteria
were used for urban residency status.

The vulnerability of some refugees living in Lusaka during the implementation of the
urban policy made it impossible for them to move to camps, particularly in the case of elderly
persons caring for a number of grandchildren whose parents had died or deserted the family.
They continued to remain in Lusaka’s compounds without electronic cards or assistance. When I
met Mariam, she was soaking her swollen foot covered in sores, a result of diabetes, and she was
in obvious pain. With only a green card, she had not received any assistance from UNHCR,
although the Red Cross staff said they would try to help her get a report order so they could
provide some medical help. Several years previously, Mariam was on her way to the eye clinic
when she was arrested and taken to prison for three months. Although sent to Meheba refugee
camp, she had to return to Lusaka to care for her daughter and four grandchildren who were left behind. Now she doesn’t worry about Immigration officers since she was so sick she rarely leaves home. Due to her age, illness, and numerous dependents, it was highly unlikely she would ever return to the refugee camp despite her illegal status in Lusaka. It was equally unlikely that she would ever be granted an electronic card due to her medical needs, particularly because of the lengthy process involved and costs related to traveling to and from COR in her condition. However, neighbors have helped her, providing her with food and items to sell to support herself. This provided evidence of her strong ties to her immediate neighborhood, which have helped mitigate the devastating effects of illness and poverty.

From the refugees surveyed who had electronic cards, the majority had received them for medical reasons, followed by family unity and study. Even with an electronic card, complete protection was not ensured under Zambian law. Due to the strict policy on employment, a residence permit did not allow refugees to work or to study if the permit did not authorize this. Those who were given permission to live in Lusaka due to health reasons or while awaiting resettlement, for example, were given no means of subsistence. They had to resort to working in the informal sector, putting them at risk of detention, deportation and exploitive working conditions. UNHCR provided some support for only a small portion of what they considered very vulnerable refugees, mainly HIV cases. Only 33 refugees were provided K150,000 ($37.50)\textsuperscript{25} per month in 2006. A large number of long term and aging refugees in Mariam’s condition have been left to provide for themselves and depend on the networks they have developed.

\textsuperscript{25} The kwacha is the Zambian national currency. At the time of my research, the currency rate was K4,000 to US$ 1.00.
Department of Immigration

Legal Basis for Enforcement

The Refugee (Control) Act of 1970 specifically denied refugees the right to exercise freedom of movement and residence, unless provided written permission from the Commissioner or his delegates in the form of local travel documents, the registration cards needed to travel internally, or residence permits. 26 Zambian law additionally allowed authorized officers, usually Immigration officers or police, to arrest refugees without warrants if refugees were reasonably suspected of violating or attempting to violate the Act. Officers were also authorized to use “such force, including the use of firearms, as may be reasonably necessary to compel any refugee to comply with any order or direction made or given under this Act.” 27 These officers were further given immunity from “any liability, action, claim or demand whatsoever” for their actions. 28

Violations could include failure to obey “any lawful order of the Commissioner or a refugee officer” and result in imprisonment for up to three months. 29 In practice detention could last far longer. While the Refugee (Control) Act suggested that violators would be taken to court, detainees were never actually tried and convicted. They were often either detained indefinitely or deported. Most of the detained refugees and asylum seekers did not commit serious criminal offenses, but simply violated the administrative requirement that they remain in designated areas (Nkula 2004). In addition, refugees and asylum seekers could be detained under the Immigration and Control Act of 1967, which prohibited all foreigners, including refugees, from engaging in

26 Ch. 120, sec. 12 in the Laws of Zambia
27 Ch. 120, sec 16 (1) and (2) in the Laws of Zambia
28 Ch 120, sec 17 in the Laws of Zambia
29 Ch 120, sec 15 (1) in the Laws of Zambia
any gainful employment, proscribed trade, business, or other occupation and studying at an
educational institution without appropriate permits.\textsuperscript{30}

It was also a criminal offense in terms of the Immigration Act for any non-national to not
report to an Immigration officer within 7 days of arrival in Zambia, or to not possess any official
travel documents. While there was not a rigid application of the 7-day rule if authorities deemed
asylum seekers to have applied for refugee status in a reasonable timeframe, refugees could still
be easily considered a prohibited immigrant by uneducated police or Immigration officers.\textsuperscript{31}
Neither the Refugee Act nor the Immigration Act made a distinction between asylum seeker and
refugee, leaving room for error and abuse of individuals seeking asylum who were immediately
assumed to be prohibited immigrants.\textsuperscript{32}

Even recognized refugees could fall into this category and be subjected to immigration
laws without regard to their official refugee status. Those considered to be prohibited immigrants
were given notice that they were required to leave Zambia within forty-eight hours, during which
time they were entitled to make an appeal to the Minister of Home Affairs.\textsuperscript{33} If they did not
comply, they could be arrested without warrant, detained for up to three years and deported,
often without trial.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Ch 123, Sec 19 (1), (2) and (3) in the Laws of Zambia

\textsuperscript{31} The Second Schedule of the Laws of Zambia, Ch 123, Sec 22, outlines the classes prohibited immigrants. These include persons capable of transmitting certain diseases, prostitutes, persons previously deported or barred from the country, persons whose permits to remain in Zambia have become invalid, persons entering without proper travel documents, and persons failing to report to an immigration officer on entering Zambia.

\textsuperscript{32} While the mandate of UNHCR does extend to the protection of asylum seekers, it is more difficult to exercise in relation to prohibited immigrants who may want to seek asylum (G. Mulenga 2002:18).

\textsuperscript{33} Ch. 123, Sec 24 in the Laws of Zambia

\textsuperscript{34} Ch. 123, Sec 30 in the Laws of Zambia
The arrests, as well as harassment and deportation or refoulement, of asylum seekers and refugees can be explained to some extent by a lack of knowledge on the part of Immigration officers and police, despite the multiple efforts of UNHCR to hold training sessions on refugee protection. Refugee law and legal practices were not well known in Zambia, and the distinctions between immigration and asylum issues was confusing, particularly the restriction on the freedom of movement of refugees, a restriction which does not apply to ordinary immigrants (Chitupila 2010:4). The Refugee (Control) Act was also completely separate from the Immigration Act with no cross-reference texts to give insight into how the laws should be applied in the case of refugees (G. Mulenga 2002:22).

In addition to problems of refugee harassment at the hands of police and Immigration officers, there were also tensions between commitments made to international human rights instruments and the local embodiment of those rights in the Constitution and implementing legislation. The refugee restrictions rather than refugee rights are outlined in legislation, ignoring many rights conferred on refugees by international conventions. This focus provided broad discretion for the authorities to decide whether a refugee’s safety or liberty was infringed if arrested, deported, or restricted to a camp. Any restrictions on the freedoms of refugees were justified by the need to control their activities in the interest of public safety or public interest, a limitation to “fundamental rights and freedom of the individual” noted in Article 11 of the

35 Zambia is a party to all six major international instruments relating to human rights.

36 Constitution of Zambia, Article 11 provides with limitations: It is recognized and declared that every person in Zambia has been and shall continue to be entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex or marital status, but subject to the limitations contained in this Part, to each and all of the following, namely: (a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; (b) freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, movement and association; (c) protection of young persons from exploitation; (d) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation; and the provisions of this Part shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest (Government of Zambia 1996).
Zambian Constitution. The result was uneven implementation of refugee policy, often depending on the individual Immigration officer. How refugees negotiated this implementation is discussed in the next section.

As the Refugee (Control) Act stated that it was a criminal offense for any refugee to leave a camp without due authority, the Department of Immigration became overzealous in enforcing the residency policy on refugees, often resulting in unjustified attacks on their freedoms. Immigration officers were given broad powers to arrest any person they reasonably suspected to be an illegal immigrant with no judicial overview. The power the Immigration officers had led to abuses as they targeted markets or small business searching for illegal migrant workers or raided areas where refugees were known to be living in the city (Gallagher 2005:9). While the church protested targeting refugees, discussed in Chapter 5, which helped mitigate some of the Department of Immigration’s actions, refugees still found themselves rounded up in broad sweeps for prohibited immigrants.

The police were also authorized to assist immigration authorities in apprehending illegal immigrants, often setting up roadblocks to control criminal activity, inspecting vehicles for safety compliance, checking licenses, and enforcing customs and immigration regulations. These roadblocks were known as excuses to extort money and goods. According to the United States Department of State’s report on human rights practices in Zambia, "police frequently used excessive force when apprehending, interrogating, and detaining ... illegal immigrants, and there were reports of torture" (U.S. Department of State 2008).

The restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms made refugees even more vulnerable to Zambian laws and nationals. Almost all refugees surveyed have had direct interaction with Immigration, whether at border checkpoints, applying for refugee status, during immigration
sweeps of markets, or during midnight raids of their homes. As a result, refugees considered the Department of Immigration the number one security concern, above even crime in the compounds or tensions within the refugee community. The constant refrain among urban refugees was “we just aren’t free.” The following sections explore the enforcement of Zambian laws and how that impacts the way refugees live in the city.

**Enforcement**

**Making Refugees Illegal**

The impact of the first registration of urban refugees in 2000 was that only a limited number of refugees could legally live in urban areas. Yet this did not result in a mass exodus of refugees to camps. Until this time many refugees had enjoyed lawful employment and residence in urban areas outside of the designated settlement for a number of years. Those who had established their lives and families in urban areas found it hard to believe that a new government policy taking effect in 2000 required that they leave their homes in Lusaka.

Many refugees who were city dwellers in their former homelands had been allowed to reside in Zambian cities for years before 2000, and those exceptions to the 1970 Refugee (Control) Act were tolerated. The majority of refugees living in Lusaka before the new policy on urban residency was introduced, some for over 10 years and many with previous written permission from COR, were deemed ineligible to continue living in the city under the new stringent regulation. Many had established small businesses in Lusaka’s markets or married Zambian nationals, but still were not given permission to remain in Lusaka. Refugee men who had married Zambian women were still required to relocate to settlements. The Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), an NGO that provides free legal services on human rights issues in Zambia, noticed that the reverse was not the case; refugee women married to Zambian men could remain
in Lusaka. They were challenging the legal basis for this decision in the courts on behalf of a refugee man. A senior UNHCR official told Julian Shabane, an unemployed DRC refugee with a degree in electrical engineering from the University of Zambia and married to a successful Zambian business woman, “that his place is in Meheba or in prison” (Osmers 2004:2).

Major issues emerged with the registration process within Lusaka and throughout Zambia. The electronic cards may have protected a few refugees, but in practice, the protection these cards offered was less than transparent. Many refugees reported that Immigration officers harassed them when they applied for permits and forced them to pay bribes to go through the standard procedures. Refugees with electronic cards have also been deported and detained. In addition, there was considerable variation in the data quality at each field office, no unifying electronic database, underreporting of refugee deaths in camps, lack of information on spontaneously settled refugees, and no individual identification cards, except for those allowed to live in urban areas (UNHCR 2007c:7). The 2000 refugee registration was supposed to expand to include refugees residing in camps as well as the self-settled, but it ran out of funds before it could do so. A provision of the 1970 Refugee (Control) Act, 6(2), stipulated that an identity card would be issued to a refugee upon registration with COR. Most refugees, however, did not. In camps and settlements, family ration cards were the only identification available to refugees, and these were only given to the head of the household.

The problems of the 2000 registration exercise led to another comprehensive re-registration in 2007. On August 30, 2007 all urban refugees in Lusaka were expected to report to COR to be re-registered and issued new refugee identification cards. Refugees were told that re-registration would

protect you from being confused with an undocumented or illegal migrant, from being forcibly returned to your country of origin and from being arrested or detained for being
undocumented. Registration facilitates your access to local assistance and protection as well as other services that are critical to your well-being. It can also help separated children and missing persons to be reunited with their families (COR 2007a).

Rather than viewing this a positive step in securing their place in Lusaka, refugees responded with confusion and, in some cases, apathy. Ultimately the new registration only covered the Angolan spontaneously settled refugees, settlement and camp refugees, and urban-based refugees legally residing there, excluding those residing in Lusaka without necessary permits. Most urban refugees were also excluded from receiving new ID cards to replace the green cards, report orders, gate passes, and expired electronic cards that refugees held onto for identification purposes if detained. They were also left out of the overall count of refugees in Zambia, which impacted policy, planning, and funding.

Mgbangson Lawrence, the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer stated in March 2006, "Refugees in urban areas are still refugees, although they might have flouted Zambia's laws for refugees. If any refugee is arrested, the UNHCR negotiates with relevant authorities to release them and they are later taken back to their camps" (Xinhua 2006). UNHCR instructed the Zambian Red Cross in 2007 to serve only refugees legally allowed to reside in Lusaka, which, while increasing the existing security and opportunities of those with the electronic cards, increased the vulnerability of the rest of urban refugees by limiting the places they could turn to for help.

The director of the Red Cross urban refugee program stated that the critical issue for urban refugees was that the most vulnerable were those without electronic cards, but the Red Cross was not allowed to help them. In fact, he stated that, “those who have cards don’t come to the Red Cross,” implying that many with electronic cards could care for themselves as they had the resources necessary to apply for the appropriate permits, both in terms of the individual assets and being able to use those assets to bribe appropriate officials.
Arrest, Detention, and Deportation

When asked how they were identified by Immigration officers, refugees often stated, “They just know.” Jacob, a Congolese, explains that Immigration officers knew how to find him by his appearance. “I am light skinned, while few Zambians are light. They will say, ‘This one is a foreigner.’” The long history of trade between Zambia and DRC and continuing violence and war in DRC brought to Lusaka a large number of Congolese who had previously lived in urban areas. Reverend Daka, a member of the Interchurch Refugee Task Force of the Council of Churches in Zambia and longtime advocate for refugees, explained that, due to the long history of trade with DRC, many Congolese were well integrated in the city but often used as scapegoats for crime.

However, Daka considered Rwandan and Burundian refugees to be the most victimized. Many were very educated and able to set up fairly successful businesses, but were easily identifiable; they have a “thin, small face, thin lips not like ours and stubby nose like yours.” While Immigration officers may overhear a different language such as Lingala, French, Swahili or Kinyarwanda, identification was generally based on appearance, which made some refugees more susceptible than others. Once identified, refugees were then approached and asked for their work permits and identification. Occasionally refugees suspected that a Zambian neighbor or someone else in the market might have identified them.

Refugees found themselves swept up into larger debates around foreigners, both regional traders and international investors, like companies from China. There was national concern about and political manipulation around foreigners in Zambia (discussed in Chapter 4). Foreign traders from the DRC, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and other surrounding countries were regularly arrested in
markets and deported. In many cases, these individuals were small-scale traders, operating illegally in the informal markets around Lusaka or unlicensed in the market dedicated to traders from neighboring countries. Particular concern was expressed about the influx of foreign traders, particularly Zimbabwean women, “Selling petty products like sweets, chocolates, drinks and biscuits along the streets of Lusaka” (Sunday Observer 2006). Refugees were often caught up in market sweeps or, at least, in the insecurity and vulnerability these sweeps caused.

In addition to sweeps in search of illegal traders, the Department of Immigration often conducted surveillance of markets and raids within the compounds to find refugees and asylum seekers, but also any illegal immigrants. Broad clean-up exercises were occasionally conducted in markets where anyone without identification could be arrested. On March 22, 2005, a combined force of the Department of Immigration and Zambian Police officers swept through Lusaka City Market and another market used by regional traders; they apprehended over 495 people suspected of being illegal immigrants (Kabwe 2005). A number of Zambians were accidently arrested in the sweep, and foreigners were processed and deported.

Changes in policy, political motivations and public relations all played a large role in when and how the Department of Immigration performed enforcement operations and increased incidents of discrimination and hostility against refugees and other foreigners. With the 1999 institution of stricter enforcement of refugee residence, the Department of Immigration began raiding compounds and rounding up people who could not produce valid residence permits. Refugees noticed that individual businesses and homes were targeted, often following news stories or declarations by politicians. In August 2007, the popular news program Eyeball to Eyeball on Muvi-TV interviewed Zambian Police Service Inspector General Ephraim Mateyo to
discuss security preparations for the Southern Africa Development Community conference in Lusaka. He stated that

Zambians by nature are very peaceful people, very peaceful people. Extremely peaceful... Most of these high profile cases of aggravated robbery, killing people dead and so on, 90% of these cases are being committed by foreigners. From some neighboring countries and I have facts to that, facts on paper. A Zambian would not, a Zambian would just pick a cell phone or groundnuts or sweets and start running away. He would not think that to get a cell phone from a defenseless woman, he would not think that he is going to take a life from that woman. Never. It is not our nature as Zambians. But because of these friends of ours surrounding our country, where law and order has broken down, they come here. To them, a life of a Zambian doesn't matter because they lose nothing. Their immediate concern is to get a motor vehicle or to get a CD or to get a TV set. They are prepared to kill. Now I’m saying, I’m not going to allow foreigners butchering Zambians as if we are not there. No. I’ve come out very clearly that when these foreigners come and try and disrupt our peace using firearms to kill these Zambians we as Zambian police, under the law have been mandated to react in accordance with the use of firearms in the law (Mateyo 2007).

