"TOO DAMN MUSLIM TO BE TRUSTED":
THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE
MUSLIM AMERICAN RESPONSE

By

Maha Hilal

Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Public Affairs
Of American University
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
Justice, Law, and Society

Chair:

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Ph.D.
David Fagelson, Ph.D.
Jube Mertus, J.D.
Steven Taylor, Ph.D.

Dean of the School of Public Affairs
April 23, 2014

2014
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Mohammed Hilal (1945-1992), whose love and care shaped my road to success. This dissertation is also dedicated to my beautiful and amazingly compassionate mother, Laila El-Marazki, who has been my pillar of strength throughout the process of obtaining my doctorate.

This dissertation is also dedicated to all those who have suffered injustice and to those who speak up in the face of injustice.
“TOO DAMN MUSLIM TO BE TRUSTED”:
THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE MUSLIM AMERICAN RESPONSE

BY
Maha Hilal

ABSTRACT

“Our war is not against Islam….Our war is a war against evil…”

- President George W. Bush

Despite President Bush’s rhetoric attempting to separate Muslims in general from terrorists who adhere to the Islamic faith, the policies of the War on Terror have generally focused on Muslims domestically and abroad, often for no greater reason than a shared religious identity with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack (see for example, National Special Entry-Exit Registration). While foreign-born Muslims were the primary subjects of earlier policies in the War on Terror, several cases involving Muslim Americans suggest that despite holding U.S. citizenship, they may be subject to differential standards of justice (i.e. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld or the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki). Building on previous scholarship that has examined the Muslim American experience post 9/11, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the substance and implementation of laws and policies and Muslim American attitudes towards political efficacy and orientations towards the U.S. government. In addition, this dissertation examines the relationship between policy design and implementation and Muslim American political participation, alienation, and withdrawal.

This study was approached through the lens of social construction in policy design, a theoretical framework that was pioneered by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. Schneider and
Ingram (1993, 1997) focus on the role of public policy in fostering and maintaining democracy. With the goal of understanding public policy as a vehicle to promoting or inhibiting democracy, their analysis focuses on how the use of social constructions of different policy group targets can affect their attitudes towards government and citizenship, in addition to behaviors such as political participation.

According to Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997, 20005), groups with favorable constructions can expect to receive positive treatment and exhibit positive attitudes towards government and participate at higher levels than groups with negative social constructions, who will develop negative orientations towards government, a decrease in feelings of political efficacy, and lower levels of political participation. Within this conceptualization of the impact of policy on target groups is the element of political power, which Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997, 2005) examine as a measure of the degree to which different target groups can challenge their social construction and, subsequently, the policy benefits or burdens directed at them.

Research studying the impact of policies on differently constructed groups (welfare recipients, veterans, etc.) has empirically verified Schneider and Ingram’s (1993, 1997, 2005) social construction in policy design theory. However, none of the existing research has yet to apply this framework to Muslim Americans as a group and in the context of counter-terrorism policies.

In order to situate the Muslim American responses according to the theories’ main propositions, this study provides a background on many of the post 9/11 counter-terrorism policies, highlighting those policies that have disproportionately impacted members of this group. This research also examines how the War on Terror has been framed, and the actors involved in the construction of the Muslim image, with a focus on discerning the ways in which
members of this population have been demonized and positioned as collectively responsible for acts of terrorism perpetrated by other Muslims.

This study utilized a mixed methods approach and included a quantitative survey and qualitative interviews. Purposive sampling was used in order to obtain a sample of Muslim Americans from different racial and ethnic backgrounds proportionate to the demographics of this community in the United States. The study findings are based on surveys from 75 individuals and interviews with 61 individuals.

The findings in this study reveal that Muslim Americans overwhelmingly perceive themselves to be the target of the War on Terror policies. Further, the data in this study shows that Muslim Americans across a range of backgrounds question the degree to which they are entitled to equity in both cultural and legal citizenship, including procedural justice. Despite exhibiting these views towards citizenship and procedural justice, a majority of Muslim Americans nonetheless reported increased levels of political participation as a response to policies that targeted them.

These findings provide additional empirical support for the social construction in policy design framework. Specifically, this data demonstrates that Muslim Americans in large part believe themselves to be the policy targets and have internalized many of the social constructions that have emerged vis-à-vis policy design and implementation. Consequently, and as the framework suggests, Muslim Americans have developed subsequently negative orientations towards government and a sense of diminished citizenship. While the study results in terms of increased political participation may appear to be at odds with what the framework suggests (i.e. decreased political participation for negatively constructed powerless groups), these increased levels of political participation are more properly couched as being a function of fear or threat,
and in this sense a symptom of being targeted. These findings not only provide support for the social construction in policy design theory, they also underscore the implications of creating policy that works towards buttressing a democratic system with equal citizenship, which includes the ability for all citizens to voice discontent.
fire in the city air and i feared for my sister's life in a way never
before. and then, and now, i fear for the rest of us.

first, please god, let it be a mistake, the pilot's heart failed, the
plane's engine died.
then please god, let it be a nightmare, wake me now.
please god, after the second plane, please, don't let it be anyone
who looks like my brothers.

i do not know how bad a life has to break in order to kill.
i have never been so hungry that i willed hunger
i have never been so angry as to want to control a gun over a pen.
not really.
even as a woman, as a palestinian, as a broken human being.
never this broken.

more than ever, i believe there is no difference.
the most privileged nation, most americans do not know the difference
between indians, afghanis, syrians, muslims, sikhs, hindus.
more than ever, there is no difference.

...  
one more person ask me if i knew the hijackers.
one more motherfucker ask me what navy my brother is in.
one more person assume no arabs or muslims were killed.one more person
assume they know me, or that i represent a people.
or that a people represent an evil. or that evil is as simple as a
flag and words on a page.

we did not vilify all white men when mcveigh bombed oklahoma.
america did not give out his family's addresses or where he went to
church. or blame the bible or pat robertson.

and when the networks air footage of palestinians dancing in the
street, there is no apology that hungry children are bribed with
sweets that turn their teeth brown. that correspondents edit images.
that archives are there to facilitate lazy and inaccurate
journalism.

and when we talk about holy books and hooded men and death, why do we
never mention the kkk?

Suheir Hammad, First Writing Since
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As I turn the pages of my dissertation and close this chapter of my life, I am simultaneously reflecting on all the individuals who helped me to get to this point. First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members, whose support brought me to the finish line. I came to know each of them through different points in my PhD career, and they have all indelibly shaped my scholarly journey. I have known Dr. Abu-Nimer from my first days at American University, and I cannot thank him enough for serving as the chair of my dissertation committee. I also thank him for his tutelage, immense knowledge, and genuine care for me as a student. His work and efforts to secure peace in different communities around the world continues to inspire me, and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to study under him.

I owe much thanks to Dr. David Fagelson. In the spring of 2009, I took my first class with Dr. Fagelson and his classes on philosophy, which seemed abstract at first, taught me the value and importance of critical thinking. I have fond memories from all his classes and will carry everything I learned from them with me throughout my scholarly journey. Dr. Fagelson was also one of my biggest supports throughout this process, and I know that without his assistance, care, and belief in my ability to succeed, I would have never persevered in this program. To him, I owe my deepest thanks.

Professor Mertus was critical in my journey throughout the PhD. Before coming to American University, I had purchased a book she edited titled *The Suitcase: Refugee Voices from Bosnia and Croatia*. I absolutely loved the book and was extremely enthusiastic when I learned of the opportunity to take one of her classes at American University. I took Professor Mertus’ class on human rights in the fall of 2009 and not only did she re-invigorate my passion for human rights, she also embodied the true meaning of what a scholar-practitioner is. I feel very
fortunate to have gotten to know her over the years and to absorb some of her great knowledge and wisdom.

To Dr. Langbein and Meg Weekes, who helped me at various points during my completion of my PhD and who I knew would see me to the end. I am indebted to both for their unwavering support.

To my mother, Laila El-Marazki, and my sister, Reem Hilal, who provided me with moral and financial support in this process and who believed in me and my ability to complete my PhD. Without these two incredible women in my life, my quest to undertake this scholarly endeavor would not have been possible. Throughout the years many tears were shed, and they were both there to comfort me and to convince me that there was indeed a light at the end of the tunnel. I extend my deepest gratitude and love to both of them.

To Sami Alkyam, my brother-in-law, who has truly become my bother and who has become an important part of our family.

To my friend Darakshan Raja, who has been one of my biggest cheerleaders throughout this process. Darakshan has become not only one of my best friends, but a sister to me. Her passion for social justice is contagious, and her sheer brilliance inspired me to think of issues in new and more nuanced ways. Most importantly, however, is the care and support she showed for me throughout every step of the way. I cannot thank God enough for sending me a better friend.

To Sheherazade Jafari, Tia Jane’l Simmons, and Juone Darko, who I have spent countless hours with in our journey to complete our PhDs. I have continuously been inspired by their intelligence, diligence, and most of all, their incredibly beautiful spirits which lifts the world up a thousand times.
To Saunji Fyffe and Melissa Lambert, who have been some of the most supportive friends throughout this process and whose success has motivated me to push myself harder.

To Dr. Shireen Lewis, whose vision of providing a supportive environment for women of color who were pursuing PhDs and who helped me meet some of the most amazing friends that I could have asked for. I am deeply grateful for her work as Executive Director of the SisterMentors program, and for her compassion and interest in seeing women of color succeed.

To F. Al-Rawaf, who was another amazing source of support, who helped carry me through many hard times and who was always there to listen. I could not have asked for a more compassionate, caring, and dynamic friend.

To my friends Nassima Neggaz, Ramah Kudaimi, Sasha Gelzin, Mehrunisa Qayyum, and Keren Batiyov, who are incredibly intelligent, strong, and amazing women who have made a career of confronting injustice whenever and wherever it occurs. To their kind words, beautiful smiles, and laughter that helped me get through my doctorate.

To Korneliya Bachiyska, who has become one of my closest and dearest friends and with whom I share a dark sense of humor. To Margueritea Jimenez for her moral support over the years and to my other friends in the PhD program who helped me in countless ways.

To Jorge Rodriguez, Esmeralda Rodriguez, and Rosalilia Mendoza, whose social justice work has continued to serve as an inspiration to me and a reminder of all the goodness that exists in humanity.

To all my other friends, who helped me throughout my journey in too many ways to mention, I thank you all and know that I could not have done this without you.

To Dr. Craig Zelizer and Dr. Catalina Rojas, with whom I have worked with at the Peace and Collaborative Development Network since May of 2012 and whose brilliance is matched
only by their kindness. They not only bolstered my confidence, but were also more understanding about me finishing my dissertation than I could have ever asked for. I am truly blessed to have both of them in my life.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ................................................................................................. ii

**PREFACE** .................................................................................................. vi

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** .............................................................................. vii

**LIST OF TABLES** ....................................................................................... xiii

**LIST OF FIGURES** ....................................................................................... xiv

**CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION** ................................................................. 1

- Statement of the Problem ........................................................................... 2
- Background of the Problem ....................................................................... 2
- Primary Research Questions ..................................................................... 4
- Study Contribution .................................................................................... 5
- Study Limitations ..................................................................................... 7
- Structure of the Dissertation .................................................................... 8

**CHAPTER 2  OVERVIEW OF THE POLICIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR**

POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ................................................................. 10

- Key Dates in the War on Terror ............................................................... 11
- Policies of the War on Terror ................................................................. 13
- Muslim American Support for Terrorism ................................................ 58
- Historical Examination of Policies Targeting Arabs and Muslims .......... 62
- Backlash, Hate Crimes, and Other Consequences of the War on Terror .. 64
- Opinion Polls on Muslims ....................................................................... 72
- The Importance of Opinion Polls ............................................................ 80
- Conclusion ............................................................................................... 81

**CHAPTER 3  THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS**

AND FRAMING THE WAR ON TERROR ...................................................... 82

- Social Constructions of Islam & Muslims: Politicians, Academics, and Moral Entrepreneurs .......................................................... 82
- The Arab and Muslim Threat Pre-9/11 .................................................... 88
- Social Construction of Muslims in the Media ......................................... 118
- Social Construction of Terrorism and the War on Terror ...................... 125
- Conclusion ............................................................................................. 130

**CHAPTER 4  LITERATURE REVIEW** ....................................................... 132

- Theoretical Framework .......................................................................... 132
- Citizenship ............................................................................................. 14
- Political Participation and Political Power ............................................. 157
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Hate Crimes Data 1996-2011 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014) .........................68

Table 2. Anti-Islamic Quotes by Moral Entrepreneurs ................................................................111

Table 3. Policy Design Impacts on Different Target Populations (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) ..........137

Table 4: Survey Sample Characteristics .......................................................................................196

Table 5: Interview Sample Characteristics ....................................................................................197

Table 6. Respondents Who Have Observed a Change in Policies Affecting Muslims Perceived Direction of Change, N = 75 ........................................................200

Table 7. Respondents’ Reported Belief That Political Participation is a Means of Influencing the Government, N = 75 ................................................................................223

Table 8. Discouragement from Political Participation – Voting/Lobbying ....................................224

Table 9. Discouragement from Political Participation – Protests/Demonstrations/Rallying ......224

Table 10. United States Political Officials’ Statements With Anti-Islamic Themes, 2006-2013 .................................................................245

Table 11. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Favorability Ratings Towards Muslims, Christians, and Jews 2001-2012 ................................................................................................253

Table 12. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Attitudes Regarding Muslim Responsibility/Muslim as Responsible for Terrorism, 2001-2012 ................................................................265

Table 13. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Attitudes About Arabs, 2001-2012 ................................270

Table 14. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Attitudes About Rights Preservation and Restriction, 2001-2013 ...........................................................................................................276
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. CARPP Workflow Overview (Pasquarella, 2013) ................................................................. 45

Figure 2. The Radicalization Process According to the FBI (Patel, 2011) .............................................. 54

Figure 3. Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators Since 9/11 (Kurtzman, 2012) ................. 60

Figure 4. Role of Scapegoating in Backlash from Society and Government Policy (Bakalian & Bozomehr, 2009) .............................................................................................................. 65

Figure 5. Themes from Political Officials’ Statements ............................................................................ 104

Figure 6. Fox’s View of Muslims (Seitz-Wald, 2011) ............................................................................ 124

Figure 7. Social Constructions and Political Power: Types of Target Populations (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) ........................................................................................................................................ 135

Figure 8. Conceptualization of “Feedforward” Element of Policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1993) ................. 138

Figure 9. Policy and Levels of Political Participation (Adapted from Schneider & Ingram, 1997, 2005, 2014) ........................................................................................................................................ 141

Figure 10. “Good Muslims” (Choudhury, 2013) ................................................................................... 155

Figure 11. Theory of Backlash and Mobilization (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr, 2009) ................................. 166

Figure 12. Components of Mobilization and Claims Making (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr, 2009) ................. 166

Figure 13. Purpose of the War on Terror ................................................................................................. 198

Figure 14. Triggers for Targeting ........................................................................................................... 203

Figure 15. War on Terror Consequences by the Numbers ..................................................................... 205

Figure 16. Components of Diminished Cultural Citizenship ................................................................. 218

Figure 17. Muslim Americans as Recipients of Procedural Justice ....................................................... 222
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“I bet you have some family members there,” remarked a passerby at Universal Studios in California in response to the shirt I was wearing that said “Shut it Down: Guantanamo Bay, January 11, 2002.” While this was not the first time that I had been the target of anti-Muslim remarks, this man’s comments reminded me of the view of Muslims as a homogeneous entity, subject to collective responsibility and undeserving of human and civil rights.

Further, his comment brought me back to the day of the 9/11 attacks, when I recall feeling both profound sadness for the victims of the attack and fear that Muslims were responsible. I knew that if Muslims were responsible, we would face a backlash in the form of government policy and negative treatment from society, both of which happened almost immediately following the identification of the perpetrators as Muslim.

Years after 9/11, I began to embrace a sense of my political identity as a Muslim. During the summer of 2007, I pursued a fellowship with the Muslim Public Service Network and as part of the fellowship, I interned at Amnesty International in Washington, D.C. in what was then called the Denounce Torture Initiative. At that time, Amnesty’s campaign focused mostly on the prison in Guantanamo Bay, and as I became more familiar with the names, faces, and stories of those imprisoned, I learned that most the prisoners were guilty of one thing and one thing alone: being Muslim. This left an indelible mark on me, and in subsequent years I became more and more immersed in and concerned with U.S. policies that were disproportionately affecting Muslims. Understanding these policies and undertaking research on the impacts of the policies on the Muslim American community has allowed me to experience a range of emotions - sadness for those who have been unfairly victimized by the policies of the War on Terror, and
disappointment at the continuing degradation of human and civil rights by the government of the United States.

Statement of the Problem

In the morning hours of September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by members of Al-Qaeda, resulting in the catastrophic demise of the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Al-Qaeda, the group that orchestrated the attack, purported to justify its actions, in part, by the teachings of Islam. Over the next decade the United States government took numerous steps to respond to the threat of further attacks. Operating under the umbrella of the War on Terror, some of these measures included and still include policies that use the Muslim religion as a proxy for guilt. Some examples include the National Special Entry Exit Registration System and the Patriot Act.

Many studies have documented the impact of several of the War on Terror policies on Muslims and Muslim Americans. However, most of these studies have focused on the efficaciousness of the policies in winning the War on Terror or on possible legal discrimination in pursuing them. My study does not focus on their effectiveness or legality per se, but instead focuses on the degree to which these policies encourage or impede democratic processes involving citizen participation. In order to pursue this analysis, this study examined what if any relationship exists between the War on Terror policies and the attitudes of the Muslim Americans in this study towards belonging and citizenship, and their willingness to participate in the legal, cultural, and political institutions in America.

Background of the Problem

Though national security has always been a prime focus and concern of public policies in the United States, the events of 9/11 dramatically expanded the breadth and scope of measures
designed to curb any threats. Post 9/11, the national security landscape has focused on implementing policies that protect the nation while seeking to preserve many core human and civil rights. The national security discourse has also focused on identifying the appropriate targets of these policies.

Several scholars have asserted that the anti-terrorism policies that rose out of 9/11 disproportionately targeted Muslims and Arabs (Cainkar, 2002; Cainkar & Maira, 2005; Naber, 2008), and have pointed to policies such as the National Special Entry Exit Registration Program (NSEERS) that directly singled out individuals from specific countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen). Other examples of disproportionate policy burdens towards Muslims, include the utilization of the Guantanamo Bay prison to house an exclusively Muslim population. Speaking about the “backlash,” of government anti-terrorism policies, a report by Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa (2010) to the Department of Justice, focused on consequences that have included for, example, FBI investigations of a largely Muslim population. The combined impact of these policies has led to what Cainkar (2009) refers to as a “sense of homeland insecurity.”

In addition to direct impacts from national security policies, Muslims in the United States and Muslim Americans have also been subject to hate crimes, which Human Rights Watch (2002), for example, attributes to the precedent that policies targeting groups regardless of culpability have on sending messages about collective guilt. The report states that:

Nevertheless, aspects of the U.S. government’s anti-terrorism campaign, the detention of twelve hundred mostly Middle Eastern and South Asians because of possible links to terrorism, the effort to question over five thousand young Middle Eastern men, and the decision to fingerprint visitors from certain Middle Eastern and Muslim countries reinforced a public perception that Arab and Muslim communities as a whole were suspect and linked to the “enemy” in the U.S. war against terrorism. (p.3)
Primary Research Questions

To that end, my research posed the following questions:

1. Do Muslim Americans believe that the policies of the War on Terror have disproportionately targeted them or Muslims in general? If so, what factors/events/beliefs contribute to the perception of being disproportionately targeted?

2. Do Muslim Americans believe that the policies of the War on Terror have contributed to negative social constructions of themselves and/or Muslims in general?

3. Have the policies of the War on Terror affected Muslim Americans’ perceptions of their treatment as equal citizens?

4. Have Muslim American attitudes towards the War on Terror impacted their level of political participation?

Operationalization of Key Terms

The key terms of use in this study will be briefly defined below as they are used in this study.

**Citizenship:** In this study, citizenship has two dimensions: legal/political and cultural.

Legal/political citizenship refers to the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state, while cultural citizenship refers to citizenship as inclusion by members of society, including how they enforce the policies of the state on the micro level.

**Collective Responsibility:** Refers to the application of group blame based on sharing an identity with an individual who perpetrates a harmful act against other members of society.

**Political Efficacy:** Refers to an individual’s belief that they have agency and can impact the actions of government.
**Political Participation:** Political participation in this study refers to any actions taken that are meant to influence how government responds to policy issues. This includes measures such as voting and lobbying, in addition to demonstrations and rallies.

**Political Power:** Refers to the degree to which a group is able to affect policy decisions of those in power, with power being a function of resources that a group has, not limited to but including money, ability to mobilize, and general participation in the political system.

**Procedural Justice:** Refers to the idea that there is fairness in the justice system and the equal distribution of rights, such as due process.

**Target Population:** Refers to the population that receives policy benefits or burdens as a result of the policy’s design or implementation.

**Social Construction of Target Populations:** Refers to collective understandings or knowledge of groups of people that are shaped and re-shaped through various avenues, such as the media, and which have intentional and unintentional consequences resulting from a particular construction.

**War on Terror:** Refers to the set of counterterrorism policies that were enacted after the attacks on September 11, 2001, such as the special registration program (NSEERS), the Patriot Act, and the Alien Absconder Initiative.

**Study Contribution**

While this study is concerned with the impact of these policies on the Muslim American community, it also aims to discern the consequences of these effects. There are ample studies suggesting that the Muslim American community feels impacted by the policies of the War on Terror (e.g. Cainkar, 2009). What is less known, however, is the direct role that public policy has played in Muslim Americans’ perceptions of citizenship and equity in the provision of
procedural justice. Specifically, this study highlights the role of public policy in changing attitudes towards policies and political participation. Embedded in my research are questions that address, for example, whether Muslim Americans feel less willing or able to participate in the political process as a function of policy design and implementation. The importance of answering these questions lies in Ingram, Schneider, and deLeon’s (2007) assertion that public policies can “perpetuate injustice, fail(s) to support democratic institutions, and produce(s) an unequal citizenship” (p. 93).

Numerous studies have been conducted that examine the role of social construction on citizenship, justice, the allocation of benefits and burdens based on social constructions, and tools in policy design based on social construction (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007). These studies provide empirical verification for the social construction in policy design framework, which suggests that a relationship exists between policy design and implementation and the attitudes that a target group has towards citizenship and government as a function of the way they are socially constructed. The framework also predicts different levels of political participation based on policy design/implementation, the target groups’ social construction, and the amount of political power that they have.

Thus far, extant research that has applied this theory has focused on veterans, welfare recipients, minorities, etc. (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007). For example, Joe Soss’ (2005) work examines the relationship between the methods by which social welfare benefits are administered and welfare beneficiaries’ attitudes towards the government and their level of political participation. There is a significant body of literature on the social construction of Muslims (see for example, Cainker, 2009, Said, 1981). However, these constructions have not to date been examined in the context of policy design in a substantive way. Thus, my study will
contribute to the literature by applying the social construction in policy design framework to a sample of Muslims Americans in the context of the counterterrorism policies of the War on Terror that emerged post 9/11.

**Study Limitations**

This study attempted to provide a picture of how Muslim Americans were impacted by the policies of the War on Terror. In studying this population, many unique challenges emerged, most importantly the sample selection. The methodology chapter will further explore the rationale behind the use of a non-random study sample, such as the vulnerability of many individuals in the Muslim American community and the sensitive nature of the questions asked of participants.

This study used purposive and proportional quota sampling in order to obtain a sample of participants that closely approximated the demographics of the Muslim community in the United States. However, throughout the process of recruiting participants it was difficult to recruit certain ethnic and racial subgroups, thus the sample does not entirely mirror the composition of the Muslim community in the United States. While this is a limitation in terms of dissecting experiences based on these differences, it also provides fodder for future research, particularly in understanding, for example, if and how the racialization of Muslims and Islam explains the differential experiences of participants.

An additional limitation of this study pertains to the fact that it does not include an in-depth examination of the role of society and media as mediators of government policies. This is an area that warrants future research and critical examination in terms of how policies may indirectly affect Muslims Americans through various channels such as the media. Though this research does propose a model for understanding this relationship, future research should include
questions that pointedly ask about the influence of media and society as means through which policy is mediated, furthered, advocated against, etc.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The following chapter discusses the literature on the social construction in policy design theory as well as empirical studies that have validated the theory. Chapter 2 provides an overview of several key policies of the War on Terror, including those that study participants identified in this study as being of core concern to them as Muslim Americans. The impacts of these policies on Muslim Americans are addressed, as are indirect consequences of the policies that have occurred in the form of backlash, not limited to, but including, hate crimes. As a part of understanding the bias towards Muslim Americans and support for policy from the American public, this chapter also contains a brief overview of opinion polls over a twelve-year period from September 2001 through September 2013.

Chapter 3 examines the social construction of Islam and Muslims and arenas in which this social construction has permeated the policy sphere. To that end, the social construction of Muslims and Muslim Americans via political officials, moral entrepreneurs, and the media will be addressed.

In order to begin applying the social construction in policy design and the central components of the theory, Chapter 4 surveys empirical studies utilizing the theory in addition to incorporating the literature on citizenship, political participation, and political power.

The following chapter, Chapter 5, details the methods of the study and the research instruments that were developed to obtain perspectives from Muslim Americans regarding the War on Terror. This chapter also describes the data collection methods in addition to the
sampling criteria, recruitment of participants, reflexivity, and study ethics. Lastly, the process of going through the IRB approval for this research is described.

In connecting all the aforementioned areas of inquiry, Chapter 6 highlights the response of participants regarding their perspectives on the War on Terror. Findings from both the survey and interviews are included and contextualized within the framework used in this study. This chapter will also discuss the findings in terms of the degree to which the social construction in policy design framework accurately describes the phenomena observed in this study, such as Muslim American attitudes towards citizenship and government as a function of the War on Terror policies.

Tying all the pieces of this study together, the conclusion will summarize the study’s goals and findings. Further, the conclusion will suggest areas for future research in addition to providing a list of policy recommendations.
CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE POLICIES OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND THEIR IMPACTS

In order to address the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the United States government, under former President Bush’s leadership, implemented a set of policies under the umbrella of the War on Terror. Their goal was to fight Islamic extremism, embodied by an organization called Al-Qaeda. Because of the religious aspect of the attacks, the War on Terror has generally focused on Muslims both abroad and domestically. While many policies of the War on Terror were created for application to the general American population, Muslims and Muslim Americans have been both implicitly and explicitly targeted by many of the policies.


A sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’. Specifically in terms of policing, individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrong doing, but simply because of their presumed membership to that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, language, accent dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may serve to delineate the sub-group. (p.649)

In many respects, as the next section will demonstrate, Muslims and Muslim Americans in the United States have been subject to a host of policies that assume collective guilt and responsibility, often leading to indiscriminate targeting. The combined effect of these policies has effectively painted this group as a “suspect community,” a perspective that many study participants expressed throughout the qualitative interviews. To understand this perspective as expressed by participants, the following section will examine the policies of the War on Terror.
that have demonstrably affected the Muslim American community.

Understanding the idea of “suspect communities” as a function of scapegoating has affected different minority groups in the history of the United States. Gruber (2006) reflects on the comparison between the treatment of the Japanese during World War II and the current disposition of Muslims in the context of the War on Terror. To this end, she asserts that, “by using ethnicity as a proxy for terrorism, the government is committing the same logical error the Roosevelt Administration committed by using ethnicity as a proxy for disloyalty” (p. 319).

Though President Clinton wrote an apology in 1993 to the Japanese American community stating that “in retrospect, we understand that the nation’s actions were deeply rooted in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leadership” (as cited in Dickerson, 2010, p. 230) the War on Terror serves as evidence that racial prejudice, among other things, is still part of policy design and implementation in the United States.

**Key Dates in the War on Terror**

The timeline on the following page highlights the introduction of different policies that were created and enacted as a part of the War on Terror. The timeline also includes Supreme Court cases that were adjudicated throughout the War on Terror and which have set important precedents, such as the right to habeas corpus for non-citizens. Further, the timeline notes key events shaping the discourse around the War on Terror, including torture at Abu Ghraib and the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki. The Policies of the War on Terror

Following the attacks on 9/11, the United States sought to implement a set of policies that would protect national security and eliminate the terrorist threat. To support this goal, numerous
- Authorization of the Use of Military Force
- War in Afghanistan Begins
- Patriot Act Signed into Law

- Absconder Initiative Implemented
- NSEERS Implemented
- First Prisoners Sent to Guantanamo
- Two U.S. Citizens declared “Enemy Combatants”
- Guantanamo Prisoners Determined “Enemy Combatants” without Geneva Convention Protections
- Department of Homeland Security Established

- Pictures of Torture by U.S. Forces in Abu Ghraib Released

- Detainee Treatment Act Signed into Law

- NYPD Releases Radicalization Study

- Holy Land Five Case Verdict

- Extrajudicial Killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki
- Drone Strike Kills Al-Awlaki’s Son
- Osama Bin Laden Killed
- NDAA Authorizes Indefinite Detention for U.S. Citizens
- Peter King Initiates Radicalization Hearings on Muslim Americans

- September 11, 2001: World Trade Center Attacks

- War in Iraq Begins
- Torture Memos Written
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

- Hamdi V. Rumsfeld
- Rasul V. Bush
- Rumsfeld V. Padilla
- Combatant Status Review Tribunals Established

- Military Commission Act Becomes Law
- Hamdan V. Rumsfeld
- Communications Management Unit Opens in Terre Haute, Indiana

- Bounediene V. Bush
- Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program
- Communication Management Unit Opens in Marion, Illinois

- Holder V. Humanitarian Law Project

- Hassan V. City of New York Case Dismissed
policies were enacted on both the international and domestic front. This section will address a number of specific policies that have disproportionately targeted Muslims, with a focus on policies that shaped Muslim American attitudes as reported in the interviews and surveys that were undertaken in this study.

**Policies of the War on Terror**

**War in Iraq**

The military effort in Iraq is one of the most prominent features of the War on Terror. Though the war in Iraq was one of the strongest measures that the United States took to address the terrorist threat, a decade after the United States started the war, many questions still remain as to the legality of the war and whether the war launched in Iraq should be considered a war of aggression. This section will address some of the background leading up to the war in Iraq and critiques about the legality of the U.S. offensive.

Because the war in Iraq constituted a major feature of the War on Terror, perceptions regarding its legitimacy have been important to sustain support for it. Muslim Americans, the focus of this study, in a study on political attitudes overwhelmingly disapproved with the Iraq war (see MAPS, 2004 as cited in Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2012). Thus, this section will discuss the legality of the war in an effort to situate the grievances of Muslim Americans.

The United States government justified the war in Iraq as a measure to prevent it from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. In order to provide a legal rationale for military intervention in response to the War on Terror, Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General John Yoo authored a memo giving the President authority to attack not only individuals involved in terrorism activities, but also foreign states thought to be hosting such
terrorists. In this 2002 memo, titled “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them,” Yoo argues the following:

We think it beyond question that the President has the plenary constitutional power to
take such military actions as he deems necessary and appropriate to respond to the
terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001. Force can be used both to
retaliate for those attacks, and to prevent and deter future assaults on the Nation. Military
actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the Constitution vests the President
with the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably
linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the
security of the United States and the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas.

The Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) was also critical to providing a rationale for the
War in Iraq. The AUMF was signed into law by former President Bush on September 18, 2001.

Section 2, part A, of the law states that:

(a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. (107th Congress, 2001-2002)

This section of the law provides executive authority to the president to pursue targets
without regard to international boundaries and different countries’ sovereignty. The AUMF
paved the way for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has most recently begun to raise
questions about the legality of the War on Terror, not limited to but including, the fact that the
war appears to have no end. The National Security Strategy of 2002 was also critical in paving
the way for the war in Iraq. Though there are many important statements made in the document,
the two below highlight a call for proactive measures and a reconsideration of how “imminent
threat” can be appropriately identified:

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s
adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means.
They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the
use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered
covertly, and used without warning…The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. (p.15)

This NSS, commonly referred to as the Bush Doctrine, as Currie (2003) writes, allowed for discussion on the possibility of attacking a state without information of a future attack. While some have argued that preventive wars and in particular, the Iraq war, marked a departure from past wars that the U.S. has been involved in, Delahunty and Yoo (2009) assert that U.S. policy has frequently involved in preventive measures and they argue further that preventive wars can, like humanitarian intervention, be justified on the basis of saving civilian lives. Despite the fact that the U.S. has engaged in such wars before, this argument does little to support the War on moral, ethical, or legal grounds.

A key critique of the war involves information that suggests that the attacks on Iraq were planned prior to the 9/11. For example, Ron Suskind’s (2004) book titled The Price of Loyalty provides evidence by way of interviews with various officials in the government and meetings of the National Security Council that there were plans to invade Iraq initiated prior to 9/11.

Moreover, a report released by the State Department in 2001 casts doubt on the narrative that maintained a connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. In its country report on terrorism, the U.S. State Department (2001) stated that: “Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2000. Although Baghdad focused on anti-dissident activity overseas, the regime continued to support various terrorist groups. The regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.” Evidence obtained from the Downing Street Memos also provide conclusive evidence that United States was
planning an attack on Iraq and that they intended to use the UN process to gain support in invading Iraq, not in preventing a war (Conyers, 2007).

Another critique of the United States’ war in Iraq rests on the argument that force was permitted against Iraq based on Resolution 687 (1991) which came out of the first Gulf War. Currie (2003), however, maintains that the authority to sanction force was provided to the Security Council, not member states. Moreover, as a signatory to the UN Charter, states agree to abstain from the using force in violation of other members’ sovereignty. Even if the United States argued that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter gives states the right to use force in order to protect itself, prior to the war in Iraq, Iraq had not launched an attack against the U.S. and as Kramer and Michalowski (2005) write, there was no evidence of an imminent attack.

While the premise and legality of attacking Iraq has been widely debated, some scholars have focused on what they believe amount to crimes during the war. Kramer and Michalowski (2005) identified four central war crimes for which they believe the coalition force is responsible for. This includes “(1) the failure to secure public safety and protect civilian rights; (2) the illegal transformation of the Iraqi economy; (3) indiscriminate response to Iraqi resistance actions, resulting in further civilian casualties; and (4) the torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners” (p. 452). Based on media reports and Iraqi government sources, Iraq Body Count estimates that the number of civilians who have been killed is estimated to be 112,811-123,449.

Drones and Targeted Killings

The use of drones generally and for targeted killings has increasingly become a contested measure in the War on Terror, and one that Muslim Americans in this study mentioned as a particular grievance in the War on Terror. The United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions by Phillip Alston
defines targeted killings as “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator” (p. 3) As the report mentions, targeted killings have become increasingly used by a number of states, including the United States. In addition to defining and identifying some of the countries that have used targeted killings as a counterterrorism measure, the report also lays out some of the basic legal questions that targeted killings raise. The legal issues addressed include targeted killings in the context of armed or unarmed conflict, sovereignty, self-defense, and appropriate targets of the killings.

These legal issues are important in assessing whether the U.S. can consider itself to be in armed conflict in some of the regions where they have used targeted killings and the appropriateness of violating other states’ sovereignty in conducted these killings. The report makes the determination that individuals who are targeted in the context of armed conflict, a target must be a “combatant” or “fighter.” Outside of armed conflict, the report maintains that determinations about legality can be made by utilizing a human rights framework as opposed to International Humanitarian Law that would apply in the context of armed conflict. By the standards set forth in human rights law, the report states that “a State killing is legal only if it is required to protect life (making lethal force proportionate) and there is no other means, such as capture or nonlethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life (making lethal force necessary)” (p. 11) In reference to state sovereignty, states may obtain consent to conduct a target killing in another states’ territory; however, the target and the implementation of the killing must be conducted by using IHL and human rights standards. Another key legal issue is the use of self-defense as a rationale for targeted killings, particularly in reference to non-state
actors. The report does not ultimately reach a conclusion about the use of targeted killings of non-state actors and argues that it is unlikely “that a non-state actor whose activities do not engage the responsibility of any State will be able to conduct the kind of armed attack that would give rise to the right to use extraterritorial force. In such exceptional circumstances, the UN Charter would require that Security Council approval should be sought” (p.14).

Addressing this Human Rights Council report in part, Yoo (2011) makes several arguments to support the idea that targeted killings can be legal in some cases. Yoo (2011) argues that a ground offensive is not feasible for the threat the United States is facing, and that the concept of imminence must be reconsidered so as to proactively address the consequences that may occur from future attacks. Yoo (2011) also engages the argument that Executive Order 12,333 does not define assassination and relies on a definition of the term as “an act of murder for ‘political purposes’” (p. 71). On this basis, Yoo (2011) concludes that “killing an enemy soldier in wartime would not be assassination, because the attack has a lawful military, rather than political purpose” (p. 71).

Radsan and Murphy (2011) add to the discussion on the legality of targeted killings, first stating that the use of drones for targeted killings is not illegal. They also suggest that International Humanitarian Law can apply to non-state actors, meaning that the relationship between the United States and terrorists can be considered within the confines of armed conflict. In using International Humanitarian Law as the standard, drone attacks, they assert, “must not cause excessive ‘collateral damage’” (p. 1206). In reference to the targeted killing of citizens, they argue that U.S. citizenship should not inherently bar an individual from being on a “kill list,” and/or being targeted, but that standards should be created that provide legal justification outside of citizenship.
One prominent example is of a White Paper, which puts forth a pseudo-legal framework arguing that American citizens can be killed without trial (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). This paper was drafted with specific reference to an American citizen named Anwar al-Awlaki. Almost a year after the memo was drafted, Al-Awlaki was killed in Yemen. The Obama administration made claims that Al-Awlaki was a legitimate target because of his affiliation with Al-Qaeda. However, Cole (2011) argues two points in an attempt to discredit the administration’s argument, the first being that Al-Awlaki lacked ties to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and the second, that he was in Yemen. According to Cole (2011), these two facts would have made his assassination illegal, even when considering the Authorization to Use Military Force.

To further incriminate Al-Awlaki, the U.S. government also alleged that the organization that he belonged to (AQAP) was working with Al-Qaeda, that he constituted an “imminent threat,” and that “capturing him in Yemen was deemed ‘not feasible’” (Cole, 2011). Cole counters this argument by stating that the standards for what could be considered “imminent” were applied incorrectly based on distorted facts, while casting doubt on the U.S.’ inability to capture Al-Awlaki, given its close work with Yemen in combatting terrorism.

Greenwald (2010) also argues against the legality of targeted killings in the case Al-Awlaki. Among the arguments that Greenwald (2010) makes are that the decision to place al-Awlaki on the kill list involved not only little/lack of evidence, but it also involved al-Awlaki’s expression of anti-American sentiment, which he maintains is protected by the constitution. Another problematic aspect that Greenwald (2010) identifies in the case of al-Awlaki is with respect to the rights afforded to U.S. citizens. He argues that cases adjudicated throughout the War on Terror have cemented the principle of due process for U.S. citizens (i.e. Yasser Hamdi), thus a determination of undertaking a targeted killing should have adhered to the same standards
Unlawful Enemy Combatants and Torture

Throughout the War on Terror, the practice of torture has by and large been directed at Muslims and Muslim Americans, making this an important policy to examine. Though the United States has a history of using torture, the Bush administration actively sought out legal frameworks to sanction its use. The Bush administration also formulated legal arguments that were used to deny alleged Al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners protections under article three of the Geneva Conventions, deeming them “unlawful enemy combatants” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). In order to avoid conflict with the War Crimes Act, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (2002) argued that denying Geneva Convention protections was critical because of the former’s designation of war crimes as those constituting “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions. In this vein Gonzales writes that, “it is difficult to predict the motives of prosecutors and independent counsels who may in the future decide to pursue unwarranted charges based on Section 2441 (War Crimes Act). Your determination would create a reasonable basis in law that (the War Crimes Act) does not apply which would provide a solid defense to any future prosecution.” Shortly thereafter, President Bush issued a directive on the treatment of detainees, which formalized denial of Geneva Convention rights for Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners.

To justify the use of torture, Jay Bybee (2002) authored a memorandum addressing the question of whether different coercive techniques amounted to torture. This included, for example, walling, facial holds, slapping, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, light deprivation, and confinement with insects. These techniques were being considered for use on Abu Zubaydah, and Bybee’s (2002) assertion was that these techniques did not rise to the level of torture specified in domestic law 18 U.S.C.2340(1). Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo
(2002) also wrote a memo asserting that that for abuse to rise to the level of torture, it must result in “organ failure” and/or death (Yoo, 2002).

Throughout the War on Terror, there have been many indications that torture was indeed practiced. In 2004, Anthony Taguba, was commissioned to write a report based on his investigation of whether torture was being used by the U.S. government. His findings revealed, “intentional abuse by military police personnel,” and the occurrence of several acts such as:

a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped; (p.16)

Despite the arguments made by members of the former Bush administration, the use of torture is generally thought to violate both international and domestic laws in the United States, and those ordering and/or conducting these acts are supposed to be held accountable.

Entrapment, Terrorism Stings, and Material Support for Terrorists

Muslim Americans have also been greatly impacted by the entrapment, informants, and material support cases. In his book titled the *The FBI’s Manufacturing of the War on Terrorism*, Aaronson (2012) documents numerous cases in which FBI informants were used in the assistance of sting operations. These “proactive” measures to combat terrorism are based on the rationale that sting operations are essentially preventing would be terrorists from committing acts of
terrorism. Aaronson (2012) bases his analysis on a review of a decade of terrorism prosecutions consisting of 508 defendants. He writes that “of the 508 defendants, 243 had been targeted through an FBI informant, 158 had been caught in an FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an agent provocateur…of the 508 cases, I could count on one hand the number of actual terrorists” (p. 15). Aaronson (2012) also asserts that the practice of conducting sting operations has increased under the Obama presidency and that in the first three years of his presidency, there were “more than seventy-five terrorism sting targets” (p. 33).

One of the arguments in favor of using informants is that if a person is co-opted into committing some act of terrorism, then they were already disposed to committing this act. Making a claim as to whether or not an individual is predisposed to committing acts of terrorism raises a concern—namely that the evidence used to demonstrate this predisposition, such as possession of certain books, films, etc. would, under normal circumstances, be constitutionally protected (Said, 2011).

According to Aaronson (2012), FBI sting operations that have targeted a mostly Muslim population gained legitimacy from a release by the FBI in 2008 titled *Bureau Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide*. The guide expands the powers of the FBI, giving agents the authority to use religion as criteria for additional scrutiny. The manual contains a section with redacted information on the use of ethnicity and race as factors warranting scrutiny, but elsewhere the manual grants permission for consideration of these factors if necessitated by national security concerns. The guide also encourages FBI agents to conduct proactive investigations which include, for example, scrutiny of materials protected by the doctrine of free speech. Moreover, the manual allows the FBI to retain information on individuals even after they have deemed to not constitute a threat (DIOG).
The DIOG expansion of powers to the FBI constitutes one problematic feature of the sting operations employed, but Aaronson (2012) also points to the fact that in many cases of sting operations, criminals are often, as are Muslims, coerced into becoming informants because of their immigration violations. One such case involved Tarek Mehanna, an Egyptian American, who was eventually indicted with terrorism charges. Mehanna alleged that he declined to become an informant, and that it was on this basis that a case against him was built. He was charged with providing material support to terrorist groups (specifically Al-Qaeda) and was convicted on the basis of the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project case, which states that it is a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”

According to the U.S. government, Mehanna was providing material support to Al-Qaeda because he was translating documents put out by terrorists. However, Mehanna’s attorneys argued that there was no proof to substantiate claims that Mehanna was connected to a terrorist group or that he was translating the documents at the behest of any terrorist group, thus constituting “independent advocacy.” The issue of independent advocacy was specifically addressed in the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project case:

The Court also finds it significant that Congress has been conscious of its own responsibility to consider how its actions may implicate constitutional concerns. Most importantly, Congress has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups (Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project).

David Cole (2010), an attorney in the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project case, commented on Mehanna’s case saying that the jury’s decision finding him guilty was unclear, and that “the jury did not specify whether it found him guilty for his aborted trip to Yemen—which resulted in no known contacts with jihadists—or for his translations, so under established law, the conviction cannot stand unless it’s permissible to penalize him for his speech.” Though many civil rights
organizations have argued that Mehanna’s case presents a challenge to free speech, an article by Pytranker (2012) evaluates several cases in which the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project was used as precedent. He asserts that among these cases (i.e. United States vs. Chandia), “(1) there is remarkable consistency among the courts in this context, and (2) there is a relatively precise dividing line between lawful and unlawful activities” (p. 38). Mehanna was charged with providing material support to terrorism and was sentenced to 17.5 years in prison.

Several cases on the use of informants have arisen in the last few years. For example, in a Harper’s report from 2009, Bartosiewicz details the case of two men, Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref, who she alleges were victims of entrapment. Aref arrived in the United States in 1999 and became the Imam of Central Avenue mosque, while Hossain was the owner of a pizzeria. According to Bartosiewicz’s (2009) account, an informant by name of “Malik,” was commissioned by the FBI to investigate Mohammed Hossain. After months of relationship building, Hossain disclosed to Malik that he was having some financial problems and upon hearing this, “Malik” offered him a sum of money to allay some of his financial problems. To complete the loan transaction, Hossain requested that Aref be present to oversee the process and it was, according to Bartosiewicz (2009), that Aref became intertwined in the case. After their arrest, the attorneys working on Aref and Hossain’s cases discovered a key error. According to Bartosiewicz (2009), “lawyers for Aref and Hossain found a stunning mistake in the evidence against their clients: the word on the mysterious scrap of paper retrieved in Rawah, which had been key to launching the investigation, had been misunderstood by U.S. intelligence. The word kak translated as the Arabic for ‘commander,’ was in fact Kurdish for ‘brother’” (p. 42). Despite this discrepancy, Aref and Hossain’s lawyers were denied access to other documents in the case, which therefore prevented their ability to challenge the other evidence. Aref was charged with
conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization and received a fifteen-year prison sentence (Stewart, 2011).

The Use of Communication Management Units

Yassin Aref is currently in a prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, in what is now referred to as a Communication Management Unit (CMU). According to a lawyer from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), “there is a tenfold over-representation of Muslim prisoners at the CMUs. So 6 percent of the national prison population is Muslim, and somewhere in the neighborhood between 66 and 72 percent of prisoners at the CMUs are Muslim” (Johnson & Williams, 2011). Prisoners housed in CMUs are prevented from having any physical contact with family members and permitted 30 minutes of phone contact each week. Interestingly, as Choudhury (2013) notes, CMU’s have been nicknamed “Guantanamo North,” taking lessons from other U.S. detention centers such as Guantanamo and Bagram which both house exclusively Muslim populations.

Despite the existence of such prisons, there is little information on their functioning, protocols, and mandates. A U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons report stated that “In FY07, the first Communications Management Unit (CMU) was established at FCC Terre Haute, IN, to house inmates who, due to their current offense, conduct, or other verified information, require increased monitoring of communications with persons in the community to ensure the safe, secure, and orderly running of BOP facilities, and to protect the public” (p. 15). With such broad criteria, many individuals are/have been housed in the CMU’s who, rather than committing a crime, are being held for espousing controversial, though constitutionally protected, religious and/or political opinions.
Information regarding prisoners in CMUs is sparse, and a few organizations such as CCR and the Brennan Center for Law and Justice have provided much of the information about these prisons, including prison demographics. The absence of official government statements and documents, coupled with the secrecy surrounding CMUs, makes it difficult to present an alternative perspective on what appears to be indiscriminate targeting and disproportional sanctions towards Muslim prisoners housed in CMUs.

The Patriot Act

The implementation of the Patriot Act has also been of concern to many Muslim Americans, prompting several organizations to respond to the impact of the Patriot Act on Arab and Muslim American communities, such as a report released by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) in 2004. The report addresses several issues with the Patriot Act, not limited to but including the fact that the Act disproportionately targeted Arab Americans or American Muslims (Institute of Social Policy and Understanding, 2004). The report also details other issues with the Patriot Act including the newly created crime of “domestic terrorism.”

Domestic terrorism, as the Act defines it, is an act which “appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, [or] affect the conduct of a government” (as cited in Institute of Social Policy and Understanding, 2004, p. 10). The ISPU reports expresses concern that the definition is so vague that it could ostensibly affect individuals who legally express dissatisfaction with laws or policies. The implementation of the Patriot Act also allows for secrecy in releasing information about who has been targeted by the Act.

Another consequence of the Patriot Act that the 2004 ISPU report identifies is an edict which reverses the restrictions placed on the Justice Department from pursuing operations such
as COINTELPRO, a program of the FBI from 1956-1971 that targeted political organizations and individuals such as Martin Luther King Jr. using tactics such as spying and surveillance. As a result, the Patriot Act has served to sanction surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers alike (Institute of Social Policy and Understanding, 2004).

The Patriot Act has also affected Muslims through restrictions on money transfers. Muslim and Arab Americans often have transnational ties, thus they often send money to other countries through the Hawalah system, which operates as an informal system for money transfers. Conducting transfers via the Hawalah system allows money to reach areas that may otherwise not be reached due to a lack of roads, formal banking systems, etc. (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2004). Despite the fact that Hawalah is used to reach remote areas, etc., the report states that “the Act implies (is) that the Hawalah system or any other system not capable of being regulated by the U.S. government is itself illegitimate” (p. 28). The existence of regulations in this regard has, according to the report, resulted in significantly lower amounts of money transfers to areas that need funding. More importantly, however, is the fact that action against the use of the Hawalah system is selectively applied, as organizations such as CARE and World Vision International distribute funds through this system in accordance with the government’s determination that the use of this system is necessary (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2004).

