PROTECTING THE MISSION:

THE CASE OF THE

U.S. ARMY

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Dedicated to my family.
In the literature of organizational change, scholars generally agree that organizations resist change, a phenomenon usually described as organizational inertia. Most of this literature, however, ignores the question of how such resistance to change is manifest. I seek to fill this gap by explaining the tactics that organizations use to resist change.

Most of the literature on organizational change also treats resistance as a byproduct of organizational nature. In contrast, I start from the presumption that resistance can be an intentional act and not solely a passive characteristic or byproduct of organizations. In seeking to understand resistance as an intentional act, I explore the following questions: How does an organization resist the external and internal forces for change that act upon it? Are there similarities and differences to this resistance depending on whether the force is internal or external? Are organizations more or less successful in resisting internal or external forces for change? Over time, do organizations become more skilled at resisting? To answer these questions, I use the case study approach to look at the U.S. Army and its response to challenges to its sense of mission, something the literature predicts the Army should resist.

More specifically, I test these hypotheses: 1) organizations employ different types of tactics of resistance depending on whether the force for change is internal or external; 2) organizations are more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change; and 3) organizations become more effective at resisting over time. In testing these hypotheses, I seek to
expand our knowledge of organizational change by addressing the “how” question regarding an organization’s intentional resistance.

In order to test these hypotheses, I examine the U.S. Army’s resistance to change during the 20th and 21st centuries using the cases of personnel, operations, and technology. In each case, I analyze and demonstrate how internal and external forces acted upon the Army in a way that threatened the organization’s sense of mission and that the Army intentionally resisted these forces for change through the employment of tactics of resistance. From this analysis, I find that there are similarities in the Army’s resistance to change depending on whether the force for change is internal or external, that the Army is more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change, but that the Army does not become more effective at resistance over time.

This project has implications for both theory and practice. This research will expand our theoretical understanding of how organizations actively resist change by moving beyond the notion that resistance is solely a passive characteristic of organizations. Broadly, such insight has important implications for scholarly research in the areas of organizational change, civil-military relations, and military innovation theory. In terms of practice, this research can help policymakers understand how and when their policy directives will meet resistance; additionally, this research informs constituencies of resistance how and when such resistance will be effective.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The horse cavalry and the 2003 Iraq War may seem like completely unrelated occurrences, but they both tell us something important about the nature of the U.S. Army’s resistance to change. In 1951, the Army finally disbanded the horse cavalry, 6 years after the use of the atomic bomb and over 30 years after motorized vehicles, machine guns, chemical weapons, and tanks demonstrated the changed nature of warfare in two world wars and obsolescence of the horse as a combat-effective tool of war. Given the destructive power of these newer technologies, the horse cavalry demonstrated uncanny endurance.

Over fifty years later in 2003, the Army faced an insurgency in Iraq after quickly overpowering and destroying the conventional armed forces of Saddam Hussein, yet it failed to initiate an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy. A CIA briefing in June 2003 called the situation in Iraq a “classic insurgency” (as quoted in Von Drehle 2005). In July 2003, General John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command responsible for managing the war in Iraq, stated during a Pentagon press briefing that U.S. forces were facing a “classic guerilla-type campaign” (as quoted in BBC News 2003). In northern Iraq, some Army officers were already meeting the insurgent threat by implementing a counterinsurgency strategy: General David Petraeus calmed the restive city of Mosul in 2003, and Colonel H.R. McMaster brought stability to the town of Tal Afar in 2005 (Packer 2006; Kaplan 2013, 71-77). Yet, the Army-led coalition forces did not begin to implement a nationwide counterinsurgency strategy until the beginning of 2007. While the horse cavalry proved remarkably resilient, a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq proved remarkably elusive.

What explains the delay in making these changes? How was the horse cavalry so enduring and a counterinsurgency strategy so elusive? In both cases, a rational, outside observer
could have justifiably expected change to come much sooner given the Army’s experiences. In both cases, there was substantial evidence that the status quo was ineffective and inappropriate.

To address these questions, this project examines how intentional resistance to change plays a role in these types of phenomena. Specifically, it analyzes the tactics by which organizations resist change and tests a number of hypotheses related to such resistance. While the horse cavalry and the Iraq War are two examples, they are not the only cases of intentional resistance to change by the U.S. Army.

The Puzzle

The literature on organizations tends to assume that resistance to change, when it happens, is a passive act of inertia. Instead, I argue that resistance can be an intentional act, an act intended to limit the success of forces that seek to cause the organization to change.

Overall, the organizational literature seldom examines resistance. Even fewer studies directly or indirectly address how organizations actually resist (Oliver 1991; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997). This results in a number of unexplained puzzles:

- What are the tactics by which an organization intentionally resists change?
- Are there differences in the ways that organizations resist external versus internal forces?
- Are organizations more successful at resisting external forces or internal forces?
- Do organizations learn to resist more effectively over time; in other words, do they learn from their acts of resistance?

These questions are the bases for the hypotheses tested in this project. Even more broadly, how does an organization protect its sense of mission when it is confronted by internal and external forces that challenge that very mission? While forces for change may act on discrete elements of an organization (e.g. individual processes, resource allocations, reward structures, tax liabilities)
and as a result generate resistance, I am only concerned with the forces for change that threaten that most essential, fundamental aspect of the organization, its sense of mission.

Specifically, I seek to understand how the U.S. Army of the 20th century has protected its sense of mission when confronted with forces for change from inside and outside the organization. In particular, I test my three hypotheses against cases of resistance to change by the U.S. Army during the 20th century in the areas of personnel, operations, and technology.

Resistance to Change—Inertial vs. Strategic

Resistance to change is perhaps the only consistent characteristic of all organizations regardless of type, time, culture or environment. While some research finds evidence in favor of organizational flexibility, the large majority of research on organizational change recognizes the pervasiveness of resistance.1 I discuss this literature in more detail in the next chapter; this section defines and describes the difference between inertial and strategic resistance. While I differentiate between inertial and strategic resistance (this will be defined subsequently), they are by no means mutually exclusive; the latter seeks to add agency to the former.

The inability to change is most often referred to as organizational inertia. Specifically, inertia is an “inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment,” a definition which recognizes that an organization’s fit within its environment is necessary to achieve performance and survive (Pfeffer 1997, 163). As a synonym for organizational resistance, inertia usually leads to images of negative or sub-optimal performance if the organization is unable to overcome it (Weick and Quinn 1999, 366; Carroll and Delacroix 1982; Hannan and Freeman 1984). Inertia, however, is not inherently a bad thing. Inertia reduces uncertainty and maintains an organization’s sense of legitimacy by maintaining predictability for both internal and external

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1 See Amburgey et al. (1993, 51-53) for a short review.
constituencies (Tushman and Romanelli 2009, 174-195). It provides the stability that is necessary to the functioning of the organization (Wilson 1989, 221).

According to the organizational change literature, inertia is inescapable. It is an inherent characteristic of organizations (Miller and Friesen 1980, 591; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Kelly and Amburgey 1991, 593-594; Amburgey et al. 1993, 69; Pardo Del Val and Fuentes 2003, 153; Tushman and Romanelli 2009, 191). In other words, organizations are inertial due to the very fact that they are organizations.

Resistance, however, can also be intentional. Within an organization, research has demonstrated how individuals will resist change if it takes away their previous freedoms (Brehm 2009), or if it challenges previous norms, disrupts cultural coherence, threatens vested interests, or violates sacred ideals (Watson, Resistance to Change 2009). Sub-groups within organizations can intentionally resist change by reducing output when such change is viewed as illegitimate and if they have a high degree of internal cohesiveness (Coch and French 2009). As opposed to the extensive research on inertial resistance, only a handful of studies examine intentional or active resistance (Oliver 1991; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997). Overall, there is very little research that examines intentional resistance to change; this project seeks to expand this research.

In this project, I use the term “strategic” resistance to change to indicate resistance that is both intentional and directed at a particular force for change.\(^2\) I do not use the term to mean that there is necessarily an over-arching plan to the Army’s resistance; in fact, as will be analyzed in the case studies, there is little evidence of this. However, resistance in each discrete instance is still strategic because it has a purpose: it is both intentional and directed at a force for change.

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\(^2\) Chorev (2012) also uses the term “strategic resistance” to explain how organizations, specifically the World Health Organization, protect their interests: “Unlike passive articulation of defiance, however, strategic resistance attempts to minimize the extent to which external forces would view the response as challenging of their expectations. An international bureaucracy that strategically resists external expectations does not reject the dominant logic, but rather relies on that very logic to legitimate its refusal to comply” (31).
By exploring resistance to change as a strategic activity and answering questions about such resistance, I expand the scholarly research on organizational change and resistance to change.

The U.S. Army and Resistance to Change

The U.S. Army’s methods and tactics by which it has resisted change have not been analyzed in depth. Yet, there are many examples of the Army resisting changes in personnel, operations, and technology when such changes threatened its sense of mission.

As mentioned earlier, consider technology and the longevity of the horse cavalry. Even when new breach loading rifles, the internal combustion engine, maneuver warfare, and artillery capabilities made the cavalry completely inappropriate as a primary means of combat, the horse cavalry remained a combat branch of the Army (Katzenbach 1958, 178). As motorized vehicles—including tanks—and more powerful weapons increasingly crowded the battlefield, the Army continued to conduct field maneuvers that incorporated the horse cavalry through 1941 (Hofmann 2006, 275). Finally in 1951, six years after the end of World War II, the Army disbanded the cavalry (Katzenbach 1958).

Or consider airplane technology, first introduced to the Army in 1909. In their first decades, airplanes were viewed as having little organizational benefit beyond reconnaissance, given that the total number of Army personnel first assigned to the aviation section was three. But as early as 1911, Army officers were testing airplanes for their bombing capabilities (Hennessey 1958, 45-47). Shortly thereafter as the Army’s young aviators and airplanes’ political supporters saw the potential of air power, the power and prestige of the traditional combat branches of the Army (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) came under duress because

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3 In 1942, Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey of the 26th Cavalry led the very last cavalry operation when he covered General Douglas MacArthur’s retreat to Bataan in the Philippines (Hofman 2006, 298). Eventually, following the retreat, the horses were eaten (ibid.).
airpower offered a completely new paradigm for prosecuting warfare. While this new technology of warfare had the potential to change war forever, airplanes would most likely have been relegated to a reconnaissance role if not for the support of a dedicated group of officers, political supporters, and the occurrence of the world wars. Army leadership fought the supporters of aviation, many of whom were their own officers, to prevent airplanes from changing the Army’s priorities.

Besides technology, the Army has also resisted changes to the types of personnel who serve. Although women have served in the Army since the Revolutionary War, they did not gain official status until World War II. Then, it was only with Congressional support and the personnel demands of a world war that they gained such status through the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) in 1942. It was not until over thirty years later, in 1974, that women became fully integrated into the same units and promotion lists as men. Yet while much of the official justification for such segregation was attributed to women’s lack of abilities, Army leaders including General John Pershing in World War I and General George Marshall in World War II recognized early in their service the capabilities that women brought to the war effort. In fact, women first successfully demonstrated their ability to serve in combat roles (serving as air defense gunners) in a secret Army test in 1942 (Holm 1982, 66-67; Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 69).

The Army has also resisted changes to the way it makes war. For example, in the early 1960’s at the beginning of the Vietnam War, President Kennedy himself attempted to force the Army to institutionalize counterinsurgency capabilities, but counterinsurgency-specific capabilities (including liaison skills, training indigenous forces, governance development, civil policing actions, etc.) were not then nor since been made a priority by Army leaders. Even when
the American forces in Vietnam were obviously faced with the severe challenges of fighting an insurgency in South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland’s strategy was not to wage a stronger counterinsurgency operation but to utilize stronger “firepower” (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 197).

The Army’s resistance to change is a vital part of understanding the priorities, capabilities, and force posture of the nation’s largest military service. It is difficult to imagine an Army today without the presence of women, airplanes, or counterinsurgency. Yet, had the Army’s resistance been stronger, this might have led to outdated weapons, personnel shortages, and failure in battle. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that such resistance is unique to the Army, because, as noted earlier, resistance is a pervasive characteristic of all organizations.

**What This Project Adds to Scholarship and Practice**

This project will add to our understanding of how organizations act and change by expanding our understanding of their ability to resist change. The literature on organizational change is extensive but incomplete because it assumes that organizations resist change and that such resistance is inertial. It largely neglects the dynamics of this resistance, instead focusing on explanations of why organizations resist and the consequences of doing so. Thus, this study contributes to a gap in the theoretical literature.

Additionally, this study also has a variety of practical implications for practitioners and policymakers who influence national security organizations as well as those who lead or influence other government agencies, business organizations in the private sector, and even civil society groups. By understanding how resistance manifests itself, those who seek to achieve change will be better prepared to address it. However, this research can also help those who seek
to resist change do so more effectively, to know when and under what conditions such resistance will likely be most effective, and to understand when resistance would be wasted effort.

The findings of this study are particularly applicable to civilian practitioners and policymakers involved in developing the national security priorities of the United States. In this country, maintaining civilian control of the military is a core aspect of the civil-military relationship, yet it is also recognized that the military does not always follow the direction of civilian leadership (Burk 2002, 7; Feaver 2003). Civilian control of the military is not just a matter of ultimate command authority during wartime; it is also a matter of day-to-day operational activities that have implications for how the armed forces prepare for meeting the nation’s national security needs. Thus, practitioners’ ability to address and correct for any resistance will benefit from understanding how such resistance actually happens. By understanding how a national security organization might avoid civilian direction, the civilian leadership will be more capable of addressing resistance and imposing its guidance on the organization.