Several days after this interview, refugees reported a late night round-up of foreigners and refugees in the compounds. Houses were searched at 2:00 a.m. The police claimed they were looking for guns, although other household items were seized. During the previous year, refugees reported that some of their businesses were destroyed during the course of a similar operation in Lusaka (UNHCR 2007c:15).

In 2006, the Department of Immigration reported detaining 3,056 illegal migrants of whom 225 were prosecuted, 2,673 deported; 554 signed an “admission of guilt” form to avoid appearing in court (African Human Security Initiative 2009:40). “Admission of guilt” required a payment of a fine, but speeded up the process and reduced time in prison. That same year, the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) reported that the Government held at least 160 refugees and asylum seekers in custody, mostly Congolese, Rwandans, and Burundians, for such offenses as illegal entry or presence, staying in an urban area without a

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37 I received a copy of the program from Muvi-TV and personally transcribed the interview.
permit, and working without a permit. In Lusaka, authorities detained at least 78 refugees for leaving camps and settlements without authorization (USCRI 2006). However, there was no systematic reporting or monitoring of arrest incidents, harassment, or detention of refugees or illegal immigrants. This left gaps in reliable figures on gender or age data and the proportion of unwarranted detentions (UNHCR 2007c:25). UNHCR estimated that there were some 70 refugees or asylum seekers in detention in various Lusaka prisons at any given time. Around 42% of refugees of the 126 surveyed had been arrested and spent time in prison.

A recent Human Rights Watch report, “Unjust and Unhealthy: HIV, TB, and Abuse in Zambian Prisons,” called Zambian prisons death traps with severe overcrowding, malnutrition, infectious disease, inadequate medical care, and violence by prison officers and fellow inmates (2010). The Zambian Human Rights Commission found that the state of the two main prisons in Lusaka, Kamwala and Lusaka Central, fell far below national and international requirements; they “are filthy, congested and unfit for human habitation”(2004:2). Overcrowding,\(^\text{38}\) compounded by poor sanitation, inadequate medical facilities, meager food supplies, and lack of clean water led to rampant infectious disease, such as TB and HIV. Prisoners must sleep in seated positions or in shifts due to lack of floor space. For example, the Lusaka Central Prison, built to accommodate 200 prisoners, held more than 1,200 inmates (US Department of State 2008).

Adults and children, convicted, pre-trial, and immigration detainees were all held together in these facilities. This included non-criminal immigration detainees, such as asylum seekers or refugees, held solely on administrative grounds. Men and women were held

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\(^{38}\) The 2002 United Nations Eighth Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Crime Justice Systems show that Zambian prisons are among the most overcrowded in the world. Out of the 128 countries that participated in the study, Zambia had the 6th highest overcrowding rate (UNODC 2002).
separately, although infants and young children were kept with their mothers until the age of four. Separated children who came to Zambia to seek asylum were often first detained before being reported to COR. This left them vulnerable to the all too common sexual abuse that occurs in prisons and detention centers.

Due to the slow and ineffective judicial system, over one-third of inmates have not gone to trial (OSISA et al. 2011). Immigration detainees were often held indefinitely without due process, while their deportation was delayed due to lack of Department of Immigration or personal funds. They were routinely told to pay for their own deportation or be held until they could do so. Immigration officials confirmed that “under normal circumstance, we don’t ask for money to deport, but we do when we don’t have money ourselves… at time it may happen frequently when the budget for deporting runs out” (HRW 2010:7). The Immigration and Deportation Act allowed immigration authorities to detain any person suspected of being a prohibited immigrant for a period of up to 14 days. A prohibited immigrant was defined as someone alleged to have carried out one of a broad range of alleged immigration-related violations; this included a visitor remaining in Zambian with an expired permit or an individual with an invalid passport. It could also include someone seeking asylum or a refugee with an expired gate pass from a refugee camp or an expired electronic card. However, in most cases, asylum seekers and refugees were detained for longer periods of time without being charged as prohibited immigrants, but without being either prosecuted or released. The Department of Immigration was allowed to detain a suspected prohibited immigrant for an indefinite period of time "pending completion of deportation from Zambia at the first reasonable opportunity" (Government of Zambia 1967). This could be an indefinite period of time for nationals from non-neighboring countries.
According to Human Rights Watch (2010:117), among the prisoners interviewed, only 38 percent of the immigration detainees had ever seen a magistrate or judge, compared to 97 percent of non-immigration detainees. In addition, immigration detainees had even less access to medical assistance and fair treatment by prison guards than the other detainees (HRW 2010). Individuals in detention who apply for asylum in Zambia had virtually no access to the asylum procedures, except through the intervention of UNHCR or other organizations.

During a visit to Kamwala Reprimand Prison, Albert and Yokwe, two refugees representing the Peace Centre, interviewed individuals who claimed to be refugees or asylum seekers to help them build a case to advocate for their release. The guard brought in one prohibited immigrant at a time. Whether a refugee or not, each man brought into the room was gaunt, wearing filthy clothes, and had a desperate, glazed look. One man sobbed uncontrollably, another angrily declared he had been on a hunger strike for the last 12 days, and another kept muttering that he was “not okay” as he explained his difficulty breathing and high blood pressure. Yokwe himself had spent three months in the Kamwala Prison after arriving in Zambia as an asylum seeker and said, “Prisons don’t reform people. They either die or become criminals.”

The Refugee (Control) Act did not explicitly protect asylum seekers from refoulement or prohibit the expulsion of persons who had the right to be recognized as refugees. It provided broad discretion to the Minister of Home Affairs and authorized officers to detain and deny status to asylum seekers without justification or deport any refugee at any time. The deportation process was not transparent and did not take into account the risks involved in refoulement. The final section in this chapter examines how refugees confronted these realities, as well as how state actors unevenly implemented policy.
Negotiation

Nkurikiye Etienne was the chairman of the Lusaka Refugee Community Coordination, an association of refugees from Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, and DRC that advocated for the rights of urban refugees. In his speech on World Refugee Day 2004, in front of representatives of COR and UNHCR and other refugee advocates, he pleaded with the Zambian government,

Your Excellencies, and distinguished guests, the sad consequence of this is that most refugees you see here today are technically in Lusaka illegally, as we are not and never will be rich investors. So we can be arrested any time and put in Chibokaila or Kamwala Remand Prisons, along with convicted criminals, without any magistrate’s order, from where we come out sick and traumatized. Some refugees have died in prison. We naturally do all we can to avoid such calamity (Etienne 2004).

Refugees sought out ways to “avoid such calamity” through negotiation with state representatives. In many cases this involved corruption. One motivation for the 2007 re-registration was UNHCR’s discovery of fraudulent practices including cards in the name of non-existent families, tampered cards, and the buying and selling of cards (2007c:18). In addition, refugees learned ways to avoid state actors, escape capture, or return to Lusaka if deported.

Corruption and Uneven Implementation

With the power given to the Department of Immigration, it is not surprising that it was seen as a place of intimidation and corruption, a characterization agreed upon by Zambia’s Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).39 The pilot efforts of the ACC to address corruption in the Department of Immigration were initially successful in streamlining immigration processes and making them more transparent. However, for low-earning Immigration officers, these changes

39 According to a baseline survey, the public agencies perceived to be the most corrupt were selected as pilots to address corruption at service delivery points, including streamlining administrative processes, limiting opportunities for corruption, and working toward behavior change. These agencies included the Ministry of Lands, the Immigration Office, the Zambian Revenue Authority (Customs), two city councils, the Pension fund, and the ACC itself (Hussman and Chikalanga 2007).
were not worth the “costs” (Hussman and Chikalanga 2007:228). Any improvements were more likely to affect the Zambian businessman applying for a passport or the British tourist purchasing a tourist visa at the airport. The legal ambiguity of refugees and the anti-foreigner environment provided the basis for harassment by Immigration officers, which often occurred outside of Department of Immigration offices and application for permits.

Etienne further commented on the situation of urban refugees, “Some Immigration officers seem to enjoy targeting refugees, especially those of us who have money. The consequences are not hard to guess. A corrupt system has developed of Immigration officers arresting refugees and taking money for our release. We can’t complain to the ACC or Human Rights Commission giving our names, as we know we will be targeted even more” (Etienne 2004). Although violations were reported to the UNHCR and the Ministry of Home Affairs, the victims of bribery needed protection before they could testify. In the case of many refugees and illegal immigrants, both the victim and the perpetrator were considered criminals. Long time advocate of refugees, Reverend John Osmers, Assistant Anglican Bishop of Lusaka wrote in a letter to Catholic Bishop’s Conference on Urban Refugees describing the situation in Lusaka, “Immigration officials appear to have developed an institutionalized antipathy to refugees, whom they now take as a source of easy income” (Osmers 2004).

The expectation of a request for bribes and fear of prison were sources of anxiety and a hindrance to earning a livelihood. The majority of Lusaka’s labor force earned its livelihood from informal activities, the bulk of which were essentially small scale trading such as street vending (LCC 2005b). Other livelihood earning strategies included piecework, child labor, seasonal farming, prostitution, and illicit beer brewing (LCC 2005a; 2005b). The areas where this activity occurred were often where Immigration officers sought out illegal migrants, making
traveling through Lusaka dangerous, as refugees went to the city center to pick up items to resell in the compounds or journeyed farther afield to buy maize at farms outside of the city.

Nanci came to Lusaka from Meheba refugee settlement to seek medical assistance due to complications with her pregnancy. Traveling to and from the hospital, she was arrested twice by Immigration officers. The first time she was caught, she was with her newborn and explained her medical problems. “They felt mercy on me and told me they should not find me here again and I should return to Meheba.” Still she decided not to return to camp even though she had no papers to be in Lusaka. She claimed that, in her weakened condition, she could not cultivate land. Her husband was violently attacked by thieves, making her the breadwinner for her family, selling kapenta and fritas, small fried dough, at a market near her home.

Corruption and uneven implementation of laws was a source of stress and insecurity for refugees, but they also provided a means to circumvent state requirements. This was particularly true for the refugees who could afford to pay off Immigration officers so they could run their businesses and avoid prison. Family members or friends could also help pay for refugee release from prison.

Avoidance

While fear of Immigration officers was prevalent, refugees tended their shops, traveled to the health clinics or hospitals, or even made trips to COR, the Peace Centre, and UNHCR. When possible, refugees learned to avoid certain spaces in the city or restricted their movement altogether. Immigration officers tended to keep an eye on the town center, including the large markets, like Soweto. A refugee in George compound, on the northeast outskirts of the city, joked that since moving there, he has had no problems, since the Department of Immigration didn’t have transport money to travel that far from the city center. Jacob, who spent much of his
free time at the Peace Centre rather than finding odd jobs around the city, explained “even on Saturdays you will find me here, sometimes I am just outside, just chatting because it is quite difficult for the Immigration [officers] to come here, but if I am somewhere else I can be arrested. So I can’t move to go and look for things to repair because Immigration [Officers are] also moving.” Particularly through the advocacy efforts of the church, Immigration officers did not target the Peace Centre, which made it a safe place for refugees to visit.

Mbelu and her family used to survive by selling groundnuts and cassava on the street near Soweto market. The small amount of capital they did have was wiped out paying for her sister’s funeral. In addition, Mbelu was arrested when she was selling oranges at the market; she lost her inventory and was imprisoned for two months. After paying off Immigration officers, she was eventually released. Several years previously her husband had been in prison for three years. With the lack of capital and fear of arrest, she and her husband had begun to send their children to make money by doing small jobs in Soweto market, such as selling plastic bags or helping transport luggage. While beneficial in the short term, sending children to work has adverse impacts over the longer-run, including missing out on schooling and skills training opportunities, family life, play, and recreation; putting them at risk of exploitation and abuse; and creating a reservoir of future unskilled labor (Oyaide 2000). Other refugee households in similar situations relied on friends or neighbors pick up items at the bustling Town Centre Market to resell in the compounds.

While refugee decisions to strictly limit movement were an effective means to avoid Immigration officers, they were not sustainable for most and were often tied to extreme poverty for those with no ability or means to move around the city. Several elderly women laughed at the
idea of Immigration officers since they barely moved from the immediate radius of their homes. Kapinga, a small spritely woman over 70 years old, lived with her granddaughter after her grandson ran off to live on the streets. She just remained at home, living on the generosity of neighbors.

Despite the active concerns about the Department of Immigration, continuing to live and move in the city was the only option for many and interacting with Immigration officers occurred just rarely enough to make the risk worth it. As Francis laughingly declared, “I don’t run away from Immigration [Officers]. Whenever I go into town, I just trust that God will protect me.” Although he was very angry with COR and the Ministry of Home Affairs, they “don’t guarantee someone staying well. The chances of him [sic] being harassed by Immigration officers are very high.” Francis was eventually arrested and, even with an electronic card, put in prison for five months.

Ease of Escape and Return

It was only through regular visitation to prisons by the UNHCR, the Red Cross, the Peace Centre, and other partners that asylum seekers and refugees were identified. The UNHCR petitioned, through COR, for their release to Lusaka or removal to Meheba Refugee Settlement. Advocacy, plus working with COR to create procedures for quicker release, also helped drop the average period of detention of refugees. The UNHCR arranged for transport for refugees detained in prison to Meheba. They also were responsible for taking new arrivals in Lusaka and urban refugees who could no longer support themselves in the city to Meheba as well.

While a majority of refugees had bypassed camps and settlements during their arrival into Zambia, from my survey sample, 50 percent of the refugees had spent time in a refugee settlement, many only due to their removal from Lusaka by UNHCR. However, they then
returned. For example, Michael arrived with his two wives from DRC in 1993. He sold shoes and second hand clothes, while his wives brewed beer to provide for their 14 children combined; although his two grade school children were not able to attend school due to lack of funds. Michael studied English for two years at the Peace Centre, which helped him in his businesses. He was also choirmaster of his church. When he was arrested in 2001 in Kabwe buying maize to resell in Lusaka and eventually sent to Meheba, his life was in Lusaka. Fortunately, he had enough disposable income to be able to quickly make his way back home within a week. Escape from Meheba was not difficult, if refugees had the funds to pay for transport back to Lusaka.

However, the Department of Immigration often tended to act independently, deporting individuals before UNHCR or advocates could intervene. Fulanswa, an Angolan, entered Zambia from DRC in 1999. Upon presenting himself as an asylum seeker at the Kabwe Immigration Offices, located between Lusaka and the DRC border, he was arrested and subsequently sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for illegal entry in Zambia. When his sentence was up, he was taken to Kamwala Remand Prison in Lusaka where the Department of Immigration refused to believe his claims of asylum and indicated that they intended to deport him. LRF applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which demanded that the state explain why Fulanswa could not be released. The High Court granted the writ, but he was eventually deported before the case was heard, after spending three years in prison (Mulunga 2002:24).

The on-going arbitrary deportations of refugees in 2006 resulted in protests by many refugee advocates, including the Anglican Diocese of Lusaka, the Norwegian Embassy, and the UNHCR. In May 2006, Immigration officers deported a group of prohibited immigrants, which included three Congolese refugees, to the Kasumbalesa border post just over the Zambian border in DRC. Jordan held a valid electronic card, which was confiscated by Immigration officers; he
was also listed for resettlement to Norway. Another held a valid gate pass from Meheba refugee settlement. The refugee men claimed they were forced to sign deportation orders, leaving their wives and children in Zambia. They escaped from the border and returned immediately to Zambia. For those who had established their lives in Lusaka, deportation to a border town was only a short term deterrent to returning to their families. The recycling of refugees from the settlements and border areas was common.\(^{40}\)

**Conclusion**

The Zambian government preferred that virtually all refugees, regardless of their backgrounds, aspirations, or specific needs, be located in the spatially segregated rural sites of refugee camps and settlements to limit integration. Yet the process of putting this policy in practice often followed general trends in urban migrant policy:

...in most cities two approaches in the migration issue coexist: one based on government’s official restriction and control policies; the other making use of policy inconsistencies and regulation loopholes to cater for illegal, mostly poor, migrants (Balbo and Marconi 2005:8).

The Ministry of Home Affairs developed specific policies and structures to register refugees and determine where and how they would be living in Zambia. However, from the very beginning, they lacked the capacity to regulate or control the influx of refugees into Lusaka. Refugees had to rely on their own networks to survive, which built the foundation for social connection and integration into Lusaka’s communities. In addition, the Department of Immigration often arbitrary enforced the policies through raids on markets and neighborhoods. For example, from the very inception of the new urban residency policy, some Immigration Department officers asked for bribes, immediately providing a loophole for refugees who could afford to remain in

\(^{40}\) To protect refugees and their stories, the specific details of this process are not included here.
Lusaka. Refugees learned to negotiate the city, discovering where to live and move; find work and housing; seek assistance and social services; and be detained, imprisoned, deported or released.