The Patriot Act has also, according to Musabji and Abraham (2007), lowered the threshold for search and seizure operations, and has extended to, for example, voluntary interviews (Musabji & Abraham, 2007). Though the interviews are reported to be voluntary, in fact officials carrying out the interviews have often failed to notify interviewees of their right to have an attorney present or instead are told that they do not need one which, according to
Musabji and Abraham (2007), “is enough to intimidate the individual into submitting to the interview without attorney representation” (p. 100).

Pitt (2011) identifies some additional consequences of the Patriot Act on Muslims, such as using nationality as a reason to bar entry to the United States. Further, Muslims, according to Pitt (2011), have been subject to a disproportionate number of violations, such as arrest and detention. Pitt (2011) asserts that “while all Americans are subjected to these laws, most often Muslims and Arabs experience more extreme versions due to the stereotypes associated with Islam and terrorism” (p. 56). Pitt’s (2011) statement in this regard relies on the research of Kam and Kinder (2007), who found a connection between ethnocentrism and support for the War on Terror.

Material Support for Terrorism—18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B

Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities. We have targeted three such NGOs. We intend to deal with them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid and abet terrorist organizations. - President Bush, Remarks on Executive Order, 2001

The issue of material support for terrorism has become a prominent fear of Muslims and Muslim Americans as a result of numerous prosecutions such as those described above. Though the rationale of targeting funding that may aid terrorists is justifiable, the manner in which many of these investigations have been carried out call into question both the vagueness in material support laws and also Muslim Americans’ ability to practice freedom of religion, expression, and association, in addition to their ability to defend themselves.

There are several key laws that frame policies on material support for terrorism or terrorism financing laws. This includes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and the Patriot Act
The AEDPA, defines material support, training and expert advices as the following:

(1) the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials;
(2) the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and
(3) the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.

Critiques of this code include the fact that the intention to support terrorism is not considered and under the code, and that humanitarian acts done in the interest of ceding acts of terror can also constitute a crime (ACLU, 2009). The ACLU’s (2009) report also notes that the Secretary of State has broad discretion to designate an organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, including the incorporation of decisions based on “foreign relations or economic interests of the United States” (ACLU, 2009, p. 28).

Said (2011) writes that 2339B was the most frequently used statute post 9/11. The Patriot Act revisions also allow for a terrorism designation if an organization “retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2001). The Patriot Act also expands the definition of domestic terrorism and includes amendments to material support definition in 2339A USC. The amendments include, a) “striking ‘or other financial securities’ and inserting ‘or monetary instruments or financial securities’” and b) “inserting ‘expert advice or assistance after training’” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2001). Despite these changes, the Patriot Act, like the AEDPA, makes no distinction in terms of whether or not there was an intention to support terrorism. The Patriot Act also allows for government seizure of organizational assets, even while awaiting investigation (ACLU, 2009).
Further, the Patriot Act also inhibits organizations from responding to claims that their organization is funding terrorists, and includes no specific time frame for the process of seizure and investigation to occur, thus leaving many organizations in limbo.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) gives the President the authority to “investigate, block… regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit any… holding… use, transfer… or transactions involving any property in which a foreign country or national thereof has any interest by any person…subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (IEEPA as cited in ACLU, 2009). The IEEPA also gives the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the authority to refrain from providing explanations of terrorist designations of organizations, including the organization in question. In a report about the process of designating organizations as supporters/financers of terrorism, the 9/11 commission stated that “IEEPA allows the freezing of an organization’s assets and its designation as SDGT before any adjudication of culpability by a court. The administrative record needed to justify a designation can include newspaper articles and other hearsay normally deemed to unreliable for court” (9/11 Commission Report as cited in ACLU (2009)). Nice-Petersen (2005) raises the issue of classified evidence as permitted by the IEEPA, particularly that such evidence can be used “ex parte” and “in camera,” which means that evidence can be presented to the court without a defendants’ attorney being present and the information used against the defendant can be kept from them.

In a report to the 9/11 commission titled Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Roth, Greenburg, and Wille (2004) acknowledge the importance of abating financing to terrorists; however, they critique the use of the IEEPA provision that allows for organizations to be effectively shut down during an investigation. The authors write that this IEEPA provision “lets the government shut down an organization without any formal determination of wrongdoing. It
requires a single piece of paper signed by a midlevel government official. Although in practice a number of agencies typically review and agree to the action, there is no formal administrative process, let alone any adjudication of guilt” (p. 112). The use of this provision was directed at two Muslim organizations, Benevolence International Foundation and the Global Relief Fund. In the case of the latter, the government did not press any terrorism charges and the only staff member that was convicted of an illegal act was Rabih Haddad, who was eventually deported for immigration violations (Al-Maryati, 2005). In the case of Benevolence International, the director, Enaam Arnout, was initially charged with financing a terrorist organization among other charges, but was subsequently convicted of racketeering, and wire and mail fraud. Musabji and Abraham (2007) write of this conviction that “due to the post-9/11 environment, prosecutors and the media were quick to portray his conviction as a ‘win’ in the war on terror, despite the district judge’s explicit statements to the prosecution that there was no evidence linking Arnaout to terrorism” (p. 106). Roth, Greenburg, and Wille (2004) express concern in both cases in terms of proving an organization is providing funding to terrorists, writing that the BIF and GRF cases “highlight fundamental issues that span all aspects of the government efforts to combat al Qaeda financing: the difference between seeing links to terrorists and proving funding of terrorists, and the problem of defining the threshold of information necessary to take disruptive action” (p. 11).

The process of designating a group as a terrorist organization poses many issues. Organizations labeled Specially Designated Global Terrorist Groups (SDGT) are, in theory, given the opportunity to challenge this designation. They must, however, do so without access to classified documents pertaining to their case. Once an organization has been designated as an SDGT, they face barriers in having their case litigated because an attorney seeking to represent
the organization must get a license from OFAC. Funds for the attorney fees may also be blocked or frozen (ACLU, 2009).

Cole (2003) points to several issues inherent in the material support statute. For example, he challenges the U.S. government’s assertion that this statute does not apply guilt by association. Cole cites the case of Buckley v. Valeo to make this point, suggesting that allocating funds to a group with which you are associated is a protected act. The court decision in this case states that “the right to join together ‘for the advancement of beliefs and ideas’…is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds that are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is to be truly or optimally ‘effective’” (Buckely v. Valeo as cited in Cole, 2003, p. 11). Cole (2003) also argues against the idea that funds donated to terrorist organizations will inevitably be used to commit acts of terrorism. He uses the case of Hamas to support this point, writing that an Israeli senior military officer acknowledges that it does allocate most of its funding (95%) to the provision of social services (Cole, 2003).

Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project is a key case that has served as a precedent in favor of the material support for terrorism statute. The decision in this case, ruling against the Humanitarian Law Project, stipulated a prohibition on in-kind donations and conflict resolution consultations (Marguiles, 2012). The rationale given for these prohibitions rested on the assumption that there is no way to track exactly how donated funds are used and that funds are fungible—meaning that donations for benign causes “frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts” (Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project as cited by Marguiles, 2012). The argument in this case also maintains that humanitarian aid can ignite acts of terrorism in two ways. The first is that funding can provide motivation for perpetuating conflict. The second argument is that conflicting parties can manipulate funding and use the resources they acquire in ways that are not
intended by the funder (Marguiles, 2012). While the Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project allows for human rights assessments, any consultation provided to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, even on the subject of using International Humanitarian Law to nonviolently advocate for their cause, may be interpreted as providing material support to terrorists.

These measures to abate financing for terrorism have exacted a great toll on the Muslim American community. According to the ACLU (2009), in December 2001 three of the largest Muslim charities had their assets seized. As of when the report was written in 2009, the Department of Treasury shut down six Muslim American charities and effectively shut down another by processing its status as “under investigation” (ACLU, 2009). The report notes that in addition to the aforementioned organizational closures, six other Muslim American charities have been subject to raids. While the Department of Treasury has not designated these six organizations as SDTGs, some of have been essentially forced to shut down (ACLU, 2009).

The Holy Land Five case (HLF) is one of the most widely known cases and one which has resulted in indictments of several of the leaders. The Holy Land Five case involved allegations from the U.S. government that HLF was donating money to Hamas indirectly by sending funds to Zakat committees. Said (2012) writes of this case that even though the connection between the Zakat committee and Hamas was nebulous and dropped by the government during the trial, the government instead asserted that funding these committees would somehow bolster Hamas’ reputation (Said, 2012). The first trial of the Holy Land Foundation began in 2004 and ended in 2007, with a mistrial because of a hung jury. Evidence presented in the case demonstrated that organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United States Agency for International Development and European Commission, and other organizations have contributed money to the same Zakat committees that HLF was indicted for providing funding for (Said,
2011). In November 2008, there was a retrial of the HLF case. The retrial, according to Said (2011a), included the same evidence as the previous trial; however, the defendants were indicted on the basis of an anonymous Israeli officer, who alleged a connection between the Zakat committees and Hamas. According to Said (2011), “the HLF trial marked the second time in a federal prosecution that a foreign intelligence agent was allowed to testify under a pseudonym, but the trial was unique in that the agent was allowed to do so as an expert witness” (p. 587). This case, according to Said (2011), poses problems on many fronts including the blanket association of all Zakat committees with Hamas, and the immediate suspicion of all charitable donations to residents in the West Bank and Gaza. Further, the testimony from the Israeli official poses a problem for a number of reasons, chief amongst them being that the agent’s unknown identity renders it impossible to ascertain a perjury ruling, and that agent’s status as a non-U.S. citizen protects the agent from conviction even if there was a guilty verdict (Said, 2011a). The trial also included evidence based on hearsay, which is typically excluded from the process of adjudicating cases (Chugani, 2009).

The Holy Land Foundation (HLF) confronted the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s designation of it as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization based on due process claims and freedom of association claims. The government dismissed the Holy Land Foundation’s challenge on the basis that they could not inform the HLF of their designation for reasons of national security, and that notice could not be afforded to HLF because this may have given them the opportunity to transfer funds and because the act of freezing assets was in line with regulations as stipulated in the IEEPA. The blocking and freezing of HLF funds also precluded the organization from being able to obtain a license from OFAC to redirect donations to a
recognized organization, and Muslims who made donations to the HLF were also unable to recover their money due to government restrictions (Al-Maryati, 2005).

In addition to the consequences faced by the Holy Land Foundation itself, 246 individuals and organizations were named as unindicted co-conspirators. This label was not indicative of any confirmation of wrongdoing but has tarnished the images of many groups including the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Islamic Society of North America. According to a report by the Charity and Security Network (Turner, 2011), this list was released as a means to allow hearsay evidence into the HLF case and not to further prosecution of the groups/individuals listed. The Charity and Security Network report also makes note of a federal district court ruling which said the following: “The government has not argued or established any legitimate government interest that warrants publicly identifying organizations and individuals as co-conspirators” (p.13).

The scrutinizing of Muslim American charities has led some to believe that these organizations are being disproportionately targeted because of their religious affiliation. Official statements have buttressed this view. For example, a former Department of Treasury official stated that, “We are not going into Irish bars looking for people who support the IRA right now. There is a reason we are focusing on the Muslim community. There is a greater proportion of Muslims engaged in ethnic terror, than other groups” (ACLU, 2009, p. 60). Aside from noting what may be perceived as differential treatment in the application of terrorism financing laws, the report also mentions a discrepancy between how non-profit and for-profit organizations are treated. For example, the company Chiquita, which had previously financed terrorism, paid a fine and received no criminal charges, while Haliburton, a company that worked with Iran, received no sanctions despite working with a “state sponsor of terrorism” (ACLU, 2009, p. 60).
As a result of these laws and the perception of being disproportionately targeted, Muslim Americans spoke extensively in the ACLU (2009) report about being fearful of donating money per their religious obligations, worrying that they could be prosecuted for having given funds to an organization that was not yet designated as a FTO at the time. Muslim Americans, as stated in the report, also exhibited fear rising from FBI interviews with the community in regards to their donations. These interviews have, according to the report, solicited information about donations made before an FTO designation was made. In this vein, the report mentions the case of Mohamed Shorabgi, who received a charge of material support for terrorism because he had donated funds to the Holy Land Foundation. A core problem in this case is the fact that the Holy Land Foundation was declared to be an FTO after he made the donations. Additionally, FBI interviewers have been known to visit workplaces of those who they decide to interview, causing further fear among community members. Aziz (2011) raises the case of Jesse Maali, who became subjected to increased scrutiny following sizeable donations to various Muslim charities. Major donors, as Aziz writes “have experienced burdensome tax audits, denials of citizenship applications, deportation proceedings, and surveillance” (p. 6).

The ACLU report also details several concerns of the Muslim American community in regards to donating, which include: “1) fear of retroactive criminal liability for donations made in good faith to legal Muslim charities; 2) fear that they would be targeted for law enforcement interviews for exercising their religious obligation to pay Zakat; and 3) fear of immigration consequences” (ACLU, 2009, p. 93). Despite the perception that uniform assessments of organizations are being made irrespective of religious affiliation, Al-Maryati (2005) notes that at the time of writing this article, the only organizations that were designated as SDGTs were Muslim - even though others also work in conflict regions.
To address their fears in regards to making financial donations, Al-Maryati (2005) notes that following the closure of one of the larger Muslim charities, that Muslims requested a list of charities that were acceptable according to government standards. Not only did the Department of Justice deny this request, Juan Zarate, Assistant Secretary of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes with the Department of Treasury, asserted that “you can’t have the U.S. government picking favorites in a multi-billion dollar industry” (Zarate as quoted by Al-Maryati, 2005). The failure to provide information that would adequately inform Muslims of acceptable donation options has magnified the fears of the community in regards to being prosecuted for material support charges.

Racial Profiling and ‘Flying While Muslim’

Airport security was an issue that was brought up frequently throughout the interviews conducted with Muslim Americans in this study. Numerous debates have ensued about the use of racial/religious profiling to determine potential terrorists, with many of these measures focusing on ethnicity and religion as proxies for suspicion. Post 9/11, airport security often involves a pat down of the body and the hijab for women who do it. Airport security has also included more extreme measures, such as deplaning individuals without sufficient cause. For example, in 2006 six imams were removed from a US Airways flight because a fellow passenger expressed concern that the imams had requested seatbelt extensions and were chanting “Allah, Allah.” As a result of the passenger’s reported anxiety, the imams were deplaned, handcuffed, arrested, and subjected to FBI questioning. Though they were cleared for flying later that day, this incident demonstrated that religious profiling could be used as a proxy for guilt (Washington Post, 2006). The imams afterwards sued the federal agent, police officers, and the airport authority, and while the case was decided in their favor, Congress passed a law shortly thereafter called the John Doe provision.
protecting individuals who report suspicious activity (Washington Times, 2007). It is important to recognize that the defendants won and that the system of justice in the United States prevailed; however, measures such as deplaning individuals for no reason other than their dress and speech in another language symbolically relegates them to a lower level of citizenship. Further, exposure from the story may have caused the defendants to experience additional burdens on their lives given that they were thought to be potential terrorists.

Another instance of airport security/profiling involved a U.S. citizen of Middle Eastern descent who boarded a plane shortly after 9/11 only to be removed because his identity as such made the flight crew uncomfortable (Musabji & Abraham, 2007). After deplaning, the individual received no additional scrutiny and was booked on a later flight to New York. These situations clearly have consequences on feelings of safety and security among Muslims. Moreover, as Neuhauser (2011) asserts, being singled out in this way leads to humiliation and a sense of powerlessness. In this vein, he writes that:

Consider that these people are singled out just because of their religion and see in the eyes of all other people from whom they are separated the fearful question: Are you a terrorist? This clearly has to count as humiliation, because these persons are not judged for what they are but for the worst anybody could be and they have no way of telling the other customers: Look, this is just a weird misunderstanding. (p. 22)

In response to increasing accounts of racial profiling, the DOT provided a directive regarding racial profiling (Chandrasekar, 2003). The directive stated the following:

Do not subject persons of their property to inspection, search, and/or detention because they appear to be Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian and/or Muslim; or solely because they speak Arabic, Farsi, or another foreign language; or solely because they speak with an accent that may lead you to believe they are Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian, and/or Muslim. (DOT email as cited in Chandrasekar, 2003, p. 218)

Despite this directive, racial profiling has gone unabated and in many cases has been legally sanctioned. For example, Meyer (2013) cites the attempted Christmas day bombing in 2009, which caused the TSA to lay down a new set of procedures that allowed for the conducting
of special screenings for individuals from certain Muslim countries and countries in Africa. Meyer (2013) notes that the TSA discounted this policy as targeting, teaching during their training that, “singling out people based on ethnicity or religion is verboten-but it’s OK if it’s based on a person’s nationality” (TSA, as cited in Meyer, 2013). Though Meyer (2013) does indicate some problematic aspects of airport security, particularly in the implementation of the SPOT program that relies on behavioral analysis, she nonetheless concludes that racial profiling is acceptable and indeed constitutional. Further, Meyer (2013) indicates her agreement with Peter Siggins, Chief Deputy Attorney General of California, who delivered a talk in 2012 saying that “the mission of responsible law enforcement officials in combating domestic terrorism is to take what they know to be true about the ethnic identity of the September 11th assailants, and combine it with other factors developed through investigation and analysis to focus investigative efforts and avoid casting a net too wide.” While the others factors he mentions may be indeed be legitimate in identifying potential terrorists, his statement that law enforcement should “take what they know to be true about the ethnic identity of the September 11th assailants” is ambiguous at best and criminalizing at worse because of what appears to be an implicit inflation between ethnic identity and culpability.

In his assessment of racial profiling post 9/11, Johnson (2004) writes of the visceral reaction once held by Americans towards this practice. He argues that post 9/11, “national security deflected attention away from the efforts to eliminate race-based law enforcement” (p. 77). However, racial profiling post 9/11, which uses racial or ethnic group affiliation as a proxy for criminality and which has affected Arabs and Muslims, has received a lot less criticism (Johnson, 2004). Further, such measures were seen as acceptable to the majority as they were primarily directed towards a minority group - something that he considers an affront to the Bill
of Rights and Constitution, which are supposed to protect the minorities from the majority.

Nonetheless, different directives, guidelines, and practices from the government have served to simultaneously challenge the practice of racial profiling while at the same time accepting the practice largely in cases of national security. For example, Justice Department Guidelines from 2003 state that:

[I]n investigating or preventing threats to national security or other catastrophic events (including the performance of duties related to air transportation security), or in enforcing laws protecting the integrity of the Nation’s borders, Federal law enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The Constitution prohibits consideration of race or ethnicity in law enforcement decisions in all but the most exceptional circumstances. Given the incalculably high stakes involved in such investigations, however, Federal law enforcement officers who are protecting national security or preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport screeners) may consider race, ethnicity, and other relevant factors to the extent permitted by our laws and the Constitution. Similarly, because enforcement of the laws protecting the Nation’s borders may necessarily involve a consideration of a person’s alienage in certain circumstances, the use of race or ethnicity in such circumstances is properly governed by existing statutory and constitutional standards. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003)

These guidelines therefore deem racial profiling to be acceptable in cases of national security, without any mention of probable cause or suspicion of culpability.

Gonzales (2002a) acknowledges that racial profiling may be unconstitutional, but she reasons that so long as public safety is the rationale for profiling as opposed to negative feelings based on racial or ethnic characteristics, that the practice is legitimate. To that end, she writes that, “the profiling of passengers, though, should be conducted with reasonableness and not as a conduit to display racial animus for Americans and other persons of Middle Eastern descent” (p. 86). Though national security is indeed a worthy cause, it is difficult to disentangle animosity for persons from the Middle East from arguments about national security, especially because the
targeting of this group often relies on the premise of collective guilt, collective responsibility, and guilt by association.

Von Rochow-Leuschner (2004) assesses the legality of the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II (CAPPS II), a threat assessment tool that was implemented after 9/11. The CAPPS II program factors in a number of considerations in determining the threat one poses to security, not limited to but including credit and criminal checks, in addition to data-mining algorithms (Von Rochow-Leuschner, 2004). Von Rochow-Leuschner (2004) notes that while the original CAPPS program identified some of the 9/11 hijackers as potential threats, they were presumed innocent because the system did not include precautions related to not having checked bags, something which CAPPS II now includes along with “an undisclosed number of additional variables” (p. 145). Von Rochow-Leuschner (2004) goes on to analyze whether or not the CAPPS II program would have effectively identified Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber.” Interestingly she notes that the system would have likely deemed him a risk based on his criminal record, conversion to Islam, and the fact that he changed his name. While a criminal record provides sufficient and solid reason to deem someone suspect, basing potential culpability on one’s conversion to Islam and a name change serves to conflate Islam with terrorism. Though a counterargument might include the fact that these measures would have accurately identified the shoe bomber, without additional criteria these measures would be overly broad and would inevitably target many innocent individuals.

Despite this fact and in cases where profiling rises to the level of unconstitutional behavior (i.e. where racial background is the only criteria or where the plaintiff is able to prove that their fourth amendment rights were violated on the basis of being unreasonably searched), Baker (2002) notes the difficulty that current political climate presents in terms of litigating
racial profiling cases. Baker (2002) also notes that the Supreme Court sanctions racial profiling, saying that “even if it be assumed that such [selections for heightened security procedures] are made largely on the basis of apparent [Arab] ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation. The likelihood that any person of [Arab] ancestry is high enough to make [Arab] appearance a relevant factor” (Supreme Court as cited in Baker, 2002, pp. 66-67). Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision effectively condones the use of race in the absence of other factors/characteristics. Post 9/11 organizations, such as the American Anti-Arab Discrimination Committee and Council on American Islamic Relations, have continued to document racial profiling when traveling, suggesting and consistent with this studies’ findings that members of both groups find racial profiling to be problematic.

Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program

In August 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union released a report titled Muslims Need Not Apply (Pasquarella, 2013). The report includes profiles of individuals who have experienced substantial delays in the naturalization process for Muslims, a conclusion arrived at through the analysis of various cases obtained through FOIA requests from the United States Citizen and Immigration Services. The report focuses on the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) and details several problematic features of CARRP, which include overly broad and vague guidelines, the inclusion of law enforcement in the adjudication process, and the restriction of individuals from becoming aware of their status as a “national security concern” while also preventing such individuals from challenging this designation.

According to the report, a “national security concern” is defined by CARRP as “an individual or organization [that] has been determined to have an articulable link to prior, current, or planned involvement in, or association with, an activity, individual or organization described in
the security and terrorism sections] of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (p. 17). Noting vagueness in this definition, the report continues to elaborate upon the criteria used to determine whether an individual can be classified as a “national security concern,” thus making them ineligible to become a naturalized citizen. The adjudication criteria includes, among other factors, designation as a “Known Suspected Terrorist,” which identifies whether or not a person’s name is listed on the “Terrorist Watch List,” a list which has been critiqued for being overinclusive (containing over 875,000 names). Should the individual pass this stage, the adjudication process is expected to proceed by identifying other factors, such as the association with a terrorist organization. These “Tier III non-designated organizations” are defined as any “group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in ‘certain enumerated terrorist activities’” (p. 22). This includes provision of material support for terrorism on the basis of what one should “reasonably know” (p. 22). One of the individuals profiled in the report is a man named Tarek Hamdi, who experienced substantial delays in his naturalization process. Hamdi was identified as a “national security concern” because of a donation made prior to 2001 to an organization that was thereafter deemed to be a terrorist organization. This accusation operated in contradiction to the government’s assertion that they had shut down the organization, Benevolence International, for reasons including the protection of donors who were unaware of fraudulent behavior. In speaking to this contradiction, the report notes that: “it is particularly ironic that USCIS would now claim that donors to these charities are ‘national security concerns’ when the government previously accused these charities of misrepresenting to donors that their money was being spent on solely charitable causes, thereby portraying the donors to these charities as innocent victims of organizations that supported terrorism” (p. 23). Other criteria used to determine the designation of an individual as a “national
security concern,” including one’s country of origin which includes areas such as the Middle East. Among the more problematic issues with CARRP, as the report notes, is the conflation of Islam with terrorism. Citing the case of Hajro v. Barrett, the report describes the scrutiny that the defendant received in his failure to acknowledge belonging to an informal Muslim group that the government had suspect of terrorist ties, though the formation of the group was based only on “talking with other Muslims about their shared faith and practices and sometimes involves travelling to other communities” (p. 41).

The problematic nature of the CARRP program, as this ACLU report documents, is the government’s attempt to circumvent naturalization. Buttressing this idea is a government document obtained through FOIA by the ACLU that depicts the CARRP workflow, which includes an emphasis on denying or delaying applications as the document on the following page demonstrates.

National Security Entry and Exit Registration System

The NSEERS program was initiated in November 2002. The program required nationals from 25 countries who were in the United States to undergo special registration procedures, including a specific requirement that males aged 16 and above undergo the registration procedures. It is important to note that of the 25 countries from which nationals were subjected to special registration, 23 of these countries were Muslim majority countries.

The special registration process ranged from fingerprinting to prolonged interrogations and in some cases detentions. A report titled The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy speaks to many of the impacts of the NSEERS program, including the separation of families and the generation of fear among Muslim communities (Rights Working Group & Penn State Law, 2012).
Figure 1. CARPP Workflow Overview (Pasquarella, 2013, p.35).
The report also documents the impacts in terms of combatting terrorism and quotes Senator Durbin, who said of the 80,000 individuals identified: “How many terrorists were identified by Special Registration? None” (p. 9). The NSEERS program has also been identified as problematic because of the explicit targeting of individuals from certain countries which communicates a particular message about their guilt. Wadhia (2010) identifies a number of philosophical and technical aspects of the NSEERS program. She writes that:

While profiling based on nationality or national origin may not be inherently wrong, there are at least five reasons why it is offensive and in many cases no different from profiling based on race, ethnicity or religion: 1) in practice many policies based on nationality disproportionately impact particular religions and ethnicities; 2) this disproportionate impact creates the perception that a particular policy is premised on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment; 3) most of the countries identified by the government as harboring terrorists have been Arab or Muslim; 4) in practice “nationality” based profiling is often conflated with “national origin” profiling; 5) profiling based on country of birth has extended to naturalized United States from particular countries, leading to the presumption that citizens from particular places are somehow less reliable or loyal in their allegiances to the United States. (p. 1514)

Alien Absconder Initiative
The Alien Absconder Initiative was initiated in 2002, with the goal of removing from the United States individuals who were in violation of deportation orders. At the onset of the policy’s implementation, estimates of the number of “absconders,” was above 300,000 (Wadhia, 2010). This policy among others integrated immigration laws with national security policy, which in some cases conflated criminal activity with immigration violations (see for example the case of Farouk Abdel-Muthi, arrested by the Absconder Task Force in 2002, CCR). Though this policy was in theory an effort to remove absconders, Lapp (2011) asserted that “the government did not intend, however, to pursue all 314,000 absconders equally” (p. 574). He draws this conclusion from explicit statements in an internal memorandum from the Office of the Deputy General. Speaking to the sequence in which absconders would be pursued, the memo states that:
“While the INS will ultimately deport all 314,000 from the United States, there are several thousand among that group who come from countries in which there has been Al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity. We want to focus our initial efforts on these priority absconders as we believe that some of them have information that could assist our campaign against terrorism” (p. 1). This policy underscores the problematic way in which the War on Terror uses guilt-by-association, religion, and ethnicity as proxies for guilt. For example, the policy focused on a group of 6,000 individuals from predominantly Muslim countries, which is a small percentage of the 314,000 of those facing deportation (Wadhia, 2010).

Surveillance of Muslim Communities

In 2011, the Associated Press released a series of stories based on their investigation of the NYPD in which it was revealed that Muslims in New York City were being spied on for no reason beyond their religious affiliation. The documents revealed by the Associated Press described the demographics of different Muslim communities and included images of Mosques under surveillance. Another report by the NYPD described weekly activities of different Muslim Student Associations in New York. Based on the reports, the Center for Constitutional Rights and Muslim Advocates sued the city of New York in Hassan vs. the City of New York (2014) on the grounds that Muslims organizations had been harmed as a result of the surveillance. On February 20, 2014, the Federal Trial Judge ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis that they failed to produce evidence of actual harm and evidence that they were targeted solely on the basis of their religion.

In reference to discrimination based on religion, the court decision stated that, “it follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a constitutional right, Plaintiffs must plead sufficient factual matter to show that the City adopted and implemented the surveillance program not for a
neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of religion” (p. 9). This decision was handed down in spite of the city’s argument that the 9/11 attacks were sufficient reason to monitor Muslims whether or not evidence of wrongdoing could be found (Sulahry, 2014). Sulahry quotes CCR’s Legal Director, Baher Azmy, who comments in regards to the ruling that it “is a modern day version of the discredited Korematsu decision allowing the wholesale internment of Japanese Americans based solely on their ancestry. It is a troubling and dangerous decision.”

Extremism and Radicalization in the Muslim American Community

The Muslim American community has been accused of not doing enough to combat violent extremism that may be occurring in their midst. This perception has led to the belief that Muslim Americans support acts of terrorism both domestically and abroad. To counter these beliefs, President Barack Obama stated in his January 2011 State of the Union Address that “as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with the respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our American family.” Moreover, in a White House publication titled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, one of the strategies suggested in combating extremism is community outreach. President Obama’s remarks, coupled with the White House document, provide evidence that the U.S. government is appearing to work with the Muslim community as partners.

Despite these goals, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has obtained numerous documents from the FBI that demonstrate that many of the purported community outreach programs were actually used to collect information pertaining to American citizens’ religious and political beliefs (ACLU, n.d.). The FBI documents retrieved by the ACLU document meetings
with Mosque leaders and provide demographic information of participants and identifying information, such as names and organizations.

Causing more skepticism of the FBI was an earlier initiative in 2003 that entailed counting local Muslims and Mosques. Cassandra Chandler, assistant director of the FBI at the time, said of the initiative that, “the survey, a small part of the FBI’s much larger re-engineering effort, looked at a wide range of demographic and other measures, focused primarily on vulnerabilities, and mosques in the past that have been targeted for violence” (Chandler as cited in Litchblau, 2003).

Despite Chandler’s statement, however, Lichtblau (2003) references a closed briefing of congressional staff members, where Wilson Lowery, Jr., then executive assistant of the FBI, stated an entirely different reason for the initiative. According to Lichtblau (2003), “Mr. Lowery told Congressional officials that the information would be used to help establish a yardstick for the number of terrorism investigations and intelligence warrants that a field office could reasonably be expected to produce.” Thus, as Lowery’s statement suggests, a conflation between Muslims and Mosques with terrorism was embedded in this initiative.

These examples of activities by the FBI are important in the way that Muslims were explicitly targeted, but also as an important piece of a counter narrative that provides some context for this community’s reluctance to work with various law enforcement agencies instead of the dominant narrative that any reluctance is based on support for violent extremism.

The issue of radicalization in the Muslim community is also important when the theories behind the trajectory of radicalization influence the types of counterterrorism responses that are implemented. Numerous theories exist which attempt to outline a linear process through which radicalization occurs, one of the most influential of which is a report titled *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. The report focuses exclusively on selected cases of terrorism
committed solely by Muslims. According to the report, the radicalization process is comprised of
four distinct stages, linear in nature, and indicates an endpoint where individuals who become
radicalized do so by embracing a “jihadi-salafi” (p. 8) interpretation of Islam. The report states
that “ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the
basis of government,” which serves to proscribe a distinct motivation for those who become
radicalized (p. 8). The first stage is pre-radicalization, followed by self-identification,indoctrination, and finally Jihadization.

The report outlines several different groups who they assert are likely candidates for
embracing radical thoughts, which includes males age 15-35, middle class families, students,
individuals who are unemployed, and immigrants (including second and third generation). Based
on the demographics of the Muslim American community, these identified groups would seem to
encompass a large percentage of the community. In the second stage of the radicalization process,
individuals are said to find their identity through religion. The report states that:

The key influences during this phase of conflict and - religious seeking includes trusted
social networks made up of friends and family, religious leaders, literature and the
Internet. Given the high volume, popularity, and almost - faddish nature of the extremist
agenda, an individual who goes searching for answers will invariably be exposed to a
plethora of Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam” (p. 32).

While a great deal of information is present on these interpretations of Islam, the report
discourts the possibility that an individual might interact and be swayed by a more moderate
version of Islam. Individuals who are said to be going through this process can be identified
according to the report, by indicators such as alienation from one’s previous life, “giving up
cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster clothes,” dressing in Islamic garments,
keeping a beard, and “becoming involved in social activism and community issues” (p. 33).
The third stage is the indoctrination stage. Individuals who are said to have reached this stage withdraw from the Mosque and begin to conceptualize grievances against the Muslim world as “a conspiratorial attack by unbelievers on Islam and the Muslim world” (p. 38). Withdrawal from the Mosque, according to the report, happens because of the fear that their increasing radicalization will be noticed by law enforcement and intelligence agencies who are infiltrating these spaces. The acknowledgement that such individuals become withdrawn from the Mosque would seem to support the idea that the Muslim American community is unaware of individuals who have chosen this path. This, however, competes with the idea that Muslims must work to combat the radicalization that is seen to be ever present in their midst.

The last stage is the Jihadization stage, which involves the decision to conduct a terrorist act. According to the report, this stage usually involves a type of “group think.” Those who have reached this stage “anoint themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen” (p. 7). However indicators that a person has reached this stage are hard to detect.

Naturally, counter-terrorism officials are keen to identify and prevent terrorist acts. In this capacity they have been building a theoretical basis from which to understand the process that leads someone to commit a terrorist act - with little consensus on what this process actually looks like. In this vein, Faiza Patel (2011) from the Brennan Center for Justice, authored a report titled *Rethinking Radicalization*, which critiques the NYPD report and other narratives surrounding radicalization. According to Patel (2011), many theories of radicalization, including those used in the NYPD report, employ a “religious conveyer belt” (p. 3) theory that proposes a trajectory from “grievance or personal crisis to religiosity to the adoption of radical beliefs to terrorism, with each step along the continuum identifiable to law enforcement officials who know how to recognize the signs” (p. 2). The problematic aspect of such a perspective includes the fact that investigative
tactics are designed based on this information, which among other things suggests a link between religiosity and radicalism (Patel, 2011). Moreover, with an account such as that offered by the NYPD to explain radicalization, Patel asks “can a community simultaneously be treated as suspect and also be expected to function as a partner?” (p. 2).

Patel (2011) critiques many of the core assumptions of NYPD’s (2007) report including the idea that there is a significant threat arising from homegrown terrorism. She writes that in contrast to earlier decades, where there were between 60-70 terrorist incidents, “prosecutions for homegrown terrorism have averaged approximately six per year since September 2001” (p. 6). In addition, Patel uses evidence from various sources to critique the assumption that there is a “terrorist profile” (p. 8). This includes an MI5 report that used empirical evidence to counter the argument that that there is a terrorist profile. The idea of the “conveyor belt” progression is also discounted by a UK agency and an expert on terrorism, Mark Sageman. Sageman (2008) asserts that “[o]ne cannot simply draw a line, put markers on it and gauge where people are along this path to see whether they are close to committing atrocities” (Sageman, 2008 as cited in Patel, 2011, p. 9). The critique that terrorism has different paths was also stated by a DHS-supported study which maintained that “there is no path, no ‘trajectory profile’ to political radicalization. Rather there are many different paths…some of these paths do not include radical ideas or activism on the way to radical action, so the radicalization progression cannot be understood as an invariable set of steps or ‘stages’ from sympathy to radicalism”’ (as cited in Patel, 2011, p. 9).

Other agencies such as the National Counter-Terrorism Center have expressed agreement with the idea that a fixed trajectory does not exist, and on this basis criticize the idea of marked changes in appearance, per the belief that such changes in appearance could be manifested by any individual, not simply those who are becoming “radicalized.”
The NYPD report is an important document to critique because the counter-terrorism tactics that are supported by these theories may actually damage relationships with potential partners in the fight against terrorism. With the stages and indicators that the report suggests, Patel asserts that “the NYPD believes that the appropriate time for law enforcement officers to intervene is at the beginning of the process - i.e., in the ‘pre-radicalization’ phase - where the radicalization ‘signature’ is essentially being a young Muslim man” (p. 16). This point is important because of the traction this report has gotten among different law enforcement agencies and the simplistic correlation that is suggested between religiosity and violence, such that specific identifiers as mentioned above include wearing Islamic garb - something which non-violent Muslims across a spectrum do (i.e. moderate to non-violent radicals).

In 2006, the FBI released a document titled *The Radicalization process: From Conversion to Jihad* (ACLU Eye on the FBI, n.d.). As a precursor to the NYPD’s model, the FBI’s version also describes a four step radicalization process. The focus on the FBI’s model, however, as the title suggests, focuses on converts to Islam who may become radicalized, and who are “growing concerns to the US Intelligence Community (USIC)” (p. 4).

Like the NYPD model, this model identifies some signifiers of radical behavior, but focuses on venues where such behavior may be fostered. Interestingly, the identification phase of the process includes “overseas experience,” comprised of “religious training” and “language training,” two broad factors given the demographics of the Muslim community, a community that is comprised of a large percentage of immigrants.

Patel (2011) argues that this model is problematic in that this “conveyor belt” perspective on radicalization is utilized to justify monitoring and surveillance of the Muslim American community in spite of evidence contradicting this theory. Not only does Patel (2011) critique
these models of radicalization in terms of their theoretical underpinnings, but she also critiques them on the basis of the impact that monitoring and surveillance - two tactics suggested by the models - have had on the relationship between law enforcement and Muslim Americans. Buttressing this idea, Patel (2011) cites a study by the Vera Institute (2006), which found that certain Arab American communities “were more afraid of law enforcement agencies - especially federal law enforcement agencies - than they were of acts of hate or violence, despite the increase in hate crimes” (Vera Institute, 2006, as cited in Patel, 2011, p. 24).

Blackwood, Hopkins, and Reicher (2013) further critique models of radicalization, saying that:

The mainstream model of alienation and radicalization, which informs counter-terrorism efforts in the West, typically locates the problem in ‘them,’ the minority... the focus tends to remain on ‘them’ - on their intragroup processes - and less on how the interactions
between majority and minority members create the context within which minority group members deliberate on their fate and what can and should be done. (p. 246)

Thus, the models of radicalization that have been proposed locate radicalization as a solely internal process, that is unaffected by external events or interactions. One reason the authors suggest in perpetuating these types of models is that it absolves responsibility for practices and policies that may contribute to a group member’s radicalization. This particular point is important in light of research suggesting a correlation between procedural injustice and perpetration of violence as a means to an end (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010).

The aforementioned critiques focused mostly on the assumptions contained within the NYPD model. Recent counter-terrorism efforts have, however, become increasingly defined by the radicalization narrative. The basis behind such models is important to examine to ensure that the relationship between law enforcement and the Muslim American community is not unduly harmed. This is difficult when the models that are used to identify radicalization take the wearing of religious clothing as a cue for increased scrutiny. Justifying policies on the basis of any given model of radicalization should be done with caution because there is virtually no empirical research that proves the validity of one theory of radicalization over another nor is there a definitive model describing the process (King & Taylor, 2011).

The “Homegrown Threat”

The idea that there is a homegrown threat rising from the Muslim American community has been perpetrated by a number of political officials, such as Representative Peter King, who initiated the Islamic Radicalization hearings. This threat has been defined by the presence of Muslims undertaking or attempting to undertake acts of terror. While several incidents of domestic terror plots and actions have occurred since 9/11, the question as to the frequency of
such plots, their connection to international groups, and the specific ideologies present requires a more nuanced look at the existing empirical evidence.

The importance of properly identifying the homegrown threat is in a) responding to the severity of the threat adequately, and in b) making sure that the entire Muslim community is not vilified on the basis of an exaggerated threat. Two initiatives to identify potential threats include a 2010 report titled Assessing the Terrorist Threat released by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010), and the hearings that Peter King held in March 2011, titled, The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response.

The executive summary of the (BPC) report begins by narrowing the homegrown terror threat to Muslims and then connecting them to Al-Qaeda. According to the BPC report, “a key shift in the past couple years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of Al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups” (p. 1). The report includes assessments of the threat of Al-Qaeda in different regions of the world, as well as an assessment of the threat from affiliated groups. While the report provides some reasonable rationales for the estimation of future targets and tactics, some of the evidence is anecdotal, which excludes specific intelligence information to support these claims. The report is fundamentally concerned with what they consider to be an inadequate response from the U.S. government. Naturally an accurate assessment of terrorist threats is critical to U.S. national security. However, painting the homegrown threat of terrorism as a pervasive problem emanating from the Muslim community alone may do more to isolate this community and damage relationships with law enforcement and intelligent officials than to serve it. Moreover, an exaggerated threat can backtrack progress and lead to backlash. In understanding the importance of accurately addressing the terrorist threats as
outlined in the BPC report, three civil rights organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Muslim Advocates (MA), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) (2010) issued a memo critiquing some of the various elements of the report. Putting this threat in perspective is important, especially where such reports determine active, kinetic responses. In fact, as this critique notes, the BPC report was included in U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee.

The BPC report also indicates that Al-Qaeda has been able to establish “an operational infrastructure in the United States with effects both at home and abroad” (p. 4). However, as the ACLU analysis highlights, this assertion is made without evidence to support their claim and evidence that runs counter to this assertion is not included, which include excerpts from the Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, concluding that Al-Qaeda is largely undeveloped in the U.S. and where it has emerged, law enforcement has been able to tackle the threat. Other critiques that the ACLU analysis makes is the fact that the BPC report broadens the scope and presence of Al-Qaeda by seeking to lump together various groups in order to create the impression of a “unified global conspiracy” (p. 5). Another critique that the report makes is that the number of terror incidents is based on arrests and indictments that might mischaracterize the threat as it occurs each year. This may be, for example, because an individual may be indicted for a crime several years after it has been committed. This is an important issue as the analysis highlights, because “such small numbers of terrorism incidents each year, the addition or removal of just a few has a significant impact on the year-by-year statistical comparisons” (p. 8). Another important critique is that the BPC report asserts that Muslims have been absent in condemning terrorist acts, which would seem to indicate silent approval. However, as the joint ACLU, MA, and MPAC (2010) report
notes, numerous Muslim voices have come out against extremism and violence and the American Muslim website contains a compendium of statements/articles, etc. where Muslims have spoken out against terrorism (Musaji, 2012).

As mentioned above, in March of 2011, Representative Peter King held hearings titled *The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response*. Prior to the hearings, King appeared on the Imus show, saying that, “It’s not just people who are involved with the terrorists and extremists, it is people who are in mainstream Islam, leaders of mosques, leaders of Muslim organizations… So, it goes beyond the terrorists and extremists and also includes those in what others call mainstream Muslim leadership” (Armbuster, 2010). King’s perspective as expressed here, effectively eliminates any distinction between the Muslims who perpetrated the attack and those who simply share a faith with the perpetrators.

In the hearings, King also argues two points: that Al-Qaeda poses a greater threat to the nation than all other types of extremism, and that radicalization is a real threat among Muslim America men. According to King, “15% of Muslim American men between the ages of 18-29 could support suicide bombings” (King, 2011). The ACLU submitted testimony for the hearings that challenged King’s proposition that American Muslim have failed to work with law enforcement (ACLU, 2011). The King hearings also presented American Muslims, including moderate Muslim Americans, as untrustworthy outsiders who hold extremist ideologies, thus engaging the idea that Muslims in general cannot be trusted.

**Muslim American Support for Terrorism**

In the current discourse on terrorism, many believe that the threat of terrorism comes mostly from a contingent of Muslims and Muslim Americans. According to a Pew Center Poll
that was released in 2011, the general public views Muslim American support for extremism to be almost double of what Muslim Americans think the extent of the problem is.

The discourse surrounding Muslim American support of terrorism is often problematic as it treats the community as collectively responsible for the actions of a small minority. The report titled *Strengthening America: The Civic and Political Integration of Muslim Americans* makes several recommendations as to how both the Muslim American community and other institutions, such as the government and media, can respond to and address challenges and barriers to Muslim American participation (Kathwari & Martin, 2007). While the report seeks to contextualize many of the problems with respect to Muslim American participation, the report focuses mostly on how this community can and should respond, rather than critiquing some of the problematic aspects of the discourses that Muslim Americans must confront. This is best articulated in the discussion on Muslim Americans’ rejection of terrorism. The report states that, “while Muslim Americans question the fairness of holding all Muslim Americans responsible for constantly condemning the actions of a few extremists, the reality is that in the eyes of much of American society, the burden is still on Muslim Americans to respond” (p. 10). Rather than challenging the idea that Muslim Americans have to respond to charges of collective responsibility, the report recommends that Muslim Americans become more proactive in condemning terrorism and acts that may lead to terrorism. While there is no doubt that terrorists have come from within the Muslim/Muslim American community, other groups/individual terrorists motivated by other religious beliefs and ideologies rarely prompt an outcry from society at large calling for the affiliated group to address the misdeeds of one of their members. In placing such a burden squarely on the Muslim American community, the discourse that seems to be perpetuated is that terrorism is a significant threat rising from this community alone, which contradicts reports that suggest a minimal threat of
Figure 3. Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators Since 9/11 (Kurtzman, 2012, p.6).

terrorism rising from this community. For example, Charles Kurzman (2012) analyzes the threat rising from the Muslim American community, including suspects, perpetrators, and supports of terrorism. As his table below demonstrates, the number of Muslim Americans who fall into any of these categories, though fluctuating, has decreased over the years, with less than ten cases documented in both 2011 and 2012. Moreover, a report by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (Perliger, 2012) challenges the idea that terrorism from the Muslim American community is problematic. The report maintains that the incidents of violent acts from members of the Muslim American community is considerably less than acts of violence that are perpetrated by right wing groups. This report is important not only in accurately identifying the threat from would be Muslim terrorists and in evaluating the subsequent actions that are taken when non-Muslim acts of terrorism are highlighted.

As another example of this last point, a report from the Department of Homeland Security, called Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in
Radicalization and Recruitment was released in 2009. Despite the warnings of extremist activities from rightwing groups, the report was immediately blocked by numerous individuals such as House Minority Leader, John Boehner. According to an article in the Daily Kos (2012), Boehner reportedly asked for an “explanation for why she (Janet Napolitano), has abandoned using the term ‘terrorist’ to describe those, such as al Qaeda, who are plotting to kill innocent Americans, while her own department is using the same term to describe American citizens who disagree with the direction Washington Democrats are taking our nation” (Daily Kos, 2012).

David K. Rehbein, National Commander of the American Legion, also commented that, “I think it is important for all of use to remember that Americans are not the enemy. The terrorists are.” (Daily Kos, 2012). As these statements suggest, extremism and violence can only be applied to select populations, which excludes those who happen to be White and right wing.

Related to the narrative around the failure of Muslims to condemn terrorism is the argument that Muslims fail to cooperate with law enforcement in combatting terrorism. To address this gap, Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq (2010) conducted a study aimed at understanding the circumstances under which Muslim Americans cooperate with law enforcement. Their study found “a robust correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim American communities in the context of antiterrorism policing” (p. 368). This study is consistent with earlier findings by Tyler (2006), who in his book Why People Obey the Law concludes that individuals are most likely to obey the law as a function of perceived legitimacy of the system, not fear. The ideas put forth here are important in dissecting the radicalization discourse and for understanding the role of authorities in creating legitimate laws and policies that are enforced equitably.
The current narrative in place that emphasizes acts of terrorism by Muslims over non-Muslims is important to address because of the implications this has on policy design and implementation. This is also a part of the narrative that Muslim Americans exhibited concern over, particularly where attention directed towards their community resulted in more restrictive policies.

**Historical Examination of Policies Targeting Arabs and Muslims**

Despite the rise in policies affecting Arabs and Muslims post 9/11, pre 9/11 there were also policies that explicitly targeted Arabs. For example, in 1972 former president Nixon launched Operation Boulder after the Munich bombings, which according to Cainkar (2009) involved “massive surveillance of Arab Americans” (p. 93). More specifically, and according to Akram (2002), Operation Boulder,

Comprised a series of Presidential directives issued by President Nixon, ostensibly to deal with the terrorist threat posed by the Munich Olympics hostage-taking and its bloody outcome. The directives authorized the FBI to investigate individuals of ‘Arabic-speaking origin,’ supposedly to determine their potential relationship with ‘terrorist’ activities related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.” (p. 7)

Additionally, as Bassiouni (1974) noted, Operation Boulder involved intensive efforts to stifle the debate around Israel and Palestine, including measures such as harassment and wiretapping of Arab American activists. Not only did this serve to restrict the actual rights of Arab Americans, it created an atmosphere that rendered “chief policy architects in Washington (were) as either unable or unwilling to distinguish between healthy political debate about American foreign policies in the Middle East and ‘potential terrorists’ - that is, between lawful political discourse and actual threat” (Cainkar, 2009, p. 94).

Operation Boulder constituted one instance of targeting of Arabs pre-9/11 through explicit policies. Other examples pre-9/11 included initiatives to combat terrorism under the Reagan
administration, which involved “target(ing) Arabs in the U.S. for harassment and intimidation” (p. 7). Reagan’s campaign was built on foreign policies aimed at avenging attacks by Arab terrorists in Rome and Vienna through striking Libya. As a result of the Reagan’s campaign, Arab and Middle Eastern residents in the U.S. became targets of different acts of violence (Akram, 2002).