Beyond military agencies, this project can also support practitioners who lead businesses, civil society organizations, and other government agencies. The challenge of achieving organizational change is pervasive and the role that resistance plays in such failure is critical. According to Ford and Ford (2010), “This may be difficult, because over half of all organization change efforts fail and, according to the managers involved, the primary reason for those failures is resistance to change [emphasis added]” (27). By better understanding how such resistance actually manifests itself beyond a reluctance to implement change programs, leaders, managers, and other change agents will be better prepared to achieve change.
Dissertation Structure and Organization

The chapters that follow will analyze organizational resistance to change as a strategic act and test three hypotheses related to such resistance. In Chapter 2, I situate this project within the literature on organizational change and resistance to change; identify the gaps in the literature I seek to fill; identify the three hypotheses that will be tested in the rest of the project; and discuss the methods by which these hypotheses will be tested.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are case studies of how the Army has resisted changes of personnel, operations, and technology, respectively. Chapter 3 examines the case of personnel and focuses specifically on African Americans, women, and homosexuals (from the Spanish-American War through the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). Chapter 4 focuses on operations and specifically on counterinsurgency operations in four wars: the Philippine-American War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Chapter 5 examines challenges presented by technology and the cases of the Army’s resistance to airplanes, nuclear weapons, and armed helicopters.

Each of the empirical chapters is organized similarly. At the beginning of each case, I provide a brief historical context. Following this overview, I identify the forces for change that acted on the Army and the direction these forces pushed the organization. Then, I argue why the Army’s resistance to these forces is best attributed to intentionality rather than another reason such as ignorance about the intended consequences, a change in the international security environment, or political pressure. Having argued that these cases are examples of strategic resistance to change rather than a byproduct of some other reason, I then identify the tactics of

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4 I have combined the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in a single case, even though they are two distinct theatres. This is because the Army had to respond to (and was affected by) the challenges of these wars at the same time.
resistance employed by constituencies of resistance within the Army. The identification of these tactics, then, provides the basis for testing hypotheses at the end of each empirical chapter.

Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this project and identifies potential areas and questions for further research. Additionally, this final chapter will examine the project’s hypotheses across all of the empirical cases and compares these findings to each of the chapter findings in order to identify other possible insights about resistance to change.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODS

This chapter reviews the literature on organizational change, identifies the hypotheses being tested, and explains the method that will be used to conduct this research. As discussed in the previous chapter, in this project I differentiate between inertial resistance to change and strategic resistance to change. Inertial resistance is automatic, routine, and lacking agency. Strategic resistance is intentional and directed towards a specific force for change with the intent of preventing that force from influencing the organization. Strategic resistance also assumes the organization could change. In other words, I am not looking at resistance due to an organization’s inability to change.

Building on this understanding of strategic resistance to change, this project analyzes tactics of resistance to change and tests hypotheses related thereto. These hypotheses examine similarities and differences between the tactics employed; whether the organization is more successful at resisting internal or external forces for change; and if the organization becomes more effective at resisting forces for change over time. To test these hypotheses, this project utilizes a comparative case study method. Fundamentally, this project addresses the “how” question of resistance to change.

Organizations, Change, and Resistance

The literature agrees that organizations will resist challenges to their sense of mission. In using the term “sense of mission,” I mean the sense of “purpose, status, and solidarity” that grows from the “single, main thing [an organization] is supposed to do” (Wilson 1989, 158).
Another way of describing a sense of mission is that it is an organization’s “reason for being” (David 1989, 90). Yet another is organizational “essence” (Halperin et al. 2006, 27-40).

This definition is closely related to an understanding of organizational culture (Schein 1990, 2004, 2009; Tushman and Romanelli 2009). Broadly, organizational culture is the operational paradigm through which organizational members filter stimuli and respond according to established scripts of right and wrong action (Johnson 1992), which establishes boundaries on when and how change is appropriate (Schein 1988). Organizational culture establishes norms and boundaries for all aspects of an organization, but for the purposes of this project, I focus on those aspects of the Army’s sense of mission and organizational culture that define who is considered an appropriate soldier and leader, what types of military operations are considered appropriate forms of warfare, and the means by which warfare should be prosecuted. I will discuss this in more detail in a subsequent section.

A sense of mission, then, provides direction and facilitates organizational stability. As discussed in the previous chapter, stability (along with credibility and legitimacy) are paramount; a change in the organization’s mission is the most unstable of instabilities. Thus, an organization will always protect its mission.

This research differs from other research on organizational resistance to change in two ways. First, the majority of the research on organizational resistance to change focuses on

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5 A similar definition for mission the “long-term objective, the achievement of which is the raison d’etre of the organization” (McDonald 2007, 257). Also, mission “…is concerned with identifying an organization’s unique and enduring purpose which is both rooted in the present and lasting for some indefinite period” (Bart and Baetz 1998, 826). The discussion of missions and their roles in organizations is extensive, but for an overview see also (Want 1986; Pearce and David 1986; Bart and Baetz 1998; Amran 2012).

6 Definitions and approaches to examining and understanding organizational culture are extensive. For more, see Schein 1990; Brown 1998; Martin 2002; Argyris 2010; Schein 2010. Schein (1988) defines organizational culture as, “the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with problems of external adaptation and internal integration—a pattern of assumptions that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (278).
explaining why organizations resist change; this project focuses on understanding how
constituences within an organization resist. In other words, resistance is not just a passive
characteristic of an organization, it is an action that constituents within the organization choose
to employ, meaning that it is the dependent variable. Second, the majority of research on
organizational resistance to change portrays resistance as an innate and sometimes involuntary
aspect of organizations. In opposition to this understanding of resistance as an inherent
characteristic of organizations, a minority of the literature examines resistance as an intentional
act; I situate this project in the latter understanding of resistance.

The literature on organizations tends to define resistance as “any phenomenon that
hinders” change by either stopping it or thwarting it (Pardo del Val and Fuentes 2003, 153).
Starting with Kurt Lewin’s (2009 [1947], 1951) recognition of the role of “restraining forces” in
social systems, organizational resistance is a consistent theme in organizational theory literature
because it is assumed. Coch and French (2009 [1948]) were among the first to study resistance
specifically (Burke et al. 2008, 333). They concluded that groups with a high degree of internal
cohesiveness resist change that is viewed as illegitimate. Since then, organizational scholars
have accepted resistance to change as a fundamental aspect of organizations: “Everyone knows
that change is always accompanied by resistance” (Burke et al. 2009, 331).

The majority of organizational resistance research focuses primarily on explaining the
causes of resistance and has identified an extensive, almost overwhelming number of factors.
Explanations of the causes of resistance can be grouped according to whether they emphasize
external, internal, or cognitive factors.

External factors are those causes of resistance to change that are outside of the
organization. External factors include aspects such as legal regulations, established relationships
with other organizations, and expectations by other groups and actors in the environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 149). Importantly, customers and suppliers pressure organizations to maintain legitimacy and reliability (Kelly and Amburgey 1991, 593) with both customers and other organizations that provide resources. Finally, constant technological changes can overwhelm organizations’ abilities to comprehend such changes such that they put off adaptation until it is too late to benefit from such changes (Henderson and Clark 1990; Dong and Saha 1998).

Scholars, however, generally place more emphasis on internal factors in explaining resistance. Internal factors include sunk costs, such as the development of factories or organization-specific technologies that cannot change to accommodate new demands (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 149) and which inhibit the allocation of money or other resources that may be necessary to achieve change. Established political relationships amongst internal constituencies also are a major restraint that prevents necessary trade-offs of funding streams or power necessary to adapt to new environments (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Levitt and March (1988, 322-323) identify competency traps as an internal driver of resistance, meaning that an organization may invest so much time and effort into perfecting a particular activity or process that it is unable to change those processes when they eventually prove ineffective. Similar to competency traps, engrained routines and habit are common explanations for resistance (Gioia 1992; O’Toole 1995, 8). Finally, financial limitations may be the cause of resistance to change (Rumelt 1995).

Cognitive or psychological factors are the third main explanation for resistance. One of the major cognitive factors leading to resistance is an inability to properly understand or recognize changes in the external environment or the need to change (Barr et al. 1992, 15-18;
Rumelt 1995; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Additionally, failure to successfully change in the past can lead to low motivation for subsequent attempts to change (Pardo del Val and Fuentes 2003). Collective fantasy and a fallacy of the exception (O’Toole 1995) can cause resistance, meaning that members of an organization do not interpret changes by other similar organizations as applicable to their own situation. Lack of vision or creativity can also cause resistance (Pardo del Val and Fuentes 2003).

Thus, the extant literature on resistance focuses on the question of why organizations resist. My research, instead, seeks to understand “how” they resist. The “how” question is particularly understudied, but the generally accepted explanation is that organizations resist change by failing to change, via “inertia.” Generally, “resistance is any conduct that tries to keep the status quo, that is to say, resistance is equivalent to inertia, as the persistence to avoid change” (del Val and Fuentes 2003, 149). More succinctly, inertia is an “inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the environment” (Pfeffer 1997, 163) and can result in negative or sub-optimal performance (Carroll and Delacroix 1982; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Weick and Quinn 1999, 366). Thus, organizational resistance to change in current scholarship is treated not as an act or process, rather it is the absence of change. Further, this absence of change is treated as a passive characteristic of organizations, not an intentional act (Miller and Friesen 1980, 591; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Kelly and Amburgey 1991, 593-594; Amburgey et al. 1993, 69; Pardo Del Val and Fuentes 2003, 153; Tushman and Romanelli 2009, 183).\footnote{As explained by Hannan and Freeman (1984, 162-163), “The price paid for high-fidelity reproduction is structural inertia. Thus if selection favors reliable, accountable organizations, it also favors organizations with high levels of inertia. In this sense, inertia can be considered to be a by-product of selection.” As explained by Tushman and Romanelli (2009, 183), “A by-product of consistency are webs of interdependencies and commitments that are associated with increased organizational complexity and specialization and, in turn, structural and social rigidities.”}

Only a small segment of the literature treats resistance as an intentional act. This view stems from an understanding of organizations as strategic actors (Child 1972, 1997; Aldrich and
Pfeffer 1976; Agocs 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Such a view is most closely associated with strategic choice theory, a vein of organizational theory that argues that constituencies holding power within organizations have the ability to influence characteristics of both the internal and external environments in response to environmental changes; constituencies are not locked into outcomes (Child 1972).\(^8\) Internally, these constituencies can influence organizational configuration, personnel, and allocation of resources; additionally, these constituencies are also understood to have influence over the external environment in that they “…may command sufficient power to influence the conditions prevailing within environments where they are already operating” (Child 1972, 5). Such control of the external environment is due to the interdependence of organizations and actors in the broader environment (or institution).

Thus, the organization’s response to changing environmental conditions is not inevitably inertial – organizations, but more specifically constituencies therein (i.e., individuals or groups who are part of the organization), can choose how they respond to forces that act upon them (Child 1972, 10). This approach, then, offers particularly useful insight to re-framing resistance to change. While organizations may be bounded in their responses (e.g., they are constrained by their resources), they do have some choice in how to respond (Child 1972, 10; Child 1997, 53). While organizations might choose to adapt to changes in the environment, they might also choose to resist.

Treating resistance to change as strategic is different from treating it as inertia, and the key difference is intentionality. Strategic resistance is not just an inability to change which results in the maintenance of the status quo; rather, it is a desire to resist manifested as an act to

\(^8\) As noted by Weiner (2011, 17), “Organizations are not hostages to their environments; rather, they make strategic choices about whether and how to influence those environments and the limitations they pose.”
keep the status quo or alter the intended consequence of a force for change to minimize its impact.

Besides intentionality, two implicit components of strategic resistance are the presence of a force for change and the ability of the organization to implement change. Strategic resistance to change is directed towards a particular force for change from either outside or inside the organization (forces for change will be discussed below). Without a force for change, there is no strategic resistance. Additionally, the organization must have the ability to actually change. If there is no ability to change, then the organization cannot be seen as resisting because it has no choice.

Thus in this project, I use the term “strategic resistance” to represent resistance that is intentional, directed at a force for change, and not due to an organization’s inability to change; such a view of resistance is distinct from and contrasted against inertial resistance and lack of ability. In the next section, I will identify the ways in which organizations pursue strategic resistance.

**Tactics of Resistance**

If resistance is strategic, then an organization resists a force for change in a particular way, through a particular act. “Tactics of resistance” are the specific forms by which an organization, or part of it, intentionally acts to thwart change.

Drawing from the literatures of organizational theory, public administration, and civil-military relations, I have identified nine tactics of resistance. While some are specifically identified in the literature, I deduce others. These nine tactics are: ignoring the force for change, waiting out (also known as foot-dragging or stalling), denial, sabotage, suppression, moving
changes to the periphery, quarantine, offering something of lesser value, and political use of expertise.

Ignoring a force for change

Ignoring a force for change is an obvious form of resistance in that it is a decision not to acknowledge a force or its intended change. Such a tactic depends on the relative balance of power between the force for change and the organization; the more power that the force for change has relative to the organization, the less able the organization will be to ignore it without suffering consequences.