The Zambian government was unable to control urban refugees, yet it did constrain true freedom of movement and residence and inform how refugees used and experienced the city. UNHCR noted that government’s effort to crack down on refugees in urban areas in 2000 had created a “state of anxiety amongst refugees in Lusaka” and even caused the deaths of two refugees in prison (IRIN 2000a). There was widespread experience of harassment and constant fear of being arrested with no access to justice due to lack of valid documents. Chapter 7 discusses the impact of the lack of proper documentation on refugees’ access to jobs, education for their children and health services. Yet despite the risks and restrictions, many refugees felt it was still worth living in Lusaka rather than to return to their country of origin or a refugee settlement. The next chapter examines role of refugee advocates in mitigating some of these negative effects.
CHAPTER 6
THIS IS A GOOD ONE: REMOVING BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

The Department of Immigration’s first targeted move to relocate refugees back to refugee settlements in 2000 prompted strong protests from Lusaka’s refugee advocates. In 2001, the three main church organizations in Zambia, the Episcopal Conference, the Christian Council, and the Evangelical Fellowship, formed an Inter-Church Refugee Committee (ICRC) task force in response to the changes in refugee residency standards and the obvious distress caused to urban refugees. The ICRC made a strong statement on behalf of the churches in Zambia:

One does not have to look far for evidence of the fact that refugees are increasingly unwelcome in Zambia. We have seen a disturbing rise in the verbal abuse, harassment, arbitrary detention, and physical violence that refugees suffer in Zambia. The church regrets the fact that people with genuine protection concerns have been forcibly returned from Zambia to countries where their lives or freedom are in jeopardy. Needless to say, this practice violates the human rights of refugees and does not reflect well on Zambia’s international image… (Darwin 2005:6).

The ICRC and other advocates have demanded that Immigration Department officers stop arresting refugees outside of refugee support locations, such as the Peace Centre. They petitioned for the release of refugees in prison and argued both for an end to refugee deportations and updates in refugee law. Reverend Daka, a pastor of a large church and active participant on the task force, believed that church pressure on the government resulted in less strict enforcement of the camp-only policy in Lusaka and specific targeting of refugees by Immigration officers and policy: “We petitioned the government to integrate refugees. They relaxed the rules in urban areas, but this has left refugees at the mercy of Immigration [corruption].”

This chapter considers the impact of advocates on the lives of refugees in Lusaka. A number of national and international organizations worked on refugees issues in Lusaka, including UNHCR, the Zambian Red Cross, JRS and the Peace Centre, and various churches, church
leaders and religious organizations (See Annex 1 for a chart of the relationships between these groups). This chapter considers if and how each of these players has offset the national policy environment and rhetoric around refugees. Has their work significantly impacted how refugees live and work in Lusaka and has it broken down barriers to integration? In addition, the final section considers how refugees themselves have advocated for their right to remain in Lusaka.

Advocating and Supporting Integration

UNHCR

During a meeting with refugee leaders on the lawn outside the UNHCR office in Lusaka, the Senior Protection officer explained that UNHCR did not feel it could confront the government directly or loudly regarding the problem of refugees being arrested in Lusaka. He confided that it has been more successful when it “goes through the back door.” For example, part of UNHCR’s advocacy efforts involved training Immigration officers, COR staff, and even MPs and explaining that these arrests are illegal, rather than issuing critical public statements. As discussed in Chapter 1, the global refugee regime was premised on the understanding that states have the primary responsibility for protection of refugees with UNHCR supporting and overseeing state efforts. However, UNHCR relies on national governments for money, authorization, and cooperation to advance refugee protection and assistance efforts. Gil Loescher observes, that this leaves UNHCR suffering from “structural disharmony” (1993:138). Its mandate is to protect refugees, yet it lacks the independence to criticize state policies and often lacks the weight to influence states to fulfill their humanitarian obligations towards refugees.

The UNHCR in Zambia has also struggled to balance both its commitment to refugees and the desires of the Zambian government. It has been intent on supporting and building Zambia’s capacity, including its domestic refugee legislation, as a means to ensure refugees’
rights are protected. As discussed in Chapter 4, UNHCR concerns about arbitrary arrest and detention of urban refugees and growing xenophobia led it to negotiate with the Government for clearer residency standards and identification methods (UNHCR 2000). It continued to advocate for the necessity and importance of revising the country’s refugee legislation to facilitate the naturalization and local integration of refugees. In 2000, UNHCR hired a lawyer to study these possibilities in the hope that the Zambian government would consider UNHCR recommendations and allow many second-generation refugees to become legal members of Zambian society (UNHCR 2000:115). Building the groundwork for long-term integration of refugees in Zambia had been a major advocacy focus of UNHCR. Yet it was also UNHCR’s express policy not to go against the Zambian government by directly or indirectly encouraging refugees to stay in urban areas without the appropriate permits. Additionally, in an effort to appease the government and reduce the migration “pull” of urban areas, UNHCR reduced the services available to illegal urban refugees.

From the perspective of refugees, the success of UNHCR in truly protecting them was mixed. The relaxed standards and minimal enforcement prior to 2000 had given refugees more freedom to move and work and that was lost when the more structured system was implemented. Refugees protested the shift in policy and saw UNHCR as not actively protecting urban refugees. One refugee explained UNHCR’s role, “UNHCR is only talking and refugees are fending for themselves. If you don’t have money, you are put in prison. And when 2000 came, UNHCR did nothing [about the new restrictions placed on urban refugees].” Yet for a small number, UNHCR offered very real and specific help. Protection Officers sought out particularly vulnerable refugees for support and possible resettlement on the recommendations from the Red Cross and other organizations. Those with electronic cards benefited from the services provided by the Red
Cross and the protection it afforded. However, it is worth noting that these programs served only a small number of urban refugees and were so limited in their scope that they could only focus on the short-term, immediate needs of refugees, such as health care and education for primary school-aged children. The continual reduction of UNHCR’s urban refugee program undercut early goals that sought to integrate refugees into Zambian society by providing “education sponsorship, job placement, [and] income-generating opportunities” and ignored the realities of protracted refugees situations (UNHCR 1994:5).

Despite its limitations, UNHCR, as an international organization committed to refugees, continued to be a sign of appeal and hope, whether or not it could provide direct assistance. UNHCR provided a platform to dialogue with the urban refugee population. In Lusaka, monthly meetings with refugee leaders and occasional meetings open to all refugees were held to communicate information about the urban-based registration exercises or repatriation efforts and to discuss concerns. Elected members of Lusaka Refugee Coordination represented Somali, Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan, Angolan, and Congolese refugees. Other refugee associations or interested individuals also attended the meetings along with UNHCR protection and community service officers. Open dialogue and the spread of information throughout the entire urban refugee population were facilitated by the distribution of leaflets and regular workshops, individual counseling sessions, and communication with refugee leaders (UNHCR 2007c:20). This communication was not limited to refugees with an electronic card, indicating UNHCR’s willingness to listen to and work with the entire urban refugee population.

The UNHCR Senior Protection Officer called on urban refugees to work with UNHCR to “create a plan of action” together. During one of the meetings with refugee leaders, he noted they have been able to establish a system to “meet you where you are to have a tête-à-tête
“conversation” at places such as Makini Transit camp and the Kamwala Refugee Center. He highlighted efforts that UNHCR has made to connect with urban refugees and to advocate for them. This platform has been a key element in reinforcing refugee organization in Lusaka. It encouraged the development of refugee community organizations, discussed later in this chapter, and gave them a place to focus their appeals and complaints. This positive relationship ensured well-attended and well-organized refugee events, like World Refugee Day, which regularly drew positive media attention.

Jesuit Refugee Service and the Urban Refugee Peace Centre

JRS began working with urban refugees in 1997. In support of the urban refugee population, it published a detailed guide in French, English, and Swahili for refugees and asylum seekers in Lusaka. This guide provided basic definitions and answered 51 questions about applying for refugee status, refugee rights and obligations, and long-term refugee options. With practical and realistic advice for refugees in Lusaka, question number 45 of the guide asked, “What can I do for my own protection?” JRS suggested:

An effective mechanism of protection is to integrate yourself into the local population as much as possible. Try to make Zambian friends and to participate in the community institutions of the Zambian people, such as churches, sport clubs, co-operatives, etc. (JRS n.d.).

The Urban Refugee Peace Centre was established in collaboration with the JRS Policy and Advocacy program to provide key tools in this integration strategy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Peace Centre offered language and training courses for refugees as well as scholarships, pastoral activity, advocacy, and protection to foster self-sustainability and community. In an effort to overcome the rising xenophobia in Zambia, the Peace Centre provided programs that were open to both refugees and Zambian citizens to encourage positive interaction between the two groups through, for example, French classes, sports teams, theater groups, and the computer
lab. The Peace Centre was a place where refugees could meet Zambians and other refugees for constructive activities and receive direct support in their efforts to integrate into the city by learning a specific trade, accessing micro-credit, or improving English language skills.

JRS helped found a strong network of local churches and religious leaders, particularly around advocating for refugees in prison and their better treatment by the Department of Immigration. Through this network, JRS began broader sensitization and awareness-raising measures. From 2000-2005, a Press Review on refugee issues in Zambia was regularly published and distributed to 350 readers, including church leaders and relevant NGOs. It included all news articles on the refugee situation in Zambia with analysis conducted by JRS, usually to encourage understanding of the plight of refugees, counter any xenophobic stereotypes of refugees, and ensure the distribution of correct information. Direct appeals to Christian values to “extend a hand of welcome and assistance to the hopeless stranger (refugees) at our doorstep” continued with the distribution of copies of “Bible Study on Refugees according to Exodus,” “Bible Study on Refugees,” and general information packets to church leaders and pastors (JRS 2005).

A regular radio program addressed various refugee themes and continued through at least 2007. For several years JRS and ICRC promoted an inter-school essay competition as part of the World Refugee Day celebrations, which increased youth awareness of the plight of refugees. A theatre group and Burundian drummers supported by JRS and other donors performed during Francophonie Week, World Refugee Day, and in other events and even traveled regionally. Actors in the theatre group worked with Zambian artists. Recently a Sudanese refugee wrote and produced his own play called “The Refugee,” with Zambian and refugee actors. These efforts attempted to make the general population more aware of and interact more directly with refugees in the city.
The Peace Centre, through a pilot Peace Program, began additional sensitization measures. Two refugees who had been trained at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, located in Kitwe, Zambia, in peace education began the program in 2007. It brought together refugees and the local Zambian population in structured discussions regarding areas of conflict and mutual suspicion, leading to a set of solutions or wider principles of behavior. More detailed training was provided to selected students who were tasked with the responsibility of establishing Peace Clubs in the compounds. An important initial outcome of the program included research reports produced by the Peace Clubs on the relationships between Zambians and refugees. Ten groups of refugees and Zambians went into different compounds to interview residents about the root causes and consequences of conflict between different nationalities and also to ask residents to consider solutions. These activities supported integration by raising awareness of refugees, and by bringing different people into close contact and cooperation. There was hope that a similar program could be launched for ministry officials and politicians.

However, at the end of 2006, JRS pulled out of Zambia to focus on higher crisis areas in West and East Africa. As overall funding decreased for humanitarian aid, many other international NGOs were focused on these more prominent crisis areas as well. Zambia, with its stable long-term refugee population, was no longer the focus of international attention. The Peace Centre had to continue with new partners to maintain some of its activities after mid-2007. This shift ultimately meant a scaling back of services and staff as it moved to work under the auspices of Archdiocese of Lusaka, funded by CRS. It was unclear if the advocacy efforts and extensive coordination would continue without the institutional knowledge and international experience of JRS.
Churches and Religious Organizations

In Zambia, the relationship between the church and the state is characterized by the government’s close identification with Christianity. In 1992, President Chiluba, an evangelical, declared Zambia a Christian nation (Phiri 2003). Although this announcement was largely a political maneuver and a means to discredit Kaunda and his Humanism, the majority of Zambians are Christian, which has given the church a position of legitimacy and influence. The growing role of civil society, which included dominant interest groups such as Christian churches and trade unions, was very important to challenging government action in Zambia. Christian churches were deeply rooted in society and used their influence to address social issues.

Churches as a whole are slowly assuming the position of a watchdog for socially disadvantaged people and of leaders in the fight against poverty and injustice, reminding the government of its social and cultural responsibilities (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012).

There is a long tradition of ecumenism among Catholics, Protestants, and Pentecostals in Zambia (Gibbs and Ajulu 1999:71). The Interchurch Refugee Committee (ICRC) is one example of coming together around a disadvantaged group and protesting the perceptions around and treatment of refugees. Refugees have been beneficiaries of broad advocacy efforts by the churches that hold the governments and even individual officials accountable for their international obligations. Unlike international NGOs that are at risk of being expelled from the country, churches have the ability to be very vocal and confrontational. Jillian, a previous advocacy officer at JRS, noted that the church “won’t be shaken,” giving it a leverage and influence beyond NGOs.

The Church was very quick to protest any direct targeting of refugees by Immigration officers. Reverend John Osmers of the Anglican Diocese of Lusaka was very vocal and had written letters to COR, particularly protesting the continued illegal deportation of refugees. In a letter to Commissioner Mphepo, he wrote
The facts are well known to you… three DR Congolese refugees were deported to the DR Congo by Immigration officers along with prohibited immigrants, when it was well known that they were recognized refugees… [Refugee 1] has been in Zambia since 1991, has a valid electronic card (held by Immigration officers) and listed for resettlement to Norway. [Refugee 2] had a valid gate pass before his arrest and deportation. They allege they were forced to sign deportation orders (Osmers 2006).

Osmers continued on, noting additional arbitrary deportations and finally requesting,

that you take up this matter with the Minister of Home Affairs to assure yourself and others that such incidents will not be repeated, and that disciplinary action be taken against those officials who have shown such flagrant disregard for the human rights of the refugees concerned (Osmers 2006).

The Church has written letters to the anti-corruption commission regarding the Department of Immigration’s actions. Church leaders were quick to intervene when Immigration officers began arresting refugees as they entered and left the Peace Centre. The clear result of this intervention was that refugees could again safely visit the Centre without harassment.

In addition, the Christian Initiative for Refugees in Prison, a collaboration between the Refugee Desk of the Archdiocese of Lusaka and JRS, advocated for improved conditions for imprisoned refugees and systematically collected information on refugees and asylum seekers imprisoned under no criminal charges. It regularly visited Zambian prisons and detention centers, provided refugees held there with pastoral support, social assistance and legal advice, notified UNHCR Protection Officers and COR, and followed-up on their responses. The result was a reduction in the average period of refugee detention to about a month, an improvement from the past when refugees were held five months or longer.

Reverend Osmers, the ICRC, and JCTR, a Jesuit research and advocacy group, petitioned Zambian churches to push for changes in the regulations regarding refugees residing in urban areas. They were particularly vocal during the effort to pass the new Refugee Bill in 2007. During the public discussion of a draft of Zambia’s new Constitution in 2005, JCTR gave detailed comments
and observations to the Constitutional Review Commission. They specifically protested the continuing prohibition of refugees born in Zambia against obtaining Zambian citizenship for the following reasons:

- This is a direct and biased discrimination against refugees, as opposed to other persons born in Zambia of non-Zambian parents;
- The thrust of the provision is contrary to incorporating long-term refugees more fully into the Zambian society in which they can contribute to the betterment of the society that has benefited them over the years;
- The proposed Article 6 in the current Constitution only entitles persons to apply for citizenship. The actual grant of citizenship is governed by Chapter 124 of the Laws of Zambia, which permits the citizenship board to grant or deny citizenship to applicants. The discretion of the board is unregulated and unreviewable in court. Citizenship can be denied for any reason or no reason at all. The proposed article 20 does not rectify this violation of due process (Mwale 2005:6).

The JCTR requested that the specific exclusion of refugees be removed from the section. In the latest version of the Constitution, the status of refugees and their children was still unclear and still appeared to restrict their ability to apply for citizenship.

Advocacy efforts have pressured the government to ease its targeting of urban refugees and to limit any steps towards invoking the cessation clause for any group of refugees in Zambia. The Zambian Episcopal Conference, the Christian Council of Churches, and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia issued a press statement on the harassment of Rwandan refugees:

The church further insists that the proposed repatriation exercise be consistent with Zambia’s undertakings as prescribed under international human rights law. Of particular concern are the recent alarming statements by some Ministry of Home Affairs that seemingly contain threatening language against the refugees who will not register for the “voluntary repatriation”… Rather than threatening Rwandans, government officials would do well to remember the threat issues by the Prophet Isaiah against the government of his time that God would judge their justice based on how they threaten the alien living among them. Zambia’s record for tireless commitment to justice will be judged by that same criteria (The Post Zambia 2003).

As discussed in Chapter 4, despite multiple discussions among the government of Zambia, the UNHCR, and the governments of refugee countries of origin, the Cessation Clause had never been invoked in Zambia, indicating that the pressure from various constituencies has shaped how the
government has approached the Cessation Clause. At the time of this research, a citizenship option for those refugees who did not return to their country of origin was being discussed as a compromise.