The Iran Crisis of 1980 also lead to policies that positioned Muslims as specific targets. As Cainkar (2006) writes, “the Iran Crisis of 1980 was specifically mentioned in the House Judiciary Committee report submitted for the 1981 law, thus connecting new geographically-based immigration policies to political Islam. Attorney General Ashcroft used the 1981 law to authorize call-in special registration” (p. 259). As this example suggests, immigration from certain countries was to be used as a proxy for guilt.

Under the leadership of President George H.W. Bush, Arabs also became targets of surveillance in the 1990’s during the first Gulf War. According to Akram (2002), during this time,

The FBI initiated a nationwide interrogation effort against Arab-American community leaders, activists and others, particularly harassing antiwar demonstrators. Additional policy measures put in place were nationwide fingerprinting of all residents and immigrants in the U.S. of Arab origin, and the institution of an FAA system of airline profile targeting individuals from the Arab world. Private harassment and violence against the Arab and Muslim communities was exacerbated by these government policies targeting the same communities. (p. 8)

As these two policies demonstrate, policies against Arabs were in effect prior to the attacks of 9/11, suggesting that even before 9/11 policies based on collective guilt were in place and affected members of this group. The previous section, though brief, provided examples of policies pre-9/11 that targeted Arabs as a means of understanding current policies through a historical lens.
The section above has detailed several policies of the War on Terror and the impacts that Muslims and Muslim Americans have faced in the face of government initiatives. The next section will briefly consider the policies as a form of backlash towards the Muslim community, focusing however on backlash as manifested through acts by the community, such as hate crimes.

**Backlash, Hate Crimes, and Other Consequences of the War on Terror**

The focus of this dissertation is on the impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Americans, thus both public policy and backlash from society need to be considered. Looking at the intersection between the two, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) developed a model of backlash that incorporates both societal and governmental reaction to some event or crisis. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr define backlash as “an excessive and adverse societal reaction to a political/ideological crisis against a group of groups” (p. 15). Those subject to backlash in a particular crisis are those who share an identity with the designated enemy of the state (Bakalian and Bozormehr, 2009). This backlash as defined above is manifest as acts of hatred and by society, and policies that target the particular group by the government. Connecting earlier literature related to the social construction of Muslims, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) also depict a place for stereotypes in the design of policy and reaction from society. Bakalian and Bozomehr (2009) propose a diagram (re-created below) that depicts the role of scapegoating in backlash from society and government policy. This model of backlash is shown on the following page and was specifically created to understand backlash in the context of “war or political/ideological crisis” (pg. 15).

Responding to a crisis, backlash from society comes in the form of hate crimes and bias incidents ranging in severity from intimidation to physical abuse, while the state responds by “singling out the targeted ethnic and/or religious group(s) within its borders for policed
“Scapegoating,” involves “hate crimes and government initiatives are mediated through deeply rooted prejudices and stereotypes” (Bakalian & Bozomehr, p. 16). Further, they state that “a feedback loop invariably reinforces the various forms of backlash, often resulting in renewed cycles of violence against the targeted ethnic or religious group(s)” (p. 17).

The model that the authors developed in the context of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans post 9/11 helps inform an analysis of the indirect and direct role that government policy has on the community and the ways that government action and societal responses to a target population operate both in tandem. This model also helps to provide a substantive way of understanding the broader impacts of the War on Terror through the use of negative social constructions as a mediating factor.
It is important to note that although the role of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination appear as a linear process above, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) focus their discussion on the backlash process as circular, thus no specific claims are made to suggest the process by which actions towards this group escalate, for example, from prejudice to discrimination to hate crimes. Other relevant literature, such as Merton’s (1976) typology of prejudice and discrimination, provides a theory of this relationship and includes categories of individuals based on whether they hold prejudicial beliefs and their desire/pressure to engage in acts of discrimination couched in the idea of the American creed. An important part of Merton’s (1976) typology concerns the role of pressure in forcing individuals to act in prejudiced ways or discriminate against others. The idea that such pressure exists comports with the social normative approach that suggests that individuals either accept or reject prejudice based on the cues they receive from their social group (see Crandall, et al., 2002, for a study verifying this theory).

Expressed another way and in particular reference to Muslim Americans among others, Ong (2002) suggests that the post 9/11 atmosphere has made certain values against groups such as Muslim Americans acceptable. Specifically, Ong (2002) writes that,

Whenever we go through a period of de-Americanization like what is currently happening to South Asians, Arabs, Muslim Americans, and people like Wen Ho Lee - a whole new generation of Americans see that exclusion and hate is acceptable; that the definition of who is an American can be narrow; that they too have the license to profile. Their license is issued when others around them engage in hate and the government chimes in with its own profiling. (p. 15).

These broader concepts related to stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination are important in terms of understanding the ways in which these attitudes/behaviors are formed, the circumstances that enable and perpetuate their existence, its impact on different target groups, in this case, Muslim Americans. The next section will focus on hate crimes as an egregious
manifestation of negative attitudes towards Muslim Americans.

Hate Crimes

"I pushed a Muslim off the train tracks because I hate Hindus and Muslims... Ever since 2001 when they put down the Twin Towers, I've been beating them up." (Santora, 2012)

This is what Erika Menendez said after pushing Sunando Sen off the train platform and to his death. Sen was not Muslim; however, numerous Muslims and those who appear to be Muslims (a function of racializing members of this group) have become increasingly subject to hate crimes post 9/11. Perry (2001) writes that a hate crime is “a mechanism of power and oppression involving acts of violence and intimidation against already stigmatized and marginalized groups, and intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize the given social order” (p.10). After 9/11, the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes increased significantly. The year 2001, as highlighted in the table on the following page, marked a dramatic spike in the number of hate crimes from pre 9/11 levels. Moreover, in the years that followed, the number of hate crimes documented has never returned back to pre-9/11 levels. Like government policies targeting or otherwise affecting Muslims, hate crimes towards members of this group has involved acts ranging from mosque vandalism to murder (Ibish, 2003). Hate crimes are especially problematic because of the messages inherent in the crimes. Mac Ginty (2001) writes that “all hate crime is political in the sense that it involves a statement that goes far beyond a particular act of violence or intimidation. It involves the identification of a target, the objectification of the targeted individual(s) and the depersonalization of the victim.

Often, hate crimes have a deliberately public aspect that is meant to convey a warning to a wider community” (p. 128). A Human Rights Watch Report (2002) post 9/11 also speaks to the seriousness of hate crimes and the implicit messages that such crimes convey.
Table 1. Hate Crimes Data 1996-2011 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidences</th>
<th>Offenses</th>
<th>Victims</th>
<th>Known Offenders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the report:

Hate crimes are a uniquely important and socially devastating kind of crime, however, that warrant enhanced public attention and action. What distinguishes a bias or hate crime from others is not the act itself - e.g. murder or assault - but the racial, ethnic, religious, gender or sexual orientation animus that propels its commission. While typically directed at a particular individual - often randomly chosen - hate crimes are motivated by anger toward an entire community distinguished by specific shared characteristics. While the bias that motivates a hate crime may be unusual in ferocity, it is rooted in a wider public climate of discrimination, fear, and intolerance against targeted communities, which may also be echoed in or enhanced by public policy… (pp. 5-6)

In their discussion on hate crimes, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) include a distinctly problematic aspect of hate crimes reporting by the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities. That is that both communities are often hesitant to report hate crimes because of the apparent targeting of these communities by different government initiatives. Thus, as Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) note, there is real fear that community members face in approaching government officials to report hate crime. In support of this point Bakalian and Bozorgmehr
(2009) also cite a study from Detroit that randomly sampled Arabs and Chaldeans, which among other findings revealed a fear of law enforcement and the FBI because of surveillance and mosque infiltration (Baker, et al., 2004). Thus, this community feared the very institutions that were supposed to protect them, compounding the impact of crimes on Muslim and Middle Eastern populations in the United States. Another important aspect of hate crimes pertaining to this community is the degree to which policies towards this group provide rationale for these types of crimes. Thus, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) write “while the state may not condone citizens’ vigilante actions, its own policies are likely to send a different message” (p. 15).

Poynting and Perry (2007) echo this sentiment in their study of the role of the state in the treatment of Muslims in Canada and Australia based on similar sets of anti-terrorism policies. To this end, they state that, “in declining adequately to recognize and to act against hate crime, and in actually modeling anti-Muslim bias by practicing discrimination and institutional racism through ‘ethnic targeting,’ ‘racial profiling,’ and the like, the state conveys a sort of ideological license to individuals, groups and institutions to perpetrate and perpetuate racial hatred” (p. 167).

Lori Peek (2011) also contributes to documenting backlash directed at Muslims. Through interviews with Muslim Americans, she uncovers a range of ways that members of this group have experienced backlash. Her assessment of the backlash faced by this group ranges from verbal harassment and intimidation to employment discrimination, housing discrimination, and racial profiling. Other Muslims reported being the victims of violent confrontation, with one study participant sharing the following anecdote:

I remember my best friend came home. She was waiting for the bus to come and drop off her daughter. On the opposite side of the street, there was another bus. He [the bus driver] stopped the bus, came across the street, spit in her face, and told her to go back to her country. She told her husband she wants to go back home [to Syria]. Now she’s going back in three weeks. It’s hard for her...but she can’t stay here. She says, ‘I can’t
stay in a country where they don’t want me. He came and spit in my face and they don’t want me here. I can’t do it.’ (p. 41)

Hate crimes as outlined above, are important in terms of fully understanding the impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Americans. Though hate crimes as experienced by Muslim Americans are inherently problematic, the larger impact of hate crimes relates to the extent to which they diminish this groups’ cultural citizenship, manifested in inclusion and belonging. In further developing the degree to which Muslim Americans feel inclusion and belonging, the next section will consider opinion polls on Muslims and Muslim Americans since the attacks of 9/11, not limited to levels of favorability towards members of this group and support for rights restrictions.

“Virtual Internment”

Examining the impacts of the War on Terror on Muslim Americans necessitates a deeper look into how consequences have manifested themselves. The section above spoke to the rationale for disproportionate policy measures towards Muslims and Muslim Americans, and this section will consider a more subtle impact, that of self-restrictive behaviors in fear of government actions.

Scholars such as Hatem Bazian (2004) have explored less visible impacts of the War on Terror policies. Bazian (2004) also makes an effort to review these impacts in the context of historical national security policies in the United States, such as those that affected the Japanese after the Pearl Harbor bombings. Acknowledging differences in how both groups have been targeted, Bazian (2004) introduces the concept of virtual internment for application to Muslims and Arabs. According to Bazian (2004), virtual internment “can be best defined as a quasi-visible but repressive, intimidating and confining structure employed by the U.S. administration and its allies on a global scale against individuals, communities, and organizations deemed unsupportive
and possibly hostile, in their worldview toward American and ‘global’ interests” (p. 5). Bazian (2004) further elaborates on the use of the virtual, saying that the structures of repression remain largely invisible and are thus hard to document. In contrast to the confinement of the Japanese, German, and Italians during World War II, Bazian (2004) argues that “virtual internment” extends to a much broader group including not only Muslims and Arabs, but anyone who supports their cause, being held collectively responsible while at the same time being positioned to indicate one’s loyalty by working against one’s own group.

To illustrate the impact of the nebulous connections of terrorism that have been made throughout the War on Terror, Bazian (2004) cites two cases. The first case involved the co-founder of a Muslim charity, named Rabih-Haddad. Haddad was deported to Lebanon and interrogated upon arrival. Charges of connections to Al-Qaeda were levied against Haddad, but neither he nor the organization he co-founded was actually charged, and Haddad’s deportation was then carried out because of a visa violation. Aside from cases in which abuses can clearly be observed, Bazian (2004) writes that “virtual internment as a mental process is even more damaging than the straightforward modes expressed earlier because it involves a larger segment of the population and also goes unnoticed and unaccounted for by the victims themselves and society at large” (p.17). Bazian (2004) asserts that “the message in Virtual Internment is clear - you are not a full American; you are an American on probation and you must demonstrate your loyalty by cooperating with government agencies at their own discretion” (p. 26).

Naber (2006) articulates an idea similar to Bazian’s (2004) notion of virtual internment. Writing about the consequences of the post 9/11 policies and the societal backlash, Naber (2006) uses the term “internment of the psyche” to describe the process by which Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims are positioned into “mechanisms of exclusion” (p. 254). Further, describing
internment of the psyche, Naber (2006) likens it to Foucault’s notion of “panopticism,” writing that internment of the psyche, “refers to the covert and unspoken medium that linked sociopolitical institutions and the individual psyche together ‘making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements.’” “Internment of the psyche” therefore, according to Naber (2006), is the idea of constantly being under the radar and that “one is totally seen without ever seeing,” (Foucault, 1972, p. 202). In this case it is the fear relating to the possibility of being targeted and the constant anxiety by potential to suffer real consequences for imagined offenses. In her interviews with Arabs and Muslims, Naber discovered a host of consequences that they faced, whether by being directly targeted or through preemptive changes to their lives, such as moving out of the United States.

The concepts that Bazian (2004) and Naber (2006) introduce are important to understanding the broader based consequences of the War on Terror. With both authors, the consequences of the War involve not only tangible consequences such as deportation and arrest, but a larger sense and fear of impending hostility.

**Opinion Polls on Muslims**

Post 9/11, an increasing number of opinion polls on Muslims and Muslim Americans has emerged. With a focus on polls originating domestically from the United States, these polls have addressed a range of attitudes towards Muslims and Muslim Americans, including general levels of favorability in addition to the assessment of the threat of radicalization in the Muslim American community. While often using smaller sample sizes, these polls have often revealed alarming trends in terms of attitudes towards this community. This is important to address, especially when policy makers rely on these attitudes to determine how problems are framed and what sort of policies may be utilized to address the problem.
This section will review, in chronological order, opinion polls concerning Muslims and Muslim Americans during the twelve-year period between September 2001 and September 2013. The polls cited here were acquired through the Polling the Nations Database using the search terms Muslims and Muslim Americans and restricting the results to the United States as the origin of the poll. The selection of specific polls was made on the basis of questions relating to the theoretical framework, which includes approval for rights restrictions and other specific policy tools, such as special screening for members of this group.

Polls immediately after 9/11, as shown above, demonstrate widespread public support for certain measures aimed at restricting the rights of Muslims and Arabs. Shortly after 9/11, Sobel (2001) produced an op-ed piece expressing concern about American citizen and government favorability/desire to restrict the rights of this group collectively. Summarizing the state of public opinion following the 9/11 attacks, Sobel (2001) wrote that:

Most of the public is prepared to endure long waits, searches and identification checks at airports, public buildings and events - 68 percent support letting the police randomly stop people who might fit a terrorist profile [emphasis added]. But only 23 percent have said that they favor random ID checks on streets and highways and slightly more than half oppose monitoring calls and e-mail. Half support the right to protest the military action, though an unequal group expects people to “rally” around country.

The majorities would, however, more carefully scrutinize Arabs and Arab Americans including “more intensive security checks” of Arab passengers on airplanes. As many as one-third feel Arab Americans should be put under special surveillance. Nearly half approve having Arab-Americans carry special ID cards, and 29 percent even approve internment camps for suspect groups [emphasis added]. (Sobel, as cited in Cainkar, 2009, pp. 68-69).

Strong support for restrictive measures towards this group, according to Cainkar (2009), backs the idea that Americans widely believed that Muslims and Arabs should be held collectively responsible for the terrorist attacks - a belief manifested in the rise in hate crimes and aggressive government policy towards Muslims.
Ample literature exists regarding the relationship between public opinion and public policy. For example, Burstein (2003) concludes that public opinion greatly impacts public policy writing, while Manza and Cook (2002) find conflicting evidence on the degree to which public opinion affects public policy. Approaching the relationship between public opinion and policy in the opposite direction, Page and Shapiro (1983) suggest that “policies and politicians and policies themselves affect public opinion” (p. 175). Others, such as Monroe (1979), have focused on and explored a general relationship indicative of congruence between public opinion and federal policy.

Much of the research studying the relationship between public opinion and public policy, such as those above, point to a direction in terms of causality. Where the direction of the relationship is based on congruence of public opinion and public policy, Page and Shapiro (1983) caution that “the mere observation of congruence between opinion and policy tells us little, of course, about which causes which. Congruence could indicate that there is democratic responsiveness: that changes in public preferences cause changes in policy. But it might instead result from policy affecting opinion” (p. 185). Though the literature on the relationship between public opinion and public policy is far from conclusive, in the context of this research opinion polls are included to a) to demonstrate support for policies that have served to restrict the rights of Muslims and/or Muslim Americans, b) to demonstrate the introduction/perpetuation of specific narratives about Muslims, and c) to demonstrate how the polls construct certain issues surrounding Muslims.

Opinion Polls: Favorability of Muslims and Characteristics Associated with Muslims and Arabs in the United States

Numerous sources have conducted opinion polls on Muslims and Muslim Americans in the decade following 9/11. Many of these polls have asked participants to comment on their
levels of favorability towards Muslims. While levels of favorability range over the years, a sizeable minority, or at least 20% of the poll respondents, report having unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims, regardless of the specific question asked and the source of the poll (see Appendix). In some cases, the percentage was much higher. For example, the American Arab Institute/Zogby International (2010) conducted an online poll asking about favorability towards Muslim Americans. Those responding mostly unfavorable and very unfavorable combined amounted to 55% of the sample’s poll of 2,100 people (Polling the Nations, 2013).

Beyond general levels of favorability, different opinion polls have examined the presences of certain feelings towards Muslims and whether they are believed to hold certain traits/embody positive/negative attributes. For example, a telephone survey by Fox News in 2002 asked whether interviewees were more likely to feel sympathy or fear of Muslims, and an astounding 63% said fear. In a later opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center (2006), participants were asked about whether or not they believe Muslims to be tolerant. Fifty eight percent of those sampled said they did not associate the characteristic of tolerance with Muslims (Polling the Nations, 2013). Asked a similar question, replacing tolerance with fanaticism, 43% said they associated fanaticism with Muslims (Polling the Nations, 2013).

Other opinion polls conducted on Arab Americans, who compose part of the Muslim American population, also show negative attitudes towards this group. For instance, the Program on International Policy Attitudes asked whether violent extremism was more prevalent among Arabs, and 59% responded that they believed more extremists came out of Arab culture. A CBS News/New York Times Poll (2001) asked participants whether they felt more distrust towards Arabs after the 9/11 attacks, and 28% responded that they thought of Arabs as less trustworthy (Polling the Nations, 2013).
Opinion Polls: On the Responsibility of Muslims

Several polls from various sources asked questions related to the responsibility of Muslims in defeating terrorism. For example, in 2002 Fox News asked a question about whether Muslims were obligated to assist in the search for Bin Laden, with the results indicating a 60% level of agreement with this statement (Polling the Nations, 2013). A year earlier, Newsweek conducted a poll that asked respondents whether they believed Muslim leaders in the United States had done enough to condemn terrorism. Forty percent of the sample reported their belief that these leaders had failed (Polling the Nations, 2013).

In April 2002, the Fox Broadcasting Company conducted a poll which asked participants to indicate whether Muslim Americans were assisting U.S. authorities in the search for terrorist cells in the U.S., to which 44% responded no (Polling the Nations, 2013). Other polls conducted by organizations such as the Public Religion Institute, which asked about Muslim American efforts to oppose extremism, show that nearly 50% of those surveyed believe that members of this group have not done enough (Polling the Nations, 2013). The Appendix includes several other questions related to the responsibility of Muslims and Muslim Americans in combatting extremism and terrorism. An important point worth mentioning though in this regard is that these questions in themselves suggest that the oneness should be on this community to challenge acts of violence by policing their own community, a responsibility that other groups are not given following the attacks of a perpetrator with their shared identity. This is not to suggest that Muslim Americans should avoid reporting suspicious activity to U.S. authorities, but instead suggests a critical look at the degree of responsibility that is shifted onto members of the group instead of law enforcement.
Opinion Polls: Patriotism

During this same time period, several questions about Muslim Americans pertained to patriotism. In a question from 2013 asked by Economist/YouGov, survey participants were asked to respond to a question about Muslim American levels of patriotism. Five percent responded that they were more patriotic than other Americans, 51% responded that they were about as patriotic, and 44% responded that they were less patriotic (Polling the Nations, 2013). Approaching patriotism from a slightly different angle, during the twelve year time period in which I conducted my search, Harris Poll (2001) asked via telephone survey whether they thought American Muslims were more sympathetic towards the United States or the terrorists. Only 13% of the sample believed that American Muslims sympathized with the attackers (Polling the Nations, 2013). The view on Arab Americans, however, from a telephone survey conducted by the New York Times was more dismal, with 26% of survey participants reporting that they thought this group was more sympathetic to terrorists than their American counterparts (Polling the Nations, 2013).

Opinion Polls: Rights Preservation and Restrictions

Soon after the 9/11 attacks, questions emerged about special measures towards Arabs. For example, a Gallup Poll in October 2001 asked participants whether they were in favor of having Arabs carry special IDs, and 49% responded that they were in favor (Polling the Nations, 2013). In another opinion poll put out by Newsweek in December 2001, 30% of sample participants in a telephone survey responded that they would be in favor of increasing surveillance of Arabs and Arab Americans similar to what was done to the Japanese (Polling the Nations, 2013).

Searches on Polling the Nations were also conducted for specific events, such as the
Boston Bombings and the Fort Hood Shootings, to gauge perspectives on rights preservations for Muslim perpetrators. One interesting digression in the case of the Boston Bombing is a question posed by Fox Broadcasting Company (2013). They surveyed 619 people via phone and asked whether they thought the bombings were an act of Islamic terrorists or homegrown terrorists. This survey was conducted a mere two days after the bombing, yet Fox News, which has a viewership of over 1 million people, only gave the survey participants these two options in terms of determining responsibility. Other questions regarding rights for Dzokhar, such as questions about being tried in criminal or military court, were asked and a majority of respondents in an Economist/YouGov (2013) study (69%) believed that he should be tried in a criminal court. Asked about being read Miranda rights, 64% of survey participants from the same poll responded yes while 36% responded no (Polling the Nations, 2013). While these numbers may not seem especially dismal, it is important to refer back to the observation that such questions are being posed in public discourse by virtue of the perpetrator being Muslim.

Another perpetrated by a Muslim, the Fort Hood Shootings, were also put up for public debate via opinion polls. A large majority of survey participants in an IPOBE/Zogby (2011) study (75%) supported the death penalty for Nidal Hassan if found guilty (Polling the Nations, 2013). Another question posed by Fox Broadcasting Company (2009) asked survey participants to indicate whether they thought the Fort Hood Shooting was a killing spree or an act of terrorism. Forty four percent responded that they believe the act to be terrorism, a sizable percentage of the total sample (Polling the Nations, 2013). Again in analyzing this question it is important to examine why acts of Muslim perpetrators are highlighted in the public sphere and how this constructs and helps to construct the image of Muslims as terrorists.
Opinion Polls: On the Right to Build Mosques

In 2010, controversy surrounding the building of a mosque near Ground Zero became very heated. As discussed in a later section, Pamela Gellar, President of the American Freedom Defense Initiative and an anti-Islam critic, was at the forefront of the challenge to building the mosque. During the period of time surrounding the controversy, opinion poll after opinion poll revealed public angst over the building of the mosque. Even when those surveyed believe that Muslims had the right to build the mosque, they still indicated that they thought it was wrong. Another opinion poll that appeared during that time was conducted by CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll (2010) and asked 1,000 people via phone survey whether they favored or opposed the building of the mosque. Sixty eight percent of respondents opposed it (Polling the Nations, 2013).

Public opinion on Muslims, Arabs, Arab Americans, and Muslim Americans has varied over the years. Throughout the twelve year period assessed in this study, the levels of favorability towards members of these groups did not approach the level of favorability towards other groups such as Christians and Jews (see Appendix B). While the argument could be made that this is simply a function of the mass scale of the 9/11 attacks and the fact that Muslims were involved, negative attitudes towards Muslim Americans in particular reveal the logic of collective responsibility as an underlying sentiment, especially as none of the 9/11 attackers held American citizenship. More problematic than levels of favorability alone are opinion polls that demonstrate support for restricting the rights of Muslims. The section below will examine the research on the relationship between public opinion and public policy as a means of supplementing the rationale for including opinion polls in the evaluation of the impacts of the War on Terror on Muslims.
The Importance of Opinion Polls

There are several reasons why opinion polls are of great importance in the context of this research, such as understanding the extent to which negative attitudes towards this group predict support for policies. Sides and Gross (2013), for example, conducted a study to determine the predictive nature of negative opinions about Muslims and support for the War on Terror. Using data from the ANES, Sides and Gross (2013) demonstrate through their analysis that “perceptions of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy are a key ingredient in support for several aspects of the War on Terror” (p. 596). They write further that, “however normatively problematic is citizens’ use of stereotypes, they nevertheless use them in nuanced ways: stereotypes matter most when the group is clearly implicated and the stereotype dimension corresponds to the policy in question” (p. 596). Sides and Gross’ work thus helps situate the importance of stereotypes and negative attitudes towards a group and support for policies that can build support based on the conceptualization of a group in a particular way.

A core theoretical underpinning in examining this question comes from the work of Converse (1964), who suggested that making political decisions relies on what he refers to as “linking information.” According to Converse, in order to use ideas about a group in the process of making decisions, individuals simply need to be “endowed with some cognitions of the group and interstitial ‘linking information’ indicating why a given party of policy is relevant to the group” (p. 237). Converse (1964) also notes that in the case of some groups, “the cues presented to citizens concerning links between the group and party or policy is so gross that they penetrate rapidly even to the less informed” (p. 238). In the case of Muslims and Muslim Americans, policy alternatives throughout the War on Terror have often succeeded in providing “linking information,” that ties the nature of Muslims to the need for certain policies. Examples of this can be found specifically in questions included above that ask survey participants about whether
or not they are in favor of curbing rights for Muslim and/or Arabs.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to provide background on several policies of the War on Terror, with a focus on those that have disproportionately affected Muslims and Muslim Americans. A section on policies targeting members of this group pre-9/11 was also included in order to demonstrate that 9/11 did not, in fact, mark the first time that policies collectively targeted this group. Further, this section served as a means of historically situating post 9/11 policies.

The consequences of the War on Terror in the form of backlash and hate crimes was also discussed in order to fully understand how the War on Terror has affected Muslims and Muslim Americans. The last piece of this chapter dealt with public opinions concerning Muslims and Muslim Americans, while also considering the relationship between public opinion and public policy.

With the overall goals of this study in mind, this chapter served to demonstrate how negative social constructions of Muslims and Muslim Americans have been embedded in policy design and implementation, while also examining some of the broader effects of the policies in terms of hate crimes.

In order to further understand negative conceptions of Muslims and Muslim Americans, the next chapter will examine how the War on Terror has been framed and the ways in which members of this group have been negatively socially constructed.
CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS AND FRAMING THE WAR ON TERROR

Social Constructions of Islam & Muslims: Politicians, Academics, and Moral Entrepreneurs

Discourse and Social Construction

The most striking recent example is the manipulation of US and world opinion about terrorism after 9/11, in which very emotional and strongly opinionated mental models held by citizens about this event were generalized to more general, shared fears, attitudes and ideologies about terrorism and related issues. This is also a genuine example of massive manipulation because the resulting social representations are not in the best interests of the citizens when such attitudes are being manipulated in order to dramatically raise military spending, legitimate military intervention and pass legislation that imposes severe restrictions on civil rights and freedoms (such as the Patriot Act). Manipulation in this case is an abuse of power because citizens are manipulated into believing that such measures are taken in order to protect them. (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 370)

…manipulation is illegitimate in a democratic society, because it (re)produces, or may reproduce, inequality. (Van Dijk, 2006, pp. 363-364)

Teun Van Dijk is a scholar who has contributed greatly to the field of discourse analysis. As the two quotes above demonstrate, Van Dijk (2006) focuses on elite uses of discourse to sustain power and create inequality. Though this dissertation does not delve into critical discourse analysis as a methodology, this section considers social construction of Muslims in terms of content and the processes through which these constructions are made.

In constructing the image of the Muslim enemy, one particularly salient method involves Van Dijk’s (1998) concept of the “ideological square.” Van Dijk defines the ideological square as a discursive strategy aimed at creating an us and them dichotomy. The process of creating these polarized identities, according to Van Dijk (2006), involves placing emphasis on “our” goodness and “their” evil, while minimizing anything negative about us and anything positive about them. Paraphrasing Van Dijk’s idea of the ideological square, Kuo & Nakamara (2005) argue that this process of creating group distinctions involves “emphasizing our good
properties/actions; emphasizing their bad properties/actions, mitigating our bad properties/actions; and mitigating their good properties/actions” (p. 410). As the section below will demonstrate, much of the rhetoric around Muslims and Muslim Americans falls neatly into the ideological square paradigm. The use of this paradigm is important in creating the image of Muslims and Muslim Americans as enemy others as a means of justifying differential treatment.

Another process through which the enemy image of Muslims is constructed comes from Merskin’s (2004) application of Spillman and Spillman’s (1997) work on stereotypes to illustrate. The process of creating an enemy, according Spillman and Spillman (1997), involves a series of five steps. The first step involves contextualizing the “enemy’s” behavior, whether past or present, as motivated by destruction of the one’s own group. The second step involves holding the enemy culpable for any problems that the in group is experiencing. Third, the process involves pitting the enemy’s values against the values of the in group. The fourth step in the process involves “‘zero-sum thinking’, whereby what is good for the enemy is bad for us, and vice versa” (Merksin, 2004, p. 374). The last step involves collective guilt, which extends the label of enemy to anyone who belongs to the enemy group. In illustrating how this process relates to political rhetoric, in particular that of former President Bush, Merskin (2004) includes several quotes from him by way of analysis. For example, she quotes Bush as saying:

We’re a nation that can’t be cowed by evildoers… We will rid the world of evildoers… There are evil people in this world… Evil folks still lurk out there, never did anybody’s thought process [sic] about how to protect America did we think that the evildoers, would fly not one, but four commercial aircraft into precious U.S. targets. That’s why I say to the American people we’ve never seen this kind of evil before. But the evildoers have never seen the American people in action, before, either - and they are about to find out. (p. 377)

Similar to other comments made by former President Bush, the concept of evil is utilized as a way of situating others in direct opposition to America’s inherent goodness. Further, his
statement emphasizes the brutality of these “evil” people, thus providing a preemptive excuse to violating the rights of others in actions taken by the United States.

Similar to the ideological square, the method that Merskin (2004) uses further highlights how these polarizing narratives are created, using terms pitting their evil against our goodness. This strategy therefore involves the sanctioning of certain punitive measures against Muslims, while simultaneously reinforcing the notion of American exceptionalism, which would preclude the possibility of the U.S. engaging in any wrongdoing in response.

Needing an Enemy

While the literature speaks to some of the ways in which the enemy images are created, the section below will consider the role that these images play during crisis and wars. Said (1978), for example, talks in general terms about the role enemy creation in policy. Said (1978) states that:

Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of “other” is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies. It should be obvious that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the legitimizations of violence…the direction of foreign policy which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. (p. 332)

Thus, according to Said (1978), the creation of the enemy serves a discrete function; that is to sanction and provide rationale for different measures that the state takes. In a similar light, Steuter and Wills (2011) assert that, “prevalent, latent, or even dormant stereotypes may be resurrected by governments for martial and propagandistic purposes, legitimated by news media, adopted by the general populace, and reinstigated by cultural producers through new forms of expression that repeatedly circulate old images” (pp. 258-259).
This process, according to Steuter and Wills (2011), has negative implications which help account for the persistence of certain images of Arabs, Arab-Americans, and Muslims, whether by the government or the media. Further, these negative social constructions of Muslims have emerged and become solidified through an extensive otherization process that posits Muslims at odds with Western values. More broadly, however, constructing Muslims as the enemy exists in a socio-political space where the construction of the enemy exists to assert one’s own uniqueness and superiority and subsequently to provide the state with justification for taking certain restrictive measures.

Stressing this point further, Frank and Melville (1988) write that, “the hysteria about the outer threat is often used as justification for secrecy and suspicion, covert actions, policies creating ‘mobilized’ societies, artificial national unity, ‘witch hunts,’ and policies expressing dissent” (p. 6). The thesis that conflict between Islam and the West is inevitable has, according to Steuter and Wills (2011), been perpetuated by religious and political officials alike and operate with “the assumption that the enemy is homogenous and indistinguishable, united in being ‘like’ each other just as they are united in being ‘unlike’ us” (p. 263). Thus, creating an enemy identity for Muslims has involved not only tropes about existential clashes, but also the use of language aimed at dehumanizing these individuals. As an example, Steuter and Wills (2011) point to some of the language used in the terrorism discourse, such as “hunt,” in terms of hunting the enemy as an example of language that has been used to demean Muslims in the context of counter-terrorism operations.

The problem in the use of such imagery and language, as they assert, is that “these representations are more than merely rhetorical, setting the stage for racist backlash, prisoner abuses, and even genocide” (p. 262). More poignantly, they write in regards to dehumanizing
the Muslim enemy that they come to be seen as a collective entity that exists without
distinguishable traits. They liken this process to that of an exterminator, writing that “just as an
exterminator does not distinguish between individual insects or vermin, so American response to
the constructed enemy does not distinguish between individual agents or individual subjects”
(Steuter & Wills, 2011, p. 263). The idea of infestation and infiltration has also emerged in the
discourse surrounding Muslims and Arabs. In this regard, Steuter and Wills (2011) argue that
the trope of infiltration is manifested through the sleeper cell narrative, whereby terrorists
operate discretely until they are “activated” (p. 64). As an example of this, Steuter and Wills
(2011) refer to a bus ad referenced by Malek (2001), which appeared shortly after 9/11 with an
image of an Arab man and the caption “Worry about your new neighbors, not about your loan”
(p. 264). The analysis of the language used to dehumanize Muslims is important, as mentioned
earlier, in as much as this dehumanization justifies negative treatment of this group. Further,
these images justify the use of extremely punitive measures for sole use on Muslims and Muslim
Americans.

Choudhury (2013) also contributes to the discussion on the creation of the enemy in the
War on Terror. Choudhury (2013) situates the enemy Muslim in the history of the United States,
where other groups have been ousted, saying that the “the Muslim-as-terrorist-fifth column”
shares in this legacy. The role of characterizing Muslims as the enemy serves to justify negative
treatment, such as rendition and torture. Similarly, and as Young (1999) writes, “the
demonization process taken to its extreme allows the perpetuation of atrocities…it permits
behavior against others quite outside what is considered normal civilized behavior” (p. 112).

This rhetoric of stealth Muslims and the “sharia creep,” which form parts of the enemy
narrative, has become increasingly problematic as Choudhury (2013) asserts because it has
become an acceptable part of political discourse, much of which is used to impact the creation of laws. Another impact of identifying the “enemy” in such narrow terms (i.e. Muslim) is an issue of security. Focusing solely on this enemy excludes the possibility of identifying other very present threats, such as the Norway shootings (Choudhury, 2013). Thus, the use of rhetoric regarding the Muslim enemy encapsulates the entire population and serves the purpose of legitimizing negative treatment of this group. As the policy section later in this study will demonstrate, Muslims and Muslim Americans have indeed been subject to collective punishment and the use of tools that are applied exclusively to members of this group.

The narrative that positions Muslims as enemy others also has consequences in positioning this community as outsiders. Specifically, this rhetoric excludes Muslims and Muslim Americans from the moral community of the United States. According to Optow (1990), “moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently harming them appears acceptable, appropriate or just” (p. 1). Understanding this rhetoric and the role it plays in situating this community outside of certain moral boundaries in assessing the extent to which mistreatment of Muslims and Muslim Americans will be tolerated.

Coryn and Borshuk (2006) specifically tested this theory of moral exclusion towards Muslim Americans by providing a stimulus about a Muslim family to 47 study participants to gauge whether or not they perceived the family to be in their moral community and reasons for inclusion and exclusion. Participants in the study did not unanimously exclude the family from their moral community, but those who did relied on issues of national security to justify exclusion of this group. Further, the study researchers conclude that “the prevalence of threat
and revenge discourse, among the narratives of participants who excluded the stimulus family from their scope of justice, supports previous findings from the inter-group relations literature, in that an ill-defined out-group was characterized in a negatively stereotypical manner that represented real or symbolic threats to the in-group” (p. 598). This study provides evidence that the rhetoric surrounding Muslims has a tangible impact on how members of society view this group and whether or not they will sanction certain treatment of group members as a function of their inclusion or exclusion from the moral community of the in-group.

This section above looked at how enemy images are created dialectically and the function of this enemy image in justifying policies of the state. Using Van Dijk’s (1996) concept of the ideological square and Merskin’s (2004) use of the Spellman and Spellman (1997) framework suggests different ways that enemy images are created, in part, by the use of polarizing language. Moving from the method by which enemies are created to the purpose of enemy creation, Said (1978), Steuter and Wills (2004), and Choudhury (2013) all converge on the point that the function of enemy creation is to legitimize specific policy alternatives that would not be possible without such images in place. The next section will build on the idea of an enemy image to demonstrate specific constructions of Islam and Muslims that have emerged in this vein.

The Arab and Muslim Threat Pre-9/11

The discourse around Arabs and Muslims, particularly that which seeks to explain post 9/11 tropes, is often guilty of suggesting that such images emerged only after 9/11. However, numerous scholars have written extensively on the construction of Arabs, later applied to Muslims, as a function of ongoing events in the Middle East throughout the 20th century. Among the events that shaped images of the Arabs in the United States was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. On the Arab-Israeli war, Cainkar (2009) notes that the changing status of Arab
Americans was due to the support that America extended to Israel. This changing status was also shaped by American media, which “according to Arab Americans, almost unanimously celebrated Israel’s conquest, relying on tropes that denigrated Arabs to do so” (p. 84). Akram (2002) also comments on the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in negative images of Arabs and Muslims, saying that, “the Arab-Israeli conflict is a consistent thread in the stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims as ‘terrorists’ in the United States since at least the 1970’s” (p. 2).

Lipset and Schneider, writing in 1977, describe how Arabs were negatively perceived even then. They maintained that, “if large numbers of Americans feel warmly toward Israel, there is some evidence to suggest that a significant minority has negative, close to racist attitudes towards Arabs” (p. 22). In putting forward this assertion, Lipset and Schneider reference a 1975 survey by Pat Cadell’s Cambridge organization. According to Lipset and Schneider (1977), “nearly half or more said that the terms ‘greedy,’ ‘arrogant,’ and ‘barbaric,’ apply to the Arabs; relatively few described the Arabs as ‘peaceful,’ ‘honest,’ as ‘friendly,’ or as ‘like Americans,’ while a majority used these terms to describe the Israelis” (p. 22).

While the 1967 Arab-Israeli lead to the construction of certain images of Arabs, so too do immigration policies that prioritized refugees from communist countries. According to Cainkar (2009),

The idea behind this particular refugee policy was that the communist enemy was an ideology and form of political rule from which people could be, and should be, saved. But because Arabs were increasingly represented as a people who were dangerous (as opposed to an ideology), there was little space to develop popular compassion for them, including those who were refugees. How can an Arab flee his or her own essence? If communism was the Cold War enemy of the United States, Arabness was portrayed as the enemy of American interests in the Middle East. (p. 85)

The Gulf War was another event that further entrenched certain notions of Arabs. Abraham (1994) argued that hate crimes directed at Arabs were a function of government rhetoric and the
presence of negative images.

On Constructing Islam and Muslims as an Ideological Threat

The section above spoke to a range of ways that negative constructions of Muslims are created and the purpose they serve. This section will elaborate specifically on different writings that have played a significant role in shaping the discourse around Muslims. Several works have positioned the threat of Islam and Muslims in the forefront of the American psyche. For example, Qureshi and Sells (2003) make the observation that depictions of the relationship between the West and Islam have been continuously defined as an unavoidable and existential struggle. Samuel Huntington is one of the foremost scholars that has served to advance such claims. For example, his *Clash of Civilizations* thesis (1996) posits Islam as a religion and Muslims as a monolithic entity inherently opposed to the Western civilization. Beyond this inherent opposition, Huntington argues that Islam is fundamentally and ideologically incompatible with other civilizations. This thesis has served to, among other works, crystalize Islam and Muslims as being in an ongoing ideological battle with the West, while simultaneously minimizing the West’s involvement in many countries across the Muslim world. According to Huntington (1997), “Islam's borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (p. 258). In articulating this position, Huntington positions the entire faith and people who follow it as problematic, further serving to solidify the idea of the Muslim threat. Despite the fact that the arguments posed by Huntington have largely been refuted, Dunn (2006-2007) asserts that this narrative has been used directly in shaping the discourse of the War on Terror. He argues that this rhetoric has been used by policy makers and includes a quote from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who stated that, “if one looks down from outer space on earth, you
find a handful of countries that generally like thinking, and they tend to be Western Europe and North America. They have freer economic systems, and tend not to be covet the land or property or other nations” (p. 2).

 Numerous others have sought to further highlight the threat that Islam and Muslims pose to the West. This includes, for example, works by author Bernard Lewis. Lewis is famous for his book titled *What Went Wrong* (2002) and an article titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (1990). In these two works, Lewis makes a strong attempt to absolve the arguments the Western world of any wrongdoing in Muslim countries in order to establish his assertion that Muslims have irreconcilable and inexplicable anger. This characterization of Muslims also provides cause for neglecting to analyze legitimate sources of anger that Muslims may exhibit towards the West.

 Referencing Huntington’s work, Said (1981) asserts that embedded in Lewis’ claim is the idea that “Muslims today react only because it is historically, and perhaps genetically, determined that they should do so; what they react to are not policies or actions, or anything mundane as that. What they are fighting on behalf of is an irrational hatred of the secular present” (p. xxxiii). The ideas of both Huntington and Lewis have been vastly influential in many cases, permeating the policy sphere. Sheehi (2011), for example, documents instances in which former Vice President Cheney publicly gave Lewis credit for influencing his ideas on policy. Dunn (2006-2007) argues that Lewis’ opinions have been influential in politics. To illustrate this point, Dunn (2006-2007) quotes Paul Bremer, a previous member on the Homeland Security Task Force, who stated that, “there’s no point in addressing the so-called root causes of bin Laden’s despair with us. We are the root causes of his terrorism. He doesn’t like America. He doesn’t like our society. He doesn’t like what we stand for. He doesn’t like our values. And short of the United States going out of existence, there’s no way to deal with the root cause of his
terrorism” (Bremer as cited in Dunn, 2006-2007, pp. 3-4). In this vein, Bremer’s statement embodies Lewis’ argument of inherent anger towards Western values, with Bremer also absolving the West of any wrongdoing.

Another strand in the construction of the Muslim threat is the idea of Muslims as predisposed to terrorism. Further, this discourse often suggests that Muslims are motivated to conduct acts of terror because they want to spread Islam and implement Sharia around the world. For example, James Arlandson argues in reference to Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri that:

The ultimate goal of Islam is to spread the message and ways of Allah around the world because Islam is the gift of God, the greatest seal and capstone of inferior Judaism and Christianity. How is this goal best manifested and carried out? In following the Qur’an and sharia (Islamic law), which expresses God’s will and ways in a pristine form. Ultimately, violent and non-violent radicals want religious world domination. (Arlandson as cited in Halverson, Furlow, & Corman, 2012, p. 9).

The construction of Muslims as violent relies on extremist rhetoric where the Qur’an is often quoted. Though this narrative of Muslims has continuously been perpetuated, there has been little examination of the degree to which the extremist rhetoric actually supports a call for global Islam. A study undertaken by Halverson, Furlow, and Corman (2012) analyzed over 2,000 extremist texts during a 13 year period from 1998-2011. In their analysis, they focus on determining which Quranic verses are used, the distribution of the use of different verses, and the time during which the verses were revealed. Through their analysis, they conclude that by and large the verses used in extremist rhetoric speak to victimhood. To this end, they write that the “verses extremists cite from the Qur’an do not suggest an aggressive offensive foe seeking domination and conquest of unbelievers, as is commonly assumed. Instead they deal with themes of victimization, dishonor, and retribution. This shows close integration with the rhetorical vision of Islamist extremists,” (p. 2). The authors also reveal based on their analysis
that the verse of the sword 9:5, which is said to condone battles with non-believers, is virtually absent in extremist literature despite popular perceptions. This counter-narrative with a factual analysis is important to dispelling ideas that Muslim extremists are interested in spreading Sharia around the world. This counter-narrative has implications for Muslim Americans as they are often held collectively responsible for the acts of other Muslims and are thus assumed to hold the same or similar viewpoints; an idea which has, in many ways, lead to them being the recipients of unequal justice.

Muslims as Racialized Others

The idea of Muslims as enemy others who pose a threat to the United States has played a dominant role in the construction of this group. In addition to the construction of Muslims as enemy others, they have also been constructed as racialized others. This particular construction of Muslims helps to codify this religious identity and position members of this group in the racial hierarchy of the United States.

Louise Cainkar is a scholar who writes extensively about Muslims and Arabs in terms of post 9/11 policy impacts and the process and rationale for racializing Muslims. In 2009, she published a book called Homeland Insecurity: The Arab and Muslim American Experience Post 9/11. Cainkar’s (2009) book includes a chapter on the social construction of Arab and Muslim Americans, and she asserts that negative social constructions of Muslims and Arabs existed long before 9/11 and that that these images (including Muslims and Arabs as violent, inclined to commit acts of terrorism, and hateful towards America) provided rationale for the mistreatment of these groups after the attacks on the World Trade Center (p. 64). Accordingly, Cainkar (2009) states that “the crisis of 9/11 crystallized preexisting sentiments such that the host of negative traits imputed to Arabs and Muslims in the United States assumed master status…” This master
status was associated with a set of symbols that included a phenotype (the dark-skinned, dark-haired Arab/Muslim/Middle Easterner), mode of dress, written script, and type of name” (p. 65).

Cainkar’s (2009) work in this chapter highlights not only how Muslims and Arabs have been socially constructed as violent, but the process by which Arabs have been racialized. In the context of other groups, Cainkar (2009) asserts that the process of racialization (i.e. Irish) were eventually inducted into the category of White, obtaining rights accordingly, while Arabs, a group also considered White have particularly post 9/11 lost their claim to Whiteness in terms of rights provisions, which included “being perceived as unique individuals, being associated with positive attributes, and being protected from structural discrimination” (p. 66). Losing the ability to claim Whiteness in this way, meant as Cainkar (2009) asserts, that after the attack on the World Trade Center, Arabs, “were positioned socially to be readily constructed as collectively culpable for the attacks and too politically weak to defend their rights without external institutional support” (p. 66).

Adding to this concept of racialization, Joshi (2006) adds that the “racialization of religion exacerbates the ‘othering’ of a religious group and has frequently worked in tandem with the white supremacist beliefs in segments of the population” (p. 216). Joshi’s situating of racialization within the structures of racism that exist in the United States provides more understanding of why Muslims have been racialized (to position them as unequal citizens in the racial project of the U.S.). Similar to Joshi (2006), Naber (2006) says that the process of racialization is aimed at differentiation the “other” as both “inferior to Whites and enemies of the nation” (p. 242). Thus, situating Arabs and Muslims within the racial hierarchy involves a deliberate attempt to position them within the existing ladder of inequality using the notion of enemy to further justify their negative positioning.
The discourse surrounding racialization of Muslims and Arabs is important to understand in terms of the implications that this has on the social construction of both groups and the extent to which this process of otherization provides support for the implementation of policies that apply broad generalizations. The process of racialization of Muslims and Arabs is also one that relies on fitting these groups within the racial schemata that organizes race relations in the U.S.

Though the discourse on racialization often focuses on differences in phenotype, Jamel (2008) argues that the racialization process extends beyond physical differences. Jamel (2008) goes on to argue that:

The racialization of Muslims and Arabs stems from the consistent deployment of an “us” versus “them” mentality, excessively propped up for the justification of military campaigns in the Arab world. The racialization of Arabs is not simply contingent on phenotypical differences; rather, this racialization of difference is driven by a perceived clash of values and exacerbated by cultural ethnocentrism. This process of “othering” is based on assumptions about culture and religion instead of phenotype. It is not based on racial divides; instead it conforms to the process of racialization that has characterized the ways in which the dominant elements in society have interacted with minority ethnic groups more generally. (p. 119)

Jamal (2008) also notes that the process of racialization of Muslims and Arabs and the particular socio-political context serves as rationale for justifying military intervention abroad as a function of anti-terrorism policies, making the racialization process exponentially more problematic for these groups. According to Jamal (2008), American exceptionalism is embedded within the racialization process of Muslims and Arabs, thus putting the U.S. in the position to claim moral superiority in the face of addressing the 9/11 attacks. In this regard, the discourse is also shaped towards asking questions such as “why do they hate us?” as Jamal (2008) notes, instead of “why do we hate them? And ‘why have we always considered Arabs and Muslims a threat to our values?’” (p. 122). The process of racializing Muslims and Arabs and the context in which this
process is occurring, provides a rationale for American’s willingness to restrict or deny rights of Muslims and Arabs (Jamal, 2008).