Ignoring a force for change only qualifies as a tactic of resistance if the organization recognizes the force for change and intentionally downplays or ignores it, not if the absence of change is due to an inability to recognize a change in the external or internal environment (inertial resistance). If an organization does not recognize the implications of a force for change or if the force for change is not apparent, then the organization cannot be said to have ignored it. But, if the force for change is recognized as such, and the organization chooses not to act, this is a tactic of resistance.

Waiting out (Slow-rolling, Stalling, or Foot-dragging)

Organizations can also intentionally slow implementation of a policy or directive with the intent of waiting until a force for change no longer has the interest or the power to instigate change.\(^9\) Waiting out is unique in that it has a temporal characteristic—by slowly implementing a policy or change in response to a force for change, the organization is biding time until the force for change either goes away or exhausts its ability to apply pressure.

\(^9\) This tactic is noted throughout the literature on government bureaucracies (e.g. Golden 2000; Binder and Maltzman 2002; Froomkin 2009; Ucko 2009, 73).
Denial

Denial is the refusal to accept responsibility for an issue or problem that arises because of a force for change. Agocs (1997, 927) describes this as a “refusal to own the problem.” This is different from ignoring the problem; denial, as a tactic of resistance, is a matter of not accepting responsibility for an issue but still recognizing that the force for change has identified an issue of concern. Denial is employed by shifting or attempting to shift responsibility for a particular change to another organization or actor, or by denying that the organization is responsible for the problem at all. This is not the same as denial in the sense that the organization is unable or incapable of recognizing a particular aspect of the environment; rather, it is an active attempt to shift responsibility.

Sabotage

Sabotage is the act of purposively dismantling a policy or change after it has been initiated or inhibiting the ability of the policy to be fully implemented. Sabotage can be conducted in a number of ways. Removing key participants or agents necessary for the success of the change or assigning people responsibility who are likely to fail; starving a policy of necessary resources; or failing to provide resources or adapt other parts of the organization that are necessary for the intended policy’s success are all techniques of sabotage (Agocs 1997, 925).

Suppression

Suppression is the act of silencing, delegitimizing, or refuting a force for change or the evidence offered by a force for change. According to Agocs (1997, 923), such a tactic is based on the power of an organization to decide who is a legitimate actor within the environment of the

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10 Agocs (1997, 927) uses the term inaction, but I use the term denial as a more precise word to describe this tactic.

11 Though I use the term sabotage, Agocs (1997, 920) uses the term “repression” – I use the former term because it more accurately describes the tactic. See also Brehm and Gates (1997).
organization. For instance, if a group of employees brings a malfeasance complaint against a manager, the organization could argue that the group is not a legitimate voice because they are represented by the union. Unlike sabotage, suppression as a tactic of resistance is used by silencing or delegitimizing the force for change rather than hampering it.

Moving Changes to the Periphery

Moving changes to the periphery of an organization can also be a tactic of resistance. As I will discuss in more detail in the analytical framework section of this chapter, organizations have core and peripheral components (Scott 1981, 204; Hannan and Freeman 1984, 156). Core components are more closely aligned with the priorities of the organization than peripheral components. By moving changes to the periphery, an organization can minimize the impact because changes to the core components of the organization usually necessitate changes in the peripheral components, but not vice versa (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 157).

Quarantine

Quarantine is similar to the above tactic of suppression, except that it can be employed against forces for change that cannot be suppressed. To quarantine a force for change means to cut off its ability to impact the rest of the organization by immobilizing or inhibiting its ability to influence, rather than actually reducing its influence directly. Like a doctor treating a patient with a severe illness, the intent is to keep the force for change from infecting the rest of the organization.

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12 Agocs (1997, 922-926) uses the term denial.

13 This tactic is deduced by blending the tactic of suppression (Agocs 1997) with core-periphery considerations (Thompson 1967; Scott 1981, 204; Hannan and Freeman 1984, 156).
Offering Something of Lesser Value (Appeasement)

If a force for change cannot be suppressed or quarantined, it may be appeased.\textsuperscript{14} Offering something of lesser value means offering smaller changes without having to undergo larger changes, or changing in a superficial way that does not reflect genuine change. This is different that moving changes to the periphery of the organization, because, in employing this tactic, the organization attempts to undercut a force for change by changing in the same way but to a lesser degree than intended or desired.

Political Use of Expertise

Bureaucracies are able to use their expertise over policy as a tactic of resistance to delegitimize, impede, or obstruct forces for change (Weber 2005 [1948]; Spencer 1982; Bendor et al. 1985). As noted by Weber (2005 [1948], 232): “Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert.’” The basis of a government bureaucracy’s power, then, is its expertise over a particular policy arena (Weber 2005 [1948]; Miller and Moe 1983; Altfeld and Miller 1984) as well as its ability to influence capabilities, budget, and risk (Niskasen 1971). While politicians have “formal authority,” they lack “de facto power” due to the difficulty of observing and measuring output and their lack of insight into the specificities of projects (Bendor et al. 1985, 1041).

Sense of Mission

While organizations may use tactics of resistance for a number of reasons, I specifically examine when organizations use tactics of resistance in order to protect their mission. I focus

\textsuperscript{14} This tactic is deduced from blending the tactic of foot-dragging with the political use of expertise (discussed subsequently). If political leadership does not actually understand the organization but still demand change, they are less likely to actually know whether the change that occurs will result in the outcomes they desire.
specifically on resistance to forces for change that threaten an organization’s sense of mission because it is the most central aspect of an organization that provides purpose to its members, thus it should generate the most resistance and provide the clearest evidence of resistance for hypothesis testing.

I use the term sense of mission in a manner most closely associated with James Q. Wilson (1989). In the most basic terms, an organization’s sense of mission develops around the “single, main thing [the organization] is supposed to do” (Wilson 1989, 158). According to Wilson (1989), a sense of mission provides “purpose, status, and solidarity” to an organization and its members (158). The idea encapsulated by the term “mission” has been expressed in other ways including “distinctive competence” as used by Philip Selznick or “essence” as used by Morton Halperin (as quoted in Wilson 1989, 95). Fundamentally, a sense of mission provides an organization with stability, direction, and purpose.

As used in this project, a sense of mission is closely related to an understanding of organizational culture. According to Edgar Schein, organizational culture is the “pattern of basic assumptions” developed and shared by a group (1984, 3). Robert Cooke and Denise Rousseau (1988) define organizational culture as “the shared norms and expectations that guide the thinking and behavior of members” (246). John Kotter identifies two aspects of organizational culture, the “values” held by individuals within an organization and the “behavior patterns or style that new employees are automatically encouraged to follow by their fellow employees” (Kotter and Heskett 1992, 4). Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy (2000) argue that “values” are

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15 According to Wilson (1989, 158): “Purpose, status, and solidarity; these are the elements out of which a sense of mission might be fashioned.”

16 “Organizational culture is the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein 1984, 3).
the fundamental building blocks of organizational culture, i.e., those characteristics or traits of individuals and the organization held to be “right” (21-22). Jay Barney (1986) defines organizational culture as the “values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that define the way in which” an organization acts and achieves its goals (657). Barney also notes that there is “little consensus concerning the definition of organizational culture” (ibid.), but for the purposes of this project, I am concerned with the assumptions held within the organization regarding people, operations, and technology, which I will discuss subsequently.

Organizational culture is particularly relevant for military organizations in that it has real affects on organizational actions and decision-making. Thomas McNaugher (1984) argues that the U.S. Army’s culture of marksmanship influenced the transition from the World War II-era M14 rifle to the Vietnam-era M16 rifle. Elizabeth Kier (1997) examines how the organizational culture of the French Army and its officers beliefs about the capabilities of its conscripted soldiers embedded a belief in a certain method of conducting operations that proved disastrous against German forces. Robert Mullins (2000) argues that the cultures of the British Royal Navy and U.S. Navy at the turn of the century affected how they each developed their views on sea power and how such operations were to be conducted. Richard Lock-Pullan (2005) describes how the U.S. Army’s organizational cultural focus on “professionalism” in the wake of its transition to the all-volunteer force in the 1970's bounded the organization’s view of how and when its forces should be applied. Other studies have examined the impact of culture on innovation (Adamsky 2012), flexibility (Finkel 2000), and overall military effectiveness (Ulmer et al. 2000). In each of these studies, scholars have found that the norms, values, and beliefs of the military organization’s culture have had real-world implications for and influence on actions and outcomes.
A sense of mission is a vitally important attribute of an organization because it bounds decision-making, determines priorities, and affects the allocation of resources. More than just identifying what the organization does, an organization’s mission imbues the organization and its members with a sense of purpose. As Wilson (1989, 92) notes, mission answers both questions of “what shall we do?” and “what shall we be?” Mission provides the “subjective meaning” (Baum 2002, 5) for individuals and the organization as a whole. For the purpose of this project, a sense of mission affects the norms, values, and beliefs of three questions: Who is an appropriate member and leader within the organization? What types of activities should the organization master? How should we carry out our primary tasks?

For the purposes of this project, I focus on the norms, values, and beliefs embedded within the Army’s sense of mission. I use the term “norms” to refer to understandings of who is and is not considered an appropriate member of the organization (e.g., Deal and Kennedy 2000). I use the term “values” to refer to the type of activities (in this case, the type of military operations) that are worthy of the organization’s time and effort (e.g., Kotter and Heskett 1992). I use the term “beliefs” to refer to the assumptions about how those types of activities should be executed (e.g., Barney 1986). Though I have adapted the terminology for the purposes of this project, my usage of these terms reflects the same basic ideas about the assumptions embedded within an organization that bound understandings of right and wrong and determine organizationally appropriate reactions to internal and external stimuli (e.g., Schein 1984; Kotter and Heskett 1992; Deal and Kennedy 2000). Additionally, because these norms, values, and beliefs are so deeply embedded within an organization, forces for change that threaten the organization’s sense of mission are most likely to generate resistance, thus these situations will provide the richest data for hypothesis testing.
The Army’s Sense of Mission

In this project, I am concerned with the U.S. Army’s sense of mission regarding the norms, values, and beliefs related to the conduct of conventional ground combat operations against other professional military organizations. The Army’s sense of mission is determined by and engrained in its personnel policies, technology, history, training, education, power relationships, reward structure, and organizational structure. This sense of mission cannot be separated from these other aspects of the organization.

The Army’s sense of mission has changed over time due to a shift in its main task. In the 19th century and before, the Army’s primary responsibility was pacifying Native Americans and protecting the country’s coastline against attack (Weigley 1984, 98). But as a result of the Civil War and the associated changes in views of warfare, the Army moved away from constabulary responsibilities and began to focus on major conflicts between mass armed forces (Weigley 1984, 265), what is today known as conventional warfare. The Army’s current focus on major conventional warfare in the 20th century has been well-established (Weigley 1984; Coffman 1986, 2004; Krepinevich 1988; Nagl 2002; Cassidy 2003, 2004; Halperin et al. 2006, 32; Davidson 2011, 73-79). Essentially, the “single, main thing” the Army was supposed to do changed in the post-Civil War era to the conduct of conventional ground combat operations against other professional military organizations. Around this main task, then, arose particular norms, values, and beliefs.

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17 Depending on the time period and the discussants, this is also called “high-intensity conflict,” “conventional warfare,” “big-war,” or as it is commonly called to the detriment of other forms of conflict, “war.”

18 Activities and events both inside and outside the organization reinforced this new mission. Within the Army, numerous professional and organizational changes occurred to instill this new post-bellum mission: professional military schools came into existence, military journals spread new ideas about warfare, and some intellectuals within the military began to experiment with new unit structures and tactics (Ambrose 1964; Weigley 1984, 265-292). At the same time, the increasing capabilities of the U.S. armed forces made it a tempting tool for political and military leaders who sought to extend America’s global presence (Weigley 1984, 313). In 1898, the United States Army
In each of the following chapters, I will explore the Army’s resistance to certain forces that challenged the norms, values, and beliefs that surround the Army’s main task of conventional operations. In the personnel chapter, I examine the Army’s resistance to forces that challenged the norms of who was and was not considered an appropriate soldier or leader. In the operations chapter, I explore how the values of what is and is not considered an appropriate military operation leads to resistance to non-traditional, unconventional operations. Finally, in the technology chapter, I examine the resistance to forces that challenged beliefs regarding technology that threatened the Army’s bias towards of ground-based, infantry operations. In each chapter, I will discuss specifically how these forces challenged these norms, values, and beliefs.

Forces for Mission Change

For the purposes of this project, strategic resistance is understood to be directed at a force that has potential to alter the mission or mission-critical elements of an organization. This section identifies the most likely sources of forces that put pressure on the mission. In discussing forces for mission change, I have differentiated between internal challenges and external challenges because these are the two most basic environments of any system (Gersick 2009, 145). This division between internal and external environments is also appropriate in that it distinguishes the degree of control over which the organization exerts influence, controls resources, and has knowledge about the unique actions, practices, and procedures of the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 (1978); Morris 2007). In reviewing the literature, I have identified eight forces for mission change, five of which are external to the organization and made its first foray abroad as a global power in the Spanish-American War, and following this event, the world wars reinforced the new mission of the Army.