One additional outcome of the vocal support of the church for refugees was the influence it had over the general Zambian population. Reverend Daka believed that tolerance and understanding for refugees has grown. Specifically, Zambians were not turning refugees into Immigration officers as often.

The Zambian Red Cross

The Zambian Red Cross implemented UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Project, which provided health care, education and social assistance to both registered refugees among the urban population and those held in prison (UNHCR 2005b). While the Red Cross staff could still help identify vulnerable refugees for the UNHCR Protection Officers, whether or not they had an electronic card, by 2007 they were no longer allowed to provide direct assistance to refugees illegally residing in Lusaka. Stan Chele, the director of Zambian Red Cross Urban Refugee Project, estimated that the organization was unable to serve at least 30 percent of refugees who came to the Refugee Centre looking for assistance and even more during its refugee outreach in the compounds. While increasing the existing security and opportunities of refugees with the electronic cards, this policy made the lives of the rest of urban refugees more vulnerable by reducing the places they could receive assistance. From Mr. Chele’s perspective, the Red Cross could no longer serve the most vulnerable in the refugee population.

On one hand, the very limited resources of the Red Cross and strict tracking of services provided, such as education scholarships, helped to enforce UNHCR’s directive. During my first visit to a Red Cross outreach center in Chawama, I noticed that they were short of supplies,
specifically notebooks and pens to use for refugee home visits. Mr. Chele informed the refugee and Zambian staff that the budget had been approved by UNHCR, but it now needed to go the Home Affairs for approval and then back to UNHCR, which would then finally disperse money to the Red Cross. This process would take another three weeks as programs continued to struggle and staff remained unpaid. Yet as Red Cross staff encountered refugees in dire need, it was evident that they struggled with the financial and logistical limitations placed on what they could do to help.

The Red Cross health workers felt it was unethical to turn away refugees in serious need, even if refugees did not have an electronic card. As a result, they requested that the UNHCR inform refugees that they could no longer come to the health center at the Kamwala office or meet the nurse who visited each of the outreach centers weekly. The outreach staff members were tasked with regularly performing home visits, learning where particularly vulnerable refugees were living, and passing on that information to resettlement officers at UNCHR. This outreach made them aware of the current population and its needs and enabled them to have some leeway in their assistance to refugees. Many Red Cross staff provided assistance to vulnerable refugees despite the prohibition, giving food and clothes when possible. One elderly refugee woman pointed to Oliver, a Zambian worker at one outreach center, “This is a good one.” Oliver had brought her some much-needed clothing for her family. Occasionally the Red Cross Urban Refugee Project would receive donations that they distributed. For example, the World Food Program occasionally donated extra maize to be given to urban refugees, a donation that often made its way to those refugees without an electronic card.

The outreach staff also provided counseling and assistance to refugees on protection issues such as the importance of obtaining individual documents and finding sources of income.
Visits were made to unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable refugees. Efforts were made over the years to create a sustainable social assistance system where refugee volunteers would reach out to and meet the needs of vulnerable refugees, with a particular focus on encouraging involvement of refugee women. A group of 15 refugee women had conducted some home visits and social work, but not systemically, and the UNHCR had not been very successful in encouraging the participation of women in the Refugee Leaders Committee. It was clear from my research that support systems were being created beyond UNHCR’s efforts and were more integrated into local Zambian communities as discussed in Chapter 7.

The UNHCR focus of the Urban Refugees Project was to encourage “the efforts of the urban refugees to attain self-sufficiency and to realize their local integration in the medium-term” (UNHCR 2006b). Specifically, the Red Cross Urban Refugee Project implemented all the following activities in support of the urban refugees:

- Limited material assistance to refugees and asylum seekers detained in Lusaka prisons;
- Management of the Chilenge House (lodging for medical referral cases) and Makeni Refugee House (lodging for other transiting refugees) and organizing the transport of refugees to the designated camps/settlements as required;
- Social assistance based on community-based outreach to vulnerable urban refugees;
- Basic education support to vulnerable refugee children (unaccompanied minors, separated children, etc.), and in exceptional cases, support to secondary and vocational school students to help them complete their education;
- Health assistance to refugees referred from the camps/settlements and to vulnerable urban refugees (UNHCR 2006b).

However, as highlighted in the discussion of UNHCR above, while necessary services for many refugees, the focus and limited capacity of this project did not link refugees’ welfare to broader development strategies, as was at least attempted with the Zambian Initiative, discussed in Chapter 4. Ultimately this project used a “basic needs” and “minimum standards” approach to long-term refugee populations, rather than highlighting the benefits that could be derived from enhancing the refugees’ own coping strategies (UNHCR 2006c:121).
Advocacy Efforts by Refugees

An outspoken Congolese leader, always present at meetings with UNHCR, said to me in frustration, “We are here to cooperate and they [UNHCR staff] don’t want to.” UNHCR sought to secure refugee community’s cooperation through meetings with refugee leaders. While these meetings were a means to reach a broader audience and even to hear concerns from refugees directly, the tensions between UNHCR’s perspective on solutions for urban refugees and those of refugee leaders were evident. Overall there was a lack of formal, independent mechanisms available to refugees to hold UNHCR or the host government accountable for unsatisfactory programs and policies (Loescher et al. 2008:85). Instead, refugees used meetings with UNHCR, World Refugee Day events, and the media to advocate for their position, and worked with churches and religious organizations as well.

Refugee leaders have persisted in calling for more resettlement opportunities, despite UNHCR repeatedly and vehemently saying this was not a realistic goal. Refugees claimed that resettlement was the only durable solution possible because they could not return to their home countries and they were not accepted by Zambia. They were frustrated by the inactivity on local integration prospects and the lack of support from UNHCR. The most vocal refugees were usually more educated and better informed. They quickly became aware of the resettlement criteria, continuing to send letters and asking for interviews with Protection Officers. For example, a Ugandan refugee had submitted several long letters to UNHCR, referencing international treaties and documents and outlining his own individual persecution and torture.

Veroff’s (2010) research in the Meheba refugee settlement found that the Congolese who lived closest to the UNHCR office actively watched and learned the system for resettlement. They regularly approached NGO staff with “applications” for resettlement, using key phrases such as “survivor of violence and torture,” “facing insecurity,” and “woman at risk” (Veroff
UNHCR officials believed that refugee exaggeration of insecurity concerns was common, including refugees buying false crime reports from the local police. This tactic and others were certainly part of the refugee strategy in Lusaka. As one Congolese refugee noted during a focus group discussion: “Most of the Congolese know their rights and when their rights are neglected, they are vocal about it.”

During a meeting at UNHCR, the Senior Protection Officer tried to convince refugee leaders that Lusaka was no longer the place to find third-country resettlement, stating, “many refugees leave [camps] and come to Lusaka to benefit from resettlement… then refugees get arrested.” In light of this, UNHCR actively interviewed and processed refugees for resettlement in camps rather than urban areas. He suggested that a new “trick” for urban refugees was “go to camps, even though you don’t want to, to get resettlement.” He claimed that in 2007, UNHCR planned to recommend 1,200 refugees for resettlement, which would include 200 from Lusaka and 1,000 from camps. The refugee response at the end of his speech encompassed the position of most of the leaders to moving to settlements for any reason. “You can’t integrate doctors and lawyers in the bush. Put intellectuals, tillers of the ground where they should be. It is form of social psyche torture to curtail our liberty!” This statement was followed by a round of applause from the refugee leaders and a plea that the idea of resettlement from camps should be revised.

Over the years, letters of protest have been sent to UNHCR and the Zambian government from refugee leaders. In December 2000, the Congolese Refugee Association of Lusaka sent a letter to the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer about the perception of the refugees and on the changes in the national context.

Asylum seekers and refugees have become the subject of heated public debate and a scapegoat for certain politicians for the deterioration of the country’s economy and rising crime wave. Such pronouncements have made the general public to believe that we, the
refugees of Zambia, are an embarrassment, an inconvenience and even a threat to national security (Congolese Refugee Association 2000).

It followed by outlining the international and national responsibilities of both Zambia and the UNHCR, asking that UNHCR help refugees pay for the appropriate permits, ensure that arbitrary arrests and detentions were stopped, and hold Zambia accountable for human rights violations.

In 1999, the Lusaka Refugee Coordination chairman urged the Government to integrate qualified refugees into mainstream Zambian society to enhance development in the country (Times of Zambia 1999). However, urban refugees were in a vulnerable position and could be subjected to arrest and deportation at anytime. Public statements by refugees clearly stated their appreciation for Zambia and the protection granted to them. As Nkurikiye Etienne, the chairman of the Lusaka Refugee Community Coordination, said in 2005, “We rejoice that Zambia has always been a nation of peace, and has opened its doors to refugees over many decades” (Xinhua 2005). Added to this vulnerability was a persistent perception that urban refugees were troublemakers: “articulate and assertive individuals, many of them young men, who make persistent demands upon the organization for resettlement places, material assistance and other benefits” (Obi and Crisp 2000:21). Being a “troublemaker” could also negatively impact resettlement prospects, which further muted how vocal refugees could be.

In a speech that was not the one approved by UNHCR, Etienne (2004) made a strongly argued defense for urban refugees at the 2004 World Refugee Day celebration in Lusaka. He denounced Zambia’s restrictions on urban refugees, citing the exorbitant fees and capital required for self-employment permits and prohibitions against running small businesses. He requested that,

Urban-based refugees be no longer regarded as foreign nationals for Immigration purposes, and be exempted from work and study permits, and be permitted to be self-supporting, by running small business which may be monitored by officials from Home Affairs (Etienne 2004: 3).
He suggested that electronic cards could then be issued to those refugees who met self-supporting criteria. From the perspective of refugee leaders, this meant those refugees with stable incomes who were not dependent on UNHCR assistance. Also he asked that changing the citizenship law in Zambia be considered as a solution for long-term refugees and a means to fully integrate refugees into Zambian society. The 2004 speech was still discussed proudly by many of the refugee leaders as a public refugee defense for their urban residence in Lusaka.

Conclusion

Prominent individuals and organizations assisted and advocated for refugees and their place in Lusaka. Refugee leaders were able to speak out, in part, due to broader support of both internal and external agencies in Zambia. They had the backing of the church, in its broadest sense, which not only defended refugees’ rights to stay in Lusaka, but also advocated for the acceptance of refugees in their congregations. While the majority of refugees remained illegally in Lusaka, their position was nevertheless continually validated and defended. It was clear that these advocacy efforts greatly assisted refugees’ integration into Lusaka. In very practical ways, advocacy limited the impact of imprisonment on refugee households and ensured more economic stability. More broadly, it created an alternative discourse that actively challenged politicians and government officials and the perseverance of xenophobia within the general public. Chapter 7 discusses many perceptions about refugees held by the Zambian public. These refugee advocates persisted in keeping positive stories about refugees in the media to offset many of the anti-foreigner statements by politicians. One result was a thread of compassion for refugee experiences and their suffering running through many of the Zambian comments about refugees and a pride in Zambia’s historical role in protecting refugees.
Alternatively, the role of national and international organizations in providing refugees with specific tools to integrate into the host country was less successful. UNHCR, in its support of Zambia’s camp-only approach to refugee hosting, limited its Urban Refugee Project to providing basic humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable, yet registered, refugees in Lusaka. UNHCR emphasized that “empowering the productive capacities and self-reliance for refugees as well as supporting host-country and local-community development” should be goal in the context of protracted refugees situations (2006c:134). Yet for urban refugees in Zambia, this was not the case. The goal of obtaining legal rights for refugees, including a citizenship option, led UNHCR to appease the government in many ways, most significantly by reducing the number of refugees it served in Lusaka. Through that process, there was increased marginalization of the most vulnerable refugees along with the continued cutting back of services and places to seek assistance.

Although very small in scope in terms of the number of refugees it served, the Peace Centre remained an excellent example of an integrated approach to providing assistance to urban refugees. It provided both the tools and the space to build social networks and skills for refugees to survive in Lusaka. Individual staff members of the Red Cross, Peace Centre, churches, other organizations, and, as discussed in the next chapter, local Zambians across Lusaka provided support for refugees. The next chapter explores practical impacts of this support and exactly how refugees lived in Lusaka.
CHAPTER 7
NO ONE BOTHERS ME HERE: LIVING
AND WORKING IN LUSAKA

Mary sat on a stool outside her two-roomed home in Chawama compound. Large and jovial, she kept my Zambian and refugee companions laughing, while I waited for the translation. We took a bench under a nearby tree and she called her grandchildren over to greet me, all barefoot in threadbare clothing. There were 25 in her household, including her children and grandchildren. A widow twice over, she worried most of all about her grandchildren, since she couldn’t find enough food for them and there was no money to pay for school fees. She sold groundnuts and tomatoes from her doorstep, laughing that her children did not help, “they just bring unwanted pregnancies.”

Mary was like many of the elderly women refugees. She was 45 years old when she arrived in Zambia in 1993 and was recently widowed, her first husband having passed away on their journey. She bluntly explained her view of the refugee camps, “One would just sit there like a prisoner.” Similar to their Zambian counterparts, these elderly women were now raising grandchildren because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. While Mary tried to remain connected to her sister in DRC, her access to transnational networks was limited. However, she had lived in Zambia long enough to develop local ties and support systems in her immediate surroundings. Her jovial exterior helped facilitate positive interactions with her Zambian neighbors, and her poverty elicited compassion, even from the Red Cross staff that occasionally gave her food and schemed to get her medical treatment even though she did not have an electronic card.

Elderly refugee women like Mary laughed at the thought of being bothered by Immigration officers due to their poverty and limited movement around Lusaka or even within their own neighborhoods. Previous chapters have established the broader context of this
situation, including the limitations of the Zambian government to fully enforce its own urban refugee policy and the efforts by many advocates to further constrain the policy’s harmful effects on refugees. However, this chapter examines the full nature of the local integration in refugees’ daily life by evaluating

- Livelihoods and standards of living
- Access to housing, markets and social services
- Levels of conflict and discrimination
- Levels of social and cultural connection

The purpose of this chapter is to fully evaluate the legal, social and economic components of local integration and the extent to which integration is possible for refugees in Lusaka. The first three sections evaluate livelihoods, housing, and social services by comparing the access of refugees to that of local Zambians and measuring refugee standards of living in Lusaka. The final section of this chapter examines sources of connection and conflict between refugees and Zambians.

**Finding Work in Lusaka**

A major indicator of integration is refugee participation in the local economy. Assessing the level of economic integration from a qualitative perspective involves examining refugee livelihood strategies, identifying particular obstacles in income generation, and comparing those to the host community. Jacob, a refugee from DRC, expressed his complete exasperation with his situation in Lusaka. Not only was he in constant fear of Immigration, but also he was unable to use the education he had acquired while living in Zambia. After Jacob arrived in Lusaka as an orphan, UNHCR supported his secondary and post-secondary studies. However, he was unable to keep his first job at a local TV station because he lacked a work permit, and he has struggled
to find odd jobs ever since. Yet even Jacob acknowledged that a limited number of employment opportunities were available for Zambian residents of Lusaka as well. “Sometimes even if they [Zambians] say refugees are not supposed to be employed, I don’t fully blame them because there are a lot of them also suffering; they are not employed. But us, what we are complaining about is the freedom.” This section evaluates what livelihoods are available to refugees, from more educated refugees to elderly, heads of household like Mary. All refugees rely on access to markets and the development of relationships with the local community to participate in Lusaka’s informal economy. This section is followed by a comparison to Zambian livelihoods and broader struggles of living in Lusaka.

Refugee Livelihoods

There were significant livelihood variations within my refugee sample. Some individuals were able to use their previous work experience and education to create businesses, while others simply survived on the goodwill of friends and neighbors. The majority of refugees worked in Lusaka’s vibrant and diverse informal sector, mainly self-employed in trade and services, or in some form of paid service. Only eight out of 138 of my questionnaire respondents had the appropriate permits giving them explicit permission to work in Lusaka in what could be considered the formal sector, such as a medical professional working at a health clinic. Yet even the formally employed often participated in additional income-generating activities, particularly when wages were insufficient to sustain the household (LCC 2000).

The poorest households engaged in crushing stones, reselling charcoal, or unskilled piecework, a Zambian term for small, temporary jobs such as transporting water or goods, washing clothes, or braiding hair. Households with slightly more capital engaged in small-scale trade and sold basic necessities from a shop or stall or hawked in the street or in outside markets.
A more skilled group of refugees was engaged as tutors, pastors, and tailors. Some also repaired electronics and ran more established businesses such as transporting goods from rural areas into Lusaka for resale.

The questionnaire distributed to the Peace Centre participants explored the economic viability of refugee households by gathering data on all sources of income, approximate monthly household income, and major expenses. Approximately 15 percent of the survey sample (Table 16) and ten percent of the interview sample could be considered well off in terms of having a stable income and in comparison to their Zambian neighbors. For example, the wife of a refugee who frequented the Peace Centre sold fish and made K1,200,000 ($300) per month, which was very successful compared to the K280,000 ($70) earned by another who sold fruit and vegetables at the market, or the K80,000 ($20) earned by a third who sold odd electrical-repair work when available and participated in a theater group. However, the JCTR determined that the bare minimum cost of living for a family of six in Lusaka in July 2007 was K1,519,700 ($380) (JCTR 2007c). Even those relatively successful refugees struggled to meet basic needs and to save and invest in technology, education or health to increase productive potential and the economic stability of the household.