Neil Gotunda (2011) adds to the discussion of the racialization of Muslims in his article titled “The Racialization of Islam in American Law”. Gotunda (2011) speaks about Muslims as a new racial category. Gotunda (2011) argues “the use of acceptance of the ‘Muslim’ category as a racial category presents enormous challenges to the assertion of Islam as a religious faith. Respect for religious beliefs and practices remains an important strand in our social fabric. By contrast, racism has been one of our most contested and disputed practices” (p. 186). Thus, Gotunda’s argument here is that racializing Muslims is a way of situating them in the racial hierarchy as a way of diminishing claims to religious freedom. As he states further to this effect, “racialized Islam in the form of the Muslim terrorist is not susceptible to the traditional analyses of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses” (p. 186).

The process of racialization, according to Gotunda (2011), involves three dimensions: “the raced body, the racial category, and the ascribed subordination” (p. 187). The dimension of raced body, involves the positioning of a group into the “‘commonsense’ idea of color-races.” The racial category, in the case of Muslims, refers to linking this group to regions of the world that are predominantly Muslim, while the third dimension in the process of racialization is ascribed subordination, which Gotunda (2011) refers to as “the active process of hierarchy and subordination” (p. 188). Providing a basis for comparison, Gotunda (2011) compares the racialization process of Asian Americans to that of Muslims. One particularly salient aspect in this comparison is ascribed foreignness, where he argues that the Muslim terrorists have essentially taken the place of “the Asian traitor, spy, and saboteur” (p. 190). Gotunda (2011) also considers the construction of the model minority as a function of the racialization process.
He argues that similar to Asian Americans, a model minority image has emerged to distinguish “good” Muslims from “bad” Muslims. He suggests that the Muslim terrorist is a defined image of the “bad” Muslim, while the construction of the “good” Muslim has not yet crystallized. However, Gotunda (2011) uses the example of Zuhdi Jasser as an example of the construction of the “good” Muslim. Jasser, for example, was a witness at the congressional hearings on Islamic Radicalization and embraced the problem of radicalization as a Muslim problem, consistent with conservative discourses. Jasser’s work in this realm is serving to create the “‘model minority’ for the racial category of Muslims” (p. 192).

Later in his article, Gotunda (2011) illustrates how the process of racializing Muslims serves to exclude White Muslims from condemnation when/if they perpetrate acts of violence. For example, John Walker Lindh was referred to as the “American Taliban,” which according to Gotunda (2011) distinguishes white Americans from minorities by emphasizing his identity as American. In emphasizing this American identity as a function of Whiteness, the foreignness of the raced non-White is simultaneously highlighted (p. 193). In a similar vein, Colleen LaRose, a white woman known as Jihad Jane, stimulated controversy because her race defied the image of the typical Muslim terrorist.

Though many scholars situate the racialization discourse in terms of placing Muslims and Arabs into the racial hierarchy of the United States, others such as Hassan (2002) see the intent of racialization in the context of this group differently. Hassan (2002) asserts the following:

Although Arabs and other people from the Middle East are classified racially as white according to the US census and most affirmative action forms, since the 1960s, the US government has unofficially constituted them as a distinct racial group by associating Arabs with terrorism and threats to national security. Unlike other racial constructs, such as blackness or Asian-ness, which are defined officially in opposition to whiteness, the contemporary racialization of Arabs appears to be linked to US foreign policy in the Middle East and its translation into the domestic context. US support of Israel and its
occupation of Arab lands casts a shadow upon Arab-Americans, who are treated as perpetual foreigners and denied the rights of other citizens and immigrants.

Others such as Shyrock (2008) argue that racialization as it has been defined and used operates as a “moral analogy” in the case of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. The purpose of racialization, therefore, is to “give(s) new meanings to processes of stigmatization and mistreatment for which Arabs and Muslims in the United States already have other names: discrimination, persecution, profiling, prejudice, blacklisting, surveillance, intolerance, hate, defamation, Orientalism, harassment, detention, deportation, racism, and so on” (p. 99).

Despite different perspectives in terms of understanding the process and purpose of racialization, the point of intersection between all of these perspectives is that racialization has consequences. For example, Bayoumi (2004) criticizes the special registration program, which effectively served to racialize Muslims. On this point, Bayoumi (2004) wrote of the requirement that:

All visa-holding men from 25 Muslim countries (and North Korea) to undergo an onerous ordeal of fingerprinting, interviewing and photographic upon entry and exit... The sweeps and programs of the government effected a removal of Muslim men from the US based firstly on the sole fact that they came at some point in their lives, from Muslim countries. In requiring that “citizens” and “nationals” of those countries suffer its burdens, Special Registration collapsed citizenship, ethnicity and religion into race. (p. 39)

Racialization is also a process that occurs selectively. Tehranian (2008) argues that “when Middle Eastern actors conform to social norms and advance positive values and conduct, their racial identity as the Other recedes to the background as they merge into the great white abyss. By contrast, when Middle Eastern actors engage in transgressive behavior, their racial identity as the Other immediately becomes a central, defining characteristic of who they are” (p.78). Thus as Tehranian (2008) notes racialization is not a uniform process and where it does occur, it occurs with the goal of conflating non-Whiteness with some variant of violent behavior.
In the case where perpetrators or individuals associated with the perpetrator are White, the racialization process intervenes to exempt Whiteness as a source of the transgression. An important illustration and extension of this idea arises when comparing an Arab Muslim, for example, to a White Muslim where explanations for White Muslims are offered in order to consider these acts as exceptions to the norm. For instance, after the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, there was intense scrutiny of the Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s wife, Katie Russell. Among the articles written about Katie is one by the New York Post (Callahan, 2014) where she is presented as a “normal” girl who deviated by virtue of being exposed to Islam and Muslims. Thus, the message that emerges is that where White individuals may be involved in acts of terrorism, their behavior is seen as a deviation, whereas with a Muslim who “looks Muslim” (i.e. Arabs, South Asians, etc.), any terroristic behavior that they may engage is presented as inherently natural. Another example is of the White Widow who was involved in attacks in Somalia. Including a quote from an acquaintance of the White Widow, an article from the Telegraph reported the person saying that she was “a quiet, calm, and normal girl. Nobody ever had any problems with her” (Marsden, 2013). Thus again the implication is that her behavior was a deviation from her Whiteness.

When a perpetrator is involved in or associated with an act of violence, the message as indicated above is that this person’s actions constitute an aberration from “normal” White behavior. This is either done through humanizing narratives or by shifting the focus away from the perpetrator. The shooting and bombing in Norway is an example of the latter. The attack was initially attributed to Muslims. However, after discovering that the attack was conducted by Anders Brevik, who directly cited anti-Muslim material from groups such as SANE and PPA, the
focus of the discourse following the attacks was on immigration, not on the identity of Brevik (Choudhury, 2013).

Examining the case of Katie Russell, the White Widow, and Anders Brevik necessarily leads to a discussion of White privilege, which underlies racialization as a process of positioning minorities into the racial hierarchy with certain value judgments. Mingu and Zopf (2010) speak to white privilege in the context of racialization in their article titled “White Means Never Gaving to Say You’re Sorry: The Racial Project in Explaining Mass Shooting.” The authors of the article set out to discover the place of race in mass shootings as conducted by two Whites and two non-Whites. Using the example of the Virginia Tech shooting, Mingu and Zopf (2010) note that a Korean official gave an apology on behalf of Koreans because of the shooter’s identity, while Whites did not feel the need, nor did they issue an apology after the mass shooting that was conducted at NIU by white student, Steven Kazmierczak. Offering another contrast to the treatment that Whites receive when perpetrating acts, the authors also examine the case of Nidal Hassan, a Palestinian American, who conducted a shooting at Fort Hood in Texas. Quoting Stein (2009), Mingu and Zopf (2010) write that after the Fort Hood Attack, Muslims and Arabs prepared “themselves for a wave of anger and attacks” (p. 58), an indication that this man’s status as non-White was a signal for holding the entire group collectively responsible.

The authors explain the choice of incidents (the fourth one being the Columbine shootings) being motivated by the fact that all of the shootings happened fairly recently and that they allow for a comparison between White and non-White perpetrators. Moreover, they write that, “when the perpetrator is identified as anything other than white, however, race suddenly takes front stage in media and public discourse, belying the significance of race in ways that had previously remained invisible” (p. 65). Further, Whiteness as they note allows for the “option of
writ(ing) ‘race,’ as well as alternate sexualities and deviance, out of the equation” (Mingus & Zopf, 2010, p. 65). In contrast, as they argue, when a shooter is non-White, race becomes the primary focal point of the discussion and not only feels it necessary to apologize, but depending on the scope of the event, may also be fearful of a potential backlash (Mingus & Zopf, 2010).

An overarching issue of consideration in this discussion of racialization is the benefits that Whites incur in the process. Mingus and Zopf (2010) write that “the very ability to eradicate race from any social discourse is a distinctly white privilege. Concomitant with this is the ability to redirect focus away from whites as a distinct population by pathologizing their aberrant behavior while reserving the right to generalize the abhorrent behavior of non-Whites” (p. 67). This bears important consequences on Muslims and Muslim Americans, who through the process of racialization are excluded from the white category and therefore denied the benefits of whiteness. The case of Nidal Hassan illustrates this point, where the discourse focused on his religious affiliation, making no mention of mental health issues which are regularly pursued as causes for White violence (Mingus & Zopf, 2010).

Racialization as discussed above operates with distinct consequences on Muslims and Muslim Americans. These consequences have included the framing of acts perpetrated by Muslims as collective acts of the group, thus denying them the privilege of being treated as individuals. In this way, Muslims and Muslim Americans have often been assumed guilty until proven innocent, which is of particular concern to Muslim Americans who are thereby denied their rights as citizens.

Formalizing the Muslim Threat: Statements by Political Officials

The Muslim threat is constructed by various processes and actors, including political officials. This next section will consider statements by political officials who have contributed
to negative constructions of Muslims and the denial of rights based on these constructions. Statements from political officials have included ideas of Islam/Sharia as a threat and the idea that Muslim Americans cannot be loyal citizens. Table 12 in Appendix A includes quotes from different political officials who have made anti-Islam/Muslim statements since the World Trade Center bombing. The table contains four columns, and the fourth column includes emergent themes based on an analysis of the statements collectively.

One of the most prominent themes from political officials’ statements concerns the idea that Islam/Sharia is a threat to the United States. A related idea that has been espoused through statements from politicians is that of “stealth” Muslims. For example, Newt Gingrich, speaking about radical and “stealth” Muslims, argued that: “the militant form believes in using military power in one form or another. The stealth form believes in using cultural, intellectual and political power but their end goal is exactly the same. The fight against Sharia and the madrassas in mosques which teach hatred and fanaticism is the heart of the enemy movement from which the terrorists spring forth” (Gingrich as quoted in Lean, 2012, p. 65).

The statements above comport with much of the dominant discourse on Islam and Muslims. The fact that political officials are using this rhetoric is problematic, especially where such rhetoric can conceivably have an impact on policy decisions. In speaking about anti-Arab racism, Abraham (1994), for example, highlights that such rhetoric can and is often used by the government and political officials to “garner public support for domestic or foreign policy objectives” (p. 195). Thus, these statements often serve the purpose of creating policies that target Muslims, while at the same time generating public bias to build support for the policies.

Beyond simply producing negative images of Islam and Muslims, the discourse on both has also served to create a dichotomy between “good” Muslims and “bad” Muslims and
providing a virtual measuring stick of “good” vs “bad” behavior. Former President Bush made many statements that categorized Muslims into good and bad Muslims. Referring to former President Bush’s statements on the War on Terror, Mamdani (2004) writes that:

President Bush moved to distinguish between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims.’ From this point of view, ‘bad Muslims,’ were clearly responsible for terrorism. At the same time, the president seemed to assure Americans that “good” Muslims were anxious to clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly support ‘us’ in a war against ‘them.’ But this could not hide the central message of such a discourse: unless proved to be a ‘good Muslim,’ every Muslim was presumed to be ‘bad.’ All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining in a war against ‘bad,’ Muslims. (p. 15)

Mamdani’s (2004) assertion above underscores an additional way in which barriers to dispel ideas about Muslims and Islam have been created. The overarching sentiment expressed in Mamdani’s quote and the statements from political officials is that Muslims should accept collective guilt and on the premise should be held responsible for distinguishing themselves from the larger group of “bad Muslims.” A chart is included on the following page to illustrate the frequency of themes that rose out of the statements from political officials described above. As the chart demonstrates, the most common theme to arise among these statements is the idea that Islam/Sharia is a threat to the United States. The other two most common themes that emerged were the theme of Islam as an extreme ideology, and the idea that Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have their rights restricted.

Formalizing the Muslim Threat: Academic Discourses

The idea of the Muslim threat is created and perpetuated through various actors. A report titled Fear, Inc. by the Center for American Progress, for example, traces financial support to individuals and organizations espousing anti-Muslim rhetoric and designates three categories of
Figure 5. Themes from Political Officials’ Statements
individuals who perform this work: scholars, validators and activists (Ali, et al., 2011). Daniel Pipes, Robert Spencer, David Yershulami, St::eve Emerson, and Frank Gaffney are identified as scholars who have perpetuated Islamophobic rhetoric.

Daniel Pipes, a scholar in Middle East studies and a fellow at Stanford University, has figured prominently in the debate on Islam and Muslims. Pipes runs his own site called “Middle East Forum,” where he writes extensively about current affairs in the Middle East with a focus on terrorism as a distinctly Muslim phenomenon. Writing about the case of a Muslim immigrant from Iran who ran into a group of pedestrians to avenge the deaths of Muslims, Pipes (2006) coined the term “sudden jihad syndrome,” by which he asserts, “normal-appearing Muslims abruptly become violent” (Pipes, 2006). While Pipes acknowledges that the use of such a term may result in scrutiny towards all Muslims, he justifies it nonetheless writing that: “Who knows whence the next jihadi? How can one be confident a law-abiding Muslim will not suddenly erupt in a homicidal rage? Yes, of course, their numbers are very small, but they are disproportionately much higher than among non-Muslims.”

Pipes’ coinage and use of these terms succeeds in further promoting a negative construction of Muslims while also justifying policies and procedures that target Muslims as a collective entity. While Pipes describes the focus of his rhetoric as being on radical Islam, it in fact extends to a broader group of Muslims. For example, in his article “Islamism 2.0,” Pipes (2009) writes that: “To borrow a computer term, if Ayatollah Khomeini, Osama bin Laden, and Nidal Hasan represent Islamism 1.0, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (the prime minister of Turkey), Tariq Ramadan (a Swiss intellectual), and Keith Ellison (a U.S. congressman) represent Islamism 2.0. The former kill more people but the latter pose a greater threat to Western civilization.” Despite holding such negative views on Islam and Muslims, Pipes was nominated
by Former President Bush to serve on the board of the United States Institute of Peace, where he served for a period of two years until 2005, indicating that Pipes’ stance was not a barrier to being in a position to directly affect U.S. policy.

Another prominent individual in the construction of Muslims as a threat is Robert Spencer. Spencer has written numerous books on Muslims and Islam and claims in his book *Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam is Subverting America Without Guns or Bombs* (2008) that Muslims are intent on taking over the United States and implementing Sharia law. His assertions that Muslims are somehow accomplishing this goal through less than visible means serves to amplify fear of Muslims, to blur the lines between “radical Islamists” and the rest of the Muslim population, and to extinguish the possibility that Muslims could ever coexist peacefully in a Western country. Spencer also founded the site “Jihad Watch,” which is dedicated to informing users of the threat that Muslims pose to overtaking society with Islamic law. According to his own website “Jihad Watch”, Spencer has spoken to the issue of jihad, Islam, and terrorism at the U.S. State Department, a problematic fact given his anti-Islam rhetoric and the potential of such rhetoric to enter the space of policy (Musaji, 2012). Additionally, Spencer’s (2006) book titled *The Truth About Mohammed: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion* was cited as recommended reading for FBI Training (Ackerman, 2011).

David Yershulami is another individual who has contributed to the discourse aimed at positioning Islam, Muslims, and Sharia as a threat. The Southern Poverty Law Center identifies Yershulami as “anti-Muslim” and quotes him saying that Sharia is “a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government.” Yershulami (2010) was also an associate for a report titled *Sharia: The Threat to America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis*, which makes many assertions, among them that Sharia is inherently unconstitutional, that Sharia contradicts
fundamental American values, that Sharia exists as an ideological threat to the United States, and that there exists a real threat of stealth jihad (Center for Security Policy, 2010). The report also likens dawa, or the raising awareness of Islam, to the policy of “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” which seeks to create favorable conditions that will eventually allow for “the ultimate, violent seizure of the U.S. government and the replacement of the U.S. Constitution with sharia” (p. 12).

In addition to this report, Yershulami also drafted model legislation called “American Laws for American Courts.” The legislation, though not explicitly stated, is focused on the exclusion of Sharia from American courts, and according to a report by the Brennan Center and the Center for American Progress, “foreign law bans have been enacted in Oklahoma, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arizona, while a related ban on religious law has been enacted in South Dakota.” Yershulami’s draft legislation defines “foreign law, legal code, or system” as a “law, legal code, or system of a jurisdiction of any state or territory of the United States, including, but not limited to, international organizations and tribunals, and applied by that jurisdiction’s courts, administrative bodies, or other formal or informal tribunals…” (American Public Policy Alliance, n.d.). In August 2013, North Carolina became the seventh state to adapt anti-Sharia legislation (Sacerbey, 2013).

Another individual who has been at the forefront of perpetuating the Muslim threat is Frank Gaffney. Gaffney is Founder and President of the Center for Security Policy and publisher and associate of the report *Sharia: A Threat to America* (Sacerbey, 2013). Previously, Gaffney was Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security policy under former President Reagan. Gaffney also hosts a show called “Secure Freedom Radio,” which focuses on issues related to national security. In 2011, Gaffney hosted Representative Peter King, who initiated
the hearings on radicalization of the Muslim community, on his show. During the show, Gaffney and King exchanged the following remarks:

GAFFNEY: It sounds like what you’re recognizing - thank God - is that within the Muslim community, even in this country, let alone elsewhere, folks are finding an environment in which on the one hand it is very easy to be radicalized if you will, to be brought to an adherence to Sharia which leads to jihad. But also, there’s an enormous pressure on those within the community presumably I would imagine you agree from the Muslim Brotherhood which is much in place in this country to not to come forward, to not help us defeat what really is our common foe: namely the folks that would impose Sharia on all of us.

KING: Yeah, and Frank, this is very unusual for our country because despite a person’s ethnic background or religious background, when a war begins, we’re all Americans. But in this case, this is not the situation. And whether it’s pressure, whether it’s cultural tradition, whatever, the fact is the Muslim community does not cooperate anywhere near to the extent that it should. The irony is that we’re living in two different worlds. One is the real world that I find when I’m talking with police officers, talking with federal law enforcement authorities. And when I raise the question of Muslim cooperation, they look at me like ‘oh of course not, no there’s no cooperation, we don’t anticipate that.’ You know, ‘We never expect cooperation.’ They try but hardly ever get it. (Fang, 2011)

This exchange between Gaffney and King carries with it the message that Muslims in general are the enemy and that their loyalty to the country is questionable at best. Similar to other anti-Muslim discourse, this discussion provides justification for differential treatment of Muslims in the form of policy and otherwise.

Among other intellectuals involved in fermenting Muslims as a collective and dangerous entity is Steve Emerson. Emerson is best known for his non-profit organization called The Investigative Project on Terrorism, an effort that focuses exclusively on the threat of Islamic terrorism. Emerson, considered a terrorism expert long before 9/11, has a history of making statements that present Muslims and Arabs as a collective entity predisposed to violence. For example, after the Oklahoma City bombings in 1993, Emerson asserted that “this (the bombing) was done with the intent to inflict as many casualties as possible. That is a Middle Eastern trait,” thereby excluding the possibility and indeed the fact that this act of terror was perpetrated by a
Formalizing the Muslim Threat: Moral Entrepreneurs

Becker (1963) coined the term “moral entrepreneurs.” Becker (1963) states that “rules are the products of someone’s initiative and we can think of the people who exhibit such enterprise as moral entrepreneurs” (p. 147). Becker distinguishes between two types of moral entrepreneurs; those who seek to create rules and those who seek to enforce them. Rule creators, according to Becker, are concerned with the establishing of rules to address a particular evil that they have identified. This type of moral entrepreneur, “feels that nothing can be right in the world until rules are made to correct it” (p. 147). Moral entrepreneurs that are rule enforcers, on the other hand, work to ensure that the rules created are observed. Moral entrepreneurs play a specific role in the creation of social constructions of different groups. Schneider and Ingram (2005) write that in the process of identifying problems, “the moral entrepreneur not only identifies behavior X (e.g. crime) as a problem, but labels it as a certain type of problem (e.g. moral) associated with a certain group of people (e.g. young black males). When a problem can be readily identified with an entire group, the perceived threat to the social order become greater than if the behavior as isolated in a few individuals” (p. 227).

The role of moral entrepreneurs in creating the discourse around Muslims as a threat is readily observable. Not only have individuals served as moral entrepreneurs seeking to establish this threat, but organizations alike have acted in this capacity. The anti-Muslim rhetoric that
these moral entrepreneurs have espoused has become increasingly prominent and visible in affecting public and policy debates on issues such as the construction of a mosque near Ground Zero or the presence of entrepreneurs such as Dr. Zuhdi Jasser in the Peter King hearings on radicalization (Posner, 2011). The table on the next page includes quotes by several prominent moral entrepreneurs. Included in the table are individuals such as Pamela Gellar who actively campaigned to prevent the building of a mosque near Ground Zero, and Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, narrator of the documentary Third Jihad at star witness for the Peter King hearings.

The table below demonstrates the presence of a rhetoric that ranges from pervasive Muslim guilt to the analogy of Islam and Muslims are a disease. More troubling than the rhetoric is the influence that many of these individuals seek to have on policy decisions. For example, Dr. Zuhdi Jasser paints terrorism as a uniquely Muslim problem while also using his identity as a Muslim to legitimate certain sanctions against this community. At the King hearings, Jasser also said “I’m Muslim and I realize that it is a problem, and I need to fix it. Let me also state clearly that it is a problem that only we can solve. Christian, Jews, non-Muslims cannot solve Muslim radicalization” (Transcript of Homeland Security Committee Hearing).

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was raised Muslim, also uses her past identity as such to legitimate her claims about the inherently violent nature of Muslims. Thus, both of these individuals serve as moral entrepreneurs in addition to “native informants,” whose role is to bring credibility to the claim against Islam and Muslims from an insider’s perspective (Sheehi 2011).

Commenting on the type of Muslims that are deliberately present in the public sphere and those which are excluded, Bowen (2010) in his study called “Can Islam be French” says that:

Now in the so-called “public sphere” dominated by such books and their sensationalist televised counterparts, very seldom do we hear from Muslims who are not in the business
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Quotation</th>
<th>Otherwise Known For</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Gellar</td>
<td>&quot;Islam is not a race. This is an ideology. This is an extreme ideology, the most radical and extreme ideology on the face of the earth&quot; (Pam Geller On Fox Business' <em>Follow the Money</em> broadcast March 10, 2011 as cited by Steinbeck, 2011, “Pamela Geller,” para. 4).</td>
<td>Staged a rally with Robert Spencer to oppose building Park51 Mosque</td>
<td>(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014; Steinbeck, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-founded Stop Islamization of America</td>
<td>(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Placed subway ads in NYC and Washington DC that said, “in any war between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.”</td>
<td>(“Anti-jihad ‘savage’ ads by Pamela Geller will go up in NYC subway,” 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Coulter</td>
<td>“We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren't punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians. That's war. And this is war” (Coulter, 2001, para. 18).</td>
<td>Columnist for <em>Human Events</em></td>
<td>(Coulter, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte Gabriel</td>
<td>“The difference, my friends, between Israel and the Arabic world is quite simply the difference between civilization and barbarism. It's the difference between good and evil and this is what we're witnessing in the Arab and Islamic world. I am angry. They have no soul! They are dead set on killing and destruction” (from a speech delivered to the Rev. John Hagee's</td>
<td>Founder and head of ACT! for America and American Council for Truth.</td>
<td>(Steinbeck, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Absolutely. If a Muslim who has - who is - a practicing Muslim who believes the word of the Koran to be the word of Allah, who abides by Islam, who goes to the mosque and prays five times a day - this practicing Muslim, who believes in the reaching of the Koran, cannot be a loyal citizen to the United States of America” (responding to a question about her thoughts towards having Muslims in political office as cited by Rodda, 2008, para. 5).

(Rodda, 2008)

David Horowitz

“Some polls estimate that 10 percent of Muslims support Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. An al-Jazeera poll put the number at 50 percent. In other words, somewhere between 150 million and 750 million Muslims support a holy war against Christians, Jews, and other Muslims who don't happen to be true believers in the Quran according to bin Laden” (in the Columbia Spectator Oct. 15, 2007, as cited by Steinbeck, 2011, “David Horowitz,” para. 5).

Organized Islamofacism weeks across U.S. campuses in 2007

Author of Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam

(Steinbeck, 2011)

P. David Gaubatz

“As an ideology [Islam] is a terminal disease that once spread is hard to destroy. Once the ideology (cancer) takes hold it is like trying to remove millions of cancerous cells in one's body. Not impossible to remove, but very, very unlikely” (essay on the Northeast Intelligence Network website June 10, 2008, as cited by Society of Americans for National Existence

(Steinbeck, 2011)

| Ayaan Hirsi Ali | “I wanted secular, non-Muslim people to stop kidding themselves that Islam is peace and tolerance” [“Top ten (plus one) Islamophobes,” 2014, para. 2]. |
| Dr. Zuhdi Jasser | “Well, I'll tell you, as a Muslim, you know, we formed the organization because we realized that terrorism and radicalization is just the symptom and that this is a Muslim problem that needs a Muslim solution. But, you know, in fact, if the solution is going to come from within, we have to engage and realize that the vast majority of Muslims are not radicalized. But we do have a problem.”

“The amount of cells and radicalization that's been happening in the last 16 to 24 months has been exponentially increasing. And Secretary Napolitano testified to this committee that it's the highest it's ever been. So I think the best way to melt away any bigotry that may exist out there towards Muslim is for Americans to see that we are taking ownership, that we want to fix it. We recognize that violence is just a symptom. And we want to begin the hard work of reform” (Martin, 2011, para. 8-9). |

| Author of two books, *Infidel* and *Nomad* [“Top ten (plus one) Islamophobes,” 2014] |
| Founder, America Islamic Forum for Democracy (Martin, 2011) |
| Star witness in Peter Kings radicalization hearings |
| Narrator of the documentary *Third Jihad* |
of denouncing their own kind - save the well-intentioned but not very effective pleas that “Islam is a religion of peace,” as if that were a satisfying response to Disfigured and Submission and unceasing reports of terrorism training. Left largely to the side - either out of their own prudence or out the “public sphere’s” decision that their voices are less interesting - is a broad middle group of Muslims who do not wish to renounce the possibility of just war (yes, jihad) and do wish to remain true to Islam’s norms (yes, sharia), and who do tune into scholarly opinions (yes, fatwas) - and who, all the while, live ordinary, nonterrorizing lives. (p. 4)

In addition to individual attempts to promote the threat of Islam and Muslims are the presence of numerous organizations that work to further this narrative (Ali, et. al, 2011; CAIR, 2013). For example, the Clarion Fund is a non-profit organization that produces material about the threat of Radical Islam. Among the Clarion Project’s film productions is a film titled Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against the West and The Third Jihad. Obsession begins with a statement that the film is about a sub-sect of Muslims - the radical ones - and that most Muslims are peaceful. Images of peaceful, normal appearing Muslims are shown; however, after a few brief seconds of this footage, the film transitions directly to a group of Muslim men wearing ski masks and holding guns, thus blurring the divide between the two groups of Muslims that the film purports to be making a distinction between. Outside of images used to construct the Muslim threat, the film also relies on the clash of civilizations rhetoric, which asserts a fundamental divide between Muslims and the West. The film also includes interviews from individuals known for espousing anti-Muslim views, such as Daniel Pipes (mentioned above) and Briggette Gabriel, author of the book Because They Hate (2008) and a previous speaker at the Joint Forces Staff College. The film gained attention when the producers paid numerous newspaper companies in swing states to distribute it in their weekly paper deliveries (Ose, 2008), an attempt by the film producers to influence politics and the outcome of the 2008 elections.

The latter of these two films, The Third Jihad, includes interviews from prominent officials including NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly and Rudy Guiliani with the focus on
“homegrown terrorism.” Similar to the disclaimer issued in *Obsession*, this film also states that it is a documentary about radical Islam and not about Muslims in general. For example, the film is narrated by Zuhdi Jasser, a “native informant,” who states the following: “This is the true agenda of much of Islam in America... A strategy to infiltrate and dominate America... This is the war you don’t know about.” From this statement, attempts to view the Muslim community as separate from radical Islamists become muddled. More problematic than the images and statements made about Muslims in this documentary is the revelation from many news sources, including the New York Times, that the documentary was shown to approximately 1,489 NYPD police officers (Powell, 2012). Further, the article mentions, that FOIA documents reveal that the film was shown on “continuous loop,” as opposed to being a mistake per the department’s original response.

In the context of the War on Terror and the theoretical framework that I utilize in this dissertation, social constructions are critical to the creation of policy design and implementation. Thus, it is important to understand how Muslims are socially constructed and how this influences policy design and/or implementation.

The Muslim Threat in Policy and Training

The creation of the Muslim threat has become especially problematic where such images have been used to train government personnel across different agencies and units. For example, previous FBI counterterrorism training has included materials that specifically suggest a connection between religiosity and the propensity for violence among Muslims (Ackerman, 2011). Several of the training documents are referenced in Ackerman’s article (2011), including a presentation entitled *Strategic Themes and Drives in Islamic Law* (Gawthrop, 2011). This training presents a perspective on just war in Islam and compares it to Jewish, Catholic, and
Realist traditions characterizing the traditions as follow: “Judaic: Passive Defensive; Catholicism: Passive Defensive; Realist: Passive Defensive; Islam: Offensive Aggressive.”

Other documents in the training materials depict Islam as one that has not entered a period of moderation, whereas Judaism and Christianity have. Additionally, the training teaches that “adherent, pious, and devout,” Muslims continue to be violent compared to their Christian and Jewish counterparts. Such trainings serve to paint the Muslim community as one that is inherently pre-disposed to violence, which impacts the type of measures that are used to counter a threat or perceived threat of violence/terrorism from this community. It is important to note that President Obama did instruct the government to modify the trainings that utilize negative images of Islam and Muslims; however, it remains unclear as to what, if any, changes this directive has resulted in (Ackerman, 2011).

Another example of negative constructions of Muslims and the conflation of Muslims with terrorists is evidenced from a story in 2012, which described a new training facility for the Navy Seals that included a simulation of a Middle Eastern neighborhood and cut-outs of Muslims (Hooda, 2012). One of the prominent cut-outs was that of a Muslim woman wearing hijab who was armed with a gun and where there were Quranic verses displayed behind her head. The Council on American Relations’ Executive Director, Nihad Awad, responded to the use of the Muslim woman in a letter to Leon Panetta, saying that: “Using a Muslim woman wearing a religious head scarf with [verses from the] Quran behind her as a target for our nation's military personnel is offensive and sends a negative and counterproductive message to trainees and to the Muslim-majority nations to which they may be deployed” (Hooda, 2012). Shortly thereafter, the Navy Seals removed the Muslim woman as a target; however, the use of such imagery coupled with training materials that demonize Islam raises concerns about countering the terrorist threat
objectively and without resort to many anti-Muslim ideas, images, and perceptions that have become so pervasive and which often result in blanket targeting of Muslims.

The use of anti-Muslim rhetoric and negative constructions of Muslims in training is also extensively documented in a report titled *Manufacturing the Muslim Menace*, by Thomas Cincotta of Political Research Associates (2011). The report focuses on profiling a number of trainers who are frequently consulted to conduct counter-terrorism trainings and who espouse negative views of Islam. The problem that Cincotta (2011) identifies is not only that such negative views are being propagated about Islam, but that the Department of Homeland Security, which dispenses funds, provides little oversight over how the funds are spent and which individual agencies are using to conduct their trainings. Cincotta’s (2011) research is based on three organizations that provide counter-terrorism trainings and which present a particularly negative view of Islam. This includes International Counter-Terrorism Officers Association (ICTOA), Security Solutions International LLC, and The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies (CI Centre). Cincotta (2011) identifies five main themes that run through many counterterrorism trainings, many of which are utilized by these focus organizations. The themes or frames, as Cincotta (2011) refers to them, include the following: (1) “Islam is a terrorist religion” (p. 33); (2) “An Islamic “Fifth Column” or “Stealth Jihad,” is subverting the U.S. from within” (p. 37); (3) “Mainstream Muslims have terrorist ties” (p. 44); (4) “Muslim American wage ‘lawfare’: Violent Jihad by other means” (p. 44); and (5) “Muslims seek to replace U.S. Constitution with Islamic, Sharia Law” (p. 46). Numerous trainers are profiled in the report, including Walid Shoebat, a guest speaker for ICOTA. Shoebat converted to Christianity from Islam and describes himself as a former Muslim Brotherhood member and terrorist. Shoebat authored a book titled *Why I Left Jihad*, (2005) and co-authored a book called *The Case for*
Islamophobia (2013), and frequently provides counter-terrorism trainings that present Muslims as a monolithic entity with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood (Cincotta, 2011).

Another individual who is profiled in the Manufacturing the Muslim Menace report is Tawfiq Hamid, who describes himself as a Muslim reformer and a former member of a terrorist group. Hamid also propagates a negative perspective of Islam. Hamid was quoted as saying that “the vast majority of Muslims were against any peaceful understanding. And they prefer this violent traditional teaching of Islam” (Hamid as cited by Cincotta, 2011). Cincotta (2011) also includes a quote from an interview with Hamid where he states that “what they teach in the mosque, for example, is that Jews are the sons of pigs and monkeys. This is traditional teaching in most of the mosques and the classical teachings in most of the books. And about the Christians, this is what they taught us – they are infidels who will go to Hell and will be tortured forever. And they describe to you the way of torturing these Christians” (Hamid as cited by Cincotta, 2011). The ideas and perspectives espoused by these individuals among others can have numerous consequences, according to Cincotta (2011), ranging from prejudice in intelligence assessments, to illegal searches and surveillance to stereotyping and profiling.

As described above, the image of Muslims as a threat has extended into policy implementation via trainings of government personnel in various agencies. The prevalence of these negative constructions have affected and continued to affect Muslims and Muslim Americans, especially where these constructions have resulted in differential treatment, a viewpoint expressed by many respondents in this study.

Social Construction of Muslims in the Media

Media plays a role in creating images of different groups, while simultaneously creating the boundaries of who “we” are. Henry and Tator (2002) speak to this idea, writing that:
Thus, media, as conceptualized here is important in the creation of identity boundaries. This statement provides an important lens through which polarizing images of Muslims in the media is understood as a dual process involving the creation of negative images of Muslims while also constructing the other’s persona vis-à-vis these images.

Literature on the construction of Muslims in the media is vast, with numerous scholars analyzing these constructions in media ranging from film to TV dramas. Evelyn Alsultany (2009) explores the use of positive images of Muslims in TV dramas through the lens of Omni and Winant’s (1994) concept of the racial project. Omni and Winant (1994) define the idea of a racial project as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or exploration of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular lines” (p. 209). Using their idea of racial projects, Alsultany (2008) remarks that “TV dramas interpret, represent, and explain the current racial dynamics in which Arabs, Arab Americans, Muslims, and Muslim Americans have come to be signified as terrorists, anti-American, and a threat to the United States” (p. 209). Alsultany (2008) further adds that “TV dramas operate alongside a variety of other post 9/11 racial projects, such as the Patriot Act and government measures to detain, deport, and monitor Arabs, Arab Americans, Muslims and Muslim Americans, that mark Arab bodies as dangerous and undeserving of citizenship rights” (p. 209).

Alsultany’s (2008) analysis highlights the ways in which Arab and Muslim civil liberties and rights are negotiated in the fictional courtrooms of shows such The Practice (Alsultany focused on an episode regarding the banning of Arabs from planes for security reasons) and the
ways that they mirror actual events such as increased scrutiny at the airport. While the episode that Alsultany (2008) focuses on favors the preservation of rights accorded to Arabs with the judge ruling against the airline that sought to discriminate against Arabs, Alsultany expresses concern with the political context that has enabled an environment whereby questioning the rights of Muslims and Arabs is appropriate. Referring to this particular episode, Alsultany (2008) writes that “sympathy for the Arab American in the episode is compromised through discourses that hold more weight: namely the right to be racist and national security threats.”

While focusing on this TV drama, Alsultany connects the ideas raised in this episode (exceptional national security measures) to the rationale that the government employs to explain away abuses of the state. In this way, Alsultany (2008) argues measures such as the Patriot Act, the invasion of Iraq, and other counter-terrorism measures become acceptable in the discourse of extraordinary threat requiring extraordinary measures. Mentioning another episode of *The Practice*, which deals with detention and interviews and Arabs and Muslims similar to the other episode that Alsultany (2008) writes about, the audience is instructed to perceive empathy for the Arab in the episode, one who claims his detention is voluntarily is, as she notes, nevertheless operating in a context in which failure to cooperate is seen as traitorous behavior because of the us and them narrative that has engulfed counter-terrorism efforts of the U.S. Still, given the existing problems with the shows, Alsultany (2008) does give credit to writers and producers in the media who try to challenge the operating narrative surround Muslims and Arabs. She argues that those challenging the narratives, the writers and producers, while often operating with the intention of creating positive change, “inadvertently support the government’s discourse on the state of affairs and re-inscribe the notion that the nation state is in a state of crisis and that Arabs
are a threat to the nation by naturalizing the government’s discourse that we are in exceptional state of crisis that merits U.S. sovereign measures” (p. 225).

Negative media coverage of Muslims and Islam is also extensively documented by Edward Said in his classic 1981 book (updated in 1997), titled *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. Said wrote this book shortly after the Iranian Revolution and focuses on analyzing key events that played a continuous and dominant role in how Americans see Iran. Said (1997) also refers to a PBS documentary called *Death of a Princess*, a story based on a Saudi princess who was executed because of a relationship she had with a civilian. Said mentions this documentary and the lack of other documentaries focusing on other conservative religious groups as a way in which images of Islam are created and put forth as uniquely backwards. Further, Said (1997) writes about media coverage of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings and the fact that images of Muslims as terrorists had become so profound and commonplace by then, that the media initially purported (with the support of individuals such as Steve Emerson) that Muslims were the culprits rather than a White Christian man by the name of Timothy McVeigh. In general, Said (1997) notes that the actions of others towards Muslims and the Muslim world are minimized in order to paint Muslim anger as inherent. In other words, as Said (1997) writes, “covering Islam is a one-sided activity that obscures what ‘we’ do, and highlights instead what Muslims and Arabs by their very flawed nature are” (p. xxii). Said’s work helps inform this research study as media has continued to play a role in the way Muslims and Muslim Americans have been constructed.

Several other scholars have written about negative representations of Muslims and Arabs in the media. For example, Jack Shaheen (2001), a scholar who focuses on film, wrote a book called *Reel Bad Arabs*, where he reviewed over 900 films and found repeated images of Arabs as
traitorous, evil, over-sexed, and inherently prone to terrorism. Semmerling (2006) corroborates many of Shaheen’s findings in his analyses of several films including *The Exorcist, Rollover, Black Sunday, Three Kings, Rules of Engagement*, and *South Park: Bigger, Longer, and Uncut*. Semmerling (2006) also analyzes a CNN special documentary titled *America Remembers*, which he observes paints Americans as innocent victims of evil Arab perpetrators. Both scholars reveal a lack of nuance in how the Arab is presented in film, and Semmerling’s analysis also incorporates a history of orientalist fears, rather than facts to support the repeated production of the evil Arab.

Numerous others have contributed to the literature surrounding Muslims/Arabs in media (Karim, 2003; Shaheen, 1984; Shaheen, 2001). Karim (1997), for example, notes that the most common characteristics assigned to Muslims in Western culture are “violence, lust, greed and barbarism” (p. 157). Halse (2011) seeks to analyze such predominant images in the TV show *24*. Halse (2011) focuses on analyzing a Muslim family, and through her analysis demonstrates how the family and Muslims in general by extension are barbaric, insidious, and violent. The insidiousness of the Muslim presence is exponentially magnified through the idea that this family and average appearing Muslims could be the “terrorists next door.” Halse (2011) observes the following about this Muslim family, their portrayal in the show, and the larger idea about Muslims living in the United States:

There are few visual cues that correspond to the traditional stereotypes, but within, in character they remain true to type. In the past, plots usually took place in Hollywood’s "Middle East"; now they take place on US soil. This analysis indicates that the Muslim stereotype in US television entertainment post-9/11 has undergone a change related to the stereotype’s relocalization. The major Muslim stereotype today seems clothed in the appearance of the average American, which redefines the Muslim "other". The strangers are now hiding amongst us and may even be living next door.
Another interesting portrayal of Muslims in the media comes from the example of the show *All-American Muslim*. While the show garnered positive reviews, The Florida Family Association was dismayed at the attempt to depict Muslims as normal. As a result, David Canton, who ran the organization, sent an email to companies urging them to refuse to advertise during the show, saying that:

The Learning Channel’s new show All-American Muslim is propaganda clearly designed to counter legitimate and present day concerns about many Muslims who are advancing Islamic Fundamentalism and Sharia law. The show profiles only Muslims that appear to be ordinary folks while excluding many Islamic believers whose agenda pose a clear and present danger to liberties and traditional values that the majority of Americans cherish (Florida Family Association, 2012).

Following this letter, the Florida Family Association expressed pride by the fact that of the 112 advertisers they had sent this letter to, 101 refrained from advertising again, including Lowe’s, AT&T, and Bank of America (Florida Family Association, 2012). In the context of the constructions of Muslims in the media, this incident was particularly troubling as it sent the message that only negative images of Islam and Muslims should have a space on television.

Mainstream news outlets have also contributed to a negative social construction of Muslims. A Think Progress study, for example, which compared the frequencies between the use of terms such as “Sharia” and “radical Islam” on Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN, found that Fox News uses these terms much more frequently than other news channels (Seitz-Wald, 2011). A chart from their website detailing the findings is included on the following page.

Of these findings, Lean (2012) argues that the frequency of usage of the terms is not in and of itself a problem, but rather how such terms were used. On this point, Lean (2012) says that the use of these terms, “were often part of stories that made a larger point about allegedly nefarious Muslims who had either participated in some act of violence or were thought to be working their way into the political fabric of the United States” (p. 69).
Other Fox News personalities have spoken out frequently against Islam. For example, Bill O’Reilly asserted that “there’s no question that there is a Muslim problem, in the world,” and Glenn Beck said, “stop with the government Muslim outreach programs, okay? I’m tired of it. I don’t care about the rest of the world. I don’t care” (Lean, 2012, p.70).

O’Reilly’s quote collectively demonizes the entire Muslim world, while Beck’s remark is reminiscent of Lewis’ attempts to absolve the Western world of any responsibility, with the express intent of positioning our goodness against their evil. These particular statements form a broader undercurrent of anti-Muslim sentiment in the media. While there are arguable differences in the quality of reporting and information provided by various news networks, this rhetoric nonetheless introduces and reinforces negative narratives about Muslims and Muslim Americans. In the case of Muslim Americans, this rhetoric becomes particularly divisive as members of this group are symbolically stripped of their American identity and treated as collective perpetrators.
Social Construction of Terrorism and the War on Terror

The previous section dealt with the social construction of Islam and Muslims. This next section will focus on how terrorism is constructed and, accordingly, who is considered a terrorist. Post 9/11, the creation and implementation of numerous policies have focused on acts of terrorism. Though many criminal convictions have been made on the basis of an assumed definition of terrorism, the term is often defined by acts that are committed by Muslims. Glenn Greenwald, a constitutional attorney, has argued this point in several articles. In Greenwald’s article from 2010 titled “Terrorism: The Most Meaningless and Manipulated Word,” he discusses the case of Joseph Stack, who flew into an IRS building and who clearly articulated political grievances as his motivation for his act. Despite the facts of the case that would otherwise be enough to classify this as an act of terrorism, Greenwald (2010) notes how the current context has confined the definition so much so that acts of terrorism can only be committed by Muslims. He notes that in this case, failure to classify Stack’s act as terrorism essentially means that terrorism is confined to an act by “a Muslim who fights against or even expresses hostility towards the United States, Israel, and its allies.” While Greenwald in this case is not commenting on how the government labeled Stack but rather the way that the case was treated in mainstream media, he maintains that the use of this term as an application to certain groups of people (i.e. Muslims) is problematic because of the punishments and sanctions that are often dispensed to those accused of terrorism. As Greenwald (2010) notes, “the term terrorist plays a central role in our political debates. It is the all-justifying term for anything the U.S. government does. Invasions, torture, due-process-free detentions, military commissions, drone attacks, warrantless surveillance, obsessive secrecy, and even assassinations of American citizens are all justified by the claim that its only being done to ‘terrorists,’ who by definition, have no rights.” Adding to this and in
reference to the shootings by Andre Brevik, a White shooter in Norway, Greenwald (2011) opined that:

…when it was widely assumed, based on basically nothing, that Muslims had been responsible for this attack and that a radical Muslim group likely perpetrated it, it was widely declared to be a "terrorist" attack. That was the word that was continuously used. And yet, when it became apparent that Muslims were not involved and that, in reality, it was a right-wing nationalist with extremely anti-Muslim, strident anti-Muslim bigotry as part of his worldview, the word "terrorism" almost completely disappeared from establishment media discourse. Instead, he began to be referred to as a "madman" or an "extremist." And it really underscores, for me, the fact that this word "terrorism," that plays such a central role in our political discourse and our law, really has no objective meaning. It’s come to mean nothing more than Muslims who engage in violence, especially when they’re Muslims whom the West dislikes.

The social construction of Muslims has contributed to the ease by which Muslims have been deemed solely responsible for acts of terrorism. However, a larger issue is the way that the problem of terrorism is framed, including how the target population is conceivably linked to the policy issue. This particular connection is important in the scope of applying the social construction in policy design framework to Muslims and Muslim Americans, especially where problem framing leads to differential policy burdens among groups.

In understanding the implications of the War on Terror frame, one aspect that is crucial is the definition of terrorism. Jackson (2008) writes that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism. He adds that there appears to be a bias towards defining terrorism as acts conducted by groups that pose a challenge to U.S. interests. Jackson (2008) also writes that counter-terrorism measures can also amount to terrorism if no distinction is made in culpability, when the use of force is unequal, when the goal is to produce fear in a community, and when it is done with a political agenda in mind.

The focus on non-state actors as the only perpetrators of violence runs contrary to those who define terrorism by the act, not the actor. Moreover, Jackson (2008) argues that the
originators of definitions that exclude the state as an actor of terrorism are problematic. In support of this point, Jackson quotes Tilly who wrote that:

There is something morally suspicious, however, about people making laws that apply to everyone else accept [sic] themselves. The sheer fact that politicians have entered into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute one another as ‘terrorists’ cannot change any logical or deontological facts of the matter. If what they do is otherwise indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be terroristic, then the acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally wrong for just the same reasons. (p. 24)

Jackson (2008) also adds that certain definitions of terrorism are put forth through a culmination of actors, such as the U.S. State Department, international law, the CIA, and the media. Further, Jackson (2008) argues that terrorism “is constituted by and through the discursive practices which make it a concrete reality for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics and so on.” Thus terrorism is a fluid term as Jackson maintains and its definition depends on the actors defining it. Complementing this idea, Schmid (2004), analyzes terrorism through different frameworks, one of which is “terrorism and politics.” Schmid (2004) compares the different tactics of state actors versus non-state actors, discovering that many of the tactics used by both sides mirror each other. This similarity provides another point from which to challenge definitions of terrorism that focus only on non-state actors. If instead a definition were to include the motivation, regardless of the actor, coupled with an assessment of harm, then state actors could surely fit the mold.