19 Even given the insights of strategic choice theory (Child 1972), an organization will likely have more control over the internal environment that the external environment.
three of which are internal to the organization. External forces for change include budgets and resources, competition over new resources and responsibilities, threats, norms, and domestic politics. Internal forces for change include organizational leadership, mavericks and insurgents, and operational experience and learning.

External Force #1: Budgets and Resources

The literature on resources and budgets agrees that severe change in access to resources can drive mission adaptation. According to resource dependency theory, organizations are dependent on other organizations for resources (Scott 2003). The Army depends on Congress for money; on military contractors for research and development, equipment production, training, business practices development, and a host of other activities that are necessary for basic organizational functions; and the American public for personnel. Because organizations cannot survive without resources, severe changes in access to resources can lead to mission adaptation.

Like other resources, budgets are limited, and government agencies will seek to maximize their budget (Niskanen 1971; Migue and Belanger 1974). Allison and Zelikow’s (1971) “bureaucratic politics model” posits that government bureaucracies will seek to expand turf and budgets whenever possible. Accordingly, bureaucracies fight against other bureaucracies “to enhance (or at least maintain) their policy and budgetary positions” (Smith 2002, 188). According to this model, mission adaptation will occur when the opportunity to expand the budget is greater than the loss of autonomy.

External Force #2: Competition over New Responsibilities

Competition over new responsibilities can also drive organizations to adapt their mission. One of the most noted competitions in the 20th century was between the Army and the Navy over
strategic bombing capabilities (Barlow 1994). During the 1950’s, another rivalry between the Army and the Air Force festered over control of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)s and primacy in space policy (Armacost 1969; Neufeld 2005). This rivalry was so heated that President Eisenhower pulled both the Army’s and Air Force’s budding space programs out of the Department of Defense and instilled them in the newly created National Aeronautics and Space Administration – NASA (Neufeld 2005). At the same time, there was competition over control of nuclear weapons (Bacevich 1986; Combat Studies Institute 2000). Then again in the latter decades of the 20th century, a similar competition occurred over the development and weaponization of lasers (Seidel 1991). Because new resources and responsibilities allow agencies both to secure more resources and more policy control, they can be a powerful force for mission change.

External Force #3: Threats

The literature on threats as a source of organizational change agrees that a change in threat is the main source of mission adaptation and thus, presumably, an absence of a change in threat would predict mission persistence. According to classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (1978), a military organization should adapt its mission so as to be able to project state power most effectively. According to the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz (1979), militaries adapt their mission so as to protect against state threats in the international environment. Structural offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2003), like classical realism, predicts that militaries should adapt their mission so as to maximize their own power and achieve hegemony. Regardless of the school of thought, all such theories are based on the assumption that states are rational actors; that the military should have the same cost-benefit calculus of the
state; and that threat is a core concern of both the state and the military. Hence, a change in the threat should lead to mission change.

External Force #4: Norms

The institutional theory literature identifies changes in norms as a key potential pressure for changes in organizations. In order to secure goods and personnel necessary to conduct their operations and to maintain their place in the environment, organizations must maintain external legitimacy which is partially structured by norms (Parsons 1960, Thompson 1967, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Institutional theory stresses the powerful influence of isomorphism.  

Because organizations generally respond isomorphically to the norms of the institutional field, a change in a core group of organizations can lead to similar changes in other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and Dimaggio 1991). In this approach, a change in mission by other military departments (e.g., the Air Force, Navy, or Marines) or a core group of other armies (such as the militaries of Britain, Russia, or China) could lead to a change in the US military’s mission.

Norms have been particularly relevant for explaining military strategy. Farrell (2002) explains organizational change in the Irish Republican Army prior to World War II as a result of the interaction of a change in the strategic environment, “professional norms [of military officers] derived from world culture,” and “local cultural models” within Irish politics and the broader society (84). Jeffrey Legro (1996) has looked at how norms of warfare affected British and German strategies in World War II. Snyder (1984) and Van Evera (1984) have used the “cult of the offensive” to explain strategic decisions in World War I. Elizabeth Keir (1995, 1997) argues that organizational culture predisposes a military organization towards offensive or

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20 Isomorphism is the process by which organizations in the same population come to resemble each other, a process that can be either goal-oriented or normatively driven (Dimaggio and Powell 1983).
defensive operations. From this perspective, a change in international norms of warfare or organizational cultural norms pressure an organization to change its mission.

External Force #5: Domestic Agencies

Domestic political influence is an important driver of mission change. Presidents, bureaucrats, and legislators have an interest in making sure that agencies under their responsibility adapt to meet the mandate expected by their constituencies (Mayhew 1974; Moe 1985). Barry Weingast and Mathew McCubbines articulate the “congressional dominance” theory that describes how agencies will adapt to Congressional desires (Moe 1987, 476). March and Olsen (1989) refer to the “iron triangle” of the bureaucracy, Congress, and interest groups, all of which set parameters that define opportunities for an organization.

The domestic agencies that can assert power on an organization include sources other than the president and Congress. Because bureaucracies include both career bureaucrats and political appointees, they are subject to influence which can result in major changes to meet the political interests of those with executive power (Altfeld and Miller 1984; Cook 1989). Cook (1989) argues that bureaucracies must answer to “multiple, competing political principles [that] attempt to control agency policy-making behavior” (966). Thus, political and policy entrepreneurs who are not part of the elected leadership of the country can also affect organizations.

Internal Force #1: Leadership

Organizational change scholars identify leadership as the most important driver of mission change. According to strategic management theory, top-level management affects organizational characteristics such as goals and structure given their own organizational vision and environmental constraints (Child 1972; Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Kanter 1983; Tichy
1983; Nadler and Tushman 1994; Kotter 1996; Yukl 2010). Organizational leadership in the form of senior military officers is absolutely critical to understanding any mission, strategy, or cultural change associated with military innovation (Rosen 1991; Farrell and Terriff 2002). A change in leadership can generate pressure to change the mission.

Internal Force #2: Mavericks and Insurgents

The literature on organizations views mavericks as another source of mission adaptation. A maverick is an individual who has significantly different views about how an organization should accomplish its mission or what it should prioritize than the current leadership (Posen 1984; Rockwell 1995). One of the military’s most famous mavericks was Hyman Rickover, a vital actor in converting the US Navy to nuclear power (Rockwell 1992). Harold Winton (1988) makes a similar argument regarding the impact of General Stuart-Burnett on the development and innovation of British armor doctrine leading up to World War II. Barry Posen (1984) has argued that mavericks play an important role in providing information to civilian policy-makers who then push military organizations to innovate.

Similar to mavericks, insurgents are intra-organizational constituencies that seek to align the organization with their own definition of mission. “Insurgent bureaucratic politics” or “bureaucratic insurgency” approaches seek to explain how intra-organizational constituencies adapt their national security organization’s core mission by aligning organizational changes with the larger organizational mission (Bergerson 1980). For the purposes of this research, insurgents differ from mavericks in that insurgents are willing to risk extradition from the organization in order to achieve their intended goals and intentionally push the organizational boundaries to

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21 However, a “maverick” according to Rosen (1988, 21) is an “outsider, who may have brilliant ideas, but who has rejected the system and has been rejected by the system.” My use of maverick in this project is closer to Posen rather than Rosen.
succeed in their goals. Mavericks, while they may have differing views of how things should be done, act within the bounds of the organization systems, structures, and processes.

**Internal Force #3: Operational Experience and Learning**

The literature on organizational learning views operational experience as a main cause of mission change. According to the organizational learning model, organizations can adapt their core mission based on learning from past experiences (Argyris and Schon 1978; Lewin and Volberda 2003; Senge 2006). Learning can be formalized in studies and reports, or can take the form of knowledge gained through organizational members’ interaction with the environment and the feedback gained through such interaction. Learning occurs when new procedures, roles, or policies become embedded within the organizational structure as a result of adaptation to these past experiences (Argote and Ingram 2000).  

**Hypotheses To Be Tested**

The hypotheses I test in this project focus on whether the tactics of resistance employed are consistent or inconsistent depending on the force for change; whether an organization is more or less successful at resisting internal versus external forces for change; and whether organizations become more or less effective at resisting forces for change over time.

**H1: An organization will resist internal and external forces for change differently.**

I hypothesize that the Army will resist internal and external forces for change differently. While organizations can influence the external environment, an organization nevertheless has more control over the internal environment than the external environment (Child 1972, 1997;  

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22 However, while learning is based on operational experience, experience may or may not lead directly to organizational change. Individual preferences, lack of understanding of what happened, lack of information, a change in organizational goals, and changes in the environment can affect whether an organization learns from its experiences and whether the adapted procedures are appropriate to the future situation (March and Olsen 1976; Baum 2002, 16-17).
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Scott 2003). Thus, an organization may be able to use direct, offensive tactics to resist internal forces for change (e.g., suppression), but it is likely to resort to tactics of redirection or avoidance to resist external forces (e.g., waiting out) due to this power disparity. This hypothesis will be supported if there is differentiation in the tactics of resistance employed against internal versus external forces for change. This hypothesis will be falsified if I find no such differentiation in analyzing resistance to internal versus external forces for change.

**H2: Organizations will more successfully resist internal forces than external forces.**

The second hypothesis posits that the Army will be more successful in resisting internal forces than external forces. Because an organization has greater control of resources and personnel in the internal environment (as noted above), the organization should have more power and thus be more successful at resisting internal forces for change. I will test this hypothesis by examining the success of resistance against internal and external forces for change. Successful resistance will be measured in terms of the observed degree of change: successful resistance results in the maintenance of the status quo, while unsuccessful resistance results in a change in the status quo. This hypothesis will be supported if there are more instances of successful resistance to internal forces versus external forces, relative to the total number of each type. If there are more instances of successful resistance to external forces, then this hypothesis will be falsified.

**H3: Organizations become more skilled at resistance over time.**

The third hypothesis builds on the acknowledgment that organizations learn and become adept at influencing their external and internal environments over time (Levitt and March 1988; Amburgey et al. 1993; Barnett and Carroll 1995; Argote 1999; Senge 2006). Organizational learning can be observed by looking for adjustments to organizational processes in a way that
leads to different outcomes given the same inputs or when the leadership calls on past experiences in order to make decisions about a current situation (Argyris and Schon 1978). If the Army attempts to resist a force but fails, it should adapt based on the lessons taken from that experience; it should not repeat past mistakes. I will test this hypothesis by looking for the presence or absence of improvement in resistance across cases over time. If the Army is able to improve its resistance, I expect to see the Army successfully resist specific forces more effectively in the later cases (over time) than in the early cases. If there is no evidence of improvement of resistance over time, then this hypothesis will have been falsified.

**Case Selection**

In this project, I will examine historical cases in which the Army’s mission was challenged by either external or internal forces. To do so, this project utilizes cross-case comparisons in an embedded case design (Yin 2003, 43-45; see also George and Bennett 2005). The intent in case selection is to choose cases in which strategic resistance is strongest, thus better facilitating hypothesis testing. The cases chosen for this project meet the criteria of both type (meaning that it is a case of a threat to the mission in manner) and degree (meaning that the threat is powerful enough to achieve change) regarding challenge to the Army’s mission and include both internal and external forces for change.

Since the first expression of the Army’s mission in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Army has faced 15 cases that could pose a threat its mission. These 15 cases are:

1) Personnel (3 cases): the integration of African Americans (1898-1951); the integration of women (1942-present); and the integration of homosexuals (1992-2011)
2) Counterinsurgency operations (3 cases): the Philippine-American War (1899-1913), Vietnam War (1955-1975), and Iraq/Afghanistan Wars (2001 – Present)\textsuperscript{23}


4) Introduction of new technologies (3 cases): Airplanes (1909-1943); Nuclear Weapons (1951-1960); Helicopters (1952-1966)

5) Development of special operations capabilities (2 cases): Special Forces, i.e. unconventional warfare (1952-present); Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta, i.e. counterterrorism capabilities (1977-present)


Next, I have chosen cases that challenge the Army’s mission in degree. By degree, I mean that the force for change (the independent variable) is strong enough to impose change on the Army. For this reason, I have chosen not to include three of these cases. I have removed peacekeeping operations because the Army was able to conduct these with a minimum allocation of resources: the largest operation, the Balkans, required only 24,000 soldiers at its height (Phillips 2006, 19). I have also declined to investigate the development of unconventional warfare and counterterrorism capabilities. Because of their historically small size, these forces have not significantly challenged the Army’s mission in degree because the demands on

\textsuperscript{23} As mentioned, I have combined Iraq and Afghanistan into a single case because the organizational responses to the forces for change from each are inseparable. This is because the personnel and leadership involved served in both theatres and the similarity of the operational experiences.
resources is relatively limited. Additionally, much of the data relevant to counterterrorism capabilities remains classified.

I have also decided not to investigate the case of the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). As a result of my pilot research, I do not believe that this case will add relevant information for hypothesis testing beyond that which is garnered from the other cases explored in this project: the forces for change, tactics of resistance employed, and the Army’s overall response in this case are similar to those in the cases I have chosen (see below).

Finally, the hypotheses to be tested in this project require cases of resistance that persist over time that include both internal and external challenges to the mission. Looking at cases that occur over time allows me to see changes and similarities across cases and within cases. Looking at both internal and external forces for change allows me to understand how or if the resistance to these forces is similar or different. Given these criteria, I have identified nine cases grouped into three categories that will be the focus of this project:

1) Personnel. Personnel include the cases of the integration of African-Americans, women, and homosexuals.