Table 16. Monthly Household Income of Refugee Survey Sample in July 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than K50,000</td>
<td>7 6%</td>
<td>7 6%</td>
<td>14 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K50,000-K150,000</td>
<td>7 6%</td>
<td>33 37%</td>
<td>40 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,001-300,000</td>
<td>6 5%</td>
<td>27 23%</td>
<td>33 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,001-450,000</td>
<td>3 3%</td>
<td>10 11%</td>
<td>13 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450,001-600,000</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>4 3%</td>
<td>7 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600,001-800,000</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800,001+</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>8 7%</td>
<td>9 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TOTAL                  | 26 22% | 89 77%| 116 100%
Several refugees had established more successful businesses, such as owning or renting a permanent structure for their shop or importing foodstuffs directly from rural areas and reselling them in Lusaka, both of which required more startup capital. I interviewed a number of Rwandan refugees who owned such shops in the compounds, stocked with basic items such as soap, oil, eggs, and sweets. One Congolese refugee received an electronic card based on a self-employment permit, which required proof of US$ 25,000 in assets, a difficult task for most refugees. He worked with a Zambian and started a successful *salaula* business, which involved importing and reselling used clothing in Lusaka’s markets.

Some refugees applied for the appropriate permits and were able to gain employment in the medical and education sectors. Jean Pierre was trained as a clinical officer\(^{41}\) in Rwanda and was able to secure employment at a health clinic in one of Lusaka’s compounds with the help of UNHCR. However, few refugees could get work and employment permits because of the stringent criteria, as well as complex bureaucratic procedures and prohibitive fees. Only four individuals from the survey sample were able to secure a work permit, which enabled them to earn significantly higher income.

Moving quickly into the informal employment sector upon arrival in Lusaka was common among refugees, even for those with a specific skill set or higher education. Many refugees had to adapt their previous work experience or create a completely new means to support themselves and their families in Lusaka. This situation was particularly relevant for those with a specific occupation like the customs clearing agent from DRC, a news broadcaster from Sudan, and a pilot from Uganda. A focus group of twelve refugees was held at the Peace Centre,

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\(^{41}\) Clinical officers are similar to physician assistants. They are qualified to perform general medical duties such as diagnosing and treating disease and injury, ordering and interpreting medical tests, performing routine medical and surgical procedures, and referring patients to other practitioners.
including 10 Congolese, one Rwandan and one Burundian. We discussed past work experiences (Table 17) and current frustrations in Zambia.

Table 17. Occupation in Country of Origin of Refugee Focus Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>Primary School Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical engineer</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language teacher/ interpreter</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the whole group, only two of the tailors were able to continue their trade in Lusaka. Refugees who were tailors in their home country or who had taken training courses in tailoring, carpentry, or radio repair at the Peace Centre or Makeni Transit Centre before it stopped training activities in 1998, could set up a similar business. One refugee would often frequent the Peace Centre to repair cell phones and other small electronics. Despite the possibility of reducing his client base, he and the Peace Centre’s Vocational and Livelihood Coordinator discussed providing a class on cell phone repair. However, even those with skill sets in demand in Lusaka struggled to find the resources necessary to conduct their work. Particularly for carpenters and tailors, loss of tools could greatly impact their business. Both tailors in the focus group noted this concern.

Less-skilled refugee employment opportunities included small-scale trade in building materials, charcoal, foodstuff, and small household items. A majority of both the surveyed and interviewed refugees engaged in some piecework. For women this generally consisted of domestic work in Zambian homes, such as doing laundry or other household chores, or occasionally plaiting hair. For men, piecework involved teaching French; doing repairs on
watches, cell phones, radios or small appliances; engaging in odd manual labor jobs; or working in someone else’s shop. The income from these activities tended to be unpredictable and limited; in most cases, it represented one of multiple sources of income in a household.

The main problem with most of these economic activities was that their low returns did not allow households to generate enough income to invest in more profitable activities or to build savings to rely on in the case of shocks. These could push them further into poverty. A refugee pastor supplemented his meager household income by repairing shoes from his home. However, even engaging in multiple income-generating activities did not significantly increase earnings stability or help his family move out of poverty. Regina had been a businesswoman in DRC, selling goods in the market in Lubumbashi, while her husband worked for the government. However, alone in Lusaka with her eight children, she had to send her three oldest sons to City Market to sell plastic bags while she brewed beer and sold vegetables at the nearby market. Her main concern was Immigration officers. “We have many problems. I was arrested twice and now I am scared to go town because I know if I am caught, my children will suffer.” She relied on fellow marketers to pick up orders for her to resell. Her dream was to enter the fish trade, since fish was a very popular commodity in the Zambian diet and more lucrative than cheap beer, but she did not have the capital to invest in a higher priced commodity.

The most vulnerable households relied heavily on only one income-earner. Jacqueline had studied business management in DRC, but was separated from her husband when they fled and did not know if he was still alive. She lived with her young daughter alone. Jacqueline represented many single refugee women in Lusaka who struggled for survival. Christine, who ran the micro-credit and training programs at the Peace Centre, insisted I interview Jacqueline “if you want to see how refugees are really living.” I first met her while she was helping at the
Peace Centre restaurant. I learned later that the two women who ran the restaurant were not paying her since the profits were too small to divide by three. However, Jacqueline would also do odd jobs for small amounts of money, including washing clothes and plaitsing the hair of her neighbors, but she was paid very little. She walked up to two hours a day looking for any type of piecework, approaching people and asking if she could help them. If there was something for her to do, they paid her; if not she just returned home. We went to her tiny one room house not far from the Peace Centre that she shared with a couple of refugee friends from her church. Jacqueline had tried selling charcoal, going to the outskirts of town, purchasing a large bag and reselling smaller quantities. However, the profit was so small that she could not pay rent and had been “chased” several times from her home by her landlord. She came to Christine’s cooking and baking class, but lacked the resources to start a business. Instead, she made do with what little money she could get from piecework.

The insecure legal position of refugees in Lusaka made them particularly vulnerable to exploitation in their work places. Many refugees commented that they had encountered non-payment for services. Bana, for example, felt that her refugee status was often taken advantage of, “like when a person comes into the shop and just takes something for free because you are from Rwanda. They are just putting a curse on us.” Ilunga was an artist in DRC, but had no capital to work in Lusaka. Instead he made the small 1” x 2” price signs that are placed by piles of tomatoes or eggs on market stands and sold them for K200 ($.05). People bought these on credit and often later refused to pay, threatening to call the Department of Immigration. He pointed to the pot half-full of beans to feed himself, his five children, and two grandchildren as evidence of their suffering. A refugee tailor had to borrow a machine from a Zambian woman who later accused her of damaging it and then took all her materials.
Refugees often had to rely on the goodwill of strangers when they arrived in the city with few resources. While this could be positive and provide an avenue to self-sufficiency, it also could allow exploitation, as many refugees were completely dependent on others in a new city. When Pierre first arrived in Lusaka, he met a Rwandan refugee who offered him a place in his shop. “I was working from 07:00 up to 20:00, and I was sleeping in the shop. It wasn’t easy to do… when you are working, they consider you like a slave.” He was not treated well but did not know the local language or the city. Fortunately he learned English and the local languages quickly and left the exploitive situation.

Even at the Zambian Red Cross, refugee staff posted at each of the four outreach centers in Lusaka protested their unfair treatment and working conditions. In a letter to the Human Rights Commission of Zambia, they stated, “unfortunately despite the fact that both refugees and Zambians have equal roles and responsibilities at these centres, refugees are paid significantly less then their Zambian colleagues.” Refugee counselors were working for K280,000 ($70)/month without work permits, which put them at risk of arrest and imprisonment. At the same time, Zambian counselors were paid K480,000 ($120)/month. Although they sent a letter of complaint to UNHCR, LRF, the International Labor Organization, and the Secretary General of the Zambian Red Cross, refugee employees had few options for recourse. A completely valid fear was that the result could be termination or even an end to the outreach centers altogether.

Pierre, who provided French tutoring and interpreting in Lusaka, commented about the Department of Immigration, “that’s why I’m always claiming we are trying to look for integration, but we are being pulled down by the Immigration and the government. Immigration is government.” His complaint against the Department of Immigration was very specific: the Department of Immigration actually used him as an interpreter, but had not paid him for the last
six trials he worked. He was afraid to push them for payment in fear that “I will be in trouble.”

While Pierre’s experience with the Department of Immigration was unique since the department was directly flouting its own laws, the majority of refugees’ insecure legal status and lack of access to legal recourse directly impacted their livelihood viability.

Refugees with more visible businesses were subjected more often to raids by the Department of Immigration as well as backlash from neighboring businesses. When local vendors were unhappy about competition from foreigners, they often complained to local authorities. Refugee businesses have also been destroyed during the course of enforcement operations by the Department of Immigration (UNHCR 2007c: 15). The loss of income and inventory if arrested by the Immigration officers was devastating to refugee household livelihoods. One refugee was operating as a tailor in City Market and rented a booth from the Zambian owner. In 2005, he was arrested, spent two months in prison and was sent to Meheba. He lost everything, including his sewing machine, clothes, and materials. He was eventually able to find transportation back to Lusaka but then had to borrow a sewing machine to begin his business anew. In the meantime, his household had become more dependent on his wife’s small business selling produce.

Margaret arrived in Zambia when she was 28 years old. At the time of my research she was 42 years old and could list a range of trade and service jobs her family had engaged in as they struggled to survive in Lusaka. Before multiple pregnancies and the responsibilities of young children kept her close to home, Margaret sorted and sold salaula. Later she joined small-scale traders and marketers outside the City Market where big piles of salaula and stacks of vegetables lined the road. Her husband had training as a carpenter, but lacked the capital to start a business. Instead he did piecework, transporting luggage and taking on small jobs at Soweto
market. However, he had been arrested several years prior to my time in Zambia, deeply impacting his family’s income and security. The fear of arrest made Margaret and her husband very cautious; they often sent their older children, whom they could not afford to send to the local community school, out to make money. This action would perpetuate poverty into the second generation. On living in Meheba when they first arrived in Zambia, Margaret said there was one thing she could not do. Pointing to her arm, which looked painfully disjointed, “I can’t manage to dig. I have no power to cultivate [crops].”

Refugees identified several hindrances to securing a stable livelihood. The biggest hindrance was the inability to secure a work permit, followed by a lack of employment opportunities, and finally the inability to move freely around Lusaka due to fear of Immigration officers. The impact of employment restrictions and the actions of Immigration officers was overwhelmingly apparent in refugee livelihoods. For example, the loss of inventory and months of work when a refugee was sent to prison created a particularly difficult economic shock for a household to overcome. The result was poorer households, which often reduced expenses by taking children out of school, paying rent late, and selling assets, even if assets were important for their livelihood. As a clear indicator of poverty, 65 percent of surveyed refugees reported eating only one meal per day; 80 percent had meat one time or less per week.

Zambian Livelihoods

The SAPs required by the World Bank and IMF directly harmed urban residents by ending currency controls and price subsidies on staple foods, and forcing uncompetitive state-owned industries to either fire workers or impose wage freezes. The result of these actions was that between 30,000 and 50,000 formal sector workers lost their jobs between 1992 and 1996 (Rakner 2007).

42 The World Bank’s 2007 Zambia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment identified a household’s inability to eat more than one meal a day as clear sign of extreme poverty (World Bank 2007:80).
With the large drop of the share of workers in the formal sector, more urban residents, particularly women, started working in the informal economy. Although the levels of employment of the urban workforce increased, urban standards of living generally declined due to the very low profitability of most activities (Moser 1993; Cottam and Moser 1994). The Zambian 2008 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey found that informal employment had remained consistent over the last several years at 71 percent of urban residents while vulnerable employment was 52 percent (ILO 2012:14). Vulnerable employment referred to persons who lacked economic stability and the institutional structures that provided insurance in times of shock (UNDESA 2007).

Lusaka’s better-off residents consisted of those in the protected formal employment sector. A minority of formally employed Zambians lived in informal settlements, particularly those in low wage jobs such as shop assistants and security guards. Some teachers, nurses, police and civil servants also lived in older informal settlements, such as Chawama (Fallavier et al. 2005: v). Most residents in compounds were self-employed and earned income by producing and selling building materials, trading small commodities, farming, and renting out houses or rooms. More skilled workers in Lusaka often ran one-person businesses from their own homes or the roadside, repairing tires, shoes, televisions, radios or bicycles, or operating as tailors, welders, carpenters or craft makers (Fallavier et al. 2005:14).

Street vending was particularly ubiquitous with streets and markets full of individuals selling second hand clothes, vegetables, fruits, foodstuffs, plastic goods, and various household necessities. Entry into the food trade was relatively easy and cheap and a common income generating strategy for women. Mostly women traveled within Lusaka to buy wholesale vegetables to re-sell in their local markets in the compounds. A pilot study of food marketing in
Lusaka found that daily profits from vegetable vending in the compounds were around K10,000 ($2.50)/ day for a typical 14-to-16 hour day (Porter et al. 2004). However, transportation costs created a huge burden and illegal traders risked having their produce confiscated. Most of these vendors were selling as a means of survival, rather than attempting to grow or specialize their businesses.

In July 2007, the average monthly income in most of Lusaka’s low-income neighborhoods was only K645,326, which was significantly below the average cost of basic food staples and essential non-food items recorded by JCTR as K1,519,700 ($380) (JCTR 2007c). Even formal wages were considered low for most workers. As shown in Table 18, only at the top of the nurses’ pay-scale do payslips fulfill basic needs. This supports the 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, which found that only about one in every three households in Zambia (35 percent) had mean monthly incomes exceeding K300,000 ($75), implying that the majority of Zambian households, approximately 65 percent, earned incomes also below the Zambian Central Statistical Office’s basic needs basket for minimum food alone (CSO 2011).

Table 18. Zambian Take Home Pay from July 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Pay Slip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>K841,000 to K1,485,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>K936,000 to K2,624,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard with Security Firm</td>
<td>K250,000 to K750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary in Civil Service</td>
<td>K817,000 to K1,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieceworker on a Farm</td>
<td>K3,000 to K15,000 per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCTR 2007c

In the compounds, it was difficult for many households to provide three meals a day. The 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey found that about half of Zambian households (50.7 percent) could afford two meals a day, 5.2 percent of households could only manage one meal a
day, and 42 percent ate three meals (CSO 2011). Groups identified as particularly poor and vulnerable were orphans, widows, and persons with severe disabilities. According to focus group research for the World Bank’s poverty study, female-headed households, households unable to send their children to school, and those eating no more than one meal per day were identified as most likely poor (World Bank 2007:80).

The above data indicate that Zambia has suffered from dramatic levels of poverty. Income-defined poverty lines are problematic, however, in that they do not measure people’s capacity to achieve access to goods and services, which may be influenced by other factors such as education, legal rights, information, insecurity, and so on. However, even from this limited information, it is clear, overall, that refugees are much poorer than the host population. Only 29 percent of refugees surveyed reported earning more than K300,000 ($75)/ month, the CSO’s extreme poverty line for all of Zambia, and less than 9 percent of refugees were able to meet JCTR’s Lusaka-specific basic needs basket. The large number of refugee households that reported eating only one meal per day reaffirmed this.

On one hand, refugees were well integrated into the economic life of Lusaka through their ability to access many of the same income generating activities as the local population, use the same markets and social networks, and encounter the same struggles to survive. On the other hand, refugees’ capacities to fully use their education, skills, and resources were greatly diminished by their insecure legal status. Fear of arrest limited refugee movement around Lusaka and their ability to grow their businesses. It equally influenced refugee feelings of security when working with the local population. Imprisonment and loss of income could seriously undermine any financial security held by a household. Lack of access to work and employment permits ensured that more educated or skilled refugees were less likely to participate in the economy in
ways commensurate with their skills. Due to these barriers, refugees could not be considered fully economically integrated into Lusaka.

Living in the Compounds

I noticed a bustle of communal activity outside of Charles’s door; women sat clustered together shelling groundnuts and children chased a ball of plastics bags. Seeing the easy interaction between them, I asked Charles about his relationship with Zambian neighbors. He smiled and nodded, “I am very lucky. We get along very well.” As the site of numerous economic and social activities, housing provides opportunities for accommodation or conflict both within and beyond the household, particularly in the close quarters of Lusaka’s low income, high-density compounds. Housing can be a significant asset in urban settlings and often underpins income, employment and physical security (Jacobsen and Nichols 2011:13). This section investigates refugee standards of living and social connections by considering refugee housing and levels of security, followed by a comparative analysis to the broader Zambian public.