The U.S. government defines terrorism is a number of ways. For example, according to the FBI, terrorism can be defined as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 18 USC 2331, defines international terrorism as acts that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended—

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

The 18 USC 2331 defines domestic terrorism as acts that:

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended—

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping;

The use of terrorism in a post 9/11 world has also tended to focus almost exclusively on a
definition of terrorism that de facto excludes state actors. Interestingly, however, other
definitions used by the government do not by definition preclude crimes of the state, even though
other definitions used by the U.S. government in various policies effectively diminish the idea
that a state, much less the United States, could commit acts of terrorism. How terrorism is
defined matters in terms of framing responses to the War on Terror and evaluating impact and
proportionality. Further, because terrorism charges have been leveraged based on the idea of
terrorism as an exceptional crime that warrants an exceptional response, and in many cases a
lower threshold for evidence (Greenwald, 2013), a clear definition of terrorism is imperative.
Former national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, also makes the case that the War on
Terror employs vague language done in order to provoke policy support. To this point Brzezinski
stated that:

The phrase itself is meaningless. It defines neither a geographic context nor our presumed
enemies...The vagueness of the phrase was deliberatively (or instinctively) calculated by
its sponsors. Constant reference to a “war on terror” did accomplish one major objective:
It stimulated the emergence of a culture of fear. Fear obscures reason, intensifies emotion
and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the
policies that they want to pursue. (Brzezinski as cited in Ross, 2011, p. 193)

The role of media in perpetuating images of Muslims was documented above. The media
also plays an important role in framing terrorism more generally and cultivating fear as a means
of garnering support for different policies. Ross (2011) includes an analysis of the content in the
New York Times, in which she concludes that the Times overwhelmingly support the dominant
discourse on the War on Terror, relying on elite and government voices. Through their reporting,
Ross (2011) concludes the Times not only supported the elite narrative, but also framed the
government as the only body equipped to understand and consequently deal with terrorism -
effectively silencing the opposition due to the notion that they were not privy to critical
information and details. Ross (2011) also writes that the analysis of the Times’ articles provides
fodder to research, suggesting that the media has been a willing actor in perpetuating elite
discourses. This according to Ross has been done by, first, privileging and prioritizing the policies
and perspectives of government and the seated administration; second, fluctuating in quantity over
time; third, mirroring in quantity of the amount of public attention given by privileged officials;
fourth, offering “balanced” two-sided coverage primarily as counter-argument with anti-
administration stories; and finally, amplifying administration catch phrases, such as “War on
Scholars have also noted the importance of rhetoric in restricting rights and justifying abuses. For example, Foot (2008) writes that “the language of war has long been recognized as having an intimate relationship with the abuse of human rights” (p. 716). The language of war is also important in the extent to which narratives frame a moral imperative. For example, in an address to the American Legion National Convention, President Bush stated that:

…the war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century. On one side are those who believe in the values of freedom and moderation - the right of all people to speak, and worship, and live in liberty. And on the other side are those driven by the values of tyranny and extremism...they are totalitarians of the 20th century.” (President Bush as cited in Foot, 2008, p. 717)

Steuter and Wills (2008) further add that the prevailing war makes us less safe by creating “insoluble divisions” (p. xi). Thus, the language of war in this context is distinctly aimed at pitting groups against each other, which is made easier in the case of Muslims because of the plethora of statements that promote narratives such as the “clash of civilizations.”

The section above speaks to a particularly salient issue that Muslim Americans identified in interviewees, that is the construction of terrorism as a Muslim phenomenon. In constructing terrorism as such, respondents often questioned the degree to which they were afforded equal rights and presumption of innocence.

**Conclusion**

This chapter described in detail the social construction of Islam and Muslims in addition to the social construction of terrorism. The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the pervasiveness of negative social constructions of Islam and Muslims which have resulted in policy designs and implementation that sanction uniquely punitive measures for this population that rely on collective guilt and responsibility. Consequently, significant attention was devoted
to highlighting the multitude of avenues that have helped in creating the social construction of Muslims and the ways in which this construction has entered the public and legal spheres in the United States.

The section describing the social construction of terrorism provided an elaboration on how terrorism is often defined by politics. More specifically, this section sought to demonstrate that different standards exist to define acts of terrorism as a function of the perpetrator’s identity. In applied terms, this has often meant that Muslim acts of violence are attributed to Islam and automatically considered acts of terrorism, whereas non-Muslim acts of violence are considered individual actions that escape the same level of scrutiny.

Having examined the policies of the War on Terror and the social constructions of Islam, Muslims, and terrorism, the next chapter will provide an overview of the social construction in policy design theory as well as to present empirical evidence in support of the theory. This chapter will also focus on applying this theory to the aforementioned policies of the War on Terror. Additionally, the following chapter will discuss literature related to political participation, and political power, two important components of the theory.
CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

This study examines Muslim American responses to the War on Terror using the theory of social construction in policy design (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, 1997, 2005). Schneider and Ingram (2005) write that:

Public policy is the primary tool through which government acts to exploit, inscribe, entrench, institutionalize, perpetuate or change social constructions… It (policy) is the dynamic element through which governments anchor, legitimize, or change social constructions. It is the means used by governments to powerfully support or undercut widespread practices of social separation, such as racial segregation in schools and housing. (p. 5)

A primary concern of Schneider and Ingram is the role that public policy plays in fostering and maintaining democracy. The bulk of their analysis focuses on how the use of social constructions of different policy group targets can affect their attitudes towards government and citizenship, in addition to behaviors such as political participation. To this end, Schneider and Ingram (1993) state that “persistent construction of certain classes of people as distinct types of targets imparts messages that relate to citizenship and participation. The unvarying experiences people have with policy inform them of their status as citizens and how they and people like themselves are likely to be treated by government” (p. 89). This statement is central to this theory because of their concern with the evaluation of policy based not only on efficiency and utility, but also in the degree to which policies foster democracy and equitable treatment of citizens. Without citizen participation, the ability to self-correct problematic and anti-democratic policies, which are central in a pluralistic society, diminish along with the identification of a range of policy alternatives that work in the interest of preserving democracy.

The authors propose the following set of relationships through their various works as
underlying tenets of the theory:

1. Policy designs are a function of a group’s political power and social construction.  
   (Schneider & Ingram, 1993)

2. “Experiences as targets of policy,” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 85) send messages about deservingness and affect target populations’ perceptions of government and citizenship.

3. Policy design can play a role in encouraging or discouraging citizen political participation:
   a. “Some policy designs encourage active responsible citizenship by providing arenas for participation and expectations that citizens will become involved. Other designs obfuscate and complicate, leaving the response to policy largely in the hands of lawyers, scientists, and highly skilled policy entrepreneurs” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, pp. 80-81).

4. Target group definition may affect subsequent attitudes towards justice and injustice:
   a. “When targets whose characteristics and behavior objectively differ very little from one another and yet are treated very different by public policy, an impression that government is unfair is created,” (Schneider & Ingram, p. 87).

5. The uses of different policy tools serve as a way to define characteristics of a target group:
   a. “Tools reflect the underlying motivations and send messages to the broader public about characteristics of the target group” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997,
b. “The way clients are treated by the government during implementation differs significantly depending upon the power and social construction of the target groups” (Schneider, Ingram, & deLeon, 2007, p. 104).

6. Policy design and implementation are lessons in democracy:

a. “Policy creates politics and affects citizen orientation and participation. Policy sends messages about what government is supposed to do, which citizens are deserving and undeserving, and what sort of participation is appropriate in democratic societies” (Ingram & Schneider, 1993, p. 68).

Social construction of target populations is central to this framework and is, according to Schneider and Ingram (1993), “measurable, empirical phenomenon.” To that end, the social constructions of groups, as they assert, “can be generated by the study of texts, such as legislative hearings, histories, statutes, guidelines, speeches, media coverage, and analysis of the symbol contained therein” (p. 335). Social constructions can also, as Schneider and Ingram (1997) note, become so prevalent so as to be seen as unquestionably defining a group.

The figure below taken from Schneider and Ingram (1993) includes four different target groups: advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants, each of which are based on the groups’ social construction and amount of power they have.

These categories are fluid, as the authors maintain and the construction of groups can change over time. In this vein, the authors maintain that “negatively constructed powerless groups will usually be proximate targets of punishment policy, and the extent of the burdens will be greater (oversubscribed) than is needed to achieve effective results” (Schneider &
Despite the argument that a group’s negative behavior is what may have given cause to a negative social construction has merit, this theory is concerned with disproportionate policy burdens on a negatively constructed group and the group’s inability to change their construction (note, that “contenders” are also negatively constructed but have substantive amounts of political power to influence their predicament). Further, an important distinction exists between groups such as “criminals,” for example, and other groups such as Muslims, etc. where policies addressing the latter group rely on collective responsibility as a means of generating group boundaries. Along with disproportionate policy burdens, this theory helps explain how the use of social constructions in policy design explains why certain issues are framed in a particular way and the causal link between the target population and the policies, the rhetoric that surrounds the issue, and the measures that are used to address the problem. An example to illustrate this point is how terrorism is framed. Glenn Greenwald (2011), Juan Cole (2013), and
numerous others have commented on a noted discrepancy between the descriptions of acts perpetrated by Whites as terrorism versus acts perpetrated by Muslims. Moreover, as the earlier section demonstrated, acts of terrorism by Muslims are typically presented as occurring at higher rates than members of other groups despite evidence to the contrary (Perliger, 2012). Additionally, attempts to raise the issue of extremism and violence from non-Muslim groups have been aggressively challenged (Daily Kos, 2012). Further, no policy changes have emerged from acts of violence perpetrated by non-Muslims.

The social construction in policy design theory states that target groups develop expectations about how the government will treat them and will have positive or negative attitudes towards government, which in turn affects political participation and citizen agency. Those with positive social constructions can be expected to hold favorable views of government, internalize the message that they are worthy citizens, and on this basis participate in the political system because of their faith that the system is working for them. In contrast, groups with negative social constructions develop negative ideas of the government and their position as lesser citizens, thus deterring them from actively participating in the political system.

Ingram and Schneider (1993) also describe the process by which target populations are identified, saying that policy makers choose which group to target based on who can be “more or less credibly linked to the solution of policy problems” (p. 334).

As the table below demonstrates, groups that are socially constructed as deviant exhibit negative attitudes towards the government, view the governmental process as corrupt, and are
less likely to participate politically. Schneider and Ingram (1993) suggest these categories as a general framework, acknowledging that different groups may fall outside of these distinct categories. This acknowledgement is important in conceptualizing Muslim American responses because although they are a group that has been constructed in a largely negative way with little power, they would fall outside of the deviant category because of some positive imaging of the group, and because they are not completely powerless as individuals within this group typically are.

In subsequent works, Schneider, Ingram, and deLeon (2014) advance other propositions that are also relevant to this study. In particular is the feedback or “feedfoward” element of policy, which Schneider and Ingram use to refer to their proposition that policy designs have “both material and symbolic (reputational or interpretive) effects on target populations that impact their attitudes and political participation” (p. 9).
This is an important relationship to consider. The language of policies often makes it difficult to prove if and how different social constructions are embedded in policy designs; however, the social construction of different target groups are more easily visible in policy implementation. In this study, the focus is on the role of public policy in creating social constructions of Muslims and Muslim Americans and/or how social constructions resulting from policy are internalized by members of this group.

Further buttressing the foundational premises of the social construction in policy design framework, Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss (2004) have provided evidence in support of the idea that public policy has an impact on citizens and the democratic process, which they suggest can be observed through increasing or decreasing rates of political participation. Mettler and Soss (2004) also argue that “political participation flows from psychological orientations - feelings of political efficacy, duty, group consciousness, and the like” (p. 57), all of which are affected by the design and implementation of public policy. This idea draws from the work of T.H. Marshall (1950), who was among the first to demonstrate a connection between social policies, the fostering of democracy, and the shaping of citizens.

Public policies, as Mettler and Soss (2004) write, define one’s place in a political community and send citizens certain messages about what Shklar (1991) refers to as “standing.”
or the ability to exercise citizenship rights (as cited in Mettler and Soss, 2004, p. 61). They assert that, “through their rules and procedures, policies address people differently. By granting full rights - unequivocal and ‘earned’ - to some individuals and treating them with dignity and respect, policies incorporate them into the esteemed rank of first class citizens. Other policies, ones that subject recipients to a heavy regime of direction, surveillance, and threats of disciplinary action, stamp recipients as inferior” (p. 61). Further, as Mettler and Soss (2004) note, policies shape perceptions that out groups have of target groups and perceptions that members of target groups have of each other. Moreover, policies can substantively affect the perceptions that groups across different ethnic, racial, religious lines, etc. have of government through measures such as profiling of target groups, which communicates unfairness in the justice system (Mettler & Soss, 2004).

The last point worth mentioning in regards to Mettler and Soss’ (2004) work is that policies shape citizen attitudes by positioning certain issues as more problematic than others, regardless of objective evidence on the seriousness of the problem. This is an important point in the context of the War on Terror and the Muslim American experience as policies and/or initiatives such as Peter King’s radicalization hearings are constructed in a way that not only exaggerates the threat of terrorism, but which also connects the crime disproportionately to Muslims. To the larger society, this justifies an intervention focused solely on this group and sends the message to target group members, in this case Muslim Americans, that they are a problem.

Theories about citizen attitudes and behaviors as a function of social construction in policy design and implementation help to contextualize Muslim Americans’ responses in terms of attitudes and political participation related to policies that are often directed at them and which
encourage racial and/or religious profiling. With regards to political participation among Muslim Americans, there are two important concepts that provide additional understanding of less visible aspects of this behavior and reasons for withdrawing from the political system. These two terms are what Naber (2006) and Bazian (2004) refer to respectively as “internment of the psyche” and “virtual internment,” which they use to explain deep seated fear that may affect one’s decision to engage in, among other things, political acts that may be deemed as subversive.

The idea that a target group’s response to policies depends on their social construction and degree of political power is a theory that has been applied to many different target groups. However, there is no existing research that illustrates the relationship between policy design and implementation and Muslim American attitudes and behaviors in the post 9/11 context. Thus, this study tests whether the phenomenon observed in the data serve as empirical verification of this theory. Further, the use of this framework in the study also helps expand existing applications of the theory to regulatory or restrictive policies, such as the policies of the War on Terror, which have disproportionately affected members of this group.

The diagram below, taken from Ingram and Schneider’s work, visually depicts relationship described by this framework, which relates policy design and implementation to subsequent attitudes towards citizenship and government in addition to the degree to which citizens participate politically and exercise political voice.

An important aspect of this diagram is the element of policy experience and interpretation which mediates how members of different target groups perceive the intent and impact of the policies on themselves or other members of their group.
Studies Utilizing Social Construction in Policy Design

The strength of this framework lies in its application in other studies that have empirically verified many of its core tenets. These studies will used as a basis for examining different contexts where policy has create differential citizens as well as to serve as a basis for comparison with this study sample.

One of the key works that applies the social construction in policy design theory is a study of veterans that was undertaken by Suzanne Mettler (2005). Mettler’s research focused on benefits conferred to veterans via the GI bill. Through her analysis, Mettler (2005) demonstrates that the conferral of benefits subsequently helped to define this group as “deserving.” Being a group defined as such and afforded educational benefits, according to Mettler (2005), effectively sent messages to this group from the government that they were deserving citizens. This sense of deservedness, according to Mettler’s (2005) work, encouraged veterans to become active citizens with high rates of political participation. This is one study that demonstrates how
positive messages from the government result in favorable attitudes towards government, in addition to an increased sense of political efficacy. The findings in this study are relevant not only in terms of understanding the role of policy benefits in citizen attitudes, but what the expected outcome might be in terms of policy burdens on citizen attitudes, which is a focus in this study with regards to the Muslim American population.

Adding to the research on veterans, Laura Jensen’s (1996) study finds that the designation of some veterans as more worthy than others had subsequent impacts of their levels of political participation. Jensen (2005) later analyzed the impact of the 1818 pension law on those in the army and the messages it created about deservedness. Her focus was on the use of entitlements and the messages these entitlements sent regarding the deservingness of the recipient. She posits that the entitlements that were allotted tended to focus on a specific group of individuals to the exclusion of others who also played key roles in maintaining the state during war. Jensen argues that such an analysis is important not only for understanding state building in the degree to which entitlements were considered legitimate policies, but also because “they furnish examples of the social construction of citizens in American public policy” (p. 36). This is another idea that applies well to the case of Muslim Americans in the context of the War on Terror, as the some of the policies have constructed them as citizens undeserving of equal human and civil rights protections.

In her 1998 book Dividing Citizens, Mettler sets out to study differences in how the New Deal differentially allocated benefits to men and women. Mettler’s (1998) analysis focuses on the fact that men received benefits stemming from nationally mandated policies while women received benefits administered from localized programs allowing for more discretion in implementation. This distinction in terms of how benefits were allocated, according to Mettler
resulted in differential levels of political participation, thus challenging notions of democracy and equitable treatment in policy formation and implementation.

Joe Soss (1999, 2000) studied the relationship between the method of benefit administration and outcomes in terms of feelings of political efficacy and political participation. He found that proof of need and heavy discretion in the administration of welfare benefits resulted in diminishing this group of individuals’ feelings of political efficacy, and subsequently lower rates of political participation. This finding is important as individuals, such as those receiving welfare benefits, stand the most to gain from political participation, yet their construction as undeserving and their experience in obtaining this government benefit effectively discourages participation.

Echoing the findings of Soss’ (1999, 2000) work on welfare beneficiaries, Andrea Campbell (2003) conducted an analysis of various sources of data including surveys, finding that recipients of welfare participate at a lower rate than beneficiaries of social security. She attributes this difference to the implicit messages that are sent via type of benefit administration. In contrast to welfare beneficiaries, Campbell’s (2003) study found that the political participation of social security recipients dramatically increased among recipients of this benefit. Campbell’s work (2003) further highlights how social constructions of groups affect their subsequent attitudes towards government and government policy, in addition to their perspectives on their effectiveness as citizens and political agents of change.

Numerous studies speak to social construction in terms of how policy is designed. For example, Donovan (1993) considers the impact of social construction on HIV/AIDS research, finding that the circumstance under which the disease was contracted was a factor used to determine allocation of research funding. Thus, more funding was being allocated to the study
of HIV/AIDS from those who contracted it from blood transfusions. Schneider, Ingram and deLeon (2014) also demonstrate the importance of how the construction of groups not only frame how culpability is attached to an individual, but also the importance that is assigned to address treatment of individuals.

The social construction theory in policy design has extended to include various areas of research spanning across housing, health, and crime. For example, Nicholson-Crotty and Meier’s (2005) work on the distribution of punishments on criminals finds a correlation between negative social constructions and harshness of punishment. An example of this work, as Schneider, Ingram, and deLeon (2014) note, is the discrepancy in drug sentencing based on which groups are more likely to be users of a particular drug, such that the use of crack is punished more heavily because of the fact that crack users are typically Black.

In her article on immigration laws and policies, Lisa Newton (2005) uses the social construction in policy design framework to dissect the discourse around immigration and the sanctioning of punitive policy tools. In shaping narratives justifying benefits or burdens towards immigrants, Newton (2005) writes that:

Whether elected officials choose to portray immigrants as deserving of membership ultimately corresponds to how officials portray immigrant target groups as they advocate particular policy tools or designs…. official rhetoric and official policy construct immigrant groups positively or negatively in ways that emphasize their contributions to or detractions from American society. (p. 140)

In her analysis of immigration policy, Newton (2005) concludes that pervasive negative social constructions of different immigrant groups helped sanction the use of policy tools focused on punishment and coercion. Moreover, she analyzes the discourse surrounding immigrants that convey the idea of immigrants as unworthy of benefits afforded to citizens. As an example of narratives that rely on certain constructions of groups, Newton (2005) highlights the fact that rather than deliberating policy on the basis of citizen versus immigrant, policy deliberations
created a distinction between those who paid taxes and those who do not with the assumption that immigrants were not taxpayers.

Another application of the framework comes from DiAlto (2005), who traces the Japanese experience in the United States, emphasizing how they went from having a negative social construction to a positive social construction. In presenting her case on the evolving constructions of the Japanese, DiAlto (2005) discusses and describes how policy, media, and the courts played a collective role in this process. Her analysis begins by tracing the way that elite White groups responding to the success of Japanese farmers helped to construct negative images.

As an important part of the Japanese construction was the role of race, such that members of this group were categorized as non-White and therefore inassimilable and denied certain rights. For example, the Naturalization Act of 1790 denied citizenship to nonwhites, thus making the Japanese ineligible. DiAlto (2005) writes about the case of In Re Saito (Saito v. United States), in which the Japanese were denied citizenship based on being considered “Mongolians.” DiAlto (2005) writes that:

…the decision in this case was significant because it provided a legitimate basis upon which future discriminatory policies targeting the Japanese could be enacted. Many of these policies would discriminate not against the Japanese explicitly but against ‘aliens ineligible for citizenship,’ a racially coded term that would be used against the Japanese time and time again in the courts. (p. 90)

The height of exclusionary treatment by the United States towards the Japanese was issued through Executive Order 9066, which authorized the internment of this group. The courts preserved the underlying sentiments of collective responsibility, with the judge in the case of Hirabayashi v. United States ruling that “in times of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry” (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, as quoted in DiAlto, 2005, p. 95). Korematsu v. United States was also an important case in the construction of the Japanese as the ruling was against the
plaintiff, which upheld the constitutionality of the exclusion order while solidifying the notion of Japanese as disloyal (DiAlto, 2005).

While the courts played a role in the negative construction of the Japanese, images of Japanese in the media concretized their image as enemy others. These constructions served an important role as DiAlto (2005) notes, writing that “negative constructions were not discouraged during this period because they helped to justify the discriminatory policies of curfew, evacuation, and relocation” (p. 95). Analysis of press coverage during this critical period of time revealed a large disparity between favorable and unfavorable coverage of the Japanese while blurring the lines between loyal and disloyal Japanese (DiAlto, 2005).

Following World War II, the Japanese experienced a shift in their negative construction, due in part to their own efforts to challenge the dominant narrative. Further, court cases adjudicated in favor of Japanese defendants also positioned this group to be more positively viewed (DiAlto, 2005).

Though the Japanese and Japanese American experience constituted a set of particularly egregious violations, Muslims and Muslim Americans in the United States have in many ways gone through a similar trajectory in terms of crisis and social construction. In the post 9/11 period and similar to the Japanese, negative social constructions of Muslims and Muslim Americans have persisted. These social constructions have served as an impetus for different policies that have served to sanction members of this group as a collective entity. Further, many court cases involving Muslims and Muslim Americans that have been adjudicated throughout the War on Terror have served a similar historical purpose of codifying into law social constructions of difference and on this basis, differential access to justice (i.e. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ruling stated
that an American citizen (who also happened to be Muslim) could be considered an enemy combatant).

The literature above provided both an overview of the social construction in policy design theory as well as studies that validate the relationship between social construction in public policy, political participation, and attitudes towards government and citizenship. In the context of the War on Terror, there are arguably two different types of policies, those that rely on social constructions in their design, for example the NSEERS program, and those that create social constructions by virtue of implementation, such as the housing of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.

In policy designs such as the NSEERS program, negative social constructions of Muslims are used as a means of legitimizing policy that applies broad punitive measures to the whole group. This idea can be gleaned from the fact that the policies’ design specifically singled out individuals from Muslim majority countries as a proxy for guilt. Policy implementation enters into the framework’s calculus by legitimizing existing social constructions and by creating new constructions that feedback into the cycle. Understanding the theory this way helps, for example, to understand the progression of the War on Terror policies as initially targeting Muslim non-citizens to those targeting Muslim Americans.

Further, in the context of the social constructions of Muslims in general, including those pre-dating 9/11, public policy can, as would be suggested by this framework, entrench existing social constructions. Attorney General Ashcroft’s reliance on the 1981 immigration laws as a means justifying special registration post 9/11 is a primary example.

In the context of the War on Terror, this theory of social construction helps to explain why policies have been subsequently devised as a reaction to violence perpetrated by Muslims,
whereas acts of violence perpetrated by non-Muslims have not rationalized precursors to policy changes, nor have any changes actually been made based on violence by this group. This idea also comports with the notion that the construction of certain groups are considered prevalent and well-established as the norm, such that acts of violence perpetrated by non-Muslims are quickly dismissed and seen as detracting attention away from the “real” terrorists, or in other words, Muslim terrorists.

The social construction in policy design theory also helps to explain the role of these very constructions in the messages that are absorbed by policy targets. In this study, and as will be discussed in the findings, Muslim Americans absorbed ideas about how policies were socially constructing them as a group in addition to signaling their status as lesser citizens (i.e. assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki).

The previous section has provided an overview of the social construction in policy design theory, in addition to an overview of the literature that empirically verified the core tenets of the theory. This section also examined the ways in which this theory helps to explain the Muslim American response to the War on Terror.

The following section will review the literature on citizenship in order to develop a full conceptual understanding of what it entails according to various authors. In examining the literature, the goal will be to assess the different dimensions of Muslim Americans’ citizenship that may have been affected by the policies of the War on Terror.

Citizenship

The concept of citizenship is of critical importance in the social construction in policy design framework. The literature on citizenship includes different conceptualizations of what citizenship includes, with many scholars moving beyond citizenship as legal status alone. For
example, Bozniak (2000) envisions citizenship as encompassing of four aspects. The four aspects include: (1) “citizenship as a legal status” (p. 456); (2) “citizenship as rights” (p. 463); (3) “citizenship as political activity” (p. 470); and (4) “citizenship as identity/solidarity” (p. 479). The first component, “citizenship as a legal status,” denotes “formal or nominal membership in an organized political community” (p. 456). The second component, “citizenship as rights,” refers to the possession of rights as a means of claiming citizenship. The third component “citizenship as political activity,” refers to “active engagement in a political community” (p.455). The last component, citizenship as “identity/solidarity,” refers to “the quality of belonging - the felt aspects of community membership” (p. 479) The last component that Bosniak (2000) mentions is consistent with the work of other scholars who argue that citizenship encompasses more than a set of legal rights between and individual and the state.

The idea of cultural citizenship is one that offers an expansion of Bosniak’s idea of inclusion as citizenship. Applying the ideas of cultural citizenship to the Chinese diaspora population in Central America and Panama, Siu (2001) succinctly describes the literature on cultural citizenship (Benmayor, Torruellas, & Juarbe, 1992; Ong, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996; Rosaldo 1989, 1994; Torruellas et al., 1991) by identifying two different lines of thinking in terms of the boundaries and characteristics of cultural citizenship of thinking. I will apply a definition of cultural citizenship that is based on the overlap between competing definitions. According to Siu (2001), scholars addressing cultural citizenship agree that:

Cultural citizenship hence attends to the different understandings, perspectives, and experiences of citizenship for differently positioned groups. It focuses on how belonging is enacted and constituted in quotidian practices of inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, cultural citizenship extends the conventional understanding of citizenship as a legal-juridical category to include the qualitative and differential experiences of citizenship in everyday interactions and situations. (p. 9)
This idea of cultural citizenship is particularly salient to Muslim Americans as they experience inclusion and exclusion outside of laws and policies. In fact, many members of the sample in this study pointed to consequences of policies in terms of societal treatment - thus the concept of cultural citizenship helps in providing context for the Muslim American experience. Baker and Shryock (2009) share this sentiment, stating that citizenship “has dimensions that function apart from the strict legality of this status, and these dimensions produce systematic and pervasive inequalities” (p. 9). This notion of citizenship leads to questions about the nation-state and who is perceived to belong within it.

Jackson (2005) states that “critical to maintaining the nation-state and the collective identity of its citizens therefore, is the notion of difference; there has to be a series of identity markers to differentiate those who belong to the community and those who do not” (p. 61). Several studies such as Nadine Naber’s (2006), which involved conducting interviews with Arabs and Muslims, provide a number of examples that elucidate the concept of cultural citizenship. Naber (2006) includes an anecdote from a study participant about being harassed on the bus. The interview subject narrated the following:

I was harassed on the bus. I was going to a meeting. Some guy came up to me. He was this huge white dude. I was on the L train. I was wearing all black and a lot of kohl. Maybe that threw him off. ‘We should have f*ing blew up your country you goddam terrorist. You f*ing Afghan. You fucking Muslim.’ He goes, ‘Maybe I should f*ing kill you right now.’ He was yelling this right in my face. About 300 pounds and nobody on the bus did anything. They all just watched. I just shut up. Stayed very calm. I got off the bus and I was almost sure he was going to follow me, but he didn’t, thank God. (p. 246)

This anecdote communicates in part the essence of cultural citizenship, where individuals are tested as being a part of the polity through everyday interactions with other members of society.

Cainkar and Maira (2005) speak to the concept of cultural citizenship in the context of Arab/Muslim/South Asian Americans. Their argument focuses specifically on criminalization
and cultural citizenship and the ways that they operate as exclusionary mechanisms. Cainkar and Maira (2005) define criminalization as “a process by which the state creates and enforces penalties for actions its claims violates public safety” (p. 2), and as an uneven process applied to different groups that “centers on state policies objectively unrelated to public harm and on selective enforcement of laws so that particular groups are penalized, but not others” (p. 2). According to the authors, criminalization and cultural citizenship intersect and these two concepts operate together to effectively exclude these groups politically and culturally. To that end, they state “Arab and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. have been denied their rights not only by official state policies, but also by representations that construed these groups outside the bounds of U.S. cultural citizenship” (pp. 3-4). Cultural citizenship is, in this context, a function of criminalization in the form of state policies, both of which diminish the citizenship rights of Arab/Muslim/South Asian Americans.

Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2002) provides another analysis of citizenship which provides more nuance of this concept in the American context. Glenn (2002) focuses on the role of race and gender in the construction of citizenship. Unlike other scholars who adhere to the idea of the “American Creed,” where deviations from equality in citizenship in the U.S. are seen as exceptional, Glenn (2002) argues instead that inequality in American citizenship has been the norm rather than the exception. The works of other authors support Glenn’s assertion that citizenship in the United States has embodied fundamental inequality (Ringer, 1983; Smith, 1997).

Glenn (2002) pieces together the history of citizenship through the experiences of various groups, and argues that,

Citizenship is not just a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging, including recognition by other members of the community. Formal law and legal rulings
create a structure that legitimates the granting or denial of recognition. The maintenance of boundaries, however, relies on ‘enforcement’ not only by designated officials but also by so-called members of the public. (p. 53)

Glenn’s (2002) analysis goes beyond the idea of “belonging,” arguing for a breakdown of the concept to include ideas of standing, nationality, and allegiance. According to Glenn (2002), standing in citizenship means that one is “recognized as a full adult capable of exercising choice and assuming responsibility” (p. 54). Nationality includes the idea of “being identified as part of a people who constitute a nation, whether corresponding to the boundaries of a nation state or not” (p. 54). Lastly, Glenn’s (2002) concept of allegiance refers to “being a loyal member of the community” (p. 54). Together, these concepts further expand ideas on what citizenship entails and the ability for citizens to exercise their rights as a function of being perceived to belong to a community or society.

Glenn (2010) also expands on the concept of cultural citizenship in her discussion on how members of society protect or work against discriminatory laws. To that end, Glenn (2010) asserts that “citizenship is not just a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging by other members of the community. Community members participate in drawing the boundaries of the citizenship and who is entitled to civil, political, and social rights by granting or withholding recognition” (p. 3). In this conception, therefore, community is intimately tied to one’s ability to claim citizenship rights.

The concepts of citizenship that are elaborated upon above challenge the notion of citizenship as encompassing of rights vis-à-vis the state. Introducing concepts such as inclusion and belonging broaden the lens through which one’s citizenship in a country can be diminished. Further understanding citizenship through a broader lens provides a necessary extension to understanding the range of policy impacts, whether felt by intervention from the
state or societal reactions to policies that target a given specific group. The experience of Muslim Americans who have suffered from both government policies and societal backlash in the form of, for example, hate crimes underscores the need for definitions of citizenship that take into account lived experiences that impede a citizen’s ability to exercise their rights.

Applications of Citizenship Discourse to Muslim Americans

Similar to other minority groups in the United States, Muslims and Muslim Americans have been subject to narratives that have categorized them as good versus bad immigrants/citizens. Engle (2004) writes on this narrative concerning Muslims in particular in her article, “Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism).” To this end, she describes the ways in which “good” and “bad” citizens are expected to behave, and describes the differential treatment that occurs depending on whether or not one is seen as a good versus bad citizen. Engle (2004) relies on the cases of Hamdi, Padilla, and Lindh to position her argument that the narrative around good versus bad citizens relies on, in part, the racial/ethnic background of the perpetrator. To this end, she maintains that John Walker Lindh had access to federal courts because of his identity as White, whereas Hamdi and Padilla, who were Saudi Arabian and Puerto Rican respectively, were denied this right. This hierarchy of granted rights, according to Engle, signifies that citizenship in the case of Hamdi and Padilla is “fragile” (p. 97).

This delineation between good citizen and good aliens is used, according to Engle (2004), as a means of legitimating the War on Terrorism. In order to be a “good citizen,” Muslims must show themselves to be eager supporters of the War on Terror and to participate in sanctioning “bad aliens and citizens” (p. 100). Engle (2004) writes that one way of sanctioning “bad aliens and citizens,” came from a government initiate, whereby a guide titled *Citizen’s Preparedness Guide* was released. The guide instructs citizens to:
Be Aware. Get to know your neighbors at home and while traveling. Be on the lookout for suspicious activities such as unusual conduct in your neighborhood, in your workplace, or while traveling. Learn to spot suspicious packages, luggage, or mail abandoned in a crowded place like an office building, an airport, a school, or a shopping center. (As cited in Engle, 2004, p.102)

Engle (2004) also argues that “good Muslims, must do more than not challenge the state by keeping their Islam private, by being part of a ‘docile, individuated, deactivated citizenry,’ they must demonstrate their allegiance to the United States by supporting it in efforts to fight the war on terrorism” (p.109). This demonstrated allegiance is taken for granted by non-Muslim Americans, who are assumed to be on the “right” side as Engle (2004) notes, whereas Muslim citizens and immigrants must demonstrate their loyalty individually. This imposed dichotomy of good versus bad citizens has important implications in this study, particularly where Muslim Americans believe their rights to be restricted as a function of being considered “good” citizens.

This underlying idea of good versus bad Muslims is borne out in a parallel discourse which distinguishes the criteria by which Muslim Americans are considered “real” Americans versus foreign others. To illustrate this argument, Choudhury (2013) situates the Muslim identity vis-a-vis the discourse that has surrounded adherence to Islam. In her conceptualization, the categorization of Muslims relies on the idea of good Muslims as patriots who abandon their religious beliefs, while bad and “un-American” Muslims include those who follow Sharia, and/or defend Islam. In reference to her categorization of Muslims, Choudhury (2013) writes that, “the Muslim is a subject that is both political, choosing to follow the ideology of Islam and religious, unable to choose but infused with religious or cultural sensibility” (p. 91).

Choudhury’s (2013) article adds an element to the construction of good versus bad
citizens, such that Muslim values are excluded in the construction of citizenship. This particular argument also resonates with this sample population in this study as this conception of citizenship also effectively restricts Muslim Americans’ rights to freedom of religion for fear of being seen as a foreign other.

The concept of de-Americanization adds another element to the discourse on citizenship. Pinder (2010) commenting on American identity asserts that “even though nonwhites have been in America since the very beginning of America’s founding, nonwhites are always viewed as...
foreigners, aliens to American’s cultural oneness/homogeneity. This is what I call the de-Americanization of racialized ethnic groups” (p. 1). Applying the concept of de-Americanization to Muslims and Arabs post 9/11, Hing (2002) describes de-Americanization as “a process that involves racism, but unlike the racism directed at African Americans, with its foundations in the historically held beliefs of inferiority, de-Americanizers base their assault on loyalty and foreignness” (p. 4). Further, de-Americanization as Hing (2002) also writes, “often involves two aspects - (1) the actions of private individuals and (2) official government-sanctioned actions” (p.4). The de-Americanization of Muslims and Arabs, according to Hing (2004), results in consequences such as denial of national identity and civil rights protections.

Hing’s (2002) analysis of the process of de-Americanization leads him to the conclusion that:

There are two Americas when it comes to race, ethnic background, and who is an American. One is an all-embracing America on the matter of who is an American. This vision recognizes that the United States is a land of immigrants, and that in spite of exclusionary policies aimed at different groups throughout its history, the country is comprised of members of all different shades and ethnic backgrounds. The other America is narrow in its view of who is an American. This second vision is Euro-centric, excluding those of Latin and Asian descent, and as we have seen recently, excluding those of Middle Eastern background. (p. 15)

The idea that Muslims can be de-Americanized is an interesting concept in the scope of citizenship as inclusion and belonging. Mohammed Nimer (2007) adds another facet to the idea of belonging, including in his analysis a philosophical distinction in terms of the connotations around the exclusion of different groups. In this vein, he considers two concepts: un-American and anti-American, arguing that the first relates to incompatibility of a group to American values and culture, whereas the second focuses on the group as a national security threat. Nimer (2007) looks specifically at the use of these terms to describe Muslims in the United States, asserting that:

The history of Muslims in the United States can be viewed in terms of the changing status
of the nature of prejudices towards them. Initially discrimination against Muslims was basically anti-"un-Americanism." The anti-Muslim sentiments of the 1920's through the 1950's were anti-Muslim because Muslims were different, but nobody thought that any Muslim was going to conquer America or that there was an "Islamic threat." However, the situation has changed dramatically in the past decade. There has been an important transition from mistrust of Muslims because they are different, somehow "un-American," to viewing Muslims as anti-American and a threat to American security. (p. 32)

**Political Participation and Political Power**

The use of the literature on political participation helps to explain factors associated with different levels of activity. An equally important component of the literature is that which seeks to uncover motivations for political participation. Merging these two bodies of literature is important in understanding rationales for participation because as Platt (2008) notes, “our extensive knowledge about who participates is divorced from the fundamental question of why people participate: participation for what?” (p. 392). This is an important question to consider when analyzing Muslim American political participation, especially in deciphering rationales for increased or decreased participation.

Relating this literature back to the social construction in policy design theory, the framework suggests that public policies have an effect on target populations’ political participation. In the case of groups have who have received disproportionate policy burdens, such as Muslim Americans, the theory predicts lower rates of political participation. Though the findings from this study indicate widespread dissatisfaction with many of the War on Terror policies, a large portion of the study sample responded with increased levels of political participation. A discussion of the literature on political participation is included below, in addition to specific research relating to the political participation of the Muslim American community.
Political Participation Literature

There are several definitions of political participation. Among these definitions is one by Huntington and Nelson (1976), who define political participation as an “activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision making” (p. 3). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) define political participation as an “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make these policies” (p. 38). These two definitions emphasize action as a means of influencing government. Thus understanding Muslim American political participation involves both an assessment as to the degree to which they believe they can affect government and on their actual levels of political participation.

Seeking to find out who participates, Verba and Nie (1972) used factor analysis to determine the characteristics that correlated most strongly with political participation. The results of their study suggest a relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation. Thus, those in a higher socioeconomic status, as their findings revealed, were more likely to politically participate.

Examining differential rates of political participation, Salamon and Van Evera (1973) conducted a study assessing the role of fear among Black Americans. Using an aggregate approach, their study found that fear accounted for different rates of participation better than discrimination or apathy. The study was based on Black Americans in the period after the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and as such the implications of this study suggest that removing legal barriers to participation are important; however, other conditions, such as those that generate fear of participation, must also be addressed.
Broad frameworks for understanding participation in politics also include Hirschman’s (1970) book *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, and Putnam’s (2000) book *Bowling Alone*. Scholars such as Hirschman (1970) have outlined the considerations that individuals make when choosing whether to participate or withdraw from a system, while others such as Putnam (2000) focus on the role of social connectedness and relationships between members of society in increasing or decreasing patterns of political participation. According to Hirschman, when an individual becomes dissatisfied with an organization, he or she can choose to exit and find a suitable alternative or voice their concerns with the hope that change will occur as a result.

Hirschman (1970) introduces the concept of loyalty as a factor that can amplify the possibility that individuals will choose voice over exit. As Hirschman suggests, the function of loyalty is to instill confidence in the individual that things will improve for the better. He adds that “as a result of loyalty, these potentially most influential customers and members will stay on longer than they would ordinarily, in the hope of or, rather, reasoned expectation that improvement or reform can be achieved ‘from within’” (p. 79). In the preservation of a democratic system, loyalty, according to Almond and Verba (1963), is of great importance. To this end, they state that “long-run political stability may be…dependent on a more…diffuse sense of attachment of loyalty to the political system” (p. 242).

The literature above, in part, speaks to an underlying idea of political alienation and reasons why it may occur. Schwartz (2007) defines political alienation as an “attitude of separation or estrangement between the self and the polity” (pp. 7-8). In evaluating an individual’s estrangement from a political system, he suggests a difference between estrangement from certain individuals and institutions versus estrangement from the principles of
the polity. In this vein he writes that, “people who can ascribe responsibility for the value
cflict to some separable political personnel or institution, and still support what they regard as
the fundamental character of the polity, are likely to maintain self-identification with the polity”
(p. 15). Moreover, on this point Schwartz (2007) writes, “an individual may feel himself quite
incapable of producing or even fostering the values he wishes represented in the institutions,
processes and policies or government and not become alienated because the political system
already accords with those values” (p. 93).

Understanding the implications of political alienation is important particularly in terms of
research suggesting a link between those who feel politically alienated and withdrawal from
politics (Baird & Javeline, n.d.). The idea that this correlation exists is one that Schwartz
(2007) disputes in his statement that the attitude of alienation is “significantly associated with
both withdrawal and activism as behavior orientations…” (p. 8). Baird and Javeline (n.d.) also
note that political alienation in the form of disappointment in the system may not necessarily
result in abstaining from political participation. Indeed, they suggest the opposite, asserting that
“just as individuals become dissatisfied when expectations of fair treatment are violated, so too
might individuals become dissatisfied and more easily mobilized when their high expectations
are disappointed and their pride in their country is weakened. In the case of Muslim Americans
in this study, many expressed discontent with the policies of the War on Terror, while at the
same time holding in high esteem principles that they thought to be fundamental to the character
of the United States, such as freedom of religion.

Other studies, such as Verba, et al. (1995) have examined and found a positive
relationship between attendance to religious institutions and political participation, where
church attendance is correlated with higher rates of political participation. With reference to
this study, Jamal (2005) adds that “beyond the actual institutional effects of participation, other scholars argue that the church - especially Black churches - bring together individuals with similar experiences and thereby, instill a group consciousness that empowers political participation” (p. 522). Thus, a religious institution can provide the necessary knowledge and skills to participate politically, while also serving as a meeting place for morale and group solidarity, both of which have been found to have a positive impact on political participation.

**Political Participation Among Muslim Americans**

Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) evaluate levels of political participation among Muslim Americans based on considerations of religiosity and resources among other factors. One of the preliminary observations that the authors make is that there are preexisting beliefs that the Muslim American community is a “politically backward group, characterized by fundamentalism and political intolerance” (p. 4). The assumption that Muslim Americans are not active participants in the political system is also disputed. Though American Muslims have participated at lower rates in the past, these lower levels of participation mimic other ethnic minority groups. Muslim Americans are currently facing the added barrier of the policies of the War on Terror, which have targeted them disproportionately. These factors combined with the great diversity of this group make the application of models of participation difficult to apply. Of particular significance in this study, which was based on survey data from the project, “Muslim Americans in the Public Square” is the authors’ hypothesis that anxiety and alienation of the American Muslim community lead to greater rates of political participation. The authors derive this hypothesis from extant research (i.e. Marcus et. al, 2000), and identify links between feelings or moods, such as anxiety and political awareness and participation, such that these feelings instigate interest in politics and subsequently higher levels of political participation.
Based on statistical analysis, American Muslims participated at a higher level than the average Americans, and that factors such as education and income, similar to other Americans, were greater predictors of political participation than their “Islam.” Referring to the scrutiny and alienation that American Muslims have faced due to policies such as The Patriot Act, Ayers and Hofsetter (2008) conclude that despite popular belief, these feelings of alienation may have in fact had the opposite effect; increasing participation among this group. The authors write that:

These findings reinforce a developing theoretical approach, ‘affective intelligence,’ that utilizes measures of reported anxiety within political science…As we demonstrate in democracies that depend upon political participation, negative events can encourage groups, like Muslims post 9/11, to participate politically rather than abstaining from the process that may benefit their concerns. (p. 22)

Ayers (2007) states this idea in a slightly different way in a previous article, writing that the post 9/11 climate, “provided Muslims a visible claim in U.S. government policy” (p. 195) due to how they would be effected.

Barreto and Dana (2008) conducted a survey of 745 Muslims in several cities with high concentrations of Muslims. Their examination was focused on the degree to which transnational ties affect Muslim American involvement in American politics. The importance of this study lies in the fact that many Muslim Americans have transnational ties and that, as Muslims, they may to some extent be considered with issues involving the Ummah or the Muslim community at large. The authors argue that transnational ties and interest in news from one’s nation of origin will spark higher levels of involvement in American politics. They further argue that Muslims feel especially compelled to participate because of pressure to demonstrate loyalty to America and the because of their awareness of the tangible impacts of American politics in Muslim countries on their daily lives and lived experiences.
Adding to the idea that transnational connections may lead to higher levels of political participation, Barretto and Dana (2008) argue with reference to American Muslims that “as a community, they came to realize their inclusion in the same category as other Muslims who live outside of the U.S. As a result, issues, news, and politics of Muslims who live outside of the U.S. became of concern to Muslims living inside the U.S. Their fate had become connected and transnational ties were an obvious bridge to the international Muslim world” (p. 8). Barretto and Dana’s (2008) study concludes with their findings that indicate a positive correlation between attention to Middle East politics and political participation in the United States. An Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (2012) report, which sought to combine the data that has been conducted on Muslim American political participation, provides statistics from the MAPS study which support, in part, Barretto and Dana’s (2008) findings. For example, 76% of Muslim Americans responded to a question about how the War on Terror should be pursued, by saying that they would opt to change U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2012).

In an article titled “The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness,” Jamal (2005) seeks to examine whether the relationship between church attendance and political participation holds true for Muslim American mosque-goers. (As an interesting side note, despite the fact that Peter King expressed concern over the role of Mosques in radicalizing the population, the MAPOS 2007-2008 study found that higher levels of mosque participation correlated with higher levels of political participation.) (MAPOS, 2007-2008; Senzai, 2012) Jamal (2005) also examines the idea of group consciousness and whether Muslim Americans experience a sense of solidarity from Mosque attendance or if this group parallels the patterns observed in other groups, where group
consciousness does “not foster patterns of political activity systematically” (p. 523). The diversity of the Muslim American community leads Jamal (2005) to consider three different ethnic/racial groups: Arabs, South Asians, and African Americans. Jamal (2005) explains the differences that emerge between the three groups to be a function of their particular lived experience in the United States. Jamal’s findings show that mosque participation is a positive predictor of political involvement for Arab Muslims, but not South Asian or African American Muslims. Similar to studies that have found a connection between SES and political participation, Arabs in Jamal’s study also exhibited higher levels of political participation based on level of education. For South Asians and African Americans, however, SES was not a predictor of political participation. For South Asians, Jamal (2005) finds that the place of birth is a predictor of political activity, where higher rates are found in those born in the United States. In the case of African Americans, Jamal (2005) finds age to be a significant factor.

Beyond the more technical role that mosques might play in increasing political participation, Jamal (2005) also looks at the role of the Mosque in fostering group consciousness, where the mosque mediates political participation. Jamal (2005) adapts the concept of group consciousness by Miller et al. (1981), which “involves the acceptance of the belief that fundamental differences exist between the interests of one’s own group and those of the dominant group. Relations between the groups are thereby perceived as antagonistic and social barriers as illegitimate, resulting in a sense of relative deprivation and discontent with one’s position in society” (Operario & Fiske, p. 495, as cited in Jamal, p. 533). Jamal (2005) concludes that mosques play a role in group consciousness for Arab Americans and African Americans. For Arab Americans, however, Mosque attendance is also associated with political and civic participation. In the case of the last group, South Asians, Jamal (2005) finds that
mosque participation enhances civic engagement but has no impact on political participation or group consciousness.

Several important ideas emerge from the literature on Muslim Americans. Given the highly influential finding that socioeconomic status is a positive predictor of political participation, it is interesting to note that this only holds true for one group in Jamal’s (2005) study. It does hold true in the analysis conducted by Ayers and Hofstter (2008), thus the discrepancy in findings can be attributed to the diversity of the community.

Based on the research that suggests a connection between attendance and religious institutions, Jamal’s study of the Muslim American community demonstrates again that this correlation is difficult to observe uniformly with such a diverse community with different ethnic subsets. In examining existing studies that attempt to explain varying rates of political participation among different groups, Jamal (2005) demonstrates how these theories cannot adequately explain political participation levels among members of this group. Barreto and Dana (2010) corroborate this finding, writing “for Muslim Americans, our traditional models of the American voter are far less appropriate. Not because Muslim voters don’t rely on similar pieces of information and resources necessary to cast a vote, but because the political system in place post 9/11 does not afford an opportunity for full electoral inclusion to the American Muslim voter” (p. 158).

The aforementioned literature speaks to political participation on an individual level. Bakalian and Bozorgmher (2009) expand the discussion on political participation of Muslims by surveying and analyzing the efforts of Middle Eastern and Muslim community based organizations post 9/11. The diagram below, reproduced with permission from Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009), is illustrative of their theory of backlash and mobilization.
In actualizing mobilization and claims making, they suggest that four components are at work. They depict the process as follows with two sided arrows signaling the cyclical and interactive nature between each of the components:

Figure 11. Theory of Backlash and Mobilization (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr, 2009, p.15)

Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2011) write that the post 9/11 backlash resulted in creating political opportunities for Muslim and Middle Eastern organizations.

In historical perspective, using the case of the Japanese as a point of comparison, the
authors suggest that the opportunity structure has allowed for mobilization of Muslims in the United States because of certain advances in law and accountability. They outline four differences which include: “(1) the civil rights laws enacted in 1964 and 1965, (2) the emergence of oversight organizations that monitor the government’s action and call foul when it violates the laws, (3) the success of the Japanese redress movement, and (4) the increasingly multicultural nature of American society in the last quarter of the twentieth century” (p. 93).

The framing mechanisms used by community based organizations (CBOs) in their study sought to raise awareness of Islam, demonstrate allegiance to the United States, and distance themselves from/condemn acts of terror. To that end, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2011) note that the organizations studied in their sample, “did not miss any opportunity to frame their position as bona fide American with views and values in synchrony with the majority population” (p. 95). Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) refer to repertoires of collective action as the strategies used in claims making, including petitions, rallies, and phone calls to elected officials, among others. The post 9/11 climate encouraged the use of different repertoires of collective action such as art, literature, and poetry in addition to the strategies above to challenge their ascribed place and identity. The last component, resource mobilization, is a strategy that the CBOs used in forming coalitions with other groups to advance their claims. In producing this model based on surveying different CBOs involved in claims making post 9/11, the authors demonstrate that rather than retreating from the backlash, these organizations entered the political sphere in a variety of ways that registered their claims as valid.