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24 During Vietnam, Special Forces reached its largest personnel strength in that war at 13,000 personnel in 1969 (McClintock 1992, 348). Today, the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Command (USASOC), including both types of capabilities, currently totals 26,000 personnel out of a force of over 540,000 (U.S. Department of the Army 2012b). Except for two secondary sources, there is little first-hand information on the establishment of SFOD – Delta. See Beckwith and Knox (1983) and Haney (2002).

25 For instance, if USASOC began to lobby for an increase in size to 300,000 soldiers without increasing the size of the Army, then this would be considered a significant force for change because it would require over half of the conventional forces to convert to special operations forces.
2) Operations. Operations include the three cases of counterinsurgency operations including the Philippine-American War, the Vietnam War, and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3) Technology. Technology includes the cases of airplanes, nuclear weapons, and helicopters.

Organizational Framework

The organizational framework used in this project allows for an examination of strategic resistance to change in a rigorous and organized manner across the cases of personnel, operations, and technology. This framework utilizes an organizational model based on an understanding of the functional components and organizational features of the U.S. Army as they relate to the organization’s mission.26

The first aspect of this model depends on identifying the functional components of the Army. The functional components of an organization are those specialized groups or constituencies within an organization that are responsible for carrying out the various different tasks of the organization (Taylor 1911). While an organization will have a number of components, some will be considered core components and others will be considered peripheral components (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 156-157; Halperin et al. 2006, 55). While both core and peripheral components are necessary for the organization to accomplish its assigned tasks and goals, the core components will be most closely aligned with the organization’s mission (Halperin et al. 2006, 55).

26 Analyzing an organization according to its functional components fits with the rational systems approach of organizational design (Davis 1996; Scott 2003; Scott and Davis 2007). Separating an organization according to its features or elements fits within the classical executive management methodology (Gulick 1937). Though the particular framework used by Gulick and others may be debated, this methodology of separating an organization into functional components and constituent elements is a useful analytical framework.
An example of core and peripheral components is seen in the U.S. Department of State. In the Department of State, the core component is the Foreign Service, which has responsibility for managing government-to-government diplomatic relations. The peripheral, non-diplomatic components include the various bureaus that take on responsibilities such as global energy requirements, religious freedom, counterterrorism, and civil rights; but, the organizational mission is more closely aligned with the Foreign Service. While the peripheral components are important, the Department of State’s mission is most closely associated with its core component of the Foreign Service and therefore can be expected to most vigorously resist change to the Foreign Service.

The U.S. Army, like the Department of State, has core and peripheral components. Thus, the elements most central to the Army’s sense of mission will be the core components. The components of the Army can be divided into combat, combat support, and combat service support. Given the Army’s mission, the combat component is the core component, while the combat support and combat service support are peripheral components. For this reason, I will only examine forces for change and resistance thereto in the combat component.

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27 For a list of the numerous bureaus and offices of the Department of State, see (U.S. Department of State 2012).

28 As the Department of State’s own mission statement indicates, “The U.S. Department of State is the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy…” (U.S. Department of State 2011).

29 In this project, I am examining only active federal U.S. Army forces. This excludes National Guard and Reserve forces.

30 This mission describes that which the Army does, not what is directed to do. The Army’s assigned tasks are found in Title 10, Section 3062 of the U.S. Code: “It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States” (U.S. Congress 2012). As noted by Wilson (1989), the breadth of such Congressional guidance allows for organizational leadership to pick and choose their own priorities, given that “preserving the peace and security” of the country could include a wide array of threats, including non-military ones. Thus, my description of the Army’s mission more accurately identifies how organizational leadership has narrowed this scope of responsibility.
Each of the Army’s 23 branches falls into one of the three categories of combat, combat support, or combat service support. The combat component is composed of those branches most responsible for the application of combat force against other military organizations which include the branches of infantry, armor (or cavalry), and field artillery. While there are other branches that are identified as “combat branches” according to Army nomenclature (including engineers, aviation, special forces, and air defense artillery), these branches apply combat power in support of the three branches of infantry, armor, and field artillery. Indeed, no Army general would send a unit composed solely of engineers or aviation into combat against another army, even if Army policy treats these units as combat branches.

Combat support components are those branches that support the application of combat power. The combat support component includes the branches of chemical corps, military intelligence, military police, and the signal corps. While important and necessary to allow the combat components to accomplish their tasks, combat support components are not in and of themselves capable of applying combat power.

Finally, combat service support components are those that support the maintenance and administrative needs of the Army. Combat service support components include the branches of finance, chaplain, transportation, quartermaster, adjutant general, and the judge advocate.

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31 Infantry is the utilization of soldiers (usually ground soldiers, but sometimes utilizing helicopters or other vehicles for transportation purposes only) to apply combat power. Armor (or cavalry) relies on vehicles to apply combat power, different from infantry because the vehicle itself is the primary combat force (such as a tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle). Field artillery utilizes cannons, howitzers, and other indirect fire weapons to apply combat power; while soldiers operate the equipment, the cannons provide the mechanical application of force.

32 An argument could be made that aviation and special forces can and do apply combat power independent of other branches. However, they are treated as supporting combat units by the Army, even if other military departments (such as the Air Force in the case of aviation) treat them as core components. From the Army perspective, these are still supporting combat components.
These are the components of the organization necessary for the day-to-day activities of maintaining the organization; they neither apply combat power nor directly support the application of combat power. Thus, the Army can be divided according to the three component groups of combat, combat support, and combat service support.

The Army can be further divided by features. Features are the discrete aspects of an organization that when coordinated lead to the accomplishment of the organizational goals (Gulick 1936). Examining the features of the organization will add further analytical rigor because different forces for change act on different aspects of an organization.

There are two categories of organizational features, primary features and secondary features. Primary features are those aspects of the organization that are most responsible for maintaining the organizational mission, while secondary features are responsive to and reinforce the primary features. For the Army, the primary features are promotion pathways, training, and organizational structure. Secondary features include materiel, doctrine, awards, education, and facilities. In this project, I will examine forces for change and resistance in both primary and secondary features.

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33 Though the number of branches has changed over the years and depending on how the branches are described, there are currently 16 basic branches of the U.S. Army divided between combat branches and non-combat branches. Non-combat branches are further divided into “combat support” and “combat service support,” though this distinction is transparent for the purposes of this project.

34 By current Department of Defense policy and practice, separating each of the military services by its features is a mechanism for identifying capability gaps. This analytical tool is called the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) (U.S. Army Force Management School 2009). This analytical mechanism separates each of the services into the features of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). However, this is a capabilities-based methodology designed for identifying capability gaps and not for analyzing organizational response to forces for change, the latter of which is the focus of this project. A recent update to the JCIDS utilizes a DOTMLPF-P framework, which adds “policy” to the original model (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012). However, this addition is only a meta-category that recognizes the fact that official Army policy has to change in order to make the other changes permanent but adds no new analytical value.

35 This builds from the understanding of core and peripheral components (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 186-187). As there are core and peripheral components, there are core and peripheral features.
Promotion pathways are a primary feature because they maintain incentive mechanisms by which individuals receive personal benefits based on their ability to further organizational priorities (Rosen 1991). More than any other feature, promotion pathways link the interests of the individual to the activities of the organization. In Chapter 3: Personnel, promotion pathways will be of particular concern because forces for change affected groups who were considered summarily unfit for participation.

Training is a primary feature because it establishes explicit and implicit guidance on actions and responses to the operational environment and it embeds organizational priorities at the individual and collective levels. Training inculcates individuals with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) necessary to successfully undertake assigned tasks in ways that the organization has deemed appropriate. The internalization of such TTPs at the individual and unit levels through training then become standard operating procedures (SOPs), and SOPs frame how the individual and unit will act when faced with the real-world operational environment. These SOPs provide implicit guidance of right and wrong and establish the set of choices of action for the organization’s members (and limitations thereof) regarding what to do in a combat situation, with the intent of reducing uncertainty and increasing efficiency (Kaufman 1960; Simon 1960; Cyert and March 1963). Problem arise, however, when the operational environment is so different than what is expected that few (or none) of the SOPs are appropriate to achieving the desired result. This will be of particular importance in Chapter 4: Operations, which explores the Army’s response to counterinsurgency.

Finally, organizational structure is the means by which the Army organizes itself in a manner that reflects its priorities and assumptions about how to conduct operations. Organizational structure is the “anatomy” of an organization and has both intended and
unintended consequences on performance (Blau et. al 1966; Child 1972; Van de Ven et al. 1976; Dalton et. al 1980, 49; Tolbert and Hall 2010). While the Army has indeed dramatically changed structure in the past century (e.g., regimental structure, Pentomic Divisions, Reorganization Objective Army Division [ROAD], Brigade Combat Teams), it has also implemented ad hoc changes (e.g., Human Terrain Teams, company-level intelligence cells, interagency development teams) that meet short-term needs but are quickly reversed. Structure, then, is the framework in which all of the components (and the branches that make up the components) of the Army will work together in accomplishing the assigned combat tasks. As will be discussed in Chapter 4: Operations, counterinsurgency operations (and the forces for change related thereto) pose a threat to the Army leadership’s preferred organizational structure designed for conventional operations. New technologies (to be examined in Chapter 5: Technology) can also threaten established organizational structures.

While the primary features are inseparable from the Army’s mission, secondary features reinforce the essential features. A change in a secondary feature does not necessarily lead to a change in the primary features, but a change in a primary feature will consequently change the secondary features. Additionally, secondary features can more readily adapt than primary features without challenging or changing the organizational mission.

Materiel, particularly in the form of technology, can be both a primary and secondary feature, but in this project, I identify it as a secondary feature. Materiel (which includes organizational-specific technologies) acts as a physical agenda that both limits and frames organizational priorities and operational possibilities (Krepinevich 1994; Smith and Marx 1994; Murray and Millett 1996). In numerous cases of technological development—including the Army’s “Big Five” of the 1980’s (M1 Abrams Tank, the Apache helicopter, Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Patriot) along with more recent developments such as the Future Combat System platforms—the Army-directed research and development of these projects and the actual use of these technologies reflected and reinforced the mission. These technologies were chosen by the organization and deployed specifically because they fit within the mission. Chapter 5: Technology, will examine cases in which certain technologies were forced on the organization, which resulted in resistance because the new technologies lead to changes in the primary features.

Doctrine is sometimes treated as a primary feature, if not the most important feature, however this model identifies it as a secondary feature. According to the Department of Defense, doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces of elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” (U.S. Department of Defense 2013, 86). Many military innovation scholars treat doctrine as a measure of organizational change and innovation (Posen 1986; Avant 1994; Kier 1997). However, for the purposes of this project, I define doctrine in its strictest sense—it is the written principles and instructions of how the Army or its elements conduct all of the various actions across the spectrum of combat and non-combat operations. This is a different interpretation of doctrine as it is used by the scholars mentioned above, which use the term to encompass the broader phenomenon of how a military organization fights and conducts its operations. As noted by other scholars (Johnston 2000), “doctrine is not enough.” In order to turn principles into a manner of conducting combat operations, the Army must train, and training, in turn, establishes how the Army will fight, and performance in combat will likely not perfectly reflect those original doctrinal principles. Thus, it is training, not doctrine, that establishes SOPs, determines how the Army intends to fight, and establishes
understandings of right and wrong organizational action in combat. Essentially, I argue that SOPs—the implementation of doctrine—is more important than the articulation of doctrine.

Awards, education, and facilities are also supporters of the primary elements, and I will use these in the analysis, as well. Awards and citations are used to reinforce certain actions, but in contrast to Napoleon’s famous quote—“A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon”—such awards are not drivers of organizational action but means by which organizations demonstrate what “right” looks like. They are used to ingrain the mission at the individual level.

Education, though an important mechanism by which doctrine is transferred, is not a central aspect of either promotion pathways or training. While it is true that officers must complete a certain educational level to achieve rank beyond a certain level, this is a “check the box” exercise in its truest form: there is literally a box that must be checked, and the educational format, rigor, or topic does not matter. Education is something that Army officers and soldiers must do, but the actual content of the education has little to no bearing on their promotions or the organizational activities.

Facilities, though necessary for training and garrison duties, are established to support the development of SOPs, not vice versa. The two largest training facilities are the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and both reflect operational and training priorities.

Thus, the Army can be divided by core and peripheral components, and primary and secondary features. The components can be divided between the combat component as the core component and the combat support and combat service support components as the peripheral components. Organizational features can also be separated into primary and secondary features. The primary features are promotion pathways, training, and structure, with secondary features
including materiel/technology, doctrine, awards, education, and facilities. Figure 1 summarizes this structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Features</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Most Important (Mission)</td>
<td>Less Important</td>
<td>Least Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training (SOPs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary Features</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Least Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
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Figure 1: Organizational Framework of the U.S. Army – Components and Features

The most critical area for examining organizational resistance to change is in the intersection of the core components and primary features. This area is the locus of the organizational mission, and internally-driven or externally-driven adaptations in this area would indicate a significant change to the mission. Hence, a threat to the Army’s mission is a force for change that would alter the primary elements of the core component of the organization. Therefore, this project is most concerned with examining forces for change that threaten one or more of the essential features (promotion pathways, training, structure) in the core functional component (combat) and the Army’s resistance to such forces, but resistance will also be examined in the secondary features because this analysis may provide insight into the nature of strategic resistance.