Refugee Housing

Owning a home provided additional security and income generation through the renting of rooms and storing of income-generating assets, such as stoves and refrigerators. Yet only a tiny proportion of refugees in Lusaka owned their residence: four individuals surveyed and one interviewed. It was clear that these households were more economically stable. These refugees all arrived in 1993 and had received some tertiary education, but only two carried a current electronic card. Joseph, who resided in George compound, was one such refugee. When we visited Joseph, I was impressed by his solidly-built home with framed, barred windows, a small stoop at the front door, brightly red polished concrete floors, and bolts of lace and fabric
decorating the walls. He explained that his Zambian father-in-law gave him the house and helped set up his business selling *salaula*. All of his ten children went to government school. At 63, he referred to the generosity of his in-laws and the peace found in Zambia to be “a blessing today, though I don’t know how it will be tomorrow.”

As a refugee owning his own house, Joseph was certainly in the minority. The majority (65 percent) of refugee survey respondents lived in two or three rented rooms in low-income, high-density areas: either in an independent home or subletting individual rooms in a Zambian home. A typical example of refugee housing was the home that Charles shared with his wife and two children, which sat on the end of a low block of four semi-detached units. Made from ubiquitous cinder blocks covered in cement plaster, each two-room home had a worn wooden door, small openings for ventilation near the ceiling, and a corrugated iron roof weighed down by heavy bricks and rocks.

Among the surveyed refugees, 55 percent reported a household size of six or more individuals, while 28 percent had over nine individuals. Household size often included immediate family and orphans of extended family members. Additionally, sharing a home with other families was also common. Mary, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, had a particularly fluid household with her children and grandchildren moving in with her when they encountered financial trouble. Her two-room home was clearly overcrowded and poorly constructed, providing an additional indication of her extreme poverty. The Zambian government considered the preferred occupancy threshold to be two persons per room to reduce overcrowding (UN Habitat 2012:59). Table 19 compares the number of individuals in the
household to the number of rooms in the residence. The highlighting portion shows those households living in overcrowded conditions with 68 percent of the refugees having more than two persons per room.

Table 19. Percentage of Overcrowding by Number of Rooms and Number of Household Members in Refugee Survey Sample in July 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in Household (HH)</th>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% HH Overcrowded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rooms Overcrowded</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded area reflects overcrowding according to the Zambian government’s preferred occupancy threshold.

Housing costs were a major expense of urban households. For most refugees surveyed, rent comprised a significant portion of their monthly income (Table 20). For example, Pierre earned K250,000 ($63)/ month and paid K150,000 ($38) in rent, leaving him K100,000 ($25) for transportation and food.
Table 20. Monthly Rent of Refugee Survey Sample in July 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Rent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;K20,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K21,000-60,000</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K61,000-100,000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K101,000-150,000</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K151,000-300,000</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K301,000-500,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K501,000&lt;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 30 percent of the refugee respondents lived in two-room homes with electricity in Kanyama or the nearby areas of New Kanyama, Chawama, Chibolya, and John Laing. However, many homes in Lusaka connected to the electricity grid illegally and it was not clear if these were paid connections. The average monthly rental costs for these homes was K200,000 ($50) in 2007. However, 25 percent of the refugees surveyed were living in one or two rooms with no electricity and paid an average of K75,000 ($19) per month, which was either an indication of the extremely poor quality of housing, subletting rooms, or both. Electricity and other assets were important for the viability of home-based production activities. Table 21 compares the refugee and Zambian percentage of asset ownership.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cell phone</th>
<th>Stove</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Refrigerator or Freezer</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>54% - 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hichaambwa et al. 2009 for Zambian households

Over half of the refugees surveyed had lived at their current location for less than two years. The frequency of refugee residential moves often resulted from the difficulty of paying rent, feelings of insecurity, or experiencing discrimination. As one refugee noted, “I was
unwanted by my former landlords because of being a foreigner.” Bana had previously lived in Chipata compound with her husband and two children. After they were robbed at their home, they felt insecure and unsettled in Lusaka. Visibly agitated, she said, “Lusaka is okay but the problem is that we were arrested. We were attacked by thieves. They even fired shots [and] then I had to go to the hospital. We even shifted [moved].” The associated time, expense, and uncertainty caused by frequent relocations hurt refugees’ livelihoods and their ability to build personal networks.

However, assistance provided by neighbors, churches or organizations helped stabilize some refugees’ housing situations. Several elderly and very poor refugees were assisted by nearby churches, usually with small handouts of food, but in some cases churches sponsored children to go to school and paid refugee rent. Marie shared a tiny one-room dilapidated structure with her husband and three grandchildren in Mandevu. She lost her leg when she fled DRC in 1993 and, at 65 years old, found it painful to move on an old prosthetic leg. The family breadwinner, her daughter, died in 1999. Since then she sent her three grandchildren out to do piecework, while she did washing when she was able. Some church members helped her pay for the room the family lived in, giving her K40,000 ($10) to offset the K85,000 ($21) due each month. However, as she was unable to make up the difference, the landlord told her to move out. During my few visits with Marie, the Red Cross staff repeatedly chastised Marie’s husband for not helping the family and taking advantage of the sympathetic support often offered to her.

One shock for Charles’s household was his arrest in 1998 when he was imprisoned for two months and then sent to Meheba refugee settlement. The weight of income earning was subsequently shifted to his wife and her small business selling *fritas*, small fried dough, in the market nearby. Their living conditions at the time of my research reflected the family’s
economic downturn, but fewer costs were associated with their smaller family size and they could afford to send their children to a community school rather than to work. Fear of Immigration officers and the lack of an electronic card limited Charles’s opportunities for work and further increased the importance of positive interactions and reliance on their immediate neighbors.

Zambian Housing

Housing conditions remain one of the most challenging issues for poor communities in Lusaka. Limited housing supply and high demand resulted in overcrowded dwellings and high rent. Over 70 percent of the urban population lived in informal, low-income settlements, which occupied only 20 percent of the city’s total area (Fallavier et al. 2005:v). Poverty and the lack of a sustainable housing policy led to urban growth being absorbed into these areas, which lacked the public infrastructure to provide residents with safe and sanitary living conditions.

While housing in Lusaka was comparatively better than other urban areas in Zambia, its quality was still poor. In compounds that still have not been upgraded or legally recognized, housing was particularly bad, with the majority of houses built with mud, poles and grass, unlike the concrete block walls and corrugated iron or asbestos sheet roofs that characterized most other housing in Lusaka. However, since most informal settlements in Lusaka have been recognized, security of tenure has improved by limiting the threat of demolition of houses by local authorities (Fallavier et al. 2005:17).

The housing market in Zambia greatly favored higher income groups. The availability of plot areas and servicing was concentrated in the high-cost formal housing sector. However, most of the real estate market was informal where lower-income groups sought accommodation in
crowded and poorly-serviced areas. According to K. Hansen (1997: 1884), the rapid population growth combined with economic decline in the 1990s limited the possibility of home ownership for urban residents and thus limited access to an important economic and social resource. In 2006, owner occupied houses comprised approximately 48 percent of homes in low-cost areas of Lusaka, while rented houses or rooms from a private landlord comprised 52 percent (CSO 2011).

While home ownership was much higher among Zambians than refugees, those Zambian households who rented also had to move frequently due to the changing demands of landlords and the deterioration of their economic situation (Gough 2008:251). Muchindu’s (2007) study of the impact of privatization on housing in Lusaka found that over a third of renters were afraid that they could be evicted at any time. Generally, informal agreements were used when renting from individuals, which created the possibility for uncertainty and conflicts (UN Habitat 2012:137). Many renters left their previous dwellings due to conflicts with landlords, often regarding rent payment or increases, and in some cases because landlords wanted the dwelling back for their own use (Muchindu 2007).

According to JCTR, the cost of renting the cheapest, reasonable-quality houses for a family of six was K700,000 a month in 2007 (JCTR 2007b). JCTR determined that a three-bedroom with access to electricity in a medium-density area was necessary for such a large family to ensure separate bedrooms for parents and female and male children (JCTR 2007b). However, to cope with the high cost of living, most households opted to live in a smaller home at a lower cost. Most households lived in only one or two rooms and yet the average household size was five to six persons (CSO 1995). Room occupancy rates of three to five people per room were common. Table 22 uses the percentage of overcrowding in refugee households described in
Table 19 and compares it to Zambian households. While data is only available from 2000 for Zambia, Table 22 does provide perspective on the differences between refugee and Zambian standards of living.

Table 22. Percentage of Overcrowding of Refugee Survey Sample in July 2007 and Zambian Households by Number of Rooms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms Occupied</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian Households</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Households</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank 2002 for Zambian households*

Access to electricity usually indicated a more expensive residence and a slightly higher standard of living. Urban households had relatively poor access to electricity with slightly over half of the households in Lusaka having electric power (Hichaambwa et al. 2009:110).

According to the JCTR, the monthly cost of housing for two electrified rooms in January 2010 averaged K150,000 ($38) in Kanyama and K200,000 ($50) in Garden compound, located between George and Mandevu (JCTR 2010). Cheaper homes could be found without electricity; for example K80,000 for two rooms in John Howard and K80,000 for two rooms in Chipata (JCTR 2007c).

Refugees were paying comparable amounts for housing in Lusaka. However, as Table 22 indicated, their homes were certainly more overcrowded. Refugees were also less likely to have electricity (48% of refugees compared to 54% to 64% of Zambians), and additional households assets such as refrigerators, stoves and cell phones. They were also less likely to own their own home. These indicators provide additional evidence that refugees experienced a lower standard of living than the population of Lusaka as a whole. Refugees’ economic struggles translated into difficulty finding secure and safe housing, leaving them in a position comparable to the poorest
Zambian. However, by living dispersed within the local population, many were able to build social connections wherever they were located, which is discussed more fully later in this chapter.

Access to Social Services

A worry repeated consistently during my interviews with refugees was how they could afford to send their children and grandchildren to school. Zambia had reservations to the 1951 Refugee Convention regarding refugee right to work, education, freedom of movement and provision of travel documents. However, the reservation placed on educating children was not put into practice and Zambia’s policy allowed recognized refugees to attend schools on the same basis as Zambian nationals. Urban refugees also had access to health care services if they paid the appropriate fees. Yet the nature of these social services and what limited refugee access in practice further informed the nature of refugee integration in Lusaka. This section focuses on education and health care by identifying the existing mechanisms that support or limit refugee access. It is followed by a broader discussion of the education and health system in Lusaka to fully situate the experiences of refugees.

Refugee Education and Health Care

The quality of the education system in Zambia had been deteriorating since the 1990s, yet the demand for education continued to grow and outnumbered the places available in government-run schools. The Zambian government abolished student user fees for primary education, the first seven years, and the obligatory uniforms in public schools in 2002. Despite this, there were still some costs such as Parent Teacher Association fees, transportation, books, and supplies that made access to education prohibitive to many of the poorest households. Community schools emerged in the 1990s across Lusaka to provide a lower cost schooling
option and to fill the gap created by the limited number of public schools spots. Government-run schools were available to all regardless of nationality, but non-nationals were required to pay an additional fee (Muyembe 2007:4). Community schools were easier for refugees to access, but sometimes also added additional fees.

UNHCR’s objective was that all registered urban refugee children be able to complete their primary education. School fees, books, and uniforms were provided to refugee children identified as vulnerable, particularly those living in single-headed households, orphans and those living with foster families. During 2006, the UNHCR sponsored some 459 children through the Red Cross (Table 23). Of refugees holding electronic residence cards, this number comprised approximately 40% of all school-aged children.

Table 23. Red Cross Supported Refugee Students in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sponsorship served only a small portion of the total school-aged refugee population. UNHCR decided to no longer support refugee children attending secondary school and above and would only continue support to those refugee children who were already attending post-primary school until they finished their studies. Table 23 shows this trend clearly. This decision was due to budgetary constraints and to ensure that primary education was prioritized for the largest number of refugees.

UNHCR’s focus on primary education may also have been connected to experiences of many long staying refugee children. Jacob arrived in Lusaka in 1993 with his younger brother
and sister when he was 16 years old and had been orphaned twice over when his uncle was killed in DRC. A Zambian family fostered the two younger children while Jacob was sent to a secondary boarding school in Solwezi. UNHCR supported this schooling, sending Jacob and his younger brother on to complete their advanced degrees in aviation mechanics and accounting respectively, while his younger sister, 19 at the time of my research, finished her secondary education. With no extended family in Zambia or DRC, they lived together in Lusaka illegally and were unable to obtain work permits. Jacob explained his frustration with UNHCR,

but life is making little sense to for me now because I’ve wasted time to complete my education but there is no job. And when I try to explain to UNHCR, the only solution they are giving me is to go into the camp after being educated, to go again in the bush where there is no, there are no planes, because I specialize in planes. For my young brother, there are no banks. Imagine. So I wonder why they wasted all that money just to have us go and stay in the camp? And for me staying in Lusaka, it is risky because anytime when I am caught, I could be arrested.

Children of refugees residing in urban areas without urban residency permits were the most vulnerable in terms of access to education. Extended family, churches, and friends would often step in, when possible, to support refugee children’s school attendance. However, financial assistance often could only be given when extra funds were available, which made support very inconsistent. Charlotte’s church had been very supportive, helping to get her released from prison after she was arrested and paying for her rent and the school fees for her children. However, the church could no longer afford to help, so Charlotte was searching for other sponsors. “I need help since the children are not going to school, so that they can start going to school and then help alleviate my sufferings.” Access to secondary education was severely limited due to the high cost of school fees and education permits, some $100.

Community schools were run with minimal or non-existent fees and designed to serve the poorest and most vulnerable children in Zambia. In Lusaka, many NGO and church-supported
community schools were provided with teaching materials and supplementary feeding programs, which made them an essential part of the education system for the urban poor (Fallavier et al. 2005:27). However, the quality of many community schools was questionable and most refugee families preferred to send their children to government-run schools, if possible. Some refugees sought to stretch the cost of education by dividing their children and sending some to government schools and others to community schools. JCTR estimated the annual direct and indirect costs for a primary education in Lusaka; the government school averaged K450,000 ($113) and community schools K190,000 ($48) (Petrauskis and Nkunika 2006:4). Tama had four children; two attended community schools, and the other two attended a Catholic school nearby. One church member paid for her oldest, in grade 9, to attend school while she paid for the rest. She was very worried about educating her children because, she said, “I cannot manage to educate them up to university.”

While legally allowed to attend Zambian schools, refugee children could also be discriminated against or charged significantly higher fees with little recourse. Occasionally this was even the case in the community-run schools. Refugees identified lack of money as the number one reason why children could not attend school. In fact, some households were not even able to pay the minimal amount to send their children to community schools; instead these children engaged in menial work to support the family. In the most vulnerable families, children might even be the principal breadwinners. Regina needed the financial support of her children when they got older; “I have 3 elder boys, so now they have gone to sell plastics. I have tried to educate them a bit from grade one to seven but they never went up to grade eight.” Even those attending schools were often compelled to work in order to obtain school exercise books.
Still, 67 percent of the households in the survey sample and over half of the refugees I interviewed were able to educate at least some of the children in their care to some degree either through a government or community school, which supported the belief that urban areas provided more opportunities for refugee children as opposed to the overcrowded and underserviced camp schools. However, the refugee children cared for by the elderly and extremely poor did not have those opportunities.

Similar to the education system, if urban refugees had the resources to pay, they received equal access to health care services in Lusaka. In the past, Zambian citizens had free access to health care but now all Zambians pay for services in public hospitals, except children younger than five years, elderly people above 65 years, and pregnant women. Although health services were still subsidized, they remained unaffordable for those in situations of economic hardship. Zambia’s health infrastructure suffered greatly due to the major economic decline in the last several decades, which resulted in poorly maintained health facilities and equipment unable to meet the needs of an impoverished population (Muyemba 2007:10-11).

The Zambian Red Cross provided out-patient health services at the Kamwala Centre, specifically for registered refugees. Established 13 years ago, this service included an onsite registered nurse or clinical officer to provide primary care and supply basic medicines such as antibiotics or malaria treatment, and referrals to the University Teaching Hospital or other area hospitals. A voucher system was used and the hospital sent the bill to the Red Cross. While a crucial service for registered refugees in Lusaka, there was a lack of funding at the Red Cross that caused long delays for patients and limited available medicine. In addition, there were no mental health services available (UNHCR 2007c:36).
Refugees who had to find health care on their own were generally charged a higher fee. Health regulations required that patients pass through a referral center before accessing a specialized hospital. For many refugees, the consultation fees at government clinics were beyond their means, as were prescription drugs. The majority of surveyed refugees responded that they first tried to go to the Red Cross for medical treatment, followed by visiting a government clinic. UNHCR had only recently decided that the Red Cross would no longer be able to serve refugees without an electronic card. It is difficult to say how this decision would impact the health of the large number of refugees who had been dependent on the Red Cross for basic health care. At the time of this research, refugees identified major challenges to accessing medical care as costs associated with visiting a medical professional and purchasing medications and the overall poor care available in health care facilities.