Mobilization of Muslim Americans via organizations is an important piece of understanding the political activity of this group post 9/11. However, two points are worth mentioning with respect to this analysis. The first relates to the fact that many Muslims do not
believe that these organizations are representing them (see for example Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, 2011); thus, it is unclear what drives these organizations to select and promote issues as they do and subsequently the extent to which they can speak to or advocate on behalf of the Muslim population. The second point relates to the use of framing mechanisms that Muslim organizations seek to validate the notion that Muslims values were compatible with American values. While congruence of values can certainly be argued, communicating their work in this way appears to convey the opposite; that there is reason to believe two sets of values are incompatible. In other words, if their loyalty and allegiance were accepted as fact, why would such organizations need to engage in and incorporate this type of language as they do? In the context of this study, this would suggest that Muslim Americans must, in contrast to other groups advocating for a particular subset of rights, constantly assert and re-affirm their loyalty and allegiance to the United States, which is, in part, a function of being excluded from the polity whether politically, culturally, or socially.

**Attitudes Towards Government Policy**

A key feature of the social construction in policy design theory is the role that policy plays in shaping citizen attitudes and the messages they receive from government. Though there is little research related to Muslim American attitudes towards the policies that have been implemented as a part of 9/11, a study titled “Muslims in the American Public Square: Shifting Political Winds & Fallout from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq,” provides some evidence of Muslim American dissatisfaction of the policies.

**Brief Overview of Study Findings**

- On issues of concern to the Muslim American community, 28% reported constitutional issues, 24% reported racism/bias issues, 11% reported becoming mainstream, and 8%
reported foreign policy.

- 38% of the survey respondents perceived the War on Terrorism to be a war against Islam (33% percent said the War on Terrorism was a war on terrorism, and the remaining 29% said they were unsure).

- 53% of survey respondents opposed military action in Afghanistan, while 81% opposed the war in Iraq (in a separate question, 79% of respondents also said that the war in Iraq was not worth it).

- When asked a question about the reasons for military action in Iraq, 39% said it was motivated by the desire to control oil, 16% responded that it was based on controlling the region, another 16% said that military action was done to support Israel. Only 5% perceived the war in Iraq to be motivated by freeing Iraqi people from oppression. Another 5% reported their belief that the war in Iraq was motivated by the desire to weaken the Muslim world, while 4% believed the war was conducted to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. 3% of survey respondents believed that the war in Iraq was conducted in order to spread weapons of mass destruction, and 2% responded that the reason for the war was to spread democracy. 10% responded that they were unsure of the reason.

- 78% of the study sample believed that military action in Iraq could spark terrorism directed towards the U.S., while 82% believed that the war in Iraq would lead to regional instability.

Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) policy design theory also incorporates the idea of political power as a factor that determines whether a group will be subject to policy burdens or benefits and the degree to which they are able to challenge their particular position. According to
Schneider and Ingram (1993), political power is “constructed as votes, wealth, and propensity of the group to mobilize for action” (p.335). Another element of political power comes from Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), who define power as influence. According to the authors, “the exercise of influence (influence process) consists in affecting policies of others than the self” (p. 71). Djeudo (2013) offers a more expanded definition of political power, saying that it is:

> The ability to shape and control the political behavior of others and lead and guide their behavior in the direction desired by the person, group, or institution wielding the political power…That is to say, political power is the ability of one political actor - e.g., an individual citizen, a family, an interest group, a political action committee, a political party, or the government to effect a desired change in the behavior of other political actors, persuading or forcing the latter to act in a manner they would not act in in the absence of the former’s impact on the situation. (p. 54)

Given the importance of political power in the author’s framework, it is important to examine this concept in the context of Muslim Americans. As highlighted above, however, there is not enough data on political participation in the Muslim American community. The lack of substantial research on this community also affects the degree to which their political power can be assessed.

Some quantitative measures of the political power of Muslims in the United States is presented below in addition to other research that collectively suggests that this group has little political power. The information below, based on the MAPS (2004) using a random sample of 1,846 Muslim Americans, provides a profile of the Muslim American voting rates and political behaviors. The findings of the study include the following:

- 82% of Muslim Americans surveyed were registered to vote. Of registered voters, 95% indicated that they would be voting in national elections.
- Close to 70% of the sample population consider their identity as Muslims in voting decisions.
• 86% of the sample values political participation for themselves, and 82% said they valued it for their children. 95% of the sample agreed with the statement that “Muslims should participate in the political process.”

• 53% of the sample was in favor of coordinating a Muslim voting bloc, compared to 36% who disagreed and 11% who were unsure.

More recent figures on the number of registered Muslim voters come from a Pew Research Center poll in 2011. The report estimates the population of Muslims in the United States to be about 2.75 million, and of the population 66% are registered voters (Pew Research Center, 2011). These numbers are important to consider in the context of political power, as the total population of the United States is estimated to be at 318,892,103, thus the Muslim population comprises a very small percent of this total, about .94%. Further, only 1.8 million of the 2.75 million Muslims are adults, meaning that the total number of Muslims voting would be at about 1.2 million based on a 66% voter registration rate. These numbers, therefore, would suggest that Muslims have little political power, at least when it comes to voting.

Building on this point, several individuals have written on the absence of Muslims from politics. For example, Haddad (2001) asserts that, “although Muslims have been in the United States for more than a century, they have mostly lived on the margins of its political life” (p. 91). Even so, some organized political activity was present pre-2000. Barreto and Bozonelos (2009), for example, write about the presidential elections in 1996 as the first time that Muslims tried to coordinate a bloc vote.

The 2000 elections, however, signaled a rise in the political involvement of the community and for the first time, a group of Arab American and Muslim groups formed a coalition that formally endorsed the Bush-Cheney ticket (Barreto &Bozonelos, 2009; Haddad,
Despite this endorsement and the fact that the Muslim vote was attributed by some to helping Bush win the presidency, the Bush administration was less than enthusiastic about meeting with members of this constituency (Nimer, 2002).

According to Ayers (2007), an indication that Muslims were gaining political prominence was evidenced by the fact that in the 2000 elections, both party conventions offered a space for Muslims to pray. Earlier examples of political recognition of Muslim Americans includes former President Clinton’s hosting of an iftar dinner for Muslims, and the Department of Defense’s appointment a Muslim Chaplain for the first time in the armed forces in 1993 (Haddad, 2001).

While space for Muslim political involvement has opened in the last decade, Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) mention Representative King’s call for mosque surveillance in 2007 and President Obama’s refusal to deliver a speech with two covered women sitting behind him as ways in which the Muslim American community has been marginalized and sidelined from politics. Further, Barreto and Dana (2010) write about Muslim Americans as “political scapegoats that were seen as a liability rather than coalition partners,” (p.157) in the 2008 elections. Adding to this point, Rachel Zoll (2008) quotes the Executive Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council as saying that presidential candidates “are not willing to have their photo taken, they don’t meet with Muslim organizations, and they shy away from any issue that may link them to the Muslim community.”

This community has, in spite of slow acceptance from the large political scene, sought to create political niches outside of formally endorsing candidates. Haddad (2001) describes, for example, how sub groups within the Muslim American population carved out political spaces by establishing organizations aimed at dispelling stereotypes based on their perception of bias in
U.S. policies towards the Middle East. However, there is, nonetheless, a relative lack of Muslim organizations that work on civic and political engagement of Muslims in the United States. For example, in a USIP report on Muslims in America, ul-Huda (2006) provides a list of seven civic and political Muslim organizations, many of which have competing goals and contradictory messages. (Compare the Council on American Islamic Relations to the American Islamic Forum on Democracy). More important, perhaps, than the actual number of Muslim organizations is the degree to which these organizations can claim to represent their Muslim constituencies and on this basis advocate on issues of concern to this community. For example, a Gallup, Inc. report on Muslim Americans found that fewer than 25% of this group considers their interests to be represented by Muslim American organizations (Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, 2011). More specifically, of the national Muslim organizations, 23% of Muslims surveyed believed that the Council on American Islamic Relations represented their interests, 11% said that the Islamic Society of North America represented their interests, and 7% said that the Muslim Public Affairs Council represented their interests. These figures suggest that even if such groups are mobilizing as previous research found, the ability to advocate on behalf of issues of concern to the community are limited by perceptions from community members that these organizations do not represent their interests. With this information in mind, any political power gained by these organizations is undermined by the perception that they do not represent the collective interests of their constituents.

The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) are both fairly new organizations founded in 1988 and 1994, respectively. While both groups actively campaign on issues concerning the Muslim community, their ability/desire to challenge certain policies affecting these groups is limited. One example of this
is a statement by the Muslim Public Affairs Council in 2003 about the fall of Saddam Hussein. The statement begins by saying that “MPAC wishes Saddam Hussein had avoided this war by heeding our call, on December 21, 2002, at our annual convention, and other calls like it, to step down from power and spare innocent lives in a military confrontation.” This statement puts the onus solely on Saddam Hussein and absolves the U.S. of any responsibility in launching the war. Later in the statement, MPAC acknowledges that the U.S. went to war in Iraq without support from allies and the United Nations, but this is stated as a matter of fact, rather than an entrance point to discussing the extent to which the U.S. should be held accountable for the war or as a means of addressing whether U.S. military intervention in Iraq was legal in the first place.

Another example of the ways in which Muslim organizations have abstained from challenging policies that are directly affecting Muslims comes from the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing held in April 2013 titled “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing.” While tens of groups submitted statements indicating their opposition to the use of drones, a search for Muslim organizations opposing the use of drones revealed that only two groups, MPAC and CAIR, submitted statements. The statements by both groups would suggest interest in the issue based on the impacts drones have had on the larger Muslim community; however, CAIR’s statement does not explicitly recognize the use of drones to specifically targeted Muslims in Muslim majority countries all over the world. Further, unlike other statements submitted for the hearing, CAIR’s statement begins with a condemnation of terrorism. While CAIR may have felt it to be entirely necessary to include this statement as a matter of principle, it fits into a larger pattern that participants frequently cited, which suggests that members of this group are thought to be collectively responsible and thus must act to condemn and apologize for acts of terrorism committed by other Muslims.
MPAC’s drone statement was not available in full on their website; however, they did include an excerpt which, similar to CAIR, excludes a specific focus on the use of drones to target Muslims.

Political power as understood by financial contributions is another area where Muslims appear to have little influence. A survey of the Center for Responsive Politics (n.d.) of Muslim American Political Action Committees yields few results and reveals minimal contributions. For example, in conducting a search for Muslim or Islamic political action committees, only 7 results appear. Of the seven, only four have contributed funds. As an example of low financial contributions is the Council on Islamic Relations PAC, which has contributed a total of $24,350 between 2004-2012. Falling significantly behind CAIR is the Indiana Muslim Political Action, which has contributed a total of $7,910 combined during 2006, 2008, and 2012. Compared to the financial contributions of these Muslim organizations, pro-Israel PACs in one year alone contributed $2,977,189. The relative lack of power of Muslim PACs is important for several reasons. First, this lack as evidenced by other data above appears to be another symptom of Muslim inactivity in the political realm. Second, in the scheme of influencing politics, the fact there are few Muslim PAC’s with limited finances constitutes another weakness in this group’s ability to advocate on interests of particular importance to them.

The lack of Muslim influence in politics can also be assessed by considering the number of Muslims who hold political positions (which is a systemic issue for many groups of minorities). For example, there are only two Muslims in Congress, one of whom is Keith Ellison, the first Muslim to be elected to the congress. Though the argument that Muslims are a minority population might be made to justify lower numbers of Muslim political officials, Muslims hold two positions and are .6% of the American population, while there are 41 Anglican/Episcopalians who are members of congress, despite the fact that the group comprises
only 1.5% of the American population (Pew Research & Religion Public Life Project, 2011). Moreover, Muslims in Congress have been subject to a range of verbal attacks by other political actors including Allen West as mentioned above. In entering this sphere of politics, therefore, there is not only a lack of Muslims, but also hostility towards their holding of positions in political offices. Though members in office from other minority groups experience attacks of a similar nature, the socio-cultural context of the United States at this juncture, where policies actively link Muslims and Muslim Americans to terrorism, presents a unique challenge for members of this group.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began with a discussion on the theoretical framework of use in this study, followed by literature that supports the framework empirically. This chapter also discussed the concepts of citizenship and political power. This last section of the chapter will seek to tie these concepts together and relate them back to this study.

The social construction in policy design framework provides an explanation of how public policies create differential citizens. The theory postulates that social construction is embedded in policy design and implementation, and that the treatment that a target group receives as a result of policy has subsequent impacts on their attitudes towards the government and citizenship. The treatment of target groups by policy also has impacts on the levels of a group’s political participation.

Because this theory incorporates the element of citizenship, part III of this chapter provided different theories of what citizenship entails in terms of rights, both in the legal and public spheres. Thus, the impact of the policy design and implementation on citizenship can be understood in legal/political terms in addition to cultural terms. In other words, the impacts of
policies can undermine citizen rights afforded to them by the government, while also affecting the degree to which they are considered and included as a part of the nation state by other members of society.

The section on political participation attempted to provide additional literature on theories pertaining to political participation in terms of what makes citizens most likely to participate and conversely what factors might impede participation, an important element of the social construction and policy design framework. Lastly, the section on political power is included as another element of the framework that suggests that the degree of political power that a group has impacts whether or not they are able to change social constructions of their group and subsequently influence policy decisions in their favor.

The following chapter will delve into this study’s methodology and will provide an explanation of the congruence between the goals of the study and the study design.
CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

In order to address the research questions posed above, this study was conducted using a mixed method approach. Thus, this research consists of a quantitative survey and qualitative interviews. One reason to use mixed methods according to Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) is for complementarity reasons. That is by using two methods, the researcher is able to “seek elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the results from one method with the results from another method” (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989, as cited in Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 62). In a similar vein, Lyons and Doueck (2010), write that qualitative data can be used to “elaborate quantitative findings (p. 103). Cresswell and Plano Clark (2011) outline a number of mixed methods designs, and while none of these designs capture my research design, the design that most closely matches this study’s design is the convergent parallel design. This design relies on simultaneous quantitative and qualitative data collection, independent analysis of each form of data, and the combining of the results in the broader interpretation. While the research design used in this study comports with these features of the “convergent parallel design,” it differs in the weight that was placed on each method. The “convergent parallel design” values both methods equally, whereas this research design is strongly influenced by a phenomenological approach which seeks to understand individual meaning and experience. Thus more emphasis is placed on the qualitative interviews because they get closer to the core of uncovering these meanings and experiences.

Field Research from Start to Finish

Several weeks after gaining IRB approval, I began administering the surveys and conducting the interviews. My study entailed, first, having the participant read the informed
consent, ask me if they had any questions, and then sign the form. Since my research was conducted both in person and virtually, the study participant would either be given a hard copy of the survey to fill out or would be sent a link to the survey online to complete there. Though most surveys are anonymous, in the spirit of using my qualitative data to enhance the breadth and depth of my quantitative findings, I skimmed participant responses to the survey prior to conducting the in-depth interviews. My in-depth interviews were semi-structured, using the survey data at this starting point, which allowed to me hone in on areas that were particularly interesting to explore, such as reasons why, for example, they may have thought a Muslim American would be targeted because of their political participation.

Following the administration of the informed consent and the survey, the next step in the process was to conduct the in-depth interviews. Despite my attempt to interview all those who took the survey, not all participants were reachable or had the time to commit to the interviews after the survey. I conducted the in-depth interviews usually within a one-week range from when the survey was administered depending on the participant’s ability to commit to a day and time. In-depth interviews were conducted in-person, via phone, or Skype. The average length of the interviews was about one hour, with some taking as little as 30 minutes and other taking as long as 2 hours.

I began the field research process in September 2011 and completed it by May 2012. My research generated 87 surveys, of which 12 were pilot surveys, and 76 interviews, of which 15 were pilots. Though as mentioned above, the goal was to have survey respondents commit to an in-depth interview, and while this was achieved on the most part, the discrepancy in the numbers between survey takers and interview participants is because of this.
Quantitative Research

According to Vogt, Gardner, and Haefele (2012), one reason for using surveys is that the researcher believes that solid evidence pertaining to the research question will be obtained and that such evidence can be gathered through brief and structured questions. In this study, a quantitative survey was used for several reasons. The primary reason was to ascertain some baseline attitudes of the Muslim American population towards the War on Terror. As an understudied and often marginalized population, there are limited surveys that address their perspectives on the War on Terror as it relates to their own experience of racism and discrimination. Further, there is a dearth of research that examines the breadth of the impacts of the policies of the War on Terror in addition to Muslim American perceptions of the practice of human rights by the U.S. and what, if any, effect such policies have had on their political participation.

The quantitative piece of this research design entailed a self-administered survey that consisted of 39 questions. The first eight questions asked for demographic information, such as name, age, and ethnic/racial background. Following the demographic portion of the survey, the rest of the questions were designed to go from less sensitive, such as awareness of political issues, to levels of political participation to more personal issues, such as whether the individual was or knew someone who was negatively impacted as a result of their political participation and whether this was a consequence of being Muslim. Following these more personal questions, the survey delved into specific questions determining surveyors’ attitudes towards the War on Terror more explicitly. My survey utilized dichotomous response questions and interval level response questions to quantify responses. Additionally, my survey included contingency questions where a specific answer included a subsequent question (Trochim, 2005).
Because this research design entailed simultaneous data collection, any individual that was willing to participate in my study was given an informed consent sheet to sign, followed by the administration of the survey. The survey was administered both in person and via internet. While 87 responses were collected in total, the first twelve surveys were used as pilots to determine and collect information from the survey takers on the breadth and range of the question and the use of appropriate terminology and the comprehensibility of each question. Following the conclusion of these first 8 pilot interviews, several revisions were made to clarify questions and to address the concerns that participants had.

Quantitative Data Analysis

The quantitative data in this study as mentioned above focused on obtaining basic frequencies of responses. The frequency data was generated through SPSS. Further analysis of this data, including correlations between racial/ethnic groups and responses to questions, are included in the Conclusion in the section on future research.

Qualitative Research

The focus of this design was the qualitative portion. Fundamentally, this study was concerned with Muslim American perceptions towards the War on Terror and the specific impact this had on many different avenues of their lives. While the survey which was conducted provided information on some baseline attitudes and behaviors, qualitative data provided a much richer context and meaning to study participants’ experiences of the War on Terror.

The decision to use qualitative research was shaped by reading the literature that underscored the strengths of this type of research. For example, Lyons and Doyeck (2010) write that qualitative research is focused on understanding individual experiences and “making sense of life rather than testing universal theories of law” (p. 86), which underscores the essence of my
study. In addition, as Heppner, Walmpold and Kivlighan (2008) write that qualitative research “stresses the process in which individuals create and give meaning to their social experience and lived realities (p. 257)” while also underscoring the role of context in the phenomena of study. Cresswell (2007) lists many other reasons for conducting qualitative research. According to Cresswell (2007):

We also conduct qualitative research because we need a complex, detailed understanding of the issue. This detail can only be established by talking directly with people, going to their homes or places of work, and allowing them to tell the stories unencumbered by what we expect to find or what we have read in the literature. We conduct qualitative research when we want to empower individuals to share their stories, hear their voices, and minimize the power relationships that often exist between a researcher and the participants in a study...We conduct qualitative research because we want to understand the contexts or settings in which participants in a study address a problem or issue...We use qualitative research to follow up quantitative research and help explain the mechanisms or linkages in causal theories or models. These theories provide a general picture of trends, associations, and relationships, but they do not tell us about why people responded as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper thoughts and behaviors that governed their responses. (p. 4)

The uses for qualitative data are numerous and as the above excerpt from Cresswell (2007) highlighted, one reason for the use of qualitative data is where there is a dearth of research on a particular population. Because of the paucity in research on Muslim Americans, it is particularly important to develop nuanced understandings of their experiences and to provide this population with a space to articulate them. The importance that Creswell places on “empowering individuals,” (p. 4) letting participants be the narrators of their own stories, and “minimiz(ing) the power relationships,” (p. 4) are all reasons of critical value when considering the Muslim American population. Since Muslim Americans have often been written about, but not consulted, this piece is critical to carving out a place for their narrative and more properly informing the discourse on who and how the policies of the War on Terror targeted. Moreover, by leveraging my identity as a Muslim American, I was able to mitigate the sense of differential
power between the participants and myself as the researcher. This enabled me to solicit more in-depth perspectives from participants because they perceived me as an insider, rather than as an outsider with more complex objectives. These qualifications and my goals for conducting research helped me select qualitative research as an appropriate fit for my study.

Approach to Qualitative Research

Several different approaches can be used within the qualitative tradition. Based on the purpose of understanding individual experiences with the War on Terror policies, this study utilized a phenomenological approach. Cresswell (2007) writes that phenomenology is focused on uncovering the “lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon” (Cresswell, 2007, p. 57). The phenomenological lens also allows us to understand how the phenomenon of interest is experienced Trochim (2005). Moreover, by conducting qualitative research through a phenomenological lens, the goal is to arrive at some meaning that defines the essence of the experience among participants. Thus, in this study, and by using a phenomenological approach, my research will describe the commonalities that define the essence of the Muslim American experience (in this study) in the context of the War on Terror.

Reflexivity in Qualitative Research

Reflexivity in qualitative research implies researcher self-awareness where one introspectively examines their own perspective. More specifically, according to Patton (2002), “reflexivity calls for self-reflection, indeed, critical self-reflection, and self-knowledge, and a willingness to consider how who one is affects what one is able to observe, hear, and understand in the field as an observer” (p. 299). King and Horrocks (2010) state that subjectivity in qualitative research is not a liability and that the practice of reflexivity is important and that it allows for a critical perspective on the role of the researcher and the particular context. The
The concept of reflexivity as discussed above corresponds with what Willig (2001) calls “personal reflexivity” (p. 189). Adding to this, Willig (2001) describes her concept of “epistemological reflexivity” (p. 189). Epistemological reflexivity, as she writes, raises questions that revolve around the examination of certain core assumptions. In participating in this process, the goal is to become attuned to how these assumptions have shaped the research.

Participating in the process of reflexivity in the context of my research was important because of my identity as a Muslim American and my personal experience in the research world in relation to the research that is being conducted. Through engaging in the process of reflexivity, I was prompted to critically approach the data in order to make sure findings could be replicated. This was a particularly important piece in the research, especially as I share an identity with study respondents, thus engaging in this process was necessary in order to be conscientious of not simply applying my own lens of experience onto study participants’ experiences. Furthermore, given the role of interpretation in qualitative research, reflexivity was an especially important part of this research, as I sought to explain the data by considering various interpretations, especially those which may have differed from those I naturally concluded based on my own experiences.

Qualitative Interviews

The qualitative portion of this dissertation research utilized in-depth interviews to examine the phenomenon of interest. The interviews consisted of 24 semi-structured questions (5 of which had sub-questions). In total, 75 interviews were conducted; however, the first 14 were used as pilot interviews. Using the first 14 interviews as pilot interviews allowed me to make changes to the wording so that participants more easily understood the questions. In
addition, the pilot interviews assisted in clarifying and determining when/where questions should be split.

The questions that were included in the interview protocol were based on several different sources. King and Horrocks (2010) include a list of sources where potential interview questions may arise from including personal experiences, knowledge of other people’s experiences, and the current discourse from a review of the literature. It was by using these three sources that the interview instrument was created. Patton’s (2002) distinction of question types was utilized to categorize the questions that were included in the interview protocol. The first type of question that he writes about and which was used is “experience and behavior questions.”

This type of question is focused on the individual’s experiences as the question implies, with the note that the experiences you are seeking to understand are those which any individual could have observed if they had been there at the time. Thus, this question focuses on the actions one took in response to an event or occurrence. Because this study aimed to understand experiences more deeply, I asked what Patton (2002) refers to as “feeling questions” (p. 350). “Feeling questions” (p. 350) are aimed at assessing the participants “emotional reactions,” in order to better understand the feelings that participants associated with their experiences.

In his list of question types, Patton (2002) also includes questions about perspectives and principles. According to Patton (2002), opinions and values questions are different than feeling questions because they are based on people’s thoughts about an issue rather than their feelings towards it. This distinction is made in the type of questions asked, with explicit wording that implies opinion or alludes to it and that which indicates a cognitive process. In this study, these questions were used not only for the purposes of ascertaining perspectives, but also because participants would often respond to these questions with an explanation of how they had formed
their opinions, thus providing additional depth to understanding the Muslim American experience.

The last type of question that was used was also based on Patton’s (2002) list which seek to determine participants level of knowledge related to relevant issues in this study. In this study, such questions were used to ascertain participants’ knowledge about certain policies and to determine whether there was a baseline of shared knowledge.

Qualitative Data Analysis

After having all my interviews transcribed, I began the process of analyzing my qualitative data. Heppner, Wampold and Kivilghan (2008) write about three approaches to qualitative data analysis: thick description, themes and relationships, and interpretation. Of these approaches, I decided to use themes and relationships because I wanted to analyze my research by looking for areas of convergence in participant responses so that the findings could be presented in a more coherent manner. Determining the key ideas expressed and categorizing them into themes is an evolving process, which often occurs in many rounds as Heppner, Wampold and Kivilghan (2008) explain. Through analyzing the data multiple times, the researcher is able to continue to refine the theme until the researcher can consider it comprehensive enough.

As any qualitative researcher, I was keen on accurately representing the findings of my data and categorizing it in a manner that communicated the breadth of my research. Towards this end, King and Horrock’s (2010) basic system for thematic analysis was utilized in this study. The system they developed involves three steps: descriptive coding, interpretive coding, and overarching themes (p. 153). The first step, descriptive coding, instructs the researcher to review each transcript without looking for themes and then to later re-read the transcript and look for
and document information that provides insight into a participant’s perspectives. After referring back to the information documented, the researcher should then develop descriptive codes.

The second step, as they describe, involves evaluating the descriptive codes and determining where any of these codes communicate similar meaning. This stage, as they note is focused on the researchers’ interpretation and thus involves the clustering of descriptive codes into interpretive codes. The last step involves referring to the codes that the researcher created in search of overlying themes that more broadly capture the essence of what is in the data.

In following several of these steps, each transcript was read once, then re-read to determine descriptive codes. Following the second reading, the codes were reviewed for consistency and then the interviews were read once more to determine the presence of meta-codes. Once the process was complete and I had as comprehensive a list of codes as possible, I then began looking for where the themes coalesced to produce a story of the bigger picture.

As this process implies, the coding was done inductively. The analysis was performed this way in order for the research to be more transparent by using participant voices to guide me in the creation of themes rather than imposing themes based on expected findings. NVivo software was used to analyzing this data. NVivo assisted in organizing themes and exploring some preliminary characteristics of the data, such as frequency of words used.

**Sampling**

While the optimal sampling method in research is random sampling, there are many reasons why random sampling is not always an option. For example, in this study with Muslim Americans, there were several barriers to random sampling and accordingly obtaining a representative sample of the Muslim American population. First, the sample frame of this population cannot be known. With estimates of the Muslim American population ranging widely
from two to seven million (Johnson, 2011), it is impossible to determine the exact number of members in this target population. Moreover, tools seeking to determine demographics, such as the U.S. census, are prohibited from asking for respondents’ religious affiliation; therefore, this measure is also of little use in determining the precise number of Muslim Americans. Another barrier preventing the use of random sampling is the sensitivity of the issue and the marginalization of this population. As a community that has been subjected to FBI surveillance, NYPD surveillance, and other obtrusive measures comprising their privacy, cold calling, for example, would have raised suspicion and potentially fear from any prospective participant. With these considerations in mind, a non-probability sample was used. Vogt, Gardner, and Haefelle (2012) state two reasons why one might use a non-probability sample: 1) Obtaining a representative sample is not critical to your research and 2) It is not possible to get a probability sample. The second rationale comports with my discussion of the barriers outlined above in regards to getting a probability sample of the Muslim American population. The first rationale relates to the broader issue of the dearth of information of Muslim Americans. Thus, while obtaining a probability sample would be ideal, my research is contributing to building more literature on Muslim Americans and by doing so, other researchers will be able to expand on my research and incorporate larger and more representative samples in the future.

The specific methods of non-probability sampling that I used included purposive sampling, quota sampling, convenience sampling, and snowball sampling. In defining the target population of Muslim Americans (that have citizenship, not just residence in the U.S.) above the age of 18, this study used purposive sampling to exclude anyone younger than 18 and anyone who was not a U.S. citizen. The purview of this research meant limiting the study to mainstream Muslim Americans, thus excluding, for example, members of the Nation of Islam.
After these designations were made, quota sampling was used in order to include a number of Muslim participants from different ethnic/racial backgrounds that represent current estimates of the demographics of this group. This included, for example, reaching out to mosques, Islamic organizations, and other institutions that were catered towards a particular ethnic/racial group. In order to present a sample that reflects in part the diversity of the Muslim American community, this study used purposive sampling.

Using convenience sampling allowed me easy access to the members of the Muslim American community that I, as the researcher, was acquainted with. This allowed for: 1) a broader and larger sample size; and 2) quick rapport building with Muslim Americans that may have otherwise taken longer. In addition to convenience sampling, this study also utilized snowball sampling. Relating back to the fact that the Muslim American community is a sensitive population, this method of sampling provided access more quickly to potential respondents because previous participants could validate my credentials as a researcher.

**Recruiting Study Participants**

In recruiting study participants, I contacted local mosques, Muslim organizations, Muslim student associations, and other institutions via phone and email. I also met with three different imams to gain access to their respective communities given their role as gatekeepers. While King and Horrocks (2010) write that working with gatekeepers is not always necessary, they maintain that using these gatekeepers as entry points to the population is helpful in establishing connections with participants and in gaining legitimacy and trust. Though one imam was receptive to the study and helped in recruiting participants, for reasons unknown two of the imams contacted in this study declined to participate and/or to notify their congregants of this study.
After reaching out to members of my local community, different organizations/institutions/communities around the country were contacted. In addition to soliciting participation from the general Muslim American community, a specific effort was made to recruit a more representative sample of this community in terms of the breakdown of ethnicity/race, thus as mentioned above, outreach included researching and attempting contact with Latino organizations, African American organizations, etc.

**Research Ethics**

As a Master’s student in Counseling, I entered this study with a keen awareness of research ethics. Thus, by the time I began my doctoral degree, I was well acquainted with the necessary measures that are incumbent upon the researcher to take when conducting human subjects research. In approaching this research, several sources such as Willig’s (2001) book *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in Theory and Method* were consulted. In her book, Willig (2001) provides a list of five ethical concerns that apply to both quantitative and qualitative research that are critical and necessary when conducting research: informed consent, no deception, right to withdraw, and confidentiality. According to Willig (2001), informed consent necessitates that the potential respondent understand what the research entails and agree to participate before the beginning of the study. No deception is the idea that respondents should be aware of the research in its entirety and the right to withdraw. Debriefing entails informing the participant about the full scope of the research and providing them with a copy of the results. Last, but not least, Willig (2001) mentions confidentiality as an important piece of the research process which protects participants from disclosure of any identifying details.
With this in mind, and prior to administering either the survey or the in-depth interviews, I made sure that participants had read and signed the informed consent and would also ask if they had any questions prior to beginning either the survey or in-depth interviews. The content, goal, and process of the study was also fully disclosed so that participants were thoroughly informed about my study and answered any questions that rose in this regard. Participants typically began the study with the survey followed by the in-depth interview, and after completion in the process participants were asked if they had any questions for the researchers and were briefed on the timeline in terms of the expected completion date. Lastly, as confidentiality was critical to the study, it was of course mentioned in the informed consent and reiterated throughout the process when/where the participants had any particular concerns in this regard.

Research Quality and Credibility

In conducting research of any magnitude, it is incumbent upon the researcher to adhere to the highest ethical standards and to ensure that the research they produce is of the highest quality. While my dissertation is a mixed method study, it was also exploratory. There were several reasons why this research was conducted as an exploratory study, with the most important factor being the dearth of research on Muslim Americans. The lack of research on Muslim Americans, the differing population estimates, and the fear of speaking out among Muslim Americans as discussed above posed difficulties in estimating an accurate population frame. Moreover, because of the sensitivity of this population, a random sample (of the frame that I was aware of) would not have been appropriate. Though this means that the study results cannot be generalized to the large population of Muslim Americans, it does provide fodder for future investigations of this population and can, coupled with existing literature, be used with caution. Further, through building the knowledge base on Muslim Americans, this study will
hopefully enable other researchers in the future to conduct larger studies with representative 
samples to describe the community at large.

Because the focus of my research was the qualitative portion, this section will discuss the 
criteria used to ensure that the research was of high quality. Trochim (2005) suggests alternative 
criteria for judging qualitative research in order to better contextualizes qualitative data. 
Trochim (2005) likens internal validity in quantitative research to credibility in qualitative 
research; external validity in quantitative research to transferability in qualitative research; 
reliability in quantitative research to dependability in qualitative research; and objectivity in 
quantitative research to confirmability in qualitative research. The criteria of credibility is 
ensured by having the participants themselves evaluate the findings, and when and where 
possible, I asked respondents to look over my results. As discussed above, because this study 
used a non-probability sample for my study (in both the quantitative and qualitative pieces), the 
results of my findings would not be considered to be transferable; however, according to 
Trochim (2005), the researcher’s ability to transfer the findings can increase if factors such as 
context and other things are adequately accounted for. This included, for example, a 
consideration of when different interviews took place compared with any substantive changes 
that were happening in the “real world,” such as new policies or measures that related to the War 
on Terror. Last, but not least, two measures were taken to confirm the results of the study: 1) the 
evaluation of the data for examples that contradicted core findings and adjusting them 
accordingly, and 2) the active engagement in the process of reflexivity so that I was keenly 
aware of my subjectivities as a researcher and can describe my role and perspective in as a 
transparent a way as possible.
Patton (2002) also discusses how to enhance the quality of qualitative research and he includes a discussion of credibility. Patton (2002) lists three criteria for evaluating the credibility of qualitative research. These include the employing of rigorous methods, credibility of the researcher, and the philosophical belief in the utility of qualitative research.

With this criterion in mind, I tried to make sure that my research was as credible as possible. In terms of employing rigorous research methods, Patton (2002) also includes as a piece of this, the researchers’ consideration of alternative explanations. Taking this point into consideration, the coding of the data was carefully reviewed to make sure that participant perspectives under each theme accurately described the coding schemata. Cases were also examined per Patton’s (2002) criteria which deviated from the majority of cases in order to “broaden the ‘rule,’ change the ‘rule’ or cast doubt on the ‘rule’ altogether” (p. 554). Another aspect of employing rigorous methods is triangulation. In this study, though less emphasis was placed on the quantitative portion, the survey was still used to triangulate some of the results from my interviews, recognizing of course that each methodology is used to solicit specific types of information.

Taking researcher credibility into consideration meant that I: a) was transparent about my background and experiences, and b) evaluated the extent to which these factors may have influenced my findings. In the Chapter 1, I document my background and experiences for the reader, and earlier in this chapter I described how I engaged in the process of reflexivity to contextualize my findings. In doing so, I believe that I created an honest account of my own position as a researcher and thus, enhanced the study’s credibility.

The last criteria that Patton (2002) mentions, is the “philosophical belief in the value of qualitative inquiry” (p. 571). Though my study was a mixed method study, I chose to place
significant emphasis on the qualitative piece. My decision to do so was based on my belief that qualitative methods were necessary in soliciting deeper and more thorough explanations of participants’ experiences and perspectives and that quantitative methods could not serve this purpose. In addition, my particular focus within the qualitative piece on utilizing a phenomenological approach was something I valued as a researcher because I believe that understanding the essence of individual experience is critical to producing thoughtful, nuanced, research.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlined the use of both qualitative and quantitative research methods that were used in this study. Further, this chapter elaborated on the reflexivity of the researcher, access to the study population, and methods of data analysis. The next chapter will reveal the findings of the study based on the use of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews.
This focus of this chapter will be on presenting the findings of this study. In an effort to integrate the themes that arose from the surveys and interviews, the quantitative and qualitative data analysis will be presented together. As mentioned earlier, the quantitative survey provides information related to baseline frequencies of Muslim American attitudes and behaviors in response to the War on Terror, while the qualitative interviews form the crux of this study and provide in-depth explanations for the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by members of the sample population.

The two tables below include the demographics of the survey sample and the interview sample. As the table below shows, the sample population for the surveys was almost equally split between males and females. In terms of age, the age range between 26-33 constituted the highest percentage of participants. This sample displayed high levels of education, with over 75% holding a bachelor’s degree or graduate degree. Lastly, the demographics related to race/ethnicity show that a majority of the study population was comprised of Asians and Middle Easterners.

The interview demographics below show similar results to the survey in terms of the breakdown of gender, age, level of education, and racial/ethnic background. As stated earlier, the goal of the study was to both survey and interview participants, however, in many instances this was not possible due to time constraints on the side of participants and/or a lack of response asking for survey or interview completion.
In discussing the findings from this study, this section will proceed by presenting broad, overarching questions pertaining to respondents’ perspectives on the War on Terror, including the rationale and the target population. Following a discussion on these findings, the remaining results will be presented in terms of frequency and relevance to theoretical framework.
Table 5: Interview Sample Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAMPLE SIZE</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34-41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Education or Less</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate’s Degree/Some College</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate/Professional Degree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American/Black</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Mixed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emergent Themes

Purpose of the War on Terror

With the goal of understanding participant orientations towards the government as a result of policy, the qualitative portion of this study asked participants to respond to the question of what they thought the War on Terror entailed. As the table below demonstrates, over 70% of respondents believed that the War on Terror was based on reasons other than preventing terrorism or protecting national security.
Though a little over 25% of respondents attributed the War on Terror to national security, approximately half of this group expressed doubt in some form. In other words, they made a distinction between the purported goal of the War on Terror as a means of fighting terrorism/protecting national security, and what was actually being accomplished. Of those expressing doubt, one participant commented that, “it seems like the war on terror is meant to target terrorism or target those that are trying to harm the U.S. or harm its citizens or harm its government, but it doesn’t seem to be doing that.” (Participant #34; November 5, 2011). In a similar vein, another participant stated that:

My understanding of the War on Terror is really to go after those groups and individuals who are there to cause harm to the national security of the U.S. With that, because the definition for me is always, it’s always stated in a very broad way. It’s used really for every incidence of the so-called terror plot. Or terror, you know, they believe the
government believes that there is a terror incident or not even a terror incident…
( Participant #5; October 31, 2011)

These results reveal that even among those who could attribute the War on Terror in part to
protecting national security there was a certain level of skepticism. More broadly, and in
reference to the other reasons stated for the War on Terror, respondents overwhelmingly
exhibited distrust of government motivations. Commenting on the reason for War on Terror as
motivated by economic reasons, one participant stated that:

So to reinforce this military imperialist policy, to keep control of you know, colonized
nations - and, and that’s the real issue here, it’s not Islam. It’s really not Islam. I mean
basically our government doesn’t really care about anybody’s religion. They just want to
keep control of, you know, the economic resources. So, there’s the foreign policy to
maintain the empire. And the internal policy to, you know, maintain that because so
many Muslims are sensitive to the effects of colonialism. Although, I think you know,
we mislabel as you know, radical extremist Muslims, you know, these are people who are
very sensitive to the effects of colonialism. I don’t see them addressing the economic and
political problems, but rather perceiving it as a religious ideological struggle. And you
know, one can argue about the ideological struggle. But, really it’s all about economics.
( Participant #21; October 21, 2011)

The sentiments expressed in this participant’s statement were echoed throughout many of the
responses from other participants. Thus, in answering this question, participants were expressing
negative orientations towards government in general pertaining to reasons for the War on Terror.

Related to the purpose of the War on Terror were participants’ perceptions of whether
Muslims were the targets of these policies. Eighty percent of the survey respondents indicated
that the War on Terror had affected Muslims. As a follow-up to this question, those who
responded affirmatively to whether or not they had observed a change in the policies of the War
on Terror affecting Muslims was a question asking respondents about their perceptions on the
direction of the change. As the table below indicates, more than 60 of the 75 survey participants
indicated that their belief that the change in policies towards Muslims was either negative or very
Given the fact that Muslim Americans viewed a change in the War on Terror policies as being negative, there was a little surprise that a majority of participants revealed feeling that they were the targets of the policies as expressed through the qualitative interviews.

Muslims as Targets of the War on Terror

It’s unfortunate that people have to, the media, and the President has to keep reiterating, like we are not anti-Muslim, like are not, the war is not against Islam. Why do they have to say that? Then they’re obviously doing something wrong if they have to make that distinction. (Participant #59; January 12, 2012)

Guantanamo, I can’t even say the word today Guantanamo Bay and that’s enough said. I mean, there’s hundreds of detainees who’ve never even had a trial, which is completely unconstitutional, and they’re all Muslims, none of them are not Muslims. So to say that this is not targeting Muslims, is just complete BS. (Participant #57; January 12, 2012)

These sentiments clearly express that Muslim Americans believe themselves to be the targets of the War on Terror. This perception was widely held among interview participants, with approximately 63% perceiving themselves as the policy targets. Within these responses of Muslims as targets of the policies of the War, a subtheme emerged from about 10% of the sample population that suggested skepticism as to the way the policies were presented and how

---

Table 6. Respondents Who Have Observed a Change in Policies Affecting Muslims Perception of Direction of Change, N = 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Change</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Positive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Positive</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Negative</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Negative</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent Response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

negative. In contrast, zero participants responded that the change towards Muslims in the policies was positive, and only 3 participants responded that the change was somewhat positive.
they were applied in practice. For instance, one participant holding this perspective stated that:

“we get a lot of reports all the time, we hear in the media about how Islam is not equated with terrorism. And we should never think that our counterterrorism policies or national security policies ever have anything to do with Islam or Muslims. And at the same time, we are still the targeted community” (Participant #17; October 20, 2011). Another participant expressed a similar sentiment stating in reference to the policies that:

I think the design of it is to be just sort of universal, national law, but indirectly, the only ones that I’ve noticed being targeted have been the Muslims, and I’m also now wondering if that will transition into immigrant issues that are coming down the pipeline. So, for now, I feel the Patriot Act could probably be the Muslim Act instead of the Patriot Act because from what I’ve been reading and observing, it’s been focused mostly on Muslims. (Participant #27; October 27, 2011).

Thus, in addition to general feelings of being targeted, Muslim Americans were expressing a noted discrepancy between the purported target/intent of the policy and the way that the policies were actually being implemented. From a slightly different angle, about 20% of this group expressed the belief that the targeting of Muslims was a function of policy implementation, not design. For example, one participant among this group said the following:

I’m wondering if our policies are sort of these generic things, and then we inject our biases into them. It’s like we only target Muslims to the exclusion of everybody else. You know, just because the policy says one thing, because we’re not allowed to say racist or prejudiced things, and plus we can’t say like, Muslims, we need to look for Muslims, you know. But there ways of like us only looking for people who are, look a certain way, you know? So I don’t know if it’s the policies per se, I think it’s more in the way people practice. (Participant #22; October 22, 2011)

In contrast to the 63% of participants who responded that they believed Muslims were the targets of the War on Terror, approximately 22% disagreed in some capacity that Muslims in general were the policy targets. However, within this group of respondents, there was a distinction between those who believed the policies to be focused on a specific subset of
Muslims as opposed to those who believed that the policies were not Muslims or being unclear as to who the targets were. To that end, one participant stated that:

I don’t think U.S. security policy is targeted against like all Muslims per se, I think its targeted specifically against those that the U.S. government deems as being extremists. And specifically extremists, when it comes to whether or not violence is an appropriate means, to, like to achieve a goal...So like I don’t think the average Muslim is pretty much of any concern to the U.S. government. But I think that any Muslim that either advocates for violence, as in like they espouse it on a website or in a public forum of any kind, or Muslims that take like, actively use violent means to achieve political goals, I think the U.S. government in terms of national security policy, is focused on that particular subset of Muslims. (Participant #19; October 18, 2011)

Of those who indicated that the policies of the War on Terror were not directed at Muslims generally were those who believed that Muslims were not targets or that the policy target group was vague or unclear. To this perspective, one participant stated that, “I don’t think the United States is the greatest at applying human rights to anyone. So no, I don’t, I think the, I don’t, I don’t see it as being specifically unequal towards Muslim Americans as opposed to any other Americans” (Participant #4; October 12, 2011). Though this statement communicates the idea that Muslims are not targets based on their faith, this participant’s response nonetheless is indicative of negative orientations towards government insofar as human rights are concerned. This sentiment was echoed among the other respondents who described doubt in identifying the policy targets. For example, another participant stated that:

But that said, I mean the FBI, no matter who they’re looking to investigate, will use these tactics of telling people that they’re investigating, oh, don’t worry about getting a lawyer. Like, these issues of criminal procedure where they sort of bypass, you know, constitutional rights, the FBI generally employs these methods with a lot of communities, not just Muslims. So, I’m cautious to say that it’s just Muslims that are being, you know, receiving this treatment. (Participant #61; February 16, 2012)

Though this participant is focusing on one particular agency within the government, the underlying implication that they are engaging in questionable behavior towards different communities resonates here as well.
In viewing the results here collectively, the majority of participants responded that they believed that the War on Terror was targeting Muslims, while a smaller group of participants, approximately 22%, however did not believe themselves to be the targets. As a result of the open ended nature of the questions and the fact that the questions asked of participants did not directly ask if Muslims were the targets of the policy, 15% of the sample did not respond in a way that confirmed or contradicted either perspective.

**Triggers for Targeting**

Delving deeper into the reasons why Muslim Americans felt targeted, a little over half of this subsample attributed the basis of the targeting of Muslims to three factors: 1) Having a Arabic or Muslim name; 2) Being from or associating with a country of interest (i.e. Muslim country; and 3) Physical appearance suggesting by way of phenotype or dress a Muslim identity. The following page contains a chart that illustrates the frequencies.

As the chart below demonstrates, those who indicated specific triggers as a reason for being targeted overwhelmingly reported their targeting to be a function of their physical appearance, which, as will be discussed later, also pertains to the social construction/racialization of Muslims. As an example of a quote pertaining to being targeted based on having a Muslim

![Figure 14. Triggers for Targeting](image)
name, one participant said that,

I think it was just like this database that, like, so for a computer method it was like finding names that sounded Muslim or something and targeting me. My dad also, at the time, was like having issues like that too where his name would come up. And I know a lot of people have even someone I know with a baby, like an infant. That infant’s name came up. (Participant #59; January 28, 2012)

In this participant’s mind, and those who opined the same reason for being targeted, a person’s name was important insofar as it indicated their religious affiliation, where affiliating with Islam was cause for suspicion.

Referring to the targeting of Muslims based on their country of origin or a country they were somehow connected to, one interviewee commented that:

The Patriot Act, where you can, where they have the ability to look into basically anyone’s records. Something like that, I don’t think that, you know, they specifically had Muslims in mind. But some Muslims would tend to be more of a target, because of the fact that we, we as Muslims tend to have more affiliation with Islamic countries. And those specific countries that are quote unquote more dangerous to the American government. (Participant #69; April 10, 2012)

Thus, this person conceptualized country of origin or affiliation with a Muslim country as an indication that these factors were proxies for guilt, a sentiment that was similarly expressed by those who mentioned this particular trigger.

The last sub-category in terms of triggers for targeting was physical appearance. Participants that specified physical appearance as a factor represented the highest percentage in this group. By physical appearance, participants were referring to visible signs that an individual was Muslim such as wearing a headscarf or hijab or donning a beard. One female interviewee stated that: “you know, for the rest of it, like profiling at the airport, because I’m Muslim, and I wear a hijab, and I’m obviously a Muslim, because if I didn’t have this hijab on, they would never have any idea that I was even a Muslim” (Participant #41; November 18, 2011).
Despite the range in rationales given for why Muslims were being targeted, a unifying point among all of these, which buttressed earlier statements, was the idea of Muslims being targeted because of their identity as Muslims. In other words, Muslim Americans specifying a trigger did not refer to more general biases such as racism or xenophobia. Though these biases may have played a factor, this subsample focused specifically on that which identified them as Muslim, not simply some “other” group.

**Negative Impacts of the War on Terror**

Throughout the interview process, interviewees made reference to a number of consequences that Muslims and Muslim Americans faced as a result of the War on Terror policies. Airport security was most frequently mentioned in the interviews, with 69% percent of the interview sample reporting that they had experienced airline profiling or knew/heard of another Muslim/Muslim American who experienced it. The chart below reports the frequencies of the different consequences that Muslim Americans identified.