The final element of this analytical framework is an examination of the action by organizational leadership to resist forces for change. I will specifically examine actions by
leadership because leaders are the most powerful constituency within the organization able to resist change (Child 1972, 1997), and it is through the employment of tactics of resistance that organizational leaders resist forces for change. While leaders are not the only constituency that resists forces for change, they are the most likely to have the power to successfully resist forces for change.

The issue of “who” is attempting to resist change is important to consider. As leadership is always a critical variable in any discussion of organizational change, the leadership in the form of the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff will be the vital constituencies to examine. These constituencies have the internal power and external influence in order to resist forces from both environments.
CHAPTER 3
PERSONNEL

This chapter analyzes the Army’s resistance to change in the area of personnel. While the Army has always needed people to achieve its goals, at various points in time individuals and constituencies within the Army have resisted the inclusion of African Americans, women, and homosexuals. While the Army has eventually changed in all three of these cases, numerous instances of resistance to change allow for testing my hypotheses. I find that the tactic of resistance employed depends on whether the force for change is internal or external; that the Army is more successful at resisting internal versus external forces for change; but that there is little coherence to or learning that occurs between instances of tactical resistance. As will be discussed, eventual change in all three cases came only with the intervention of political leadership.

Though the Army has faced both internal and external demands to change its personnel policies, the most important force for change has consistently been the demand for personnel. For the purposes of this paper, I consider demand for personnel an external force for change because it arises due to the demands placed on the organization by the environment (i.e. a war). Other external forces for change in this case include political groups and political leadership.

Internal forces for change have also impacted the Army in regards to personnel. These include operational experience, organizational leadership, and studies and assessments (organizational learning). Though demand for personnel is an external force for change during conflict, operational experience after a conflict is an internal force for change as the organization must decide how to address the lessons of the experience.

36 Alternatively, an internal force for change regarding demand for personnel would be a decision by the Chief of Staff to increase the size of the Army in order to provide for more maintenance or administrative capabilities for garrison duties during peacetime. Historically, all wars have demanded more, not less, soldiers.
As identified in Chapter 2, strategic resistance is that which is intentional, focused on a force for change, and not due to a lack of capacity to undertake that change. Intentionality means that an individual or constituency within the organization acts deliberately in order to prevent a change from impacting the organization. Furthermore, such resistance is focused on a particular force for change.

At different times in the 20th century, Army leadership has resisted the presence of blacks, women, and homosexuals in various roles in an effort to protect the organization’s mission. More precisely, the service of blacks and women has been resisted in combat and leadership positions; the presence of homosexuals has been resisted altogether. As stated in the previous chapter, the Army’s sense of mission is the norms, values, and beliefs related to the conduct of conventional ground combat operations against other professional military organizations. Given this sense of mission, the resistance to these groups has been inherently connected to the customs and understanding within the Army (and shared by the general public, in many instances) of who has the characteristics to be an effective soldier, as soldiers are the most necessary element of combat.

Almost all organizations have an idealized version of the appropriate organizational member. Certain individuals represent the ideal for who should or should not represent the organization (Allport 1954; Kanter 1977; Taylor and Fiske 1978; Pfeffer 1983; Tajfel and Turner 1985; Ashforth and Mael 1989; Messick and Mackie 1989). These scholars define this bifurcation between the preferred and outcast individuals in terms of an “ingroup”/“outgroup” dynamic. For the Army, the ideal was white men, preferably of Protestant faith. The presence of blacks, women, and homosexuals has been seen as a threat to the Army’s mission because they
violated the ideal of who should be the representative of and executor of the organization’s mission; they represented the “outgroup.”

This chapter will explore the Army’s efforts to resist the inclusion of blacks, women, and homosexuals. The first section of the chapter will discuss the history of how the Army has met its personnel shortages and the role of personnel in the Army’s mission. Following this discussion, I will address each group individually in order to illustrate the tactical resistance applied by constituencies within the Army. In each case, I will give a short history followed by a discussion of the external and internal forces for change; next, I look at lack of change and analyze which features indicate strategic resistance. While overall change does occur in each case, I will examine the numerous instances of interaction between forces for change and the Army’s resistance that occurred in the years (or decades) prior to the overall change. Finally, I will analyze the tactics of resistance.

The final section of the chapter will address my three hypotheses. The first hypothesis asks whether an organization resists internal and external forces for change differently. The evidence and analysis of the Army’s response indicates that the Army does indeed resist such forces for change differently. The second hypothesis asks whether the Army is more successful in resisting internal forces than external ones. Here, the findings indicate that the Army is indeed more successful at resisting internal forces for change. Finally, the third hypothesis argues that organizations should become more skilled at resistance over time. Hence, I look for evidence that the Army has evaluated and attempted to improve its ability to resist change overall, or a particular force for change. Based on the findings in this chapter, however, the Army does not become more skilled at resistance over time.
Personnel Changes – Background, Context, and Impact on Mission

Personnel are a fundamental aspect of an organization, particularly its leadership. Who is a member of an organization critically influences the organization’s mission (Wilson 1989, 93-122), and the organization’s leadership sets the standards for who should be a member. In the Army prior to and during the early part of the 20th century, the preferred group to serve in leadership positions were white, Anglo-Saxon, upper-class, Protestant men (Janowitz 1977, 79-103). These characteristics were considered most likely to result in a good soldier who had the strength to serve and lead in combat. Women, blacks, and homosexuals, from the organizational perspective, could not lead or perform in combat and therefore were undesirable as personnel.

The Army resisted African Americans, women, and homosexuals because they were perceived to be innately weak, which prevented them from leading and serving in core organizational roles. In the early 20th century, blacks were viewed as mentally weak, without initiative or courage, and lacking in leadership abilities, all of which precluded them from service unless led by white (usually Southern) men (Lee 1966, 8-20; Binkin et al. 1982, 22-23; MacGregor 1985, 3-7; Astor 1998, 133). Women were unable to serve in core functions (or lead) because of the Army’s perception of their inherent physical and psychological weakness and lack of inherent characteristics necessary to wage combat (Mitchell 1989, 6-7; Treadwell 1991, 4-5; Peach 1996, 161-162; Haggerty 2003, 11-20). The argument against homosexuals was based on their assumed moral and psychological weakness (Crittenden 1957, 4; Wells-Petry 1993, 74-75; Burrelli 1994, 17-20; Ray 1994, 92-93; Shawver 1995, 3-6). As soldering requires both strong moral and mental character, homosexuals’ presence would weaken the organization’s
capabilities. These groups were not just lacking in bravery; they had no potential for bravery because of these perceived innate weaknesses. Additionally, these groups’ very presence in the Army demeaned the sense of those who were innately brave and had a special claim to such.

For most of its history, the Army’s small personnel requirements meant that any necessary expansion of combat force came via the state militias. After the American Revolution, the Regular Army totaled just 80 men (Weigley 1984, 81). This number increased to 718 in 1789, but this small standing Army represented an ideological and operational dependence on state militias (Weigley 1984, 74-94). Until the Civil War, a small Regular Army was tasked with pacification of and defense against native populations, and when the threat subsided, so did the size of the force. The federal government as well as the state governments could authorize larger groups of volunteers to serve in the Regulars and militias, however this was only for emergencies and such increases were temporary (Griffith 1997, 5). In 1846 when the United States went to war against Mexico, the Regular Army consisted of 734 officers and 7,885 enlisted personnel. But in support of the war effort, another 75,000 would serve the Army as part of the militias or as Regular volunteers (Weigley 1984, 182-183). The American distrust of a large standing Army kept the permanent forces small and relied on the states’ militias and volunteers for combat (Weigley 1984, 74-94; Griffith 1997, 3-6).

Although the Army’s personnel needs varied throughout the 20th century, depending on whether the United States was engaged in conflict, the Army’s ability to fill its ranks worsened as demand for personnel to serve in the Army increased, volunteerism dropped, and public

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37 Another argument put forth more recently is that the presence of homosexuals in barracks and close quarters violates the privacy of heterosexuals (Shawver 1995, 4). This is a more recent argument put forth after the previous arguments discussed above proved unpersuasive.

38 A key counterargument to this explanation of resistance is that social norms perpetuated in the public arena motivated the Army to resist these groups. While I recognize that social norms facilitated the resistance to these groups, such an explanation does not adequately explain Army leadership’s actions towards these groups. I will explore this counterargument in more detail further in the chapter.
support for the draft fluctuated. In 1898, at the beginning of the Spanish-American War, the authorized strength of the U.S. Army was 28,747 soldiers and officers. In 1917 at the beginning of World War I, it was at 213,557 personnel but grew to 3,685,458 by the last day of the war. At the end of World War II in 1945, it reached its height of 8.3 million but was reduced to 1,070,000 by March 1947. That number further dropped to 630,000 by January 1950. During the Korean War, the number increased again to 1,081,000 in August 1950, 1,263,000 in 1951, 1,353,000 in 1952, and 1,577,000 in 1953. Between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the Army’s size hovered around 850,000 personnel, but increased to 1,460,000 at the height of Vietnam. In 1991, it was 725,000; and in 2005, it was 562,400 (Weigley 1984, 596-600; Gough 1987, 5-17; Global Security 2012). As the Army’s recruitment capabilities diminished and the ability to recruit soldiers ebbed and flowed during times of war and peace, the Army’s need to tap into other groups of manpower changed. These groups, though needed, were not necessarily wanted.\(^{39}\)

Demand for personnel, then, was the first and most important force for change towards the Army’s personnel policies, but it was by no means the only force for change. In the following sections, I will illustrate the forces for change that applied pressure to the Army and analyze the Army’s resistance to such forces in each case.

\(^{39}\) Following World War II, the Army’s ability to meet its personnel needs was further hampered by the reduced public support for the draft. World War II marked the high point at which the Army could draw personnel resources from a willing public; after that, personnel increased but public support did not increase at the same rate. Starting with the Korean War, the American public became less and less supportive of “limited” wars that were not seen as existential threats to the nation, and ambivalence turned to outright hostility at the height of the Vietnam War (Rostker 2007).
African Americans

African American soldiers have served in the Army since the American Revolution, but the Army resisted their service for the majority of that time. However, from the Spanish-American War through the Korean War, a number of forces for change pressured the Army to adapt its policies regarding black soldiers. External forces included an ever-increasing demand for personnel, and pressure for racial equality from political groups and political leadership. Internal forces for change came in the form of organizational studies and reports, the Army’s leadership, and operational assessments that challenged the Army’s assumptions about black soldiers. These forces for change all met strong resistance.

In this section, I analyze the Army’s resistance to change regarding the service of black soldiers. I first provide a short overview of the service of black soldiers and the forces for change that affected such service, focusing on the time period between the Spanish-American War and the Korean War. I then analyze the resistance to change, and I argue that such resistance was strategic and cannot be attributed to other explanations such as accident, political roadblocks, or an inability to change policy. I then analyze the tactics of resistance utilized.

History

African American soldiers first served in the U.S. Army during the American Revolution. Over 5,000 slaves and freemen served in the war after personnel demands forced George Washington to bring them into the Continental Army (Hope 1979, 11; Nalty 1986, 4-15).40 Just

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40 The British also recognized the role that black men could play in the war. On November 7, 1775, the British governor of Virginia, John Murray, fourth Earl of Dunmore, promised freedom to all slaves and indentured servants should they bear arms with the British forces against the colonial militias. Within weeks of the announcement, approximately 500 slaves joined the British military (Nalty 1986, 12). However, few blacks would serve in the British Army outside of this initial recruitment. Dunmore would be forced to flee the colonies in August 1776 and Sir William Howe, commander of the British Forces during the American Revolution, barred all blacks from serving with the British (Selig n.d.). During this time period, the black population of the United States was approximately 2.5 million people (Hope 1979, 11).
two decades later, 500 black soldiers served under General Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812 (Astor 1998, 19). But regardless of their service in these conflicts, the post-war outcome for them was the same: irrespective of their status as slaves or freemen, they were not allowed to serve in the Army on a permanent basis (Astor 1998, 19; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 2).

A shift in policy occurred after the Civil War when black units were made a permanent part of the Army. In 1866 at the direction of Congress, War Department General Order Number 56 established four segregated black units as part of the regular Army: the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments (Colored) and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments (Colored) (Townsend 1866). Primarily, these units were stationed in the western and southwestern United States. Though their boundary service kept them at the edges of both the country and the organization, the black regiments received 17 Medals of Honor in the Indian Wars of the late 19th century (MacGregor 1985, 3-8; Nalty 1986, 51-62; Kenner 1999; Dobak and Phillips 2001).

41 Prior to the Battle of New Orleans, Jackson said to these soldiers: “To the Men of Color—Soldiers!... I invited you to share in the perils and to divide the glory of your white countrymen.... I knew that you loved the land of your nativity, and that, like ourselves, you had to defend all that is most dear to man. But you surpass my hopes. I have found in you, united to these qualities, that noble enthusiasm which impels to great deeds....” (as quoted in Astor 1998, 19).

42 Unlike all other wars in which black units took part in the conflict, these regiments were made official under the law by Congress in 1866 and 1869 under the leadership of Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts (MacGregor 1985; Nalty 1986, 51). During the Civil War, approximately 180,000 black soldiers served in the Army, comprising around 10% of the Union Army (Astor 1998, 32).