HIV/AIDS was a huge concern to UNHCR and all NGOs serving refugees, including the Peace Centre, which was trying to complement the efforts of the Red Cross. The government of Zambia declared the HIV/AIDS pandemic to be a national emergency in 2005, and it announced that all nationals requiring anti-retroviral treatment would be given free medication, including refugees. No restrictions to care had been placed on asylum seekers or refugees who tested positive for the virus. Access to Voluntary Counseling and Testing was universal and strictly confidential. The Red Cross provided counseling to refugees and referred refugees to an anti-retroviral treatment and voluntary counseling and testing center near the University of Zambia. A particular focus was been placed on training and sensitizing the refugee community about sexual and reproductive health concerns, and voluntary peer educators have participated in these efforts.
The high incidence of HIV/AIDS in the urban setting, coupled with the extremely poor economic conditions experienced by most refugees, have led many households to lose their primary breadwinner. A number of children have been left orphaned and as such were extremely vulnerable to labor and sexual exploitation. Combating HIV/AIDS was an important component of the outreach program implemented by the Zambian Red Cross. With or without an electronic card, refugees could continue to receive anti-retroviral treatment and were given report orders, on a three-month basis, to remain in Lusaka. A major concern of UNHCR however, was the continuation of treatment when refugees were repatriated. The director the Zambian Red Cross urban refugee project, Mr. Chele, speculated that the number of refugees with HIV was comparable to the percentage of Zambians. However there was no data available specifically on the HIV status of urban refugees or on their health more generally (UNHCR 2007c:9).

Zambian Education and Health Care

The introduction of free primary education in Zambia allowed many vulnerable children, especially orphans and those from very poor households, to attend government schools for the first time. However, there still remained a large number of children in Lusaka’s high density, low-income areas that could not access education. For example in 2003, only 360 of the 1200 applicants to first grade could be accommodated at Chisuba Basic School in Chawama, leaving 70 percent of the potential first graders without access to government education (World Bank 2007:92). The “free education” also had a number of hidden costs that still made it inaccessible to poorer households. Table 24 is JCTR’s estimate of direct and indirect costs of education in Lusaka in 2005 and includes government primary, government secondary schools, and community schools for comparison. Direct costs included project fees paid directly to the school
and some optional costs for activities like sports or computer labs. Indirect costs were calculated through parent estimates of the costs incurred by sending a child to school, which included transportation and supplies.

Table 24. Estimated Annual Direct and Indirect Costs of School in Lusaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total Direct Cost</th>
<th>Estimated Indirect Cost</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Primary (grades 1-7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero East Basic</td>
<td>10,000-30,000</td>
<td>300,000-1,485,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chawama Basic</td>
<td>15,000-20,000</td>
<td>46,000-900,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlands B Basic</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>190,000-1,580,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamwala Basic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>184,000-820,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibelo Basic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90,000-125,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages:</td>
<td>K10,000</td>
<td>K440,000</td>
<td>K450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Junior (grades 8-9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero East Basic</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>200,000-1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chawama Basic</td>
<td>410,000-470,000</td>
<td>84,000-194,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibelo Basic</td>
<td>350,000-380,000</td>
<td>165,000-355,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero Basic</td>
<td>220,000-250,000</td>
<td>420,000-2,400,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages:</td>
<td>K310,000</td>
<td>K670,000</td>
<td>K980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Senior (grades 12-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero Boys</td>
<td>220,000-235,000</td>
<td>350,000-1,300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabulonga Girls</td>
<td>260,000-300,000</td>
<td>2,680,000-3,370,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arakan High</td>
<td>380,000-430,000</td>
<td>700,000-1,100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages:</td>
<td>K300,000</td>
<td>K1,270,000</td>
<td>K1,570,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community School (grades 1-7)/ (grades 8-9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero ZOCS</td>
<td>15,000/ 55,000</td>
<td>15,000-150,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chawama ZOCS</td>
<td>25,000/ 240,000</td>
<td>60,000-367,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages:</td>
<td>K20,000/</td>
<td>K170,000</td>
<td>K190,000/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Petrauskis and Nkunika 2005:4

Note: Zambia Open Community School (ZOCS) was the largest NGO working in the community school sector.

While the direct costs of primary education at community schools were on average higher than those at a government school, the lower indirect costs made community school education more affordable overall. In addition, community schools were often more accessible. Chawama only had four primary government schools for an estimated population of 95,000, but there were 50 community schools located across the compound (Fallavier et al. 2005:22). However, the user
fees charged by community schools might still have prevented some extremely poor and vulnerable households from sending school-aged children to school.

Additional barriers existed to prevent children from accessing education. For example, regular attendance remained a major problem, particularly for girls. Some were expected to stay home from school and take care of their families when their parents had other obligations; others were sent to work in the market (Fallavier et al. 2005:22). However, campaigns in support of the girl-child are helping to promote gender equity in schools. Also, very few spaces were available in secondary school after grade seven, which encouraged unfair practices in allocating those spots and deprived many children from the chance to attend. Parents reported paying bribes to head teachers in order to secure school places for their children (JCTR 2007a:2).

Community schools were set up in informal settlements to handle the shortage of space and high cost in public schools, often in collaboration with church groups or NGOs, and at times with inputs from the government. However, there were important differences in quality between government and community schools. While the quality of government-run schools was consistent across the country, community schools could differ greatly in their physical infrastructure and level of development. They relied on donations from residents of poor communities, churches, and NGOs. Many used untrained volunteer teachers from the community and space provided by churches. Limited resources made it difficult for community schools to follow the same curricula and standards as public schools. There were community schools that realized their limitations and focused instead on providing general literacy, numeracy skills, and vocational training, and creating a safe place to keep children off the streets (Fallavier et al. 2005:33). Other schools were more successful in securing financial support, training and paying
teachers, and providing a high standard of education; ZOCS is one example. Community schools consistently served orphaned and vulnerable children, as well as over-age students.

Ultimately with the support of community schools, overall primary school attendance rates were at 85 percent in Lusaka province in 2007, although the quality of education was varied. Table 25 also clearly shows the limited availability of secondary education in Zambia.

Table 25. Net School Attendance Rates by Sex and Age Group in Lusaka Province, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Primary School</th>
<th>Secondary School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO et al. 2009:19

The government provided 65 percent of the health services in Zambia, while churches served almost a third of the population and another five percent of Zambians accessed health services through private entities (Muyemba 2007:10). As a result of extending health facilities into high-density areas of Lusaka, 93% of urban residents lived within a five-kilometer radius of a health facility (CSO 2011). The majority of residents in Lusaka relied on government health services as their main source of medical care. However, due to underfunding, public health care in Zambia was poor in terms of quality and coverage. There was general discontent in the low-income areas of Lusaka regarding the standard of government provided health services and availability of drugs (World Bank 2007:76).

There was no comprehensive social health insurance in Zambia; everyone paid for health services, except for children under five, adults above 65 years and pregnant women. JCTR estimated the cost of an emergency visit to a health clinic at K5,500 ($1.25). While inexpensive, many poor households did not access health services because the services they obtained were of poor quality and medication was not affordable. Patients at government clinics complained of
waiting for hours to be seen by qualified personnel due to overcrowding. After being examined, patients in most instances were just given a prescription, which needed to be purchased at a privately run drug store. The absence of drugs in Lusaka clinics was widespread, although common drugs should have been in stock and free, according to the Ministry of Health (JCTR 2007a). The proliferation of private drug stores and suspicious lack of drugs at health clinics revealed widespread corruption and mismanagement (JCTR 2011). The 2007 Demographic and Health Survey revealed that 54% of women were concerned that there were no drugs available at the health facility and that this was a major factor affecting them in seeking medical advice or treatment (CSO et al. 2009:136).

Health services often emphasized outpatient care to the detriment of preventative services such as maternal and child health services and health education. Residents of informal settlements in Lusaka requested, in particular, maternity services and mortuary units to accommodate the large number of HIV/AIDS affected individuals who died in their homes (Fallavier et al. 2005:23). If patients were referred to a hospital or private clinic by a local health center, cost of transport created a significant barrier for many low-income households. As a result, a large portion of the population relied on traditional healers in addition to accessing conventional care. The very poor depended mainly on self-treatment or on traditional healers, who were more flexible than health centers in regard to payment. This was most likely why only one percent of Zambian household expenditure was used on health, according the 2006 Living Conditions survey (CSO 2011).

Revealing an in important contradiction to the stated Zambian refugee policy, refugees in Lusaka had the same access to education and health care as the general public, if they were able to afford the costs. There were only a few reported instances of their refugee status being a
barrier to access or outright discrimination. A number of NGOs and churches directly served refugees by providing scholarships to school-aged children and some basic health care. However, this was limited to a small portion of the refugee population and, in the case of UNHCR-supported services, to only those refugee households with an electronic card. It was unclear if refugee status was problematic when accessing social service support programs targeted at the broader Zambian public by NGOs.

School attendance rates among refugees further indicated that refugee households were among the poorest in Lusaka. A total of 67 percent of refugee households sent their children to school, compared to 85 percent of Zambians (CSO et al. 2009:19). Lack of financial support was the main reason refugee children never went to school or did not finish, further indicating the economic hardships faced by refugees.

Conflict and Connection in Lusaka

A Somali businesswoman said she had been happy living in Zambia for 24 years. She was free to ask for salt or tomatoes from her Zambian neighbors and they helped one another at funerals and weddings. One day when she was in city center, a man told her to return to her home country, but she retorted, “Zambia is also my country.” Tama, originally from DRC also spoke affectionately about her community, “I like staying in Chawama because we are like family. The neighbor that I have comforts me, she makes me feel as though I am part of the family.” Before her husband died, Tama moved often. He was mentally ill and was not accepted in many places. Even though she worried about educating her children and finding work, she was happy in Zambia. This section examines both positive and negative daily interactions refugees had with Zambian and how they impacted feelings of safety, security, and connection in Lusaka.
Research on urban refugees has often highlighted mistreatment from the local population in forms of xenophobic attitudes, discrimination, and harassment (Campbell 2005; Campbell et al. 2006; Grabska 2006; Jacobsen 2004; 2006; Landau 2004; 2006). While this was also undoubtedly true in Lusaka as evidenced by refugee struggles to secure regular income, the examples provided in the previous paragraph from two individuals of different economic status and ethnic backgrounds reveal deeper connections. Many other refugees highlighted the positive daily interactions like those of Charles and Mary, discussed previously in the chapter, where they borrowed items from their Zambian neighbors and supported each other’s businesses. Over 50 percent of the surveyed refugees reported good or very good relationships with those Zambians with whom they interacted on a regular basis, and another 26 percent were neutral about those interactions. These included Zambians from their churches, neighborhoods, and marketplaces; some were close friends and business partners. For those refugees who interacted mainly with their neighbors, the percentage of positive or at least neutral relations was even higher, at 86 percent.

In part, the length of time lived in Lusaka impacted the strength of refugee social connections. Almost 75 percent of refugees had lived in Lusaka for longer than six years and were able to develop deep local connections. Participation in churches, mosques, refugee organizations, and local networks increased over time, as did knowledge of local languages. Over 65% of the refugees surveyed could communicate in the main local languages spoken in Lusaka, particularly Nyanja and Bemba. A few men who noted they had little knowledge of either mentioned that their wives and children “were very good in the local languages.” Alternatively, these men were very involved with refugee groups, providing a different, but
important, support system. The knowledge of the local languages enabled refugees to join local networks and conduct business, positively impacting their livelihood security.

Relations between urban refugees and local communities could differ from neighborhood to neighborhood and from refugee to refugee. Some enjoyed excellent relations that were not overshadowed by the larger context of xenophobia, but others intimately felt discrimination, hostility, and outright violence. Jacqueline, who had struggled alone in the city with her daughter, commented, “[Zambians] like people who can give them food; if you are poor, they don’t consider you.” She felt that her own daughter was often teased mercilessly for being poor. However, Jacqueline was an example of a refugee who had not developed ties with Zambians nor did she have any family support in the city. Jacqueline was a minority within my study population, but she was the type of vulnerable female refugee that UNHCR specifically sought out for resettlement.

When asked what the biggest source of insecurity in Lusaka was, 50 percent responded that the Department of Immigration was the biggest threat, while 25 percent were concerned about Zambians in general. In some cases, refugees felt that their precarious legal position was used against them when Zambians threatened, “we will tell [Immigration officers] we have foreigners here.” More common were general insults from Zambians that were more irritating than dangerous to refugee livelihoods. The term Kasai had long been associated with those from DRC, but was perceived by Congolese refugees as an insult, particularly for those from the Katanga region who faced persecution due to their Kasai background. Refugees were also called foreigner, chikasia, or mwanyamulenge, which means rebel, as insults. This occurred at the market or during arguments, commonly with interactions between children. Mwambila noted, “Like the neighbor here, we don’t get along well. Once you do anything, they would call us
Kasai. However a small thing you would do, they would say Kasai, so we are not on good terms.” She did have other Zambian friends to whom he was close and visited often. When Zelenia’s children went to fetch water at the public tap, they were bullied, called foreigners, and their containers were stolen. If a child did anything wrong, he or she was shouted at and called “foreigner.”

This harassment could take a dangerous turn for elderly refugees with little family left in Lusaka, as they often faced accusations of being witches. Martha, only 65 years old, laughed when asked about getting along with her neighbors, “I’m an old woman, who can want us?” People made up stories about her. She defended herself saying “I grew up in town. My father was a teacher. I didn’t grow up in a village. We didn’t know about witchcraft where I come from. Here when they see you have grown old, they say that you are a witch. They don’t know what a real witch is.” Manyonga, 80 years old, sat with her in-laws and held her twin grandchildren. Due to her advanced age, many assumed witchcraft was involved in prolonging her life, which made finding assistance very difficult and even resulted in attacks. The use of witchcraft was a common accusation for elderly Zambians as well.

While the name-calling was a reminder to some that they were considered outsiders, others have found ways to adapt. Mateya has found that “people are good to you if you are good to them. If you show bad character, they will also show you bad character. But generally, our fellow brothers, they don’t like the foreigners, no. That is all I can say. But I ignore that because I have been here from 1978 until now.”

During a Peace Education program at the Peace Centre, eight groups of Zambians and refugees were sent out into the compounds to examine root causes and effects of conflicts between refugees and Zambians. For example, the group who conducted fieldwork in Mandevu
compound interviewed 38 Zambians and 22 refugees. Through the course of the interviews, perceptions that underlie discrimination and the atmosphere of xenophobia became clearer.

On one hand, there were assumptions that reflected the long history of refugee hosting. Many Zambians felt general weariness towards refugee hosting and believed that the government was letting in too many refugees and spending all national wealth on them. It was assumed that refugee arrival in Lusaka brought increased rent due to higher demands for housing and increased competition between businesses. On top of this, there was a perception that refugees were violent because they came from violence, bringing crime and possible uprisings.

Zambian assumptions about refugees were also embedded within larger concerns about foreigners and a perception that foreigners were taking shops and businesses away from Zambians. In June 2006, the Department of Immigration confirmed the arrest of two Indians, three Congolese, one Rwandan, and seven Chinese for illegal trading in the Kamwala area. The Department of Immigration’s spokesperson, Mr. Mbangweta, said, “many of these come as investors (especially the Chinese and Indians) in farming, manufacturing companies and textiles but acquire shops and start trading using Zambians” (The Post Zambia 2006a). After Michael Sata lost the 2006 presidential election, rioting broke out and Chinese shopkeepers in Lusaka had to barricade themselves in. One man said, “Wherever you go—the market, the town centre—the Chinese are there and they are putting Zambians out of business” (SW Radio Africa 2006). Street vendors also complained that shop rentals in the government’s modern markets were “too high for a simple trader to afford, therefore [they] are being occupied by foreign traders who run bigger businesses” (Zibani Zambia 2012).

In fact, when specifically asked about refugees, many Zambians interviewed made more general statements about foreigners instead. For example, one Zambian schoolteacher
complained that most foreigners were rude and selfish, selling their commodities at very high prices. “There is need to educate them [on how to live in Zambia], though they are very hard workers.” This fed into the perception that “refugees have successful businesses, while Zambians aren’t making it.”

In some cases, Zambians felt unfairly treated by refugee shop owners and employers. This was exacerbated by cultural misunderstandings and misperceptions about their wealth. Kabwe, a very poor refugee widow from the DRC, had her home broken into and bedding stolen. Her home was almost empty of belongings, and she stated angrily, “You know these criminals in the compound, once they know that there is a Kasai there, to them Kasai means money and they have to attack every time.” Locals often viewed urban refugees as rich and business owners and sometimes perceived refugees as competition for clients and resources (Campbell 2005; Campbell et al. 2006; Jacobsen 2004).

Some refugee owned businesses were viewed with suspicion and became a source of tension in a community. One refugee commented, “When they see us doing well, we are told we are satanic and we use muti (magic).” A refugee shop owner in Mandevu caused anger by not measuring his sugar and cooking oil accurately and then not closing his shop when there was a funeral in the neighborhood. The Peace Education group that was interviewing individuals in that community took time to talk to the shop owner, explaining the tensions and promoting some dialogue.