![War on Terror Consequences by the Numbers](image)

*Figure 15. War on Terror Consequences by the Numbers*
As mentioned and demonstrated above, airport profiling was mentioned most frequently as consequences in the policies affecting Muslims and Muslim Americans in this study. A common theme that ran through those reporting airport security as an issue was that the profiling was not random. For instance, one interviewee remarked that:

I mean I know any number of people who have been detained when they re-enter at airports in immigration, they go into the waiting room, and everybody in the room appears to be Muslim or Middle Eastern. I’ve noticed people coming out of flights at the airport, the white people come out first, then the black people, and then the Muslims and the Middle Eastern people last, meaning they went through the passport screening the slowest. (Participant #24; October 24, 2011)

Another interviewee commenting on whether the airport profiling was random or not suggested that other groups may be targeted, but that Muslims were consistently targeting, effectively rendering the targeting non-random. To that end, this respondent commented that:

I think there’s definitely an element of profiling in U.S. national security policy. I, you know, I think that it’s just sort of subjective to say that, oh, you know what, I went to the airport, I was screened more often, or my friends get screened more often, but it certainly seems like that. It would be difficult for me to say that this was more than a random screening of other ethnic groups, because I know they do that as well, but I would definitely say that it’s very difficult to be Muslim or Arab or just South Asian without getting screened or scrutinized whether it’s at the airport or in your day-to-day living. (Participant #26; October 24, 2011)

As both of these comments illustrate, Muslim Americans in this study, feel singled out by airport security. This sense of being discreetly singled out or, put another way, subject to unique measures by virtue of being Muslim was evident among the other consequences that participants cited. For instance, one interviewee in referring to the use of informants commented that:

Well I guess one, kind of sticking example is, all these fishing expeditions by the CIA or FBI. So they are going into these Muslim communities, and they are trying to convince the people to plan attacks while it’s not in their minds at all. And no other community is targeted the same way. So that’s one thing. And that creates basically a chilling effect. (Participant #48; January 12, 2012)
In presenting participants’ responses in terms of specific consequences, the findings here suggest that Muslim Americans have experienced or know of others who have experienced direct impacts. Therefore, the fact that Muslim Americans can readily identify concrete impacts of the War on Terror indicates a certain pervasiveness of said policies and the fact that these policies are affecting them on a very local level, at least for the sample in this study.

Social Construction of Muslims and Differential Policy Implications

Constructing the Muslim Image

The theme of social constructions of Muslims rose out of several questions, including the question about whether participants believed that the policies of the War on Terror were disproportionately impacting Muslims and Muslim Americans. The following two quotes provide some insight into the general attitudes that interviewees expressed along these lines.

You know for example, that story about the Marines, you know Marines urinating on dead bodies. It’s not even, the way it’s usually talked about, and everybody will say its deplorable and this is not something the U.S. military does. But at the same time, they always talk about how it’s going to be used as propaganda. But that’s really frustrating, because, you know, it’s always linked to Muslims engaged in unreasonable behavior. (Participant #51; January 12, 2012)

How could people talk the way that they talked last summer, the way they are talking about Sharia now? How could they do that if they extended even the most basic humanity to our people? They couldn’t, and so they don’t. They don’t see us that way. Like, we are foreigners, we are an enemy, we will always be that way to them. (Participant #6; October 13, 2011)

The two quotes above are examples of the attributes participants thought were attached to Muslims vis-à-vis negative social constructions. In the first example, the interviewee expresses the idea that Muslims are portrayed as inherently irrational. Additionally problematic in this context, as the interviewee suggests, is that this construction of Muslims is aiding in shifting the discourse away from perpetrator accountability. Similarly, the interviewee in the second
example also focuses on the lack of accountability as a function of negative social constructions of Muslims.

The idea that a negative social construction of Muslims exists was expressed by nearly 50% of the interview sample, suggesting the salience of this theme to the study sample. Consistent with the literature on the social constructions of Muslims, one construction in particular was dominant among respondents, that of Muslims as terrorists. To that end, interviewees expressed the following two remarks:

However, with, with Muslims right now, Americans as a general and it can include Congress, Senate, government leaders, as a whole are ignorant. And a lot like me before I became Muslim, Arab is Muslim, Muslim is terrorist, Arab is terrorist. You know? People that come from that part of the world. (Participant #25; October 24, 2011)

Unfortunately, there’s a lot of people that, I had a friend say to me that, ‘oh my gosh, did you hear? They killed this guy and he was Sikh and they killed him because he was a terrorist and he wasn’t even Muslim.’ And, I mean, I said to her, “Oh, did you hear they attacked this Muslims and killed him and the Muslim wasn’t even a terrorist? And, I mean, my point was that she was the justification of like this person that they attacked wasn’t even a Muslim, but it’s kind of become okay to think of Muslim as synonymous with terrorist, and anybody who looks Middle Eastern or South Asian is synonymous with being a Muslim. (Participant #26; October 24, 2011)

This first interviewee communicates not only the presence of this construction of Muslims, but also their perceived prevalence of this construction among Americans, particularly government officials. The second interviewee also suggests the pervasiveness of the social construction of Muslims as terrorists in the public sphere.

Constructing Muslims as terrorists also involves a simultaneous process of constructing terrorism as a Muslim crime. Approximately one third of the study sample referred to the way that the terrorism label is only applied to Muslim perpetrators. For instance, one interviewee said that:

The FBI specifically targets Muslims. It is specific targeting of a religious group. It’s not a joke when we say that Muslims are being targeted. We can’t pretend this war on terrorism is just a war on terror. Because, for example the terrorists in, my eyes, there are
these terrorists, who flew the airplane into the IRS building, but who were not labeled terrorists. There were no extra security measures taken because of him. None that I know of, or none that the media highlighted. But make that person a Muslim, and you know what the difference would be… (Participant #16; October 18, 2011)

Referring to homegrown terrorism, another participant remarked that it is,

…an extension of the War on Terror, it’s the domestic version of the War on Terror. It’s now, it’s kind of a Muslim only club. Where, you know, you get these politicians on the hill and in Congress, people don’t want to even think about terrorism that is engaged by non-Muslims, usually White people. And if, and if you try to bring it up, they either say, ‘oh, that’s an anomaly,’ or that person was mentally ill. (Participant #9; October 14, 2011)

This interviewee is clearly expressing frustration that Muslims are being targeted, while highlighting their perception that outcomes in terms of policy burdens differ based on the social construction of Muslims versus, in this case, non-Muslims. As the section below will further elucidate, several other participants echoed this view, which is consistent with the framework used in this study.

In substantiating the claim that differential treatment of acts of terrorism are based on the construction of target groups, and of Muslims in particular, the examples that were mentioned included Timothy McVeigh and the case of the gunman in Arizona who shot Congressman Giffords. Referring to the latter case, for example, one participant stated that, “(it) wasn’t seen as a terror attack because it was, I believe in my opinion, it wasn’t someone of Middle Eastern or Arab descent or, someone that’s really foreign-born” (Participant #5; October 13, 2011). For this participant, therefore, acts of terrorism are also defined by one’s ethnic identity (generally conflated to include religious identity), suggesting that an additional factor in differential treatment of terror suspects.
Within the responses indicating a social construction of Muslims, a subset of this group, approximately 10%, made a link between the social construction of Muslims and differential policy implications. For example, one respondent stated that:

I think it was in early 2009, there was a report that was leaked at Homeland Security that was about the rise of right-wing terrorist groups. And it was very fascinating, it was essentially saying, you know, now that we have a black president, we have the right wing, extremist groups getting really upset and they’re organizing, mobilizing their concerns, you know national security concerns. And rather than responding in the same way they would for a report on Muslim extremist groups, and say, well you know, we really need to figure out, get to the bottom of this, it was a huge backlash and accusations of, you know, bias and politicization and you know inappropriate targeting. So it was a sign that says, “okay you can do it against Muslims, but you can’t do it against you know, the right wing, the average White conservative because that is considered inappropriate, employs selective targeting, and is biased. (Participant #9; October 14, 2011)

Interviewees identified other consequences of the negative social constructions of Muslims. For example, one participant said that “it is more of the undertone of what the policies imply. You know, they, they kind of imply that you have to watch out for Arabs and Muslims in general. And that kind of translates to the general populace, who don’t know anything about Arabs or Muslims, except that we are people who should be feared and that has extremely adverse effects” (Participant #53; April 10, 2012).

Another prominent subtheme of the social construction of Muslims which was raised by about 50% of interviewees was the construction of Muslims as racialized others. Racializing Muslims as described by study participants was a process that creates a discrete image of what a terrorist looks like while simultaneously relying on the notion of collective responsibility that is ascribed to non-White groups. Indiscriminate targeting of members this group was seen as a consequence of racialization. The two quotes below describe how Muslims have been racialized:

As far as it affects Muslims directly, you know, at the airports of course, you know, as I say, I’m a stealth Muslim, I sneak through. I think if they were doing their profiling and investigation carefully, you know, an ostensibly single white convert with my political background should be more suspicious than you know, the brown-skinned lady with, you
know, hijab with her children. But, you know, I skate through, and you know, this sister and her kids are being detained and searched. It’s ridiculous. (Participant #21; October 12, 2011)

I guess I’m kind of unusual, in that I’m a convert so I don’t look Muslim, whatever that means. I don’t look like a stereotypical Muslim, so people would generally not, at least, wouldn’t know I was Muslim unless they talked to me or something. (Participant #55; January 26, 2012)

Interestingly, these two quotes demonstrate from the angle of being White how racialization constructs the Muslim identity in a specific way. Relating racialization to the conflation of Middle Eastern as Muslim, one respondent gave this example:

The example I always like to give is the one of the Ground Zero mosque, Ground Zero mosque, all that. Where these Egyptian cops showed up in order to protest with the locals, you know, with some of the locals, you know, against the construction of the mosque. But when they showed up there, you know, the crowd started booing them, they started being heckled, so on and so forth. They were trying to explain to them, “No, listen, we’re with you, we’re Christians from Egypt, you know, we’re with you.” But the crowd just kept going because they didn’t give a shit. You know, it wasn’t about them being Muslims per se, it was about them being the Other. And Other, I mean there’s a specific, you know, Middle Eastern quote unquote Other. Which is, I mean if you, if you were to try to delineate what that Other comprises of, yeah Muslim would be part of it, but it’s certainly not the only part of it. I think, you know, Arab is, I mean obviously the young Arab male in their twenties is the face of terror in America. Which is I think, something like I jokingly tell my students. Like, ‘Yeah, I’m the face of terror in America.’ (Participant #14; October 17, 2011)

As this example demonstrates, study participants were reflecting on the racialization of Muslims as done by members of society, consistent with the idea expressed above relating to how common certain constructions of Muslims have become. Referring to racialization in the context of policies, another interviewee remarked that, “and for the most part, there have been specific policies that rely very heavily on profiling and, you know specifically targeting of Muslims or anybody who looks like a Muslim” (Participant #44; December 18, 2011). What this participant is describing is actions from the government that rely on a certain conceptualization of what a Muslim looks like which, as the literature suggests, refers mostly to the conflation of Arabs with Islam.
Both social construction of Muslims and differential policy impacts are critical ideas to the social construction in policy design theory. This particular theme is consistent with the literature that highlights instances of differential use of policy tools with Muslim Americans and is consistent with theory’s propositions that target groups receive messages from the design and implementations of policies.

We Are All Mohammed, The Terrorist

Collective responsibility emerged as one of the most prominent themes throughout the interviews that were conducted. Of the 61 participants interviewed, approximately 72% of the sample referred to collective responsibility as an issue facing Muslims/Muslim Americans.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes the distinction between individual and collective responsibility, stating that collective responsibility unlike its two more purely individualistic counterparts, (it) does not associate either causal responsibility or blameworthiness with discrete individuals or locate the source of moral responsibility in the free will of individual moral agents. Instead, it associates both causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups and locates the source of moral responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups understood as collectives” (Smiley, 2011).

Conveying the perspective that Muslims were held collectively responsible for the actions of other Muslims, one respondent stated that:

I mean, we are the group that the United States has declared war on in a sense because of how nebulous the war on terror is. This entire subset of people have been written off as being potential terrorists, and then there’s this idea that’s been fed into the American mainstream, which is that you don’t know, it could be your neighbor, it could be your friend, everybody on alert, you never know who the next terrorist is, which is a horrible place to live, it’s a horrible way to live, and especially when you feel like that paranoia is directed against you, it affects your day-to-day life. (Participant #26; October 24, 2011)

Another interviewee expressed a similar feeling of paranoia, saying that:

So I think there is a sense that there’s a general wariness, and it’s hard to even watch the news without feeling as though you’re responsible for some horrible things that are going on. But I don’t, I’m, I’m not sure how much of it is a part of the government and how
much is a part of the media. I think that this lumping together of all Muslims as though they all act in one particular or have one particular set of goals has been very detrimental. (Participant #43; December 5, 2011)

Not only did interviewees mention collective responsibility as an issue, similar to the implications of social construction and differential policy implications, respondents also suggested that the idea of Muslims as collectively responsible resulted in differential consequences. In this vein, one interviewee asserted that:

That wanted image that they’ve created that looks like so many Muslims instead of, you know, what they’re really going after. And it’s like casting this huge net where you get everybody; and it’s so against the foundation, of the, you know, how the justice system is, like, innocent until proven guilty, but like with the profiling thing, like the War on Terror is just let’s snatch up as many people and let’s, you know, figure out later who was the, who was the enemy. (Participant #46; December 28, 2011)

The implication here, as expressed by this participant, is that an act of terrorism perpetrated by a non-Muslim is an individual act, whereas an act perpetrated by a Muslim is a collective act worthy of intensified scrutiny. Relating this theme back to the theoretical framework that is utilized in this study, when collective responsibility is employed, certain policies that target a group writ large can be employed. Numerous examples of policies that embed the construction of Muslims as collectively responsible include, for example, the NSEERS program or the sanctioning of ethnic/racial/religious profiling of members of this group.

It’s Your Turn: Muslim Scapegoats

Well, it’s really, you know, the same old stuff in a slightly different package. You know, Muslims are the new target, but it’s the same old repressive measures. You know, growing up in the Civil Rights movement, I saw how African Americans were targeted. And you know, the Black Panthers were treated as a major threat. And you know, there were abridgements of civil liberties for all people, but specifically targeting Black folks of you know, who were active in the Left and the community. I mean, my God, bring breakfast to schoolchildren, how terrifying. Yeah, and for the McCarthy era, where my parents were very much affected. As a child, you know, I remember hearing about my father’s boss getting phone calls saying that he should get fired because he’s a communist, and you know, my father was never a member of the Communist Party. We
had friends who were commies, but so what? You know, guilt by association, political
repression, this goes way back in American history. And there always has to be some
target, there always has to be some scapegoat. (Participant #21; October 21, 2011)

The theme of Muslims as current scapegoats emerged in over 33% of interview
responses, with a majority of participants situating the current predicament that Muslims face
within the historical context of the United States. In cases where Muslims were positioned in the
historical narrative of the United States, they considered the experience of Muslims relative to
other immigrant groups to be par for the course. Despite the view that Muslims were enduring
the same mistreatment as other groups in the past, at least one participant considered Muslims to
be in a worse position because of increased access to information. To that end, the participant
stated, referring to scapegoating that, “it’s not new in that sense, but what is I guess, what is new,
is that with like the access that we have to media and information nowadays. Like, it’s a lot,
actually, it’s a lot more public…” (Participant #60; February 12, 2012). In this sense, as this
participant’s response indicates, several features of the Muslim experience are the same but there
are nuances, such as access to information that may be amplifying the degree to which Muslims
are seen as an enemy other.

Tying in Muslim experiences with other groups contextualizes their predicament while
also highlighting an overarching tool used in scapegoating by the United States government; that
of creating dueling identities in the form of an enemy other. Therefore, in the current context, as
several interviewees noted, Muslims have been positioned as the new enemy, a process
buttressed by both old and new stereotypes, biases, and prejudices.

Social Construction of Americanness

Among the emergent themes that are relevant to the theoretical framework in this study is
the social construction of Americanness and who this identity pertains to. Nearly 40% of the
study sample referred to the construction of Americanness, in terms of ethnic/racial/religious background and the role of society in enforcing the boundaries of Americanness. As the quotes below demonstrate, the constructions of Americanness have excluded Muslim Americans in some capacity. For example, the quote below illustrates the construction of American as encompassing of a White identity. To this idea and the question of whether their citizenship had been questioned, one respondent replied that, “Oh it has been questioned. I mean, people always ask me where I come from. Maybe I don’t blame them because I don’t look like I’m American. I do, you know, have Egyptian roots. But yeah, I think people are surprised when they find out I’m American. Born and raised here” (Participant #16; October 18, 2011). Another interviewee, in response to whether her citizenship had been questioned, stated that:

I don’t think personally it has, but what I will say is that, you know, you remember the whole concept of white privilege, and the idea that, you know, one of the sort of at least aspects which I consider most salient is that as someone who’s white, you can sort of criticize the U.S. government and whatever, however much you want and generally no one’s going to tell you to go back where you came from. Whereas that’s happened if you’re not white. And I think that happens a lot more quickly with Muslim Americans, or people who look like their Muslim or you know, vaguely Middle Eastern, that sort of thing. I feel like the threshold for that is significantly lower than for any other ethnicity. So that in itself I think is fairly, I mean it it brings fundamentally into question, you know, identity and, you know, what being an American means and whether you can be an American and be a Muslim, so on and so forth. (Participant #14; October 17, 2011)

This participant’s statement raises the issue of the physical construction of Americanness, such that those with non Anglo-Saxon roots are prevented from exercising equal rights. In conjunction with the racialization of Muslims mentioned earlier, this construction of citizenship as whiteness serves as an additional way of excluding Muslims from the American fold and as expressed above, real consequences such as rights restrictions.

Americanness was also conceptualized by participants, as any identity that de facto excluded the possibility of being Muslim. One respondent raised an issue in this regard that was
problematic to her: that is that she was being asked to account for the actions of another country as a result of her ethnic background. To this end, she stated that:

So that kind of makes me responsible for the actions of a foreign government which I have nothing to do with. While, I mean, I choose to be here. Or I was born here, for some. Well, if I’m a citizen, an American citizen, why am I being questioned, held responsible for the actions of a foreign government? So that’s basically saying, a rejection of Muslims because of being Muslim. Nothing other than that. (Participant #48; January 2, 2012)

Similarly, another participant stated that:

I think that there has been, you know, from other people the sort of idea that you can’t be Muslim and American at the same time, and that the two are mutually exclusive. And that if you are Muslim, your allegiance must lie elsewhere. So I think that’s been the sort of theme that’s run through a lot of commentary and pundits. (Participant #39; November 17, 2011)

Complementing this statement, two different interviewees stated that:

I mean though more people are questioning what it means to be an American, and that discussion is happening. I think that there are a lot of people who are really frightened by the idea of a, like an American identity that’s based on multiplicity. And I think that people are really disturbed by that concept. And so I, this leads to this kind of reaction. Where it’s American, and it’s linked to a superior idea of what it means to be American. (Participant #51; January 12, 2012)

…People are always saying, are you Muslim or are you American? Not realizing that you can be both and, you know, very proudly, be both, which I am. I mean, I never questioned it, you know, I’m Muslim and I’m American… (Participant #66; March 6, 2012)

As the quotes above demonstrate, ideas of Americanness center around Muslim Americans’ dual identities and the construction of Americanness as exclusive of the Islamic faith.

Diminished Cultural Citizenship in the Public Sphere

Extending the theme of the construction of Americanness is the theme of diminished cultural citizenship, where participants spoke in a broader sense about inclusion and belongingness. This particular theme was expressed in direct terms by a little over 20% of the interview sample; however, the percentage increased to 50% when considering elements that
constituted cultural citizenship, such as bullying and hate crimes. Speaking broadly to the idea of diminished cultural citizenship, one participant said that:

But then there’s also really subtle ways where, you know, just your ability to feel at home is challenged. Like, something like Park 51. As you know, like a Muslim person in DC like, was life directly impacted by what was happening there? No. But what everybody was saying about whether we actually had a right to be here if we had a space that’s too close to one thing or the other or that I’m not allowed to own in any way? That says something about my ability to be here. And it’s a subtle. It’s not like somebody went up to me, and they’re like hey, I think you should leave the country. (Participant #6; October 13, 2011)

Participants also experienced diminished cultural citizenship in the form of questions that forced them to assert their identity as American citizens. For example, one participant stated that:

I feel like I have to constantly prove that I’m an American citizen. People always ask, “Where are you from?” Which is assuming that I could not have possibly been born in America, which is really frustrating; I’ve spent my entire life here. Or, they’re always shocked when I speak English perfectly. So I feel like I’m constantly trying to prove to others that I am an American citizen by whatever they want to define American as. (Participant #54; January 23, 2012)

The idea of diminished cultural citizenship came from an example from an interviewee who was commenting on discourse surrounding President Obama as Muslim. To this extent, they stated that, “well look, there was a lot of scandal around Obama, whether he was Muslim or not. And he had to go to, and prove, and stand out to prove that he wasn’t Muslim. That he was an American citizen. I mean, that takes a lot, and there’s still people who are coming up to contest that as well” (Participant #44; December 8, 2011). In this example, the participant is pointing to diminished cultural citizenship by virtue of the fact that the individual holding the highest office in U.S. government was forced to distinguish himself as non-Muslim in order to be taken seriously as a candidate.
Components of Diminished Cultural Citizenship

Beyond ideas of belongingness that caused participants to experience a sense of diminished cultural citizenship, participants also provided examples of more tangible. A general statement made about these instances of diminished cultural citizenship communicated a connection between government actions and societal backlash in the forms identified above. This person stated that:

Because, you know, when government acts people assume that that means, you know, it has a certain gravitas to it. So I, I think that our communities are less safe and you see it in all the cases that people are reporting. People are getting physically attacked, the mosques are getting vandalized, they’re losing their jobs due to discrimination, their kids are getting bullied. (Participant #9; October 14, 2011).

Extending this idea further, this same participant as above asserted that, “People are internalizing the rhetoric, the anti-Muslim rhetoric from the War on Terror, and then they are taking it out on their co-workers, and at work discriminating against them. So yes, that’s in the employment context, I think it’s indisputable” (Participant #9; October 14, 2011)

Moving to hate crimes, the majority of participants indicating this as an issue provided examples of individuals or Mosques that had been attacked or accosted. One participant relayed concerns that not only were hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims, but that they receive little attention. Speaking to this, the respondent asserted that:

Figure 16. Components of Diminished Cultural Citizenship
I get stories from New York about a cab driver just being stabbed for who he is or what he practices. And you know, this should get national attention, so that the problem can at least be addressed and then we can use our tools and resources to figure out a way to prevent this from happening. But unfortunately you know, we only, that that, person, that Muslim was stabbed, you know, by someone he was picking up in his cab, got a little tiny article in the newspaper. I mean any attacks against us is is, you have to like really search for it, and really like know what you’re searching for to, find out you know about the incident. Besides that, you know the media is totally against, you know, presenting the facts and especially what goes on, you know, the atrocious acts against Muslims and Arabs in this country. (Participant #14; October 17, 2011).

One participant among the 10 related the prevalence of these crimes to the discourse around Muslims, suggesting an idea similar to that expressed above. This participant commented that:

But, when they are talking about terrorism, putting the label ‘Islamist, is something that definitely affects me as a Muslim. Or terms like ‘Islamofascist’ and those kind of things. And when those things are repeated over and over again, it creates certain kinds of images in people’s minds. And may end up giving very nasty results - I think there was a mosque attack today, last night, for instance. Those are the kind of things I see as a product of all those years of using that kind of language. (Participant #48; January 12, 2012)

As all of these examples point out, Muslim American interviewees are expressing a sense of being doubly accosted, either by the government setting the tone for these violations or the lack of attention that is afforded to Muslim victims. Combined these examples, as well as the examples of the other violations relating to cultural citizenship, reveal the multiple ways that this group is de facto excluded from society.

Are We Equal Citizens? Explorations of Legal Citizenship

While participants in the study mentioned several examples of ways in which their sense of cultural citizenship had been diminished, another theme that emerged was diminished legal citizenship, which was expressed by over 50% of the sample population. Referring to the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki, a respondent remarked that President Obama:

…killed an American without any trial. Like I don’t know of that happening very often in American history. And it just happened and nobody gives a shit. We have literally and fundamentally given up part of our covenant with this country, and nobody cares
because it was a Muslim guy who got into terrorism. (Participant #6; December 13, 2011)

The example of Anwar Al-Awlaki was cited as a recurrent example of how Muslim Americans’ rights were being compromised. Another interviewee commenting on Al-Awlaki’s death stated that:

So I think that, you know, and then, you know, and then there’s things like, you know, the Anwar Al-Awlaki killing, where it’s, where it’s things that we thought being a citizen protected us against maybe are being protected anymore. And I think that’s because those things are largely perpetrated against Muslim individual, I think it’s caused Muslim Americans who are citizens to feel a degradation of their citizenship… (Participant #23; October 24, 2011)

As evidenced by recurring references to Anwar Al-Awlaki’, Muslim Americans perceived his assassination as a message that they should expect to be treated as unequal citizens. Expressing this idea, another participant said that:

So I think that the atmosphere has changed, and I think that it’s really clear and, even, you know, like there are so many examples of not only outside of the, you know, during the War on Terror, and what has been done in other countries. But even the way that American citizens are also dealt with. That you, as a Muslim now feel like you’re not completely safe just because you have American citizenship. (Participant #51; January 12, 2012)

This view that legal citizenship did not protect Muslim Americans is similar to what is expressed in the comment above by close to half of the interview sample.

I think my identity as an American citizen has been questioned because of my religion. And these policies are very careful not to ever explicitly say it’s a war on Islam. But it’s so inherent in the policies, that yes, I’m seen as a suspect and so, yes. There are times when I’m questioned because of my religion. And I think of it as a result of these policies. (Participant #17; October 20, 2011)

As these statements collectively illustrate, there was a strong feeling that the citizenship of Muslim Americans had been demoted to a lower status which, as the case of Al-Awlaki suggests, made them more susceptible to rights violations. Commenting more broadly on compromised legal citizenship, a respondent asserted that, “the scrutiny of Muslims is kind of, like moderate
Muslims, are, you know, are those that are complicit with American foreign policy or whatever.

Muslims that criticize these policies are extremists or something, you know?” (Participant #55; January 26, 2011). Similarly, another participant remarked that, “I think that any time you question American policy, your Americanism becomes questionable” (Participant #11; October 15, 2011). In articulating these views, respondents were communicating their belief that their citizenship was watered down version that excluded certain rights, such as free speech.

The idea of degraded citizenship was echoed in statements from other interviewees such as the one below who remarked that:

There is no equal citizenship. So you don’t, it doesn’t have to happen all the time, every day to every person to be established. It’s usually just as a general idea. And it usually only flares and come to the fore when Muslims dare to exercise those equal citizenship rights. When they’re in a position, when they want to cash in those citizenship rights, like wanting to be a judge, like wanting to run for office, like wanting to be President. Like you know, when they’re, as long as they act like second-class citizens, which is in the dark, keep your head down, don’t talk, don’t protest, don’t dissent, then there’s this appearance of equal citizenship. But equal citizenship only really matters when people start exercising the equal part, you the equal rights of their citizenship. And usually when that happens, they get attacked. You know there’s a backlash. So that I think is what evinces the second class citizenship and the tired citizenship. (Participant #9; October 14, 2011)

As a function of citizenship, participants were also asked to comment on whether they believed that Muslim Americans received equal applications of procedural justice, with several noting in particular the absence of procedural justice in national security cases. As the table below demonstrates, Muslim Americans largely believe that equal applications of procedural justice are not afforded to them as compared to their non-Muslim American counterparts, an idea consistent with the sentiments expressed above in terms of second tiered citizenship.

Despite these findings suggesting that Muslim Americans feel like they are receiving unequal justice as shown above, few participants indicated that they had faith in the justice system. For instance, one interviewee said that “I’m not saying that somebody wouldn’t discriminate against
me, because I was Muslim, but I feel like I would have the ability to get recourse under the law” (Participant #19; October 18, 2011). Another interviewee expressed optimism about the justice system in regards to Muslims saying that, “I still think the laws are still pretty good, and in theory we are still protected. And when we exercise those rights, and when we go to court, we usually win. So that is a good thing. It hasn’t gotten that bad” (Participant #9; October 14, 2011).

![Figure 17: Muslim Americans as Recipients of Procedural Justice Compared to their Non-Muslim American Counterparts](image)

Figure 17: Muslim Americans as Recipients of Procedural Justice

**Political Efficacy**

The idea that Muslim Americans feel politically efficacious rose out of the survey findings. Individuals taking the survey were asked to comment on whether they believed they could influence government action through their political participation. As the table below shows, over 73% of participants believed this to be the case.
Table 7. Respondents’ Reported Belief That Political Participation is a Means of Influencing the Government, N = 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Agreement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey that was used in this study also pointed to increased political participation as a result of the policies. The table shown below indicates that Muslims perceive a negative change from the policies directed at their group and that they have responded by heightening their level of involvement in politics.

Of those who perceived a change in U.S. policies towards Muslims, 54.7% reported becoming more politically active as far as voting and lobbying, while 41.3% percent reported becoming active with regards to protesting and rallying.

Asked slightly differently, other questions assessed the degree to which Muslim Americans felt discouraged from participating based on general consequences towards the group as a result of the War on Terror. In this case, over 50% of participants indicated disagreement at being discouraged from participating politically. The two tables below show similar responses, suggesting that even when specific policy prompts were used, the majority of Muslim Americans still disagreed with the statement that such measures would discourage them from voting, lobbying, or participating in protests, demonstrations, and rallies.
Table 8. Specific Actions of the U.S. Government Towards Muslim Americans Such as Discrimination, Profiling, Arrests, etc. Has Discouraged Me From Some Forms of Political Participation Such As Voting and Lobbying, N = 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Agreement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Specific Actions of the U.S. Government Towards Muslim Americans Such as Discrimination, Profiling, Arrests, etc. Has Discouraged Me From Some Forms of Political Participation Such As Protests, Demonstrations and Rallying, N = 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Agreement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualitative interviews also offered support in terms of the survey findings.

Reflecting on changes in political participation by the Muslim American community, an interviewee stated that, “I’ve definitely seen, like I never remember before 9/11 there being, like voter registration drives at the mosque. I don’t even remember candidates coming to the mosque. Maybe I was just too young to realize. But I don’t remember these things happening before 9/11, and I feel like they’ve happened since” (Participant #19; October 18, 2011). Other respondents, such as the one below, commented that Muslim Americans had become more active as a result of the policies of the War on Terror. To this end, the interviewee stated that:

Definitely it has. I think at the beginning, Muslims were much more complacent. They were much more afraid to be outspoken and politically active. But I think in the past, I would say, not quite five years, I’ve seen a trend in the political activism of Muslims. Muslims being much more politically and civically engaged. (Participant #5; October 13, 2011)

These quotes were part of a larger trend of study participants (approximately 50%) who believed...
that the political participation for Muslim Americans as a whole had increased.

In accounting for reasons motivating increased political participation among this group was the idea that participation was necessary in order to combat negative policies directed at them. For instance, one participant said, referring to increased political participation that:

I mean I think people have become more politically active because they’ve needed to. For for their mosque not to be torn down. Like, essentially they had to learn about freedom of speech, they had to learn about freedom of religion. (Participant #2; October 11, 2011)

Others spoke to the increase in political participation as a direct result of the War on Terror policies. For example, one participant stated that:

When we started to really need voices saying the American Muslims are a vital part of America, and we feel victimized by some of these policies, and that’s I think it’s been growing and growing since, because we need, we that arm of our community in order to have, have voice and I think it’s just growing and growing, not as big as some other communities are, but it’s getting there. (Participant #59; January 28, 2012)

As this participant opined, Muslim Americans have responded positively to the push back in policies targeting them. Moreover, Muslim Americans in this study, as this interviewee and several others indicate, have encouraged members of this group to engage in the political process through various avenues of participation, while becoming more informed and aware.

Fear of Political Participation

But I think that there’s yeah, on the whole, Muslim Americans are more reluctant to participate politically. Even though they realize what happened in the political sphere greatly affects them, I think it is increasingly affecting them. I think they’re less likely to participate because they fear backlash, and because they fear that there’s nothing that they can really do. (Participant #14; October 17, 2011)

Though less than half of interview participants responded that they believed Muslim Americans’ political participation had decreased, 20% did respond accordingly and the reasons given are pertinent to the framework of use in this study. As the above quote illustrates, fear is seen to be driving the decrease. Fear, was frequently cited as an explanation for why the community wasn’t
responding, though several participants made sure to distinguish between the older and younger generations and immigrants and first generation immigrants. Those who considered age believed that the younger generation was more likely to be active and those who mentioned a distinction between immigrants and their children believed that the children of immigrants were more likely to participate as a function of being less inhibited by fear. One participant noted that: “I think it’s probably made, it’s made the immigrants scared and they don’t participate largely, but then, like, the younger generation of American-born Muslims, I think it spurs them forward a bit more, at least some of them.” (Participant #55; January 26, 2012)

Despite the fact that participants reported a general sense of political efficacy and increased political participation, the survey results below buttress interview responses that indicate some degree of fear of political participation. For example, about 40% of survey respondents replied strongly agree or agree to the question of whether they or their community would face harm due to political participation. However, as a subsequent question demonstrates, most participants, about 80%, did not report facing any repercussions and of those that did, just a little over 13% believed that the reason for targeting was their identity as Muslims.

While participants did not report high levels of repercussions for their own individual acts, as the table below shows, 44% of the survey participants responded that they know of someone who had faced repercussions due to their political participation, with approximately 35% perceiving the repercussions to be due to having a Muslim identity.

To recap, the data regarding political efficacy, suggests that Muslim Americans in this study by and large feel politically efficacious. This is coupled with increased political participation on the individual and group level, though both the qualitative and quantitative data
did suggest that a margin of the population had decreased their rates of participation, largely out of fear.

**Political Power**

Constructs related to political power, such as the ability to challenge policies targeting Muslims, the existence of advocacy organizations, occupying political positions. Degree of political maturity and the ability to mobilize was expressed by close to 40% of the population. The only significant subtheme, however, in terms of political power, was Muslim Americans presence in/ability to hold political offices/government jobs, which was expressed by approximately 25% of the interview sample. There was, however, a split among responses in terms of whether things had changed for the better or worse. Only two interviewees responding to this question viewed working in government in some capacity as both positive and negative. Viewing the situation as positive, one interviewee stated, “…I’ve seen more Muslims in the government, in the military. Lot more Muslims. And there is also, in the military, an increase in the number of Muslim chaplains…” (Participant #37; November 10, 2011). In a similar vein, another participant remarked that, “so, there are Muslim voices in the State Department, I’m sure in the government level as well. Keith Ellison, another Congressman, you know, he’s trying his, he’s working hard to make a positive change in the government level…” (Participant #32; October 27, 2011). On the flip side, were interviewees who felt discouraged by the political space for Muslims. As such, this respondent stated that:

> I mean, just seeing how they treated our current president with the, just the idea of him being Muslim, as that being a kind of bad point, I think that would discourage any Muslim American to run for any kind of, any kind of office. (Participant #53; April 10, 2012)

Another interviewee was skeptical about the place for Muslims in political office/government,
believing that occupying such positions would do little in terms of positive change for the Muslim community. To that end, the respondent stated:

I did not vote for Obama because most of my African American cohorts did because he’s African American. That’s not a good enough reason, and if there was a Muslim to run for president, I probably would not vote for the Muslim either because the Muslim would probably have to do the same thing Obama’s doing, having to prove his loyalty by killing more Muslims because that’s you, know, killing Muslims, maybe that’s too harsh a term, but that Muslim would have to prove his loyalty and patronage, you know, to America. (Participant #28; October 26, 2011)

Findings Summary

Numerous themes emerged throughout this data analysis section. The beginning of the chapter focused on general attitudes towards the purpose of the War on Terror and how it affected Muslims and Muslim Americans. As the findings demonstrated, Muslim Americans in this study exhibited skepticism towards the policies, with only a little over 25% of the sample believing, with disclaimers, that the war was launched to curb terrorism. Related to the purpose of the War on Terror were participants’ perspectives on whether the War on Terror policies were effective or legitimate. Of those who responded in these terms, significantly more participants considered the policies to be ineffective versus effective, and the ratio of participants responding to the legitimacy of the policies was 1:10, such that one person saw the policies as legitimate while ten did not.

Related to the impact on Muslims and Muslim Americans in particular, survey respondents overwhelmingly believed the change in policies towards Muslims to be negative, and over 50% of the interview sample believe that the policies were targeting them. Specific consequences of the policies as referenced by participants included airport profiling, surveillance, and virtual self-policing.
Another prominent theme throughout the interviews was the social construction of Muslims and differential policy impacts. The construction of Muslims was expressed by study participants as inclusive of general negative traits, the conflation with Muslims as terrorists, and Muslims as racialized others.

The construction of Muslims as collectively responsible was also an emergent theme and was expressed by over 70% of participants. This theme of collective responsibility was also related to the theme of Muslim scapegoats, which positioned Muslims into the socio-political and historical context of the United States, where different minority groups were excluded in similar ways as par for the course.

Excluding Muslims vis-à-vis constructions was also expressed in the theme of the social construction of Americanness. Americanness was one facet of identity as exclusion, but this feeling also extended to diminished cultural and legal citizenship among this sample of Muslim Americans. Diminished cultural citizenship resulted in loss of belongingness which legal exclusion resulted, according to interviewees, in differences in this group’s ability to make rights claims.

Muslim Americans in this study also exhibited a sense of efficaciousness and a larger pattern of increasing political participation as a response to the policies of the War on Terror. However, among a subset of the population, fear as a recurrent theme among those who were not politically participating or whose participation declined. Related to this group’s ability to effect change in the political system was the emergent theme of political power. Participants who referenced different elements of political power spoke mostly to the idea of Muslims in positions of political office, with no consensus about whether this was good or bad or this community/constituency.
CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

This chapter will begin by discussing the findings in the context of the sub-areas of literature presented above (i.e. citizenship, political participation, etc.). Following this piece of the discussion, the next section will focus on addressing the degree to which the social construction in policy design theory explains the data from this study.

Post 9/11, research has emerged which examines the impact of 9/11 on Muslims Americans. This body of emergent research looks at, in part, the specific consequences that the War on Terror has had on members of this population. Scholars such as Louise Cainkar (2009), Cainkar and Maira (2005), Welch (2006), and organizations such as the ACLU (2009) and Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (2004) have documented the targeting of Muslims and Muslim Americans throughout the War on Terror. Consistent with this research, a major finding in this study was that a large number of Muslim Americans in this sample believed themselves to be targets of the War on Terror policies and gave specific examples, corroborated by much of the research above, of consequences such as airport profiling and restrictions on charitable giving. Another theme that presented itself in this research is backlash as a function of the policies of the War on Terror; something that Bakalian and Bozorghmehr (2011) and Human Rights Watch (2002) document as consequences of the policies.

The research regarding Muslims as targets of the War on Terror also documents the ways in which the social construction of Muslims has become pervasive and in many cases entered into policy design and implementation (Cainkar, 2009; Gotunda, 2011, Greenwald, 2011, Jamel, 2008; Naber, 2006). For example, the concept of racialization is discussed by several of these authors by way of understanding the process by which Muslims are situated as foreign others deserving of special treatment. Greenwald (2011) provides an analysis of the construction of
terrorism as a Muslim crime, drawing from the adjudication of a case involving terrorism charges.

Similar to the research that terrorism was often framed as a Muslim problem, Muslim Americans in this study relayed their perspectives that terrorism was constructed and defined by the identity of the perpetrator, such that acts of terror by non-Muslims were treated differently and had differential policy implications. Other themes emerging in this vein suggested that Muslims believed that a certain image of them as terrorists had been constructed, and that this image relied on the notion of collective responsibility. Accordingly, participants suggested that these constructions underlie the design and execution of policies, a finding that is consistent with the tenets of the social construction in policy design theory.

As a corollary to the research suggesting that Muslims have been targeted in the War on Terror are the messages of inequitable treatment for members of this group. For example, Aaronson (2012) writes about the use of entrapment and informants towards a mostly Muslim population, suggesting that the government a) targets this population disproportionately and b) sanctions the use of differential policy tools towards Muslims/Muslim Americans. The case of Hassan v. New York City also involves the sanctioning of differential policy tools, with the additional layer of the law as a means to upholding targeted surveillance of Muslims and Muslim Americans. The ACLU (2009) report regarding charitable giving also suggests that Muslim are differentially targeted and that, based on material support cases, they should expect to be receive additional scrutiny by virtue of identifying as Muslim. Messages received by participants in this study corroborate this research, with Muslim Americans providing several examples from government that they should expect to be treated as lesser citizens. Though not all participants believe that they were recipients of unequal justice on the basis of being Muslim, there was some
baseline acknowledgement that such questions were relevant in the current context. This studies’ finding in this regard, also comports with the social construction in policy design theory because of the proposition that target populations absorb messages about their status as citizens and how they should expect to be treated by the government.

Questions about what constitutes a good citizen, as well as the rights that citizens are afforded, proved to be relevant among interviewee responses. The responses from Muslim Americans in this study concerning perceptions of being unequal recipients of procedural justice as compared to their non-Muslim American counterparts underscore the importance of citizenship as legal rights. Further, on the level of legal and political rights, Muslim Americans expressed feelings of exclusion and inability to claim rights, and in several cases described themselves as second-class citizens. This idea fits into Glenn’s (2002), both of citizenship as legal rights and as an extension of that, the ability to feel included and able to exercise one’s legal/political rights. The perspectives expressed by participants also comports with Bosniak’s (2000) analysis of citizenship, which extend citizenship beyond legal rights vis-à-vis the state to include political participation and inclusion. Glenn’s (2002) analysis of what constitutes citizenship also extends beyond legal rights to include the concept of belonging. The responses where participants spoke to mistreatment from members of society also fits into Siu’s (2001) work, which focuses on lived experiences in the public sphere.

Beyond concepts relating to the composition of citizenship and the rights it entailed were specific ways that Muslim Americans study respondents felt that they had to position their identity as Americans and how their citizenship would be evaluated. This relates to Engle’s (2004) concept of good vs. bad Muslim citizens and the extent to which members of the Muslim Americans felt able to express dissent. Further, Muslim Americans in this study expressed that
they felt that their religious freedom was being restricted, thus suggesting in many ways that Islam is considered to be outside of the American fold and that what constitutes a real American, per Choudhury’s (2013) critique, are Muslims who reject their faith.

The theme of scapegoating surfaced in many of the interview responses. Many of the participants, similar to the literature reviewed above, believed that they were part of the historical narrative of the United States where different minority groups experience being targeted. Though they attributed general targeting and scapegoating to the immigrant experience, many responses were situated in a national security context that evoked the history of McCarythism and Japanese internment. This response from participants as a part of the theoretical framework indicated that Muslims believed that such targeted treatment of different groups was to some extent a core feature of American governance.

The idea of ethnicity as a proxy for guilt is also consistent with the aforementioned literature, such as Hillyard (1993) and Pentazis and Pemberton (2009), who elaborate on this concept, writing about how Muslims in the UK in particular have assumed the position of the Irish in the context of the War on Terror. Though these examples span from the UK, others such as Grueber (2006) have reflected on the use of scapegoats throughout the history of the United States vis-à-vis comparisons between the Japanese during World War II and Muslims in the current War on Terror, a historical narrative which interviewees believed themselves to be a part of as a group.

In reference to one of the key pieces of the social construction in policy design theory, political participation was a key part of this study. The research on political participation is vast, with scholars such as Verba and Nie (1972) discovering a correlation between socioeconomic status and political participation, and others such as Salamon and Van Evera (1973) who use fear
as a measure of understanding different levels of political participation between groups. Others such as Ayers and Hofstter (2008) examine and find anxiety and fear as factors leading to increased political participation among the Muslim American population. Miller and Krosnick (2004) also find a correlation between threat and political participation, such that threat becomes a political activator. Schwartz (1979) examines the concept of political alienation and disputes previous literature suggesting that political alienation necessarily leads to withdrawal. In fact, as he notes, estrangement from politics may not necessarily result if an individual identifies with the fundamental principles of the polity. Approached at a different angle, empirical studies utilizing the social construction in policy design framework suggest correlations between policies that incorporate negative social constructions of a group into design and implementation and subsequent declines in political participation.

The findings in this study corroborate much of the research on political participation mentioned above. Over 50% of Muslim Americans in this study reported an increase in political participation, while a much smaller percentage (20%) reported a decrease. Consistent with the literature that suggest a relationship between fear, anxiety, and political participation, several interviewees indicated that their increased level of political participation was a response to policies that were targeting and jeopardizing some of their most essential rights. Further, many individuals spoke about exercising their rights as citizens by way of constitutional principles, suggesting that while this group may feel alienated from the particular policies in place and the actors in charge with designing and executing these policies, they still identified with American ideals.

Despite the increase in political participation that was noted by a majority of participants, many study respondents across the surveys and interviewees did indicate fear as a reason for not
participating or decreasing levels of participation. This is consistent with the social construction in policy design framework that asserts a connection between the policies and political participation such that groups that receive negative treatment from the government are expected to view themselves as politically ineffectual and withdraw from politics.

The discussion above focused on relating the emergent themes from the study to different pieces of the literature review. This next section will consider the overall findings in the context of the theoretical framework of use in this study.

The social construction in policy design framework articulates a set of relationships between public policies and subsequent attitudes towards citizenship and government. The framework also proposes a relationship between public policy and political participation. Several specific propositions are advanced by this theory. For example, the theory suggests that policy sends messages about deservingness and citizenship. This proposition proved to be relevant in this study where Muslim Americans took cues from government policy that they were lesser citizens. The idea that policy shaped deservingness was also echoed in the study’s findings as study respondents articulated differential policy implications based on their identities as Muslim. This particular point is also a crucial proposition in this theory, that different behaviors from different target groups yield different policies. Thus, for example, participants articulated how acts of terrorism by non-Muslims were either dismissed as acts of terrorism despite fitting the definition or were de-emphasized.

This framework also puts forth the proposition that the tools used with different target groups “send messages to the broader public about characteristics of the target group” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 96). This particular idea was also voiced throughout the interviews where Muslim Americans articulated the role of policy in constructing negative images of Muslims and
fostering the notion of collective responsibility. As a corollary to this point, Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that the selection of specific policy targets relies on the connection that is between a given group and the particular policy issue. As pre and post 9/11 policy demonstrates, policies targeting this group have effectively relied on establishing this connection, made easier by certain events and the removing of attention away from violence from other groups. Consistent with this literature and in the context of the theory, Muslim Americans in this study believed that their acts of terrorism were the only ones problematized.

The framework that Ingram and Schneider propose also includes the element of political power and the combined impact of political power and the social construction of different groups in the creation of policy design. The literature above speaks to the negative social constructions of Muslims that have been created, while the research on the political power of Muslim Americans points to the fact that Muslim Americans have little political power (Bonzelos, 2009; Haddad, 2001). Though not asked directly, elements of political power was articulated in less than 40% of the interview responses, suggesting the lack of salience in this theme for Muslim Americans in terms of understanding themselves as a political body advocating as a collective group in their best interests. Though more respondents perceived the situation to be more positive than negative, of those who did view the situation as positive, only one interviewee commented specifically on tangible and visible outcomes of the Muslim presence in politics and government. This finding coupled with the intersectionality that Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997, 2005) propose between social construction and political power helps to explain, in part, Muslims and Muslim Americans’ inability to significantly challenge policies directed towards them.
Empirical studies verifying the social construction in policy design theory provide additional context for interpreting the findings of this study. For example, Mettler and Soss’ (2004) work focuses on how policies create different classes of citizens, such that punitive measures such as surveillance, “stamp recipients as inferior” (p. 61). This hierarchical notion of citizenship was also articulated by Muslim Americans, especially where they perceived themselves to be subject to special measures such as entrapment and mosque infiltration - something they suggested would not be done with other communities.

Other findings involving empirical verification of the social construction in policy design theory involves the relationship between policy and political participation. Jensen (1996) and Mettler (2005) demonstrate the impact of policy design on political participation, such that groups treated favorably respond with higher levels of political participation, while groups receiving negative treatment and/or messages of being undeserving respond by decreasing their levels of political participation. In terms of this study, the results were mixed on this front. Contrary to what the theory would suggest, a good number of Muslim Americans in this study indicated a positive impact on levels of political participation as a direct response to the policies, which they overwhelmingly viewed as negative. On the flip side, however, were Muslim Americans who indicated lower levels of political participation based on their perception of lacking efficacy and fear, which suggests some consistency with this research. This finding does not, however, contradict the social construction in policy design theory, as Muslim Americans as a group, do not fall neatly into one of the quadrants that Schneider and Ingram propose in terms of understanding policy benefits and burdens as a function of social constructions and political power. In the schemata proposed, Muslim Americans do not lack complete political power nor are their constructions, despite being overwhelmingly negative, uniform.
In terms of policy burdens, Newton (2005) and DiAlto (2005) demonstrate the role that social constructions play in the allotment of policy burdens. Thus, Newton (2005) focuses on how immigrants are portrayed based on the goal of receiving policy benefit or incurring policy burdens, such that they will be constructed “positively or negatively in ways that emphasize their contributions to or detractions from American society” (p. 140). In a similar vein, DiAlto’s (2005) work focuses on negative social constructions of the Japanese and the use of these constructions to justify certain policy tools and alternatives. These findings are also consistent with the research on Muslims and Muslim Americans above that shows how members of this group are constructed as enemy others who must be sanctioned with extreme policy burdens. These ideas were echoed in responses from study participants, who indicated their belief that certain measures directed towards Muslims and Muslim Americans were sanctioned as a function of their religious identity and the negative meaning attached to that.