43 Within the Army, there was disagreement amongst its leaders as to the role of the black regiments. General Ulysses S. Grant argued that black regiments should only be used as reserve forces in cases of national emergencies rather than as permanent units due to his view that the peacetime Army “should have the smallest possible numbers and the highest possible efficiency...” (Grant 1866; see also Astor 1998, 43; Dobak and Phillips 2001, xiii). General William Tecumseh Sherman, however, proposed in 1877 to desegregate the armed forces (Astor 1998, 47). General Sherman was also the officer who acted on War Department General Order Number 56 to organize two of the four new black regiments.

44 Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Hinks of the 25th Cavalry would make an appeal to the War Department in 1870 for the desegregation of all Army units. His justification was that this would allow the most qualified people to serve and would balanced the levels of education and capabilities more efficiently throughout the service (Dobak and Phillips 2001, 16-20).
The Spanish-American War marked the first war in which these regiments saw substantial combat alongside white units. Because of the small size of the standing Army at the time (just over 24,000 personnel), the government’s rush to go to war, and the time it took to raise and deploy the state and volunteer militias, these units were the first to be sent to the “splendid little war” in Cuba and the Philippines (Weigley 1984, 596-600). When the Cuban expeditionary force left Florida, it consisted of only 14,400 Regular Army soldiers including members from all four segregated regiments (Weigley 1984, 306; Nalty 1986, 68). In the Philippines, a relatively small number of black soldiers from the 24th and the 25th Infantry Divisions served (Nalty 1986, 74-76). In total, 3,339 black regulars and approximately 10,000 black volunteers served during the conflict in Cuba and the Philippines (MacGregor 1985, 3-8).

Just over a decade later, World War I would bring black Americans into the Army as never before. In the draft calls for the war, 2.2 million blacks were registered out of a total of 26 million registrants (Provost Marshal General 1918, 32). Of these, 367,000 blacks were inducted (16% of the registrants) while 2.4 million whites were inducted (10% of the registrants) (Provost Marshall General 1918, 34). As in previous conflicts, Army policy dictated that blacks in World War I would serve only in segregated units.

In World War I, black soldiers served in either the 92nd or 93rd Infantry Divisions or one of twelve segregated regiments. Other than the two infantry divisions, black soldiers were assigned to support roles in the Quartermaster or Engineer corps in white divisions in which their main responsibilities were road-building and manual labor (Bliss 1917; Nalty and MacGregor

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45 Along with the small size of the Army and the government’s haste to get to war, the speed with which these units were sent to Cuba was also partly due to an erroneous but broadly held belief that blacks withstood the humidity better than whites and were immune to the diseases of the tropics, namely yellow fever (Nalty 1986, 65). Over 124,000 personnel were in the volunteer units by May of 1898 and the Regular Army increased from 24,000 to 58,000 (Weigley 1984, 297-298).

46 Under the command of General William Shafter, the force entered its first battle on June 22, 1898 and the Spanish land forces surrendered shortly thereafter on July 16, 1898.
1977, 135-144; MacGregor 1985, 17-46). Though blacks represented one-eighth of the total strength of the Army in World War I, they held one-third of the labor and support positions and represented only about one-thirtieth of the combat strength (Hope 1979, 16).  

Black soldiers entered the Army in even higher numbers in World War II, but the Army’s segregation policies kept more from serving. In 1940, the population of the United States was 132 million people of which blacks were 11% (Astor 1998, 166-167). Though the total number of personnel to serve in all of the armed forces during World War II was 16 million (just over 10% of the population), the Army’s demand for all personnel (black and white) outpaced the number of personnel that the Bureau of Selective Service could supply starting in April 1943 (MacGregor 1985, 36; Department of Defense 2012). Of the entire 2.5 million blacks who registered for the draft for World War II, just over 900,000 served in the U.S. Army (Lee 1966, 414). Yet even with these high numbers, quotas and the Army’s segregation policies served as bottlenecks for making use of the full capabilities of black Americans in the Army (McNutt 1943; Lee 1966; MacGregor 1985, 23-24).

As in World War I, the majority of black soldiers served in support and logistics roles in World War II. Though the Army did have approximately 10% black soldiers throughout the war, they were not evenly spread out amongst the Army branches: the Infantry had 5% while the Air Corps, Medical Corps, and Signal Corps each took only 2% (MacGregor 1985, 24). As in World War I, nearly 30% of all engineer units and almost 50% of all quartermaster units consisted of black soldiers (Lee 1961, 129). Also as in World War I, only the 92nd and 93rd Infantry Divisions were combat units (Astor 1998, 239-258).

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47 The large majority of these soldiers, over 90%, would serve within the quartermaster corps. Typical responsibilities included: loading and unloading ships, building roads, and day labor. Except for the 9th and 10th Cavaliories and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, blacks were unable to serve in combat units in the Army. In World War I, the large majority of black soldiers served in quartermaster or other services and supply units (Lee 1966, 5).
Integration in the Army would not begin until the Korean War. Following the hearings and final report of President Harry Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Service (the Fahy Committee) issued in 1950, the Army integrated its first two regiments in Korea in May 1951 (Brooks 1951; Haislip 1951; McAuliffe 1951; Marshall 1951). By the end of 1951, 61% of infantry units in Korea were desegregated; the entire Far East command was desegregated by May 1952 (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 226-229). The Army’s last unit desegregated in 1954 (Nalty 1986, 262).

Integration of the rest of the Army was uneven and required direct involvement from the Army Chief of Staff (Nalty 1986, 261-262). Basic training units had already begun to integrate in 1949 and were completely integrated by March 1951 (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 230). But in Europe, as of December 1951, almost a full year after the Army issued initial guidance to integrate, 93% of enlisted black men and 83% of black officers in Europe still served in segregated units (Nalty 1986, 260-261). In 1952, the Army Chief of Staff officially ordered desegregation of all U.S. units post-haste. By October 1953, nine months after this order, 95% of all black personnel served in desegregated units, and it took until the end of 1954 for all units to become integrated (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 246). As of 1954, the Army became a fully integrated organization.

The Army’s policies regarding black soldiers were consistent from the Civil War through Korea. These policies were: blacks should serve in segregated units, commanded by white

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48 The historic black units of the 9th and 10th Cavaliertes would be re-flagged as integrated tank battalions, and other black units would be disbanded completely in 1952 (ibid.).

49 234,000 Army personnel served on the continent of which 27,000 were black. According to a representative of the Army sent to study the problem in Europe, most Army leaders did not believe that integration had actually been achieved in Korea (Nalty 1986, 261).

50 State-controlled National Guard units continued to be segregated after the Regular Army achieved desegregation (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 247).
officers; black representation in the Army should be kept to a minimum; black soldiers did not
make good combat soldiers because of an innate lack of courage; blacks were not suitable for
command; and black soldiers did not trust black officers (Gibson 1945; Nalty 1986, 162-183).

Forces for Change

Both external and internal forces for change acted on the Army in regards to the service
of black soldiers. External forces for change included demands for personnel coupled with draft
policies, political groups, and political leadership. Internal forces for change included
performance assessments, studies and reviews, and organizational leadership.

External

Demand for personnel, coupled with the draft policies, was a consistent force for change
during World War I and World War II. In preparing for World War I, President Wilson
approved the National Defense Act of 1916, which increased the regular Army from 94,000 to
175,000 people, but the projected demands of the war required a draft to be implemented a year
later (Griffith 1982, 7-10). Over the course of three draft calls, 24 million men were registered
for the draft and over 2.7 million entered the armed forces, of which over 99% entered the Army
(Coffman 1998, 29). Given that the population of the United States at the time was
approximately 100 million and that 24 million people were registered for the draft, it would seem
that the Army would not need to accept anyone other than white men.

However, draft policies of the time caused more blacks to be inducted than could be used.
The implementation of the draft was left to 4,648 local community draft boards, and these boards
took into account local political interests and social norms; they were more willing to send black

51 This was the Selective Service Act of 1917. Unlike the Civil War draft, this law fixed some of the major
problems that had resulted in such backlash during the Civil War: the draft boards consisted of local citizens, no one
was able to buy their way out of service or hire substitutes, and all persons brought into the service through the draft
would serve no longer than four months following the end of the war (Griffith 1982, 8-10).
soldiers to war than whites (Coffman 1998, 29; Farwell 1999, 50). As a result, blacks made up 13% of all draftees during World War I for a total of over 360,000 personnel (MacGregor 1985, 7; Nalty 1986, 108).

During World War II, the demand for personnel outpaced the number of personnel that the Bureau of Selective Service could supply starting in April 1943, but the Army’s quota and segregation policies hampered the induction of available black draftees (MacGregor 1985, 23-36). According to the director of the draft program, “The use of Negro and White [draft] calls compels the local board to disregard the order numbers of registrants in order to fill White calls…. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 Negroes have been passed over to fill White calls…” (McNutt 1943). As in World War I, the white draft boards wanted to send black personnel who passed the physical and mental screening and leave responsibility to the Army on how to utilize them (Nalty 1986, 108), but the Army could not use all of the black inductees because of its personnel policies. In response, the Army and particularly the Army Air Corps created a number of black units specifically to accept black draftees, units that had little or no true military value (MacGregor 1985, 25).

After World War II, personnel demands continued to be a force for change. The post-war drawdown conflicted with a much higher manning requirement than existed before the war (Weigley 1984, 485-487). The official Army position of the time was that the percentage of black soldiers in the service should match the black percentage of the general population (MacGregor1985, 182-187), which was about 10% of the population. However, blacks

52 To determine eligibility, men were assigned to one of five categories. The first category was the most capable, filled with single males who did not fill an “essential occupation” while the fifth category were those deemed “permanently unavailable for service” (Farwell 1999, 51). Due to economic, political, and social differences between whites and blacks of the time, the majority of blacks were deemed unfit due to health or education (Farwell 1999, 51).

53 The draft boards questioned the legality of the quota system and tried to force the Army to accept more black soldiers (MacGregor 1985, 24).
represented 16% of the Army in July 1946, and the Army’s personnel division believed this number would increase to 24% in 1947 (MacGregor 1985, 182-184). As of 1946, African Americans composed approximately 10% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).

Political groups were a second external force for change. During World War I, political groups were particularly concerned with increasing the number of black officers. As of 1917, only three black officers had served in the Regular Army (Patton 1981). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led by Dr. J.E. Spingarn, pushed for greater numbers of blacks as officers and non-commissioned officers in the Army for service in World War I (Springarn 1917; Nalty 1986, 114). Spingarn achieved some success but only with the support of leadership in the Army (to be discussed in the next section).

Such political groups were more prevalent during World War II. As during World War I, these groups wanted more opportunities for blacks in leadership positions (for both officers and non-commissioned officers) but they also wanted an end to the Army’s segregation policy. In the 1940’s, politically-focused groups such as the NAACP, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the National Youth Administration, the Urban League, and other political groups were able to tie black political support for elected officials and the war effort, overall, to their interests in desegregation (NAACP 1927; MacGregor 1985, 8-16; Nalty 1986, 138-139). As a result, these groups were able to influence important political actors.

Charles Young was the third black graduate of West Point, graduating in 1889 (U.S. Department of Defense 1982, 134; Nalty 1986, 61). After Young, a black officer would not graduate from West Point for almost fifty years (ibid.).

Such groups gained moral support because World War II was seen as a war against fascism. For these groups, the inherent contradiction was that American forces were fighting fascism in Europe when it existed in the United States (Morris and Schlossman 1998, 36). Hence, the “Double V Campaign” was given life by the Pittsburg Courier and found support within the Army and the general public; black soldiers were fighting both for victory over fascism overseas and victory over discrimination in the United States.
Political leadership was a third external force for change. President Franklin Roosevelt, in an attempt to win political support away from the more desegregationist Wendell Wilkie in the campaign of 1940, exerted pressure on the Army through the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War to increase the quota and open more positions to black personnel but still within segregated units (Nalty 1986, 138-139). Additionally, he made a number of appointments including the first black Army general (Nalty 1986, 139). Less than a decade later in 1948, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 which, though it did not desegregate the armed forces immediately, directed the armed forces to provide “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin” (The President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity 1950).

The final political force for change was President Truman’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Also known as the Fahy Committee, this committee pressured the Army to justify its segregation policies (Binkin et al. 1982, 26-28). Following the hearings and report of the Fahy Committee but not without challenges, the Army fully integrated by 1954 (Nalty 1986, 260-262).

Internal

Positive combat assessments and reviews served as an internal force for change. Serving under Major General Joseph Wheeler and alongside Teddy Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders,” black

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56 Benjamin Davis was the first black general in the Army (U.S. Department of Defense 1982, 106-107).