These types of cultural misunderstandings, such as the shop owner not closing during a funeral, were apparent. Congolese traditionally play music at funerals, which offended Zambians who preferred a more solemn occasion. Even though most refugees were conversant in the local languages, some Zambians complained, “refugees only speak their own language and don’t
integrate.” In Garden compound, difficulties communicating with Burundian and Rwandan refugees were referenced as a source of tension and misunderstanding. There were a few refugee-only churches, which were seen as very exclusive and not a way to integrate into Lusaka. Alternatively, intermarriage between refugees and Zambians was viewed as a dilution of national identity, which “destroys Zambian culture.” Some complained that refugees were marrying Zambian women and then leaving them when they went back to their country of origin, leaving children without fathers.

Alternatively, refugees and Zambians often attended funerals and weddings together and worshiped together. The majority of refugee pastors interviewed were part of multi-language church services. A local market chairman in Garden compound said at first he found most Congolese were thieves because they came to Zambia with no money. However, now he found them to be good partners and instead blamed the government for abolishing price controls. This was a good example of focusing blame on individuals versus the larger social and economic context, particularly considering the relatively small number of refugees in Lusaka. Refugees were often praised for being hard workers, a result of their experiences. “Refugees do not have relatives in Zambia, so for them to survive, they need to work extra hard.” As one woman commented, “We Zambians are lazy; that is why we feel jealousy.”

Conclusion

The residents of Lusaka have proved themselves diverse and dynamic. As living conditions have worsened, the urban poor have developed their own coping mechanisms outside of and beyond weak government interventions. Refugees participated in these coping strategies by becoming involved in the informal employment sector alongside local Zambians and building support networks through their neighborhoods, churches and refugee communities. In many
ways, refugees were fully integrated into the social fabric of Lusaka and built strong, positive connections with many of Zambians with whom they interacted with on a daily basis.

However, it is possible to be integrated in some ways and not in others. The lack of government permission to live and work in Lusaka dramatically impacted the economic viability of refugee households, which further impacted their access to health services and education and their overall standard of living. When asked how they compared to their neighbors in terms of standard of living, 56% of the refugee questionnaire respondents considered themselves worse off than their neighbors, while 28% considered themselves the same and 16% better off. Those respondents who considered themselves on par with their Zambian neighbors focused on shared circumstances they all faced living in Lusaka, a similar standard of living with comparable housing and the number of meals a day. One respondent noted, “The people in our compound are not rich and we are not rich either, so at times we can afford to eat better than our neighbors and other times they are better off.” Alternatively, respondents who considered themselves much worse off focused on the material items, such as number of meals, access to electricity, nice furniture, and regular employment. They also added the lack of overall freedom, which included fear of Immigration officers, being constantly identified as a foreigner, and the inability to work. Due to these refugee-specific experiences, they could not be fully integrated into Lusaka.
CHAPTER 8
WHERE IS HOME?: THE FUTURE OF URBAN REFUGEES IN LUSAKA

When I asked refugees whether they would return to their country of origin, the constant response was, “How can I go”? Their explanations ranged from being “used to Lusaka now” to continued fears of the traumas of war and violence in their countries of origin that initially caused them to flee to Zambia. Many refugees lost everything and felt there was nothing to return to in their home country. “No way [am I returning]. Where will I live? I have no husband, no family. They are all dead. I am just alone.” As exile has extended to decades, the solution sought by many refugees in the immediate- and long-term was integration into Lusaka. Urban refugees found ways to survive and make a life for themselves and their families. This integration raises the question of why some refugees would return to their country of origin, a question that contradicts dominant assumptions about refugee motivations and feelings of belonging.

This concluding chapter reviews the nature and characteristics of refugee integration, in particular the legal, economic, and social aspects, in Lusaka and the conditions that made integration possible or not possible. The main findings of this dissertation fell within three different themes: the challenge of the dominant durable solutions model, the limits of state policy, and the intentional actions of refugees in their own solutions and futures. I conclude this chapter with an update on the latest developments in Zambia and, finally, the broader implications of my research.
Summary of Findings

This dissertation examined the local integration of refugees in the Lusaka by evaluating the mechanisms that both facilitated and obstructed their process of settling into and becoming part of the local community. The Zambian government, like the majority of host countries in the region, instituted policies that discouraged the long-term integration of refugees by isolating them in camps and settlements until they could be returned to their countries of origin and by placing strict restrictions on those in urban areas. Yet refugees themselves asserted their right to remain in Lusaka by ignoring government policies and staying. The refugee choice of local integration was carried out through a variety of strategies to create a sense of belonging in Zambian society. This dissertation looked at the extent to which such strategies had been successful.

This dissertation began with Barbara Harrell-Bond’s simple definition of refugee integration that emphasized the roles of both refugees and their hosts (1986:7). UNHCR even acknowledged that local integration in the refugee context is a dynamic and multi-faceted two-way process, which requires efforts by all parties concerned, including a preparedness of the part of refugees to adapt to the host society without having to forgo their own cultural identity, and a corresponding readiness on the part of communities and public institutions to welcome refugees and to meet the needs of a diverse population (UNHCR 2005c:15).

The UNHCR further recognized that refugee integration was complex and gradual, and was comprised of distinct but inter-related dimensions: legal, economic, and social (UNHCR 2005c:15). The following outlines my findings, based on these legal, economic and social aspects of integration, including what exactly was involved in each, and how they were experienced in Lusaka.

Legal integration can mean the legal access to the rights such as the right to seek employment or engage in income generating activities, to own property, to enjoy freedom of
movement and to have access to public social services. On a purely legal level, the majority of refugees did not have these rights in Lusaka, due largely to the policies the Zambian government enacted concerning refugees. However, Zambia was not able to fully enforce the limitations it placed on refugees. The clearest example of this was the presence of refugees in Lusaka without official permission. There were a number of reasons why inconsistencies occurred between government policy and practice, which included contradictions in the government’s own policies, limited capacity, and inconsistent enforcement. For example, refugees could avoid or pay Immigration officers who would have arrested them for not having proper papers. In addition, the active advocacy of UNHCR, churches and other refugee activists were instrumental in getting refugees out of prison and reducing the specific targeting of refugees by the Department of Immigration. Additionally, even if refugees were deported or sent to refugee settlements, if they had resources, it was fairly easy for them to return to Lusaka. That said, I do not want to under-emphasize how fear of arrest and deportation, and the lack of legal status played significant roles in refugee lives. They directly affected how refugees lived and moved in the city and their ability to gain employment and general financial stability.

In terms of economic integration, I examined refugee livelihoods and standards of living, access to markets, and income generating activities in comparison to local Zambians. Similar to the Zambian population, economic stability varied within the refugee population and certainly there were a number of refugees able to set up relatively successful businesses and stable livelihoods. However, this group was a minority within the overall refugee population and was often limited to those with electronic cards. In one sense refugees were economically integrated in that they had access to markets and participated in common income-generating activities. In addition, they equally had access to housing and basic social services.
Yet there were a number of ways that the majority of refugees were significantly worse off than the local population and were often comparable to the poorest Zambians living in Lusaka. There were absolute limits to the work refugees could find. Higher skilled refugees were rarely able to find employment commensurate with their skills due to government restrictions to accessing work permits, so work was often restricted to the informal sector. Arrests and imprisonment had devastating effects on households due to loss of income and often loss of inventory. Refugees were more vulnerable to exploitation by not being paid for the goods and services they provided. Comparing the refugee standard of living, incomes, and coping strategies to the Zambian population made the impact of refugees’ precarious legal and economic position particularly evident. Only a small number of refugees received financial assistance from UNHCR. UNHCR provided primary school education for refugee children and access to health care only to those with an electronic card who were legally allowed in Lusaka. Therefore, the majority of refugees relied heavily on their own social networks of churches, neighborhoods and refugee organizations to survive. However, surviving in this case certainly did not equal thriving.

The development of refugee social and cultural integration, in particular the feeling of belonging in the host countries, relied on the quality and type of interactions with the local community in neighborhoods, churches, markets, and work places. Such connections and supportive social networks could even compensate for a hostile national environment to a certain extent. In Lusaka there was a wide range of experiences. On the negative end, refugees complained about encountering discrimination, being called names, being robbed due to the assumption that “refugees are rich,” and being vulnerable to exploitation. However, I found that, on average, the real anger was directed at government policies and the Department of Immigration. Over 75 percent of refugees surveyed had good or at least neutral relationships
with those Zambians with whom they interacted on a regular basis. These included Zambians from their churches, neighborhoods, and marketplaces; some were close friends and business partners. Refugees who interacted mainly with their neighbors had an even higher percentage of positive interaction. I do think that the role of the churches, refugee advocates and even refugee community leaders were very purposeful in this regard. These groups made a concerted effort through articles in the newspapers, outreach to churches, and publicized events and activities to encourage Zambian compassion and understanding towards refugees.

Ultimately it was possible for refugees to be integrated in some ways, but not in others. For example, many refugees had great relationships with neighbors and felt a connection to Lusaka, but still deeply struggled economically due to the political environment. Refugee choice to remain and integrate in Lusaka challenged the dominant durable solutions model that relied on the state to be the facilitator of a long-term integration solution. The intentional actions of refugees further challenged state policy and ensured that refugees controlled their own solutions and futures despite the national context.

Recent Developments in Zambia

Since the end of 2007 and this research, Zambia approach to refugees has evolved. There were significant repatriation efforts, which reduced the total number of refugees from 114,928 refugees in mid-2007 to 25,653 by the end of 2012 (COR 2007b; UNHCR 2012). With the significant reduction in the total number of refugees, Zambia became more open to the option of local integration as a permanent solution. Repatriation was still the preferred solution, but the Zambian government acknowledged that local integration might be the most appropriate option, particularly for those refugees who have lived in Zambia for over 30 years. In concert with the cessation of Angolan refugee status in mid-2012, Zambia granted some Angolan refugees
permanent residency. The integration program was funded by a number of international donors who covered the permit application costs.

In what appeared to be a very controlled effort, local integration permits were to be issued to up to 10,000 Angolan refugees who met the criteria under immigration laws. This was a little less than half of the current Angolan population. Angolans who qualified for local integration would be eligible for citizenship after an average of 10 years. The Minister of Home Affairs stated, "Under the Zambian local integration exercise, those Angolans who apply and meet the established criteria will be considered for local integration by the government by regularizing their stay in the country under Zambia's existing domestic immigration laws” (Shimo 2012). In Mayukwayukwa, out of the 7,000 remaining Angolan refugees, only about 1,002 qualified for local integration based mainly on their employment prospects. However, only 140 registered for the alternative, repatriation to Angola (Kachingwe 2013). The option for legal integration through Zambian immigration procedures occurred outside of updates to refugee legislation, which still have not passed parliament.

For Rwandan refugees, the Rwandan government, the Zambian government, and the UNHCR continue to push for Rwandan repatriation and an end to their refugee status. This push still meets with stiff resistance from refugee advocates and refugees themselves who continued to believe that they would be unsafe if they returned. Renewed fighting in Eastern DRC led to a resumption of Congolese refugees entering Zambia in the northeast, and the reopening of refugee camps in the area was being considered.

In urban areas, the refugees’ status since the end of my research is not entirely clear, but it appeared to be a continuation of the status quo. While the local integration option certainly is a welcome change and not completely surprising, it was limited to the majority rural Angolan
population and not the many urban refugees, who undoubtedly continued to resist repatriation. The very real concern for urban refugees is that the overall reduction in refugees in Zambia reduces the interest in and advocacy for a refugee presence in Lusaka. In the long term, urban refugees could lose their refugee status, as in the case of many Angolan refugees, and become even more vulnerable. The Urban Refugee Peace Centre closed its doors in 2012, a reflection of the reduction in refugee funding in Zambia. As the refugee population continues to decrease as a whole, urban refugees will need to rely on the remaining vocal refugee advocates to support their continued presence in Lusaka.

Implications of Research

With the reality of protracted refugee situations, more and more interest is being directed towards local integration as a policy solution. However, it is imperative to understand what integration looks like now as it is being chosen by refugees, independent of international and national policy interventions. In particular, my research situated refugee action in the social structures that both facilitate and obstruct integration and provided a broad critique of the current efforts to support urban refugees.

The new developments in Zambia centered on allowing a limited number of refugees to locally integrate is an example of advocates actively challenging a democratically elected government and fighting for the rights of refugees. During my research it was evident that advocacy by a number of national and international organizations such as UNHCR, JCTR, various churches and church leaders significantly eased the lives of refugees living in Lusaka in definitive ways. Now the option of citizenship is available to refugees after years of pressure by these advocates, even if, so far, it has only been for a limited number of refugees. In addition, a review of UNHCR refugee numbers in Lusaka show a gradual increase of total numbers legally
allowed to reside in the city. In 2012, the number was 7,857 compared to previous numbers hovering around 5,000 (UNHCR n.d). This seems to indicate that more urban refugees are gaining permission to live in Lusaka and the strict standards around urban residency are being eased.

Despite these positive developments, I am still extraordinarily concerned about the refugees who are not deemed economically beneficial and will not be able to gain permission to remain in Lusaka or even in Zambia in the long-term. UNHCR has been very intent on legal rights for refugees, and the positive result is now the option for citizenship for long-staying refugees. Yet this focus on legal rights has been at the expense of social and economic rights of urban refugees. UNHCR has made a number of concessions to the government and its camp-only policy, in particular the limited support to urban refugees. The Urban Refugee Program was so scaled back that it focused only on immediate needs, rather than a more integrated approach that could have involved the local community and encouraged local support for the urban refugee population. These limitations are equally a broader critique of the lack of burden sharing by the international community and the underfunding of UNHCR, which directly contributed to its limited capacity to address urban refugees. The result of under-serving the majority of the refugee in urban areas was the increased marginalization of the most vulnerable refugees. These are individuals that want to live in Lusaka and should be allowed to live there, but absolutely need additional support to thrive. In continuation of Zambia’s well-known hospitality and generosity hosting refugees for the past 50 years, legal options should be opened to all urban refugees who wish to stay in Lusaka, and with the support of UNHCR, refugees should be able to freely participate in the economic and communal life of Zambia.
APPENDIX A

RELATIONAL CHART AND DESCRIPTIONS OF MAIN ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS WORKING WITH REFUGEES IN LUSAKA
Ministry of Home Affairs

Department of Immigration provided work, study, and employment permits for refugees, as well as report orders for individuals undergoing refugee status or urban residency determination. It was also empowered to arrest and detain any person suspected of being a prohibited immigrant or in violation of the Refugee Control Act.

Commissioner of Refugees was responsible for all refugees in Zambia, and appointed a Refugee Officer in each refugee camp and settlement. Their National Eligibility Committee performed urban-based refugee status determination while the Residency Sub-Committee provided urban residence permits.

UNHCR

UNHCR, with a full protection mandate, coordinated the work of implementing partners; provided financial and logistical support to COR and NGOs; provided legal assistance and counsel to refugees; and advocated for an expansion of refugee rights and solutions.

Zambian Red Cross Lusaka Urban Refugee Project was the implementing partner for UNHCR’s urban refugee project. It provided limited material assistance to refugees and asylum seekers detained in Lusaka prisons; managed Chilenge House (lodging for medical referral cases) and Makeni Transit Centre (food and shelter for pending resettlement cases); organized transport of refugees to designated camps or settlements; provided social assistance to vulnerable refugees; and provided basic education to vulnerable refugee children and basic health assistance.

Jesuit Refugee Service

The Urban Refugee Peace Centre provided language, training and computer classes to both refugees and Zambians; supported income generating activities; provided scholarships to primary and secondary school refugee children; supported arts, sports, and religious programs; and gave legal advice to refugees and asylum seekers.

The National Office and Policy Unit supported refugee-related communication and advocacy initiatives. It delivered bi-monthly Press Reviews on refugee issues in Zambia; produced Guide for Refugee leaflets; distributed Bible Study on Refugees according to Exodus to churches; produced radio and TV broadcasts; and advocated for refugee rights and legislative reform. It also worked in Meheba Settlement and Nangweshi Camp.

Churches

The Inter-church Refugee Task Force coordinated the three main church bodies in Zambia (Episcopal Conference, Christian Council, and Evangelical Fellowship) and JRS to work on refugee matters. It met with the Chief Immigration officer regarding refugee employment

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permits and encouraged the government of Zambia to grant some permanent legal status and rights to long-term refugees.

The *Christian Initiative for Refugees in Prison* was a coordination of JRS, Catholic Relief Services, the Catholic Church, including the Archdiocese of Lusaka, and the refugee community to address the rights of detained refugees and asylum seekers. Its work included advocating for refugee freedom of movement; intervening on behalf of refugees and asylum-seekers detained without criminal charges; and encouraging local civic society organizations to counter xenophobia.

**Legal Resources Foundation**

The *Legal Resources Foundation* provided paralegals to follow-up with COR and the Department of Immigration on refugee detention cases; performed pro bono cases for refugees in cases of human rights violations; assisted refugees in drafting statements of claim; and appeared in court on behalf of refugees.
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