The findings in this study largely comport with the social construction in policy design theory which, to summarize, suggests that social constructions of different target groups are embedded in policy designs and that policies have subsequent attitudes towards their citizenship and government, in addition to displaying different levels of political participation.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of this study was to explore the application of the social construction in policy design theory to a sample of Muslim Americans in the context of the War on Terror. The overarching goal is to assess policy in the degree to which it fosters democracy. To understand policy in this context, the theory focuses on social constructions that are embedded in policy design and which send messages to different target groups about their deservingness and equality as citizens. Subsequently, and according to the theory, social construction, whether embedded in
design or implementation, impacts citizen attitudes towards government and their levels of political participation.

The findings of this study, coupled with existing evidence on policy targets, confirms many of the propositions of the social construction in policy design framework, which is fundamentally concerned with how policy creates citizens. As the findings in this study suggest, Muslim Americans have experienced tangible consequences that have affected the degree to which they believe are treated as deserving subjects and whether they will be treated as equal citizens.

Schneider and Ingram (2005) assert that public policy is a way that government constructs or perpetuates different social constructions of groups. Participants in this study provided several examples of policies, whether in design or implementation, which perpetuated a certain image of Muslims as disloyal, for example, a construction which bore consequences both in terms of their perspectives on being recipients of equal justice. Further, as the theory indicates and as participants suggested, negatively constructed groups receive disproportionate policy burdens. In this regard, several participants mentioned the assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki by way of explaining how, despite being an American citizen, he was extra judicially killed without accountability by virtue of being Muslim. This particular example illustrates the degree to which Muslim Americans are seen as deserving and entitled to rights afforded to other citizens, a core component of the theory.

The findings of this study also support the idea that power and social construction combined affect the way a target population is treated by government. Despite the fact that many cases involving disparate justice for Muslims have been adjudicated in favor of the defendants, the court cases which many of these issues address indicate that Muslim Americans,
at least on some level, are treated inequitably by virtue of the suit being brought in the first place. Cases such as the six imams being deplaned as described above provide one example of favorable adjudication. However, a broader lens must be used to understand why such policies and measures were implemented towards these individuals in the first place. The negative social construction of Muslim Americans, coupled with their lack of political power, as articulated in the literature review, and, as elaborated upon in the responses from study participants is also consistent with the notion policy implementation affects groups differently as a function of both.

The literature above detailing the policies of the War on Terror provide substantive evidence that social constructions of Muslims and Muslim American are embedded in policy design and implementation, a view that was held by many study participants. The messages that study respondents absorbed from policy design and implementation have lead many of the interviewees to see themselves as second class citizens, unable to exercise their legal and political rights, while at the same time experiencing consequences in the sense of diminished cultural citizenship for many reasons, including the absorption of bias as expressed through policy, by members of society. The policies did, as the framework predicts, affect orientations towards government, an example that can be represented by findings suggesting broad skepticism on the reasons why the War on Terror was initiated. Further, Muslim Americans, as the framework suggests, internalized the constructions that were created about members of this group vis-à-vis policy design and implementation, leading them to perceive themselves as subject to broad overreaching measures.

Increased levels of political participation represented the only deviation from the propositions of the theory, though it is important to note that as discussed above this could be a function of the fact that Muslim Americans do not fit neatly into the social construction/political
power matrix. Further, a sizeable minority of participants reported no change or a decrease in participation. These findings therefore call for an expanded view of the intersection between public policy and political participation and the factors that help to explain differential participation in the face of policy threats.

The dissertation sought out to examine Muslim Americans responses in the context of the War on Terror. Specifically, the study was aimed at discerning whether the policies that were implemented under the umbrella of the War on Terror affected Muslim Americans perceptions of their status as equal citizens and whether they would be equal recipients of procedural justice. Further, the study sought to examine whether the policies had produced any tangible impacts in terms of political participation.

In sum, this study contributed to the research on the impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Americans and connects these impacts to different and less tangible areas, such as diminished perceptions of equal citizenship. Furthermore, this literature provides entry into an idea emerging from this research on democratization of groups under negative pretexts. As this study largely found, Muslim Americans were more politically active, suggesting that they are participating in the United States’ democracy, but unlike other groups who enter to receive or influence benefits towards their group, Muslim Americans were engaging in the political process as a response towards policies in the belief that their participation was needed in order to cede more harm from befalling their community.

Future Research

This study has documented the impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Americans. As the sample’s study shows, the majority of participants were educated. Therefore, in order to assess the impacts of the War on Terror more broadly, future research would do well to include a
range of Muslim Americans from various educational and socioeconomic statuses acknowledging, of course, the difficulty in recruiting such a range given the nature of this topic.

Future research based on this study should also include research that delineates the impacts of the War on Terror on different subgroups within the Muslim American population. This would include, for example, comparing male versus female experiences, where males have borne the brunt of more explicit policy impacts and where females have, in many ways suffered indirectly by the aftermath of for example, male family members arrests, detentions, deportations, etc.

Additionally, differences between first generation and second generation Muslim Americans would provide fodder for more interesting comparisons, particularly in examining the difference in political participation and the internalization of American values and principles.

Given the discourse around the social construction of Muslims and in particular, the racialization of Muslim, future research should also focus on comparing the experiences of White Muslims versus those of non-White Muslims. This particular comparison will help to develop a better understanding of the consequences related to “looking Muslim.”

Building on the literature that speaks to minorities in politics and factors that affect their political participation, future research should include comparisons between Muslim Americans and for example, African Americans, Latinos, etc. In conducting such a comparison, the goal will be to examine the socio-cultural and political context affecting each of these groups and to ascertain if and/or how the Muslim American experience is unique.

In order to substantiate broader claims of differential policy burdens, future research should examine terrorist attacks on the U.S. as a function of perpetrator identity, which would involve analysis of policy debates, legislation passed, and government statements/rhetoric.
Policy Recommendations

Though a country must act to defend itself in cases where its security has been compromised, the policies that are implemented towards this goal must focus not only on efficacy and efficiency, but also on the degree to which these policies impede the democratic process. As this study has shown, Muslim Americans report experiencing a diminished sense of their citizenship, a message absorbed from the policies that treat them differentially.

In order to address their grievances, particularly in the realm of citizenship and equal rights, several different actions can be taken. A few policy recommendations are included below:

1. The Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury should engage with organizations such as Muslim Advocates, who are working to accredit different Muslim charitable organizations, and ensuring that these organizations have measures of accountability and transparency in place. In this vein, and with proof of benign intent, no charges should be leveraged against individuals who donate to an organization prior to its designation as a terrorist organization.

2. The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division should assume a policy of accountability where federal, state and local law enforcement agencies found guilty of mass surveillance are subject to some degree of sanctioning.

3. Significantly curb and/or reform existing regulations regarding the use of racial and religious profiling by Federal and state law enforcement agencies in counter-terrorism cases.

4. Ensure that trainings for law enforcement agencies do not consist of anti-Islamic or anti-Muslim rhetoric. Further, law enforcement agencies should provide sensitivity training to personnel that provide understanding of the Arab culture/Muslim religion.
5. Develop and enhance behavior analysis tools as substitutes for writ large targeting of Muslims and Arabs in the context of airport security.

6. Condemn in the strongest terms hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs, and lend additional financial support to examining and solving these crimes. The federal government should also provide training to local law enforcement agencies on responding to hate crimes.

7. Promote effective models of community policing that rely on trust between law enforcement and different target communities as a means of ensuring safety. This includes addressing and/or ceding surveillance efforts directed towards different Muslim communities for no other reason than adhering to Islam. Further, in working with the Muslim community, efforts should be made to focus holistically on the community and the issues they face as opposed to focusing solely on the community in a counterterrorism context.
### APPENDIX A - STATEMENTS WITH ANTI-ISLAMIC THEMES

**Table 10. United States Political Officials’ Statements With Anti-Islamic Themes, 2006-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Official</th>
<th>Quotation</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Anti-Islamic Theme</th>
<th>Thematic Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant William J. Boykin</td>
<td>“Seal the borders and eliminate sanctuary cities and they’ll go home. No mosques in America. Islam is a totalitarian way of life; it’s not just a religion.”</td>
<td>(Tashman, 2011, first quote)</td>
<td>Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S.</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islam is an extreme ideology</td>
<td>E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have rights restricted</td>
<td>D1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired General Thomas McInerney</td>
<td>“We have to use profiling. And I mean be very serious and harsh about the profiling... If you are an 18-28 year-old Muslim man, then you should be strip searched.”</td>
<td>(Rothschild, 2010, paragraph three)</td>
<td>Muslims should be subject to collective responsibility</td>
<td>C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have rights restricted</td>
<td>D1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Cain, former Presidential</td>
<td>“I want people in my administration that are committed to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the</td>
<td>(Admin, 2011, paragraph two)</td>
<td>Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S.</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States.</td>
<td>I don’t want any inkling of anybody in my administration who would put Sharia law over American law. I have not found a Muslim that has said that they will denounce Sharia law, you know, in order to support the Constitution of the United States.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims cannot be loyal citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter King, U.S. Representative from New York</td>
<td>“Police have to be in the community, they have to build up as many sources as they can, and they have to realize that the threat is coming from the Muslim community and increase surveillance there.” (Referring to Boston bombings)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Unfortunately, we have too many mosques in this country. There are too many people who are sympathetic to radical Islam. We should be looking at them more carefully. We should be finding out how we can infiltrate.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All acts of terrorism are committed by Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Trinko, 2013, paragraph two)</td>
<td>All Muslims are prone to radicalization and are extremists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have rights restricted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p.13)</td>
<td>(Trinko, 2013, paragraph two)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Allen West, U.S. Representative from Florida Speaking about Representative Ellison: “(he) really does represent the antithesis of the principles upon which this country was established.”

“I think one of the critical things that we must come together is that there is an infiltration of the Sharia practice into all of our operating systems in our country as well as across Western civilization. So we must be willing to recognize that enemy. We cannot have a national security strategy that does not recognize it in specific and understand its goals and objectives. So once again, we can tailor you know our internal goals and objectives as far as our security systems, our political systems, economic systems, our cultural and educational systems, so that we can thwart this. And it comes back to one of those strategic goals that you mentioned, reducing the sphere of influence of this Sharia you know ideology that is tied into Islam. But I think that is our most threatening part, is the Sharia philosophy.”

(Rayfield & Seitz-Wald, 2012, paragraph three) Muslims cannot be loyal citizens

Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S.

(Fang, 2011, paragraph two) Islam is an extreme ideology

L1

T1

E1
Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the House of Representatives and former Presidential candidate

“Nazis don't have the right to put up a sign next to the Holocaust museum in Washington. We would never accept the Japanese putting up a site next to Pearl Harbor. There is no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade Center.”

(Barr, 2010, paragraph six)

Muslims should be subject to collective responsibility/guilt

C1

Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have rights restricted

D1

Michelle Bachmann, U.S. Representative from Minnesota

"Tonight's news does not bring back the lives of the thousands of innocent people who were killed that day by Osama bin Laden's horrific plan, and it does not end the threat posed by terrorists, but it is my hope that this is the beginning of the end of Sharia-compliant terrorism."

(Brusk, 2011, paragraph five)

Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S.

T1

George W. Bush, former U.S. President

“The recent arrests that our fellow citizens are now learning about are a stark reminder that this nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom.” (referring to London bombings)

(Ford, 2012, summary of Gaffney’s comments)

Muslims are/Islam is barbaric/uncivilized

D2

Muslims are inherently violent

V1

Islam is an extreme ideology

E1
“If there's any comparison between the compassion and decency of the American people and the terrorist tactics of extremists, it's flawed logic. It's just - I simply can't accept that. It's unacceptable to think that there's any kind of comparison between the behavior of the United States of America and the action of Islamic extremists who kill innocent women and children to achieve an objective.”

<p>| Frank Gaffney, radio host and newspaper columnist | “Most of the Muslim-American groups of any prominence in America are now known to be, as a matter of fact, hostile to the United States and its Constitution.” (Tashman, 2012, paragraph three) | Muslims are/Islam is barbaric/uncivilized | D2 |
| Todd Akin, former U.S. Representative from Missouri | “We see that all the time with [what] the Islamists pull out on us: we’re offended so we’re going to cut your head off.” (Musaji, 2013, Hays comment) | Muslims cannot be loyal citizens Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S. Muslims are/Islam is barbaric/uncivilized | V1 |
| Alan Hays, Florida Senator | “When you were a child, did your parents have you vaccinated against different diseases? That was a preemptive gesture on their part for which I would hope you’re very thankful. And this is very similar to (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2002, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2002) | Muslims are inherently violent | T1 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Affiliation</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Ashcroft, former U.S. Attorney General</td>
<td>“Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you.”</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 11)</td>
<td>E1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Fanelli, former candidate for U.S. House of Representatives from Florida</td>
<td>“All passengers are NOT created equally.”</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 11)</td>
<td>D1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Inhofe, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma</td>
<td>“All terrorists are Muslims or Middle Easterners between the age of 20 and 35.”</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 10)</td>
<td>T3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Ann Hogan, Republican Party</td>
<td>“Islam is a hateful and frightening religion. Even if they have gotten</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 7)</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairwoman from Florida</td>
<td>&quot;citizenship, they are not true Americans in my opinion. They all want to kill us.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrad Burns, U.S. Senator from Montana</td>
<td>&quot;The United States is up against ‘a faceless enemy’ of terrorists who ‘drive taxicabs in the daytime and kill at night.’”</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Kirk, U.S. Senator from Illinois</td>
<td>&quot;I’m OK with discrimination against young Arab males from terrorist-producing states. I'm not threatened by people from China. I’m not even threatened by people from Mexico.  I just know where the threat is from.  It’s from a unique place, and I think it's OK to recognize that.”</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Sali, former U.S. Representative</td>
<td>&quot;We have not only have a Hindu prayer being offered in the Senate, we have a</td>
<td>(SAALT, 2010, p. 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Islam is an extreme ideology
Muslims are inherently violent
Muslims cannot be loyal citizens
Terrorism is a distinctly Muslim phenomenon
Muslims should be subject to collective responsibility/guilt
Muslims should be subject to special measures/should have rights restricted
Islam/Sharia is a
| From Idaho | Muslim member of the House of Representatives now, Keith Ellison from Minnesota. Those are changes and they are not what was envisioned by the Founding Fathers.” |
| John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona | “…since this nation was founded primarily on Christian principles.... personally, I prefer someone who I know who has a solid grounding in my faith. I just feel that that's an important part of our qualifications to lead.” |

14) Threat to the U.S. Muslims cannot be loyal citizens

Islam/Sharia is a threat to the U.S. Muslims cannot be loyal citizens
## Table 11. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Favorability Ratings Towards Muslims, Christians, and Jews 2001-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question. As a result of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, do you feel more favorable, less favorable, or no different toward Muslims living abroad?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/CNN (September 13, 2001)</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>More favorable 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less favorable 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No different 62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question. Is your overall opinion of Muslim Americans very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zogby International (October 8, 2001)</td>
<td>Telephone (P) and online (O) surveys of voters</td>
<td>10,240</td>
<td>Very favorable (21% P, 25% O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat favorable (35% P, 41% O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable (14% P, 17% O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable (5% P and O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not familiar (21% P, 9% O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure (5% P, 3% O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center (March 16, 2004)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very favorable 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat favorable 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Very favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>10,001</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center, (September 17, 2008)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI (August 18, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab American Institute/Zogby International (September 30, 2010)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Method of Interview</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Very favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 21, 2011)</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question. Is your overall opinion of Muslim Americans very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(March 20, 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 24, 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April 20, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center (May 10, 2005)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Very favorable 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly favorable 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly unfavorable 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never heard of 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Can’t rate 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center (July 26, 2005)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Very favorable 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly favorable 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly unfavorable 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never heard of .5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Can’t rate 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center (September 9, 2009)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>Very favorable 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly favorable 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly unfavorable 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never heard of 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Can’t/refused 29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,0008</td>
<td>Very favorable 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(June 17, 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly favorable 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll Source</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek (August 27, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone interviews</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>Mostly unfavorable 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very favorable 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(September 7, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly favorable 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly unfavorable 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never heard of 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don't know 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question. Do you have a favorable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or an unfavorable opinion of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov (January 17, 2012)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very/Somewhat favorable 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very/Somewhat unfavorable 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov (March 6, 2012)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very/Somewhat favorable 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very/Somewhat unfavorable 38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Overall, do you think Americans are more likely to feel sympathy or be fearful of Muslims?

Fox Broadcasting Company (June 20, 2002)  Telephone Interviews  900  Sympathy 12%
Fear 63%
Both 8%
Neither 7%
Not sure 10%

Question. What is your impression of American Muslims? As of today, is it very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable or haven’t you heard enough about it to say?

Los Angeles Times (September 27, 2002)  Telephone Interviews  1,372  Very favorable 11%
Somewhat favorable 28%
Somewhat unfavorable 15%
Very unfavorable 11%
Haven’t heard enough 27%

Question. Rate Muslims using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group.

General Social Surveys (2004)  Telephone Interviews  2,812  0-29 Degrees 4%
30-49 Degrees 4%
50-69 Degrees 14%
70-89 Degrees 4%
90-100 Degrees 1%
Don’t know 2%
Question. Please rate Muslims using a feeling thermometer, a scale that goes between 1 and 100. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel warm and favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 1 degree and 49 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the group and that you don’t care too much for that group. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the group, you would rate the group at the 50-degree mark.

Public Religion Research Institute
(April 19, 2012)

Question. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Christians.

Pew Research Center
(March 16, 2004)

Pew Research Center
(July 14, 2005)

Pew Research Center
(September 17, 2008)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Very Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Favorable</th>
<th>Somewhat Unfavorable</th>
<th>Very Unfavorable</th>
<th>Don’t know/refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 21, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question.</strong> Do you have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of Christians?**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very/Somewhat favorable 59%</td>
<td>Neutral 31%</td>
<td>Very/Somewhat unfavorable 10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(January 17, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question. Rate Christians using a feeling thermometer, a scale that goes between 1 and 100. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel warm and favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 1 degree and 49 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the group and that you don’t care too much for that group. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the group, you would rate the group at the 50-degree mark.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Religion Research Institute</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>M = 68.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April 19, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of Jews.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Very favorable 36%</td>
<td>Somewhat favorable 41%</td>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable 6%</td>
<td>Very unfavorable 2%</td>
<td>Don’t know/refused 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(March 16, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Very favorable</td>
<td>Somewhat favorable</td>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable</td>
<td>Very unfavorable</td>
<td>Don’t know/refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>10,001</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Rate Jews using a feeling thermometer, a scale that goes between 1 and 100. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel warm and favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 1 degree and 49 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the group and that you don’t care too much for that group. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the group, you would rate the group at the 50-degree mark.

Public Religion Research Institute  
(April 19, 2012)  
Question. Which of these characteristics do you associate with Muslims—Tolerant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Yes, Associate</th>
<th>No, do not associate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pew Research Center  
(July 21, 2011)  
Not specified  
1,001  
Yes 33%  
No 55%  
Don’t Know/Refused 11%

Question. Which of these characteristics do you associate with Muslims–Fanatical?

Pew Research Center  
(June 22, 2006)  
Not specified  
1,001  
Yes, Associate 43%  
No, do not associate 41%  
Don’t know/refused 16%

Pew Research Center  
(July 21, 2011)  
Not specified  
1,001  
Yes 41%  
No 49%  
Don’t Know/Refused 10%

Question. Which of these characteristics do you associate with Muslims-Violent?

Pew Research Center  
(July 21, 2011)  
Not Specified  
1,001  
Yes 45%  
No 46%  
Don’t know/refused 9%

Question. How worried are you, if at all, about radicals within the U.S. Muslim community?

Newsweek  
(August 27, 2010)  
Telephone Interviews  
1,029  
Very worried 20%  
Somewhat worried 32%  
Not too worried 27%  
Not at all worried 19%  
Don’t know 2%
Question. These days, do people you know have negative feelings toward Muslims because of the attack on the World Trade Center, or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Yes Percentage</th>
<th>No Percentage</th>
<th>Don't know/no answer Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBS News/New York Times Poll (September 15, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>Yes 55%</td>
<td>No 40%</td>
<td>Don’t know/no answer 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS News/New York Times Poll (September 8, 2011)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>Yes 55%</td>
<td>No 41%</td>
<td>Don’t know/No answer 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you ever have any negative feelings toward Muslims because of the attack on the World Trade Center?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Yes Percentage</th>
<th>No Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBS News/New York Times Poll (September 15, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>Yes 21%</td>
<td>No 74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? Muslims tend to be religious fanatics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Strongly agree Percentage</th>
<th>Somewhat agree Percentage</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree Percentage</th>
<th>Strongly disagree Percentage</th>
<th>Not sure Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab American Institute/Zogby International (September 30, 2010)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Strongly agree 17%</td>
<td>Somewhat agree 24%</td>
<td>Somewhat disagree 25%</td>
<td>Strongly disagree 27%</td>
<td>Not sure 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. If you were boarding an airplane and saw fellow passengers dressed in Muslim clothing, would that make you nervous, or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Yes Percentage</th>
<th>No Percentage</th>
<th>Don’t know/No answer Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox News (October 29, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Yes 38%</td>
<td>No 58%</td>
<td>Don’t know 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. As I read a few statements please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly
disagree, or completely disagree with each one. Congress should investigate religious extremism anywhere it exists in the U.S., and not focus on the American Muslim community.

Public Religion Research Institute (February 14, 2011)  
Telephone Interviews 1,015  
Completely agree 38%  
Mostly agree 34%  
Mostly disagree 10%  
Completely disagree 12%  
6% Don’t know

Question. Rate your feelings toward Muslims, with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0-100. The higher the number, the more favorable your feelings are toward that country.

Program on International Policy Attitudes (April 11, 2011)  
Online Survey 802  
$M = 44$

Note. All search results are from Polling the Nations (2013).
Table 12. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Attitudes Regarding Muslim Responsibility/Muslim as Responsible for Terrorism, 2001-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Agree 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(November 2, 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you agree or disagree? People of the Muslim faith in the U.S. have a special obligation to help authorities track down terrorists and defeat Osama bin Laden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Done enough 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(December 15, 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed 53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Please tell me whether or not you think each of the following has done enough to support the U.S. and oppose terrorism since the attacks of September 11th. What about Muslim leaders from other countries?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Done enough 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(June 28, 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you think American Muslims support the U.S. in the war on terror, or not?

Question. Do you think American Muslims are doing enough to help U.S. authorities track down terrorist cell members here in the U.S.?
Question. Do you think most, many, only some, or very few Muslims living in the U.S. today support the goals of Al Qaeda and the Islamic fundamentalists?

Newsweek (August 27, 2010) Telephone Interviews 1,029

Most 11%

Many 9%

Only some 25%

Very few 42%

Don’t know 13%

Question. Do you think most, many, only some, or very few Muslims living in the U.S. today oppose the goals of Al Qaeda and the Islamic fundamentalists?

Newsweek (August 27, 2010) Telephone Interviews 1,029

Most 35%

Many 13%

Only some 20%

Very few 15%

Don’t know 17%

Question. Do you think most, many, only some, or very few Muslims living in the U.S. today are peaceable and do not condone violence?

Newsweek (August 27, 2010) Telephone Interviews 1,029

Most 48%

Many 14%

Only some 16%

Very few 13%

Don’t know 9%
Question. Do you think most, many, only some, or very few Muslims living in the U.S. today support the use of violence by Muslims against non-Muslims?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek (August 27, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>Most 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Only some 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very few 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Thinking about Muslims in the world, do you think most, many, only some or very few support the goals of Al Qaeda and Islamic extremists?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company (October 29, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Most 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Only some 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very few 47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. If you were boarding an airplane and saw fellow passengers dressed in Muslim clothing, would that make you nervous, or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company (October 29, 2010)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Yes 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, disagree, or completely disagree. American Muslims have not done enough to oppose extremism in their own communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Religion Research Institute (February 14, 2011)</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>Completely agree 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly agree 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly disagree 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Completely disagree 12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Don’t know 20%

Question. As you may know, Congress is scheduled to begin hearings this week to explore al Qaeda’s efforts to recruit terrorists in the U.S., as well as whether the Muslim-American community is doing enough to stop these efforts. Do you think it is appropriate or not appropriate to hold these hearings focused on U.S. Muslims?

USA Today/Gallup
(March 10, 2011)

Question. Regardless of whether you have heard about the upcoming committee hearings, do you think holding hearings to investigate alleged extremism in the American Muslim community is a good idea or a bad idea?

Public Religion Research Institute
(February 14, 2011)

Question. As I read a few statements please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, or completely disagree with each one. American Muslims ultimately want to establish Shari’a or Islamic law as the law of the land in the U.S.

Public Religion Research Institute
(February 14, 2011)

Question. Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with each one. Congress should investigate religious extremism anywhere it exists in the U.S., and not just focus on the American Muslim community.

Public Religion Research Institute
(February 14, 2011)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economist/YouGov (April 29, 2013)</th>
<th>Online Survey</th>
<th>1,000</th>
<th>More patriotic 5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About as patriotic 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less patriotic 43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** All search results are from Polling the Nations (2013)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBS News/New York Times</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>Less trustworthy 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll (September 24, 2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More trustworthy 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Doesn’t affect opinion 68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know/no answer 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zogby International (October 8, 2001)</td>
<td>Telephone and Online Surveys</td>
<td>10,240</td>
<td>Very favorable 14% (T), 10% (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat favorable 31% (T), 33% (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable 22% (T), 34% (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very unfavorable 12% (T), 13% (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not familiar 17% (T), 6% (O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure 5% (T), 4% (O)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Is your overall opinion of Arab Americans very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?
Question. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very favorable opinion of Arabs?

Gallup Poll
(October 19, 2001)
Telephone Survey
1,011
Very favorable 9%
Mostly favorable 45%
Mostly unfavorable 25%
Very unfavorable 12%
No opinion 9%

Question. In response to the terrorist attacks, do you think the U.S. should put Arabs and Arab-Americans under special surveillance, or that it would be a mistake to target a nationality group, as was done with Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor?

Newsweek
(December 1, 2001)
Telephone Survey
1,002
Increase surveillance 30%
Mistake 62%
Don’t know 8%

Question. If you honestly assessed yourself, would you say that you have at least some feelings of prejudice about Arabs, or not?

ABS News/Washington Post
(March 8, 2006)
Telephone Survey
1,000
Yes 25%
No 74%

Arab American Institute/Zogby International
(September 30, 2010)
Online Survey
2,100
Very favorable 10%
Somewhat favorable
Somewhat unfavorable 33%
Very unfavorable 30%
Not familiar 2%
Not sure 8%

Question. What is your opinion of Arab people in general?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Details</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Favorable Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program on International Policy Attitudes (April 11, 2011)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>Very/mostly favorable 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very/mostly unfavorable 38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know/refused 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Please rate your feelings about the people of the Arab world with 100 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. The higher the number, the more favorable your feelings are toward that country.

Program on International Policy Attitudes (April 11, 2011)
Online Survey
802
M = 45

Question. What is your overall opinion of Arab people in general, favorable or unfavorable?

Program on International Policy Attitudes (October 8, 2012)
Phone/Mail/Online survey
737
Favorable 49%
Unfavorable 47%

Question. As a result of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, do you feel more favorable, less favorable, or no different toward Arab Americans?

Time/CNN (September 13, 2001)
Telephone Survey
1,082
More favorable 4%
Less favorable 27%
No different 65%
Question. Do you think the attacks this week will make you personally more suspicious of people who you think are of Arab descent, or not?

Washington Post/ABC News Poll (September 13, 2001)  
Telephone Survey 609  
Yes 43%  
No 56%  
No Opinion 1%

Question. Do you think Arab Americans are more sympathetic to terrorists than other American citizens are?

CBS News (September 15, 2001)  
Telephone Survey 959  
More sympathetic 28%  
Not more sympathetic 51%  
Don’t know/no answer 21%

CBS/New York Times (September 24, 2001)  
Telephone Survey 1,216  
More sympathetic 26%  
Not more sympathetic 62%  
Don’t know/no answer 12%

CBS News/New York Times Poll (December 12, 2001)  
Telephone Survey 1,052  
More sympathetic 33%  
Not more sympathetic 58%  
Don’t know 9%

CBS News/New York Times Poll (December 12, 2001)  
Telephone Survey 1,052  
More sympathetic 33%  
Not more sympathetic 58%  
Don’t know 9%

CBS News/New York Times (September 7, 2002)  
Telephone Survey 937  
More sympathetic 33%  
Not more sympathetic
Question. Right now do you think most Arab-Americans sympathize more with the United States or with those who attacked us?

Harris Poll (September 27, 2001) Telephone Survey 1,012
Sympathize with us 73%
Sympathize with attackers 13%
Neither 2%
Not sure/refused 10%

Question. Right now do you think most American Muslims sympathize more with the United States or with those who attacked us?

Harris Poll (September 27, 2001) Telephone Survey 1,012
Sympathize with us 76%
Sympathize with attackers 11%
Neither 3%
Not sure/refused 10%

Question. How do you think most Arab-Americans and immigrants from the Middle East feel about the terrorists’ cause? Do you think they are more sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause than other Americans, or about the same as other Americans on this?

National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/ Harvard University Kennedy School (November 2001) Telephone Survey 1,208
More sympathetic 20%
Same 73%
Don’t know 3%

Question. How do you think most Arab-Americans and immigrants from the Middle East feel about the terrorists’ acts? Do you think they are more sympathetic to the terrorists’ acts than other Americans, or about the same as other Americans on this?

National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/ Harvard Telephone Survey 1,208
More sympathetic 18%
University Kennedy School
(November 2001)

Same 77%
Don’t know 5%

Note. All search results are from Polling the Nations (2013).
### Table 14. U.S. Polling Data Indicating Attitudes About Rights Preservation and Restriction, 2001-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling Organization (Date)</th>
<th>Research Methodology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program on International Policy Attitudes (April 11, 2001)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>More violent extremists 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fewer violent extremists 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About the same as in other cultures 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1% Don’t know/refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company (August 13, 2001)</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Appropriate 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wrong 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek (September 15, 2001)</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>Should increase surveillance 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Would be a mistake 62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Please tell me if you favor or oppose each of the following actions in the U.S. for at least several years. How about requiring Arabs, including those who become U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID?

Gallup Poll
(October 31, 2001)
Telephone Survey 1,066 Favor 49%
Oppose 49%
No opinion 2%

Question. Do you think there should be special screening for Muslims who want to immigrate to the U.S.?

Fox Broadcasting Company
(September 14, 2006)
Telephone Interview 900 Yes 66% Overall (O), 62% Democrats (D), 73% Republicans (R)
No 27% (O), 30% (D), 22% (R)
Don’t know 7% (O), 8% (D), 5% (R)

Question. Do you think it is more likely that alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan was a Muslim extremist protesting U.S. foreign policy or that he was just someone who went nuts and shot at his co-workers?

Fox News
(November 20, 2009)
Telephone Survey 900 Protesting U.S. foreign policy 38%
Just went nuts 45%
Some of both 10%
Don’t know 7%

Question. How do you think the recent shooting incident at the Army installation in Fort Hood, Texas where 13 people were killed is most accurately described - as an act of terrorism or as a killing spree?

Fox Broadcasting Company
(November 20, 2009)
Telephone Survey 900 Act of terrorism 44%
Killing spree 49%
Don’t know 7%
Question. Regardless of whether you think it is appropriate to build a mosque near ground zero, do you think the Muslim group has the right to build a mosque there, or don’t they have that right?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>Yes 61%</td>
<td>No 34%</td>
<td>Don’t know 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. What if Muslims proposed building a community center and place of worship two blocks from your home. Would you favor or oppose it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>No answer/don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Favor 55%</td>
<td>Oppose 34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Overall, do you favor or oppose the building of the Muslim community center and mosque near where the World Trade Center stood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>No answer/don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Favor 26%</td>
<td>Oppose 61%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Some people say that building the Muslim community center and mosque near the World Trade Center site would serve as a symbol of the country’s religious tolerance. Others say that building the mosque near the World Trade Center site would be an insult to those who died on 9/11. Which comes closest to your view, or do you agree somewhat with both views?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Symbol of religious tolerance</th>
<th>Insult to those who died</th>
<th>Agree with both</th>
<th>No answer/don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Do you think that a Muslim should be allowed to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Yes 65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 18, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Answer/Don’t know 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you think that a Muslim should be allowed to run for president of the U.S.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time/ABT SRBI</td>
<td>Telephone Interviews</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>Yes 61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 18, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Answer/Don’t know 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Whether or not you think the Islamic Cultural Center and mosque should be built near the World Trade Center site, do you think that Muslims have a constitutional right to build a mosque there?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Yes 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 19, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure 17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you think the Islamic Cultural Center and mosque should be built there (a few blocks from the World Trade Center in New York City), or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Should 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 19, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Should not 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No opinion 25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion: Muslims should be able to build mosques in the U.S. wherever other religions can build house or worship; there are some places in the U.S. where it is not appropriate to build mosques, though it would be appropriate for other religions to build house of worship; or mosques should not be permitted anywhere in the U.S.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Provider</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Build wherever other religions can build 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some places it is not appropriate 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Should not be permitted anywhere 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question. As you may know, there is a proposal to build an Islamic cultural center and mosque in downtown New York City, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center. From what you’ve read and heard, do you agree more with: those who object to the building of this center; or those who think the center should be allowed to be built?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>Object to the building 51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 24, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Should be allowed to be built 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know/refused 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question. Regardless of whether you think it is appropriate to build a mosque near the site of the World Trade Center in New York City, do you think the developers have a right to build a mosque there, or don’t they have that right?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS News</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>Yes, they have the right 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 26, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No, they don’t have the right 29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question. If a group of Muslim Americans wanted to build a mosque in your local community, would that be okay or not okay with you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>Okay 72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(August 27, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not okay 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Please tell me which statement comes closer to your point of view. (A) The mosque should not be built there. The memories of 9/11 are too fresh and it is insensitive to the survivors’ and victims’ families to have a mosque and Muslim cultural center so close to the site of the attacks. (B) The mosque should be allowed to be built there. Freedom of religion is one of the founding principles of this country. Muslims in this country have the constitutional rights to practice their religion peacefully anywhere, just as all other religions can.

NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (September 7, 2010) Telephone Survey 1,000 Mosque not allowed 55%
Mosque allowed 39%
Not sure 6%

Question. As you may know, there has been controversy over plans to build a Muslim community center and mosque near Ground Zero. Do you favor or oppose government taking action to block the building of this community center and mosque?

Democracy Corps (September 27, 2010) Telephone Survey 1,000 Strongly favor 30%
Somewhat favor 8%
Somewhat oppose 14%
Strongly oppose 39%
Don’t know/refused 9%

Question. Do you generally support or generally oppose allowing a mosque and Muslim cultural center to be built in New York City near where the World Trade Center once stood?

NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (September 7, 2010) Online Survey 1,000 Support 22%
Oppose 51%
No opinion 26%
Not sure 1%

Question. There has been news lately about plans for a Muslim community center and place of worship in Lower Manhattan, near the site of the former World Trade Center. Do you think this Muslim community center should or should be built at this location? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?
Question. You said you oppose building a Muslim community center and place of worship in Lower Manhattan, near the site of the former World Trade Center. Is that more because you oppose building a Muslim community center at this particular location, or more because you oppose building Muslim community centers in this country in general?

ABC News/Washington Post, (September 8, 2010) Telephone Survey 1,002

This location 82%
In general 14%
Other 3%
No opinion 1%

Question. Major Nidal Hasan, who has been charged with killing 13 people and wounding 32 at the Texas military base Fort Hood in 2009, is being tried in a military court. He is likely to face the death penalty if convicted. Do you support or oppose the military seeking the death penalty in this case if Hasan is found guilty?

IBOPE, Zogby (July 29, 2011) Online Survey 2,297

Support 75%
Oppose 18%
Not sure 6%

Question. Do you think building the Islamic cultural center and mosque near the World Trade Center should be allowed, or should it not be allowed? [If allowed] And do you personally feel that building the Islamic cultural center and mosque near the World Trade Center is a good idea or a bad idea?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Support/Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pew Research Center (August 29, 2011)</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>Allowed, good idea 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allowed, bad idea 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allowed, don’t know/refused 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not allowed 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know/refused 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heard nothing at all/don’t know 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS/New York Times Poll, (September 8, 2011)</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>Favor strongly 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Favor not strongly 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oppose not strongly 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oppose strongly 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know/no answer 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Religion Research Institute (April 19, 2012)</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>Strongly favor 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Favor 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oppose 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly oppose 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Refused 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Just your best guess—who do you believe is more likely to be responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings—Islamic terrorists or homegrown terrorists?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Islamic terrorists</th>
<th>Homegrown terrorists</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fox Broadcasting Company</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you agree with the decision to read Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon bomber, his Miranda rights or do you think he should not be read his Miranda rights?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Should be read Miranda rights</th>
<th>Should not be read Miranda Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. Do you think that Dzokhar Tsarnaev should be tried in a criminal court or a military court?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Criminal court</th>
<th>Military Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Online Survey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question. If Dzokhar Tsarnaev is found guilty for his role in the Boston Marathon bombing, what do you think the appropriate punishment for him should be? The death penalty/life imprisonment without the possibility of parole/long-term imprisonment with the eventual possibility of parole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Death penalty</th>
<th>Life imprisonment without parole</th>
<th>Imprisonment with possibility of parole</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economist/YouGov</td>
<td>Telephone Survey</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question. Do you think the suspects in the bombings at the Boston Marathon acted alone or do you think they were connected to a larger terrorist group?

Telephone Survey 965  
Alone 32%  
Larger Group 53%  
Don’t know/no answer 15%

Question. If Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the suspect in the Boston marathon bombings who is accused of killing four people and injuring more than 180 others, is convicted—what punishment do you think he should get?

Fox Broadcasting Company (May 22, 2013)  
Telephone Survey 1,013  
Death penalty 65%  
Life in prison 32%  
Other 1%  
Don’t know 2%

Note. All search results are from Polling the Nations (2013).
APPENDIX C – STUDY INSTRUMENTS

DISSERTATION SURVEY
Muslim American Responses to the War on Terror

1) Name
2) Age
3) Ethnic/Racial background
4) Place of Residence in the United States
5) Country(s) of citizenship
6) Highest level of education completed
7) Profession
8) Do you work for a Muslim Organization and/or another organization advocates that advocates on behalf of issues pertaining to Muslims? If so, please name the organization:
9) I am a member of a community or a neighborhood association:
   a. Yes
   b. No
10) I am a member of a political association(s) (e.g. Republican Association, Democratic Association):
    a. Yes
    b. No
11) I make an effort to stay abreast of local politics, not limited to, changes in city or county laws and regulations affecting different aspects of life such as unionized work places, school districting, etc.:
    a. Strongly Disagree
    b. Disagree
    c. Neutral
    d. Agree
    e. Strongly Agree
12) I consider myself to be well informed about crucial issues domestically and internationally and the opinions of my political representatives towards these issues (i.e. domestic: money for the educational system; international: defense spending):
    a. Strongly Disagree
    b. Disagree
    c. Neutral
    d. Agree
    e. Strongly Agree
13) I vote in local elections, which includes city council members, district superintendent, etc.
    a. Never
    b. Rarely
    c. Sometimes
    d. Very Often
    e. Always
14) I vote in national elections which include presidential and congressional elections, etc.
    a. Never
    b. Rarely
15) I participate in protests, demonstrations, and other actions aimed at changing policy decisions:
   a. Never
   b. Rarely
   c. Sometimes
   d. Very Often
   e. Always

16) I believe that my political participation is a way of influencing how the government responds to policy issues:
   a. Strongly Disagree
   b. Disagree
   c. Neutral
   d. Agree
   e. Strongly Agree

17) My political participation whether protests, voting, etc. has changed over the last decade:
   a. Strongly Disagree
   b. Disagree
   c. Neutral
   d. Agree
   e. Strongly Agree

18) In the last decade, my political participation in measures such as voting, lobbying, etc. has:
   a. Decreased
   b. No Change
   c. Increased

19) In the last decade, my political participation in measures such as a protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc., has:
   a. Decreased
   b. No Change
   c. Increased

20) I believe that I or my community may face some harm due to political participation:
   a. Strongly Disagree
   b. Disagree
   c. Neutral
   d. Agree
   e. Strongly Agree

21) I have faced some sort of repercussion as a result of my political participation (If you answer “No,” please select “N/A” for question 22):
   a. Yes
   b. No

22) If I have faced repercussions due to my political participation, I believe that this is due to the fact that I am Muslim:
   a. Strongly Disagree
b. Disagree 
c. Neutral 
d. Agree 
e. Strongly Agree 
f. N/A 

23) Someone I know has faced some sort of repercussion as a result of their political participation (If you answer “No,” please select “N/A” for question 24):
   a. Yes 
   b. No 

24) If someone I know has faced some repercussions due to their political participation, I believe this is due to the fact that they are Muslim:
   a. Strongly Disagree 
   b. Disagree 
   c. Neutral 
   d. Agree 
   e. Strongly Agree 

25) I have observed a change in the policies affecting Muslims by the U.S. government, specifically related to the “War on Terror” (If you answer “No,” please select “N/A” for questions 26, 27, and 28):
   a. Yes 
   b. No 

26) If you observed a change in the policies affecting Muslims by the U.S. government, how would you describe it:
   a. Very Negative 
   b. Somewhat Negative 
   c. Somewhat Positive 
   d. Very Positive 
   e. N/A 

27) If I observe a change in policies affecting Muslims by the U.S. government, specifically related to the War on Terror, this has changed my level of political participation in measures such as voting, and lobbying and has made me:
   a. Less Politically Active 
   b. No Change 
   c. More Politically Active 
   d. N/A 

28) If I observe a change in policies affecting Muslims by the U.S. government, specifically related to the "War on Terror, this has changed my level of political participation in measures such as protesting and rallying and has made me:
   a. Less Politically Active 
   b. No Change 
   c. More Politically Active 
   d. N/A 

29) The "War on Terror" policies since 9/11 that have affected some Muslim countries has discouraged me from some forms of political participation such as voting, lobbying, etc.:
   a. Strongly Disagree 
   b. Disagree
c. Neutral  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree  

30) The "War on Terror" policies since 9/11 that have affected some Muslim countries has discouraged me from some forms of political participation including protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc.:  
   a. Strongly Disagree  
   b. Disagree  
   c. Neutral  
   d. Agree  
   e. Strongly Agree  

31) The "War on Terror" policies that have affected some Muslim Americans has discouraged me from some forms of political participation such as voting, lobbying, etc.:  
   a. Strongly Disagree  
   b. Disagree  
   c. Neutral  
   d. Agree  
   e. Strongly Agree  

32) The "War on Terror" policies that have affected some Muslim Americans has discouraged me from some forms of political participation such as protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc.:  
   a. Strongly Disagree  
   b. Disagree  
   c. Neutral  
   d. Agree  
   e. Strongly Agree  

33) Specific actions of the U.S. government towards Muslim Americans such as discrimination, profiling, arrests, etc. has discouraged me from some forms of political participation such as voting, lobbying, etc.:  
   a. Strongly Disagree  
   b. Disagree  
   c. Neutral  
   d. Agree  
   e. Strongly Agree  

34) Specific actions of the U.S. government towards Muslim Americans such as discrimination, profiling, arrests, etc. has discouraged me from some forms of political participation such as protests, demonstrations, rallying, etc.:  
   a. Strongly Disagree  
   b. Disagree  
   c. Neutral  
   d. Agree  
   e. Strongly Agree  

35) My attitudes towards human rights, justice, and accountability as practiced by the U.S. government has changed as a result of the policies of the "War on Terror" (If you answer "No," please select "N/A" for questions 36, 37, and 38):
a. Yes
b. No

36) If your attitudes towards human rights, justice, and accountability as practiced by the U.S. government has changed, how would you describe it:
   a. Very Negative
   b. Somewhat Negative
   c. Somewhat Positive
   d. Very Positive
   e. N/A

37) If your attitudes towards human rights, justice, and accountability as practiced by the U.S. government has changed, this has changed your level of participation in measures such as voting, lobbying, etc. and has made you:
   a. Less Politically Active
   b. No Change
   c. More Politically Active
   d. N/A

38) If your attitudes towards human rights, justice, and accountability as practiced by the U.S. government has changed, this has changed your level of participation in measures such as protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc. and has made you:
   a. Less Politically Active
   b. No Change
   c. More Politically Active
   d. N/A

39) Do you have any questions or comments?
DISSERTATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

1) How do you understand US national security policies regarding Muslims (Muslims in general)? What do you think of these policies?

2) How do you understand the War on Terror? In your opinion, what does it involve?

3) Do you feel safer as a result of the War on Terror policies? Why or why not?

4) Do these policies affect Muslim and Arab Americans more than other groups in America? If yes, in what ways, and why, in your opinion?

5) Do you think you have received any sort of preferential treatment as a Muslim American due to the War on Terror policies?

6) Have you observed a change in the treatment of Muslims (in general) as a result of these policies? If so, can you cite specific examples of a change in treatment?

7) Do you believe the Muslim American community has benefited as a whole by the policies of the War on Terror? If so, can you provide specific examples?

8) Has the Muslim American community, in your opinion suffered as a whole, by the policies of the War on Terror? If so, can you provide specific examples? (This might include increased scrutiny of Mosques, etc.)

9) If you believe Muslim Americans were negatively impacted by the War on Terror policies, do you think that some suffered more than others depending on the region of the country that they resided in?

10) Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. or hasn’t it changed very much? (*Question from Pew Research Center, 2007, p.79)

11) Do you believe that your identity as an American citizen has been reaffirmed as a result of the War on Terror policies? If so, can you describe how?

12) Do you believe that your identity as an American citizen has been questioned as a result of the War on Terror policies? If so, can you describe how?

13) Do you believe that you are treated as a lesser citizen? If so, in what ways has this impacted your life? This might include for example, unequal protection of the law, unequal recourse for violations of civil, political, and human rights, selective application of laws?

14) Have you been personally affected by the War on Terror policies? If so, can you describe how? Why do you think you were selected for this treatment?
15) Has anyone you know been affected by the War on Terror policies? If so, can you describe how? Why do you think they were selected for this treatment?

16) What are your thoughts on human rights issues in a post 9/11 world? Have the War on Terror policies specifically affected your perspective on whether and how the United States adheres to human rights principles? This might include for example, the practice of torture and indefinite detention.

17) What does justice mean to you in a post 9/11 world?

a) Do you believe there is a connection between justice and equal protections of the law, impartial courts, etc.?

b) Have the principles of impartial courts, equal protection of the law, etc. to Muslim Americans as just as they have to their non-Muslim American counterparts? In your opinion, has this changed between the Bush and Obama administrations? If yes, how?

18) Has your notion of accountability of abuses by the U.S. government changed post 9/11 and as a result of the War on Terror policies?

   a) Do you know that government officials are supposed to be held accountable?

   b) In your opinion, is there accountability for human rights abuses that are committed by the U.S. government and do you think accountability for these abuses differ in your opinion based on whether the abuse is perpetrated towards a Muslim or non-Muslim (Muslims in general)?

   c) Do you think the right people who have committed crimes have been held accountable?

19) Do you think human rights principles are applied equally to Muslims (Muslims in general) by the United States government? Some examples of human rights principles include equality and non-discrimination.

20) Can you describe your level of political activity (if any) post 9/11? Are you more or less likely to participate politically now? (Political participation as operationalized above includes direct measures such as voting and indirect measures such as attending protests.)

21) Are there specific factors that make you more or less likely to participate politically? (Some examples may include fear of the government, retaliation in the form of arrest, detention, etc., fear of other repercussions resulting in, for example employment discrimination based on political beliefs/opinions.)

22) In your opinion, have Muslim Americans’ political participation has been affected by the War on Terror policies? If so, how and why?
23) Have you experienced any violations of your human rights due to the policies of the War on Terror? If so, what in your mind would constitute redress? In other words, what in your opinion would be sufficient compensation? (i.e. apology, financial compensation). More generally, what do you think the United States government can do to promote reconciliation and justice in cases like yours?

24) Do you think that the United States government should promote some kind of reconciliation and justice towards the larger Muslim and Muslim American community? If so, what would this entail? What measures, for example, would this entail? For example, financial compensation, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, apology, etc.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Law Review, 25, 16.


295


Aziz, S. (2011). Stick and stones, the words that hurt: Entrenched stereotypes eight years after 9/11. In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute (Ed.), Arab and Muslim American civil rights and identity (pp. 49-76). Washington, DC: American-
Arab Discrimination Committee Research Institute.


Barreto, M. A., & Bozonelos, D. N. (2009). Democrat, Republican, or none of the above? The role of religiosity in Muslim American party identification. *Politics and Religion,* 2(Special Issue 02), 200-229. doi: doi:10.1017/S1755048309000200

Barreto, M. A., & Dana, K. (2008). *The political incorporation of Muslims in America: The role*


300


Drone wars: The constitutional and counterterrorism implications of targeted killing. 113th Congress. (2003)


judgment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.


Perlinger, A. (2012). Challengers from the sidelines: Understanding America’s violent far-right. West Point, NY: The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point


Posner, S. (2011, March 8). Meet Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, star witness in Peter King's anti-Muslim


Rayfield, J., & Seitz-Wald, A. (2012, October 20). The 10 most Islamophobic moments in the 2012 elections: From Allen West to Michele Bachmann, these are the most hateful examples of bigotry against Muslims this campaign. Salon.com. Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/2012/10/20/the_10_most_islamophobic_moments_in_the_2012_elections/


Semmerling, T. J. (2008). Those “evil” Muslims! Orientalist fears in the narratives of the War on


Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center.


323