57 Truman issued Executive Order 9981 for reasons related both to foreign policy and domestic politics. In regards to foreign policy, segregation undercut the moral argument between the United States and the Soviet Union and hindered America’s ability to convince the developing world of the superiority of democracy over communism (Dudziak 2000, 79-86; Meriwether 2002, 85-86). In regards to immediate domestic political concerns, President Truman sought to win political support away from Hubert Humphrey, a more progressive civil rights advocate, at the Democratic convention in the summer of 1948 in Chicago (Ferrel 1994, 296). Some historians argue that Truman’s domestic political concerns outweighed foreign policy concerns (Dudziak 2000, 86). Though debated in retrospect, President Truman’s personal views and commitment to civil rights played a critical role in the passage of Executive Order 9981 (Ferrel 1994, 292-298; Dudziak 2000, 87). Particularly, Truman was angered at the violence that black World War II veterans faced upon returning to the United States (Ferrel 1994, 293).
soldiers in Cuba garnered praise directly from Roosevelt who stated to a journalist that “no better man” fought as they did (Nalty 1986, 77). Besides Roosevelt, other white officers who led or fought with black soldiers attested to their capabilities and bravery during the war (Baldwin 1898; Leavell 1898; Wygant 1898; Grierson 1905). Major General Wheeler praised the 10th Cavalry along with other units in an official memorandum for actions in Cuba (Wheeler 1898). General John Pershing, who served in the 10th Cavalry Regiment during the Spanish-American War and would later command all U.S. forces in World War I, credited his unit with saving Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” during the battle of San Juan Hill (Nalty 1986, 77). Given these assessments and after-action reviews as recorded by white officers, the ability of black soldiers to serve effectively as combat troops had been demonstrated and noted. Army leaders could no longer pretend that black soldiers could not serve effectively in combat.

Studies during World War II had similar conclusions. Early in the war, the Army assigned the Organization-Mobilization Group of G-3 (Operations) to study its segregation policy. Headed by Colonel Edwin W. Chamberlain, the Chamberlain Plan of 1942 argued in favor of putting black soldiers directly into all Army units at a ratio of one black soldier to every nine white soldiers, in effect putting an end to segregation. According to this report, segregation

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58 One of the reviews from the officers of the 24th Infantry Regiment stated, “The gallantry and bearing shown by the officers and soldiers under this trying ordeal [at the battle of San Juan Hill] was such that it has every reason to be proud of its record” (Wygant 1898, 191).

59 Besides the Regular Army units, black National Guard units also served successfully in Cuba. In particular, the 8th Volunteer Infantry from Illinois, a unit composed and led entirely by black personnel received praise for its performance as an all-black unit established by Kansas (Illinois State Adjutant General 1898; Kansas State Adjutant General 1899). Other black National Guard units came from Ohio, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Virginia (Nalty and MacGregor 1977).
wasted manpower and funds and “aggravated if not caused in its entirety” racial problems within the Army (as quoted in MacGregor 1981, 24).

An extensive study conducted late in World War II tested the effects of integration under combat conditions. In December 1944, the command group of the European Theatre of Operations estimated that Army forces would be short 23,000 personnel by February of that year (Lee 1966, 688). Lt. General John C.H. Lee of the Ground Forces Replacement Command recommended to General Eisenhower that replacements on the combat frontlines be made on an individual basis, regardless of race. Eisenhower agreed to the test initially, but instead he approved the mixing of black and white platoons rather than individual soldiers within platoons (Lee 1966, 689; MacGregor 1985, 46-57). In total, at least 49 black platoons (all volunteers) would serve in white companies in the final months of the war (Lee 1966, 693). The individuals who volunteered for General Lee’s platoons reflected the same training, education level, and experience of the majority of black soldiers then serving in the European theatre (Lee 1966, 693).

According to after-action reports by unit leaders, black platoons demonstrated “courage, coolness, dependability and pride” in combat (as quoted in Merson and Schlossman 1998, 126; see also Lee 1966, 686-694). One of the few recurring complaints about these “composite” platoons was that they were “sometimes too aggressive” (as quoted in Merson and Schlossman 1998, 126). In May and June of 1945, the Research Branch of the Information and Education

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60 Because of the relatively low Army General Classification Test (AGCT) scores of many black service members, the Chamberlain Plan also recommended integrating low-scoring and high-scoring soldiers (MacGregor 1981, 24). As of 1945, approximately 83% of all black servicemembers scored in the lowest two grades (class IV and V) of the AGCT, while 31% of white servicemembers scored in these grades (Gibson 1945).

61 In the first months of 1945, Lee received over 4,500 volunteers for these units and he accepted 2,500 of them (Lee 1966, 693).

62 A number of those who served in these platoons won individual citations, including the Distinguished Service Cross (Lee 1966, 699-705).
Division under direction by General Eisenhower surveyed the white officers and platoon
sergeants who commanded these black platoons. Of those surveyed, over 80% said that black
soldiers performed “very well” and that unit morale and cohesion between black and white
soldiers was much better than they expected, and an additional 16% said they served “fairly
well” (Headquarters, U.S. Army Services Forces, 1945; War Department 1947; MacGregor
1985, 46-57; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 141-143).

Finally, organizational leadership in one specific instance acted as a force for change
during World War I. General Leonard Wood, previously the Army Chief of Staff and a
politically-connected officer still serving in the Army, became personally interested in
incorporating more black officers. In letter exchanges with Dr. Springarn of the NAACP in
1916, Wood wrote, “If we could arrange for such a camp [for training black officers] I should be
very glad indeed to establish it. Just at present the absence of troops on the Mexican border,
combined with resulting shortage of officers, is going to make it extremely difficult to establish
any new organizations” (Wood 1916). As a result of his communications with Dr. Springarn,
Wood then helped win support from Secretary of War Newton Baker and the training camp was
established at Fort Des Moines, Iowa in 1917 for college-educated men coming from Howard
University, Tuskegee University, Harvard University, and Yale University (Baker 1917; Nalty
1986, 110; Morris 2005). As a result, 1,250 black officers received training and the graduates
were sent to serve in Europe the segregated units (Nalty 1986, 110).

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63 In the Spanish-American War, General Wood had commanded a brigade consisting of the 9th and 10th Cavalry
Regiments and Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders (Astor 1998, 63). Like other officers in that war, Wood had
personally seen the combat abilities of black soldiers. Wood was also one of the few senior officers who supported
Charles Young, giving him a commendation for his actions while serving in Liberia (Astor 1998, 91). Wood’s
influence over the Army came from his close personal ties to people such as Theodore Roosevelt (Morris 2001, 185;
300) and Henry Stimson (McCallum 2006, 253-254).
Strategic Resistance to Change

These forces for change were met with resistance. The table below summarizes the features that were protected through strategic resistance:

Table 1: Strategic Resistance to African Americans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Not Applicable$^{64}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions by leaders to resist FFCs?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is indication of strategic resistance to change in the primary elements of promotion pathways and structure, and in the secondary features of facilities. In regards to promotion pathways, black soldiers were overwhelmingly not promoted to officer and senior-NCO levels.$^{65}$

As of 1901, the Army had four black officers; by 1940, the number increased to five (Binkin et al. 1982, 18; Nalty 1986, 76; 136). In the intervening years, Major Charles Young led elements of the 10th Cavalry Regiment against Pancho Villa and over 1,000 black officers served in World War II. The same was true during World War II (Binkin et al. 1982, 19-25). While black soldiers might not have had more combat experience than white soldiers, they had experience equal enough to at least place black soldiers in leadership positions within the segregated units (which did not happen).

$^{64}$ In this table, “not applicable” means that a force for change did not specifically exert pressure on this feature. In this case, black soldiers received the same type of training as white soldiers; they used the same materiel, equipment and technology; they fought according to the same doctrine; their officer and NCO schools followed the same curriculum; and they received the same awards for the same reasons as white soldiers (it does not mean, however, that there were not differences between blacks and whites in a matter of degree). In all other cases in this project, “not applicable” has the same meaning.

$^{65}$ An argument could also be made that black soldiers were not put in senior leadership positions because of their lack of combat experience. However, as discussed earlier, black soldiers of the segregated regiments took part in combat during the Spanish-American War yet their own officers were white; during World War I, the 92nd Infantry Division, which served under the French and received high praise for their service, also maintained white officers (Binkin et al. 1982, 17-19). The same was true during World War II (Binkin et al. 1982, 19-25). While black soldiers might not have had more combat experience than white soldiers, they had experience equal enough to at least place black soldiers in leadership positions within the segregated units (which did not happen).
War I, but the latter were de-activated soon after the war (Nalty 1986, 98; 110). The first black officer was promoted to brigadier general in 1940; the second black officer was promoted to brigadier general in 1954 (U.S. Department of Defense 1982, 108-109). If there were no strategic resistance to change, black soldiers and officers would have represented a greater portion of the Army, both soldiers and leaders, through World War II.

In terms of structure, segregated units were maintained through World War II and into Korea and black soldiers were kept out of combat units. It was not until President Truman’s issuance of Executive Order 9981 and the findings of the Fahy Committee in 1950 (also established by President Truman) that the Army begin to integrate its units in 1951. If there was no resistance to forces that were pushing the Army towards integration, then the Army structure of segregated units should have changed well before 1951 as a result of the challenges of meeting the personnel demands of World War I and World War II, which were aggravated by the Army’s segregation policies. Additionally, more black soldiers should have been assigned to combat units as a result of the experiences of the Spanish-American War, World War I, and the studies of General Lee’s composite platoons in World War II.

In the secondary elements, strategic resistance to change is seen in facilities. Even though the lack of appropriate segregated training facilities made worse the ability to efficiently integrate black soldiers during World War II and meet the personnel demands of the war (MacGregor 1981, 25), the Army responded by lowering the quota for black personnel rather than integrate training facilities. Segregated training facilities were maintained through World War II; if resistance were not present, facilities should have been integrated.

Intentional resistance to protect the mission is the most likely explanation for this resistance to change, though there are counterarguments to this explanation. Counterarguments
include: the Army did not actually need soldiers; a fear that the presence of black soldiers would destabilize the organization; social norms held by the broader American public; and intervention by political leadership. However, each of these arguments fails to fully explain the Army’s actions, and I argue that an intentional desire to protect the mission offers the most explanatory value.

The first counterargument to intentional resistance is that the Army did not actually need personnel. If this were true, then the Army should have limited white draftees in World War I and World War II just as it turned away black draftees (McNutt 1943; MacGregor 1985, 23-36). Instead, as a result of the personnel shortages in World War I, Army leadership, as noted in an official report written at the Army War College in 1922, recognized that black soldiers would inevitably serve in future wars due to such shortages (War Department 1922). In World War II, the Army’s demand for personnel outpaced the number of personnel that the Bureau of Selective Service could supply starting in April 1943 (MacGregor 1985, 36; U.S. Department of Defense 2012), demonstrating that the Army did indeed need people. Thus, lack of demand does not explain the Army’s resistance to integrating black personnel.

Another counterargument is that Army leaders were responding solely to a fear that racial tension would destabilize the organization. As George Marshall wrote in 1941 at the onset of World War II, “…vexing racial problems cannot be permitted to complicate the tremendous task of the War Department and thereby jeopardize discipline and morale” (as quoted in MacGregor 1985, 17-18). During the first half of the 20th century, a few events did occur due to tension between soldiers and local civilian populations, motivated partly by the imposition of Jim Crow laws and other segregation policies on military bases (MacGregor 1985, 34-39; Nalty 1986, 163-
Most military base commanders, particularly in bases in the south, maintained segregation policies on post even though they were not required to do so, thus adding to tension between white and black soldiers (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 68).

However, such an argument fails to recognize that the Army’s own policies caused most of these tensions, and thus it could reduce these problems. Appointed in 1940 by President Roosevelt as a special aide on racial issues to the Secretary of War, Judge William Hastie made a number of recommendations to Army and War Department leadership in a 1941 report that laid the responsibility for morale problems, disciplinary issues, and racial tensions with the organization’s own segregation policies (MacGregor 1985, 17-23; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 101-102). Additionally, the Chamberlain Report, written only two years later in 1942, raised many of the same issues as to the causes of such tensions (MacGregor 1981, 24). Even given these suggestions, Hastie’s recommendations were only minimally enacted and he resigned in 1943 (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 101). In a 1943 memorandum, General George Marshall instructed all commanders to “prevent incidents of discrimination” that led to violence, though he did not change overall Army policies (Nalty 1986, 165).

An argument could be made, though, that Marshall and other Army leaders did not believe Hastie or the recommendations of the Chamberlin report. If they did not believe these reports, then it is possible to explain the Army’s resistance as partly due to a fear of organizational tensions. However, this does not exclude the fact that high-ranking Army and  

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66 The most famous event occurred in Brownsville, Texas in 1906 in which two civilians were shot; this event resulted in the dismissal of 167 black soldiers from the Army (Astor 1998, 81-83). As Secretary of War William Taft had written two months previously, “The fact is that a certain amount of race prejudice between white and black seems to have become almost universal throughout the country, and no matter where colored troops are sent there are always some who make objections to their coming” (Taft 1906 as quoted in Astor 1998, 79).

67 Other civilian aides within the War Department and Army made similar findings, including Hastie’s replacement Truman Gibson Marcus Ray, special aide to the President (MacGregor 1985, 206-215; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 103-105).
War Department officials (such as Special Assistant Hastie) had informed Army leaders of the organization’s own responsibility for these problems.

Social norms might also explain the Army’s resistance. In order to maintain the support of the public, in terms of moral support or even recruitment needs, one might argue that the Army needed to reflect the social mores and norms of the broader American public. At the time, both during World War II and before, segregation was the norm and the white public was in fact in favor of segregation (MacGregor 1985, 18). Just a few months before President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, a Gallup poll found that 63% of the public opposed integration while only 26% supported it (National Defense Research Institute 1993, 184). On numerous occasions, General Marshall and other Army leaders argued that the Army could not afford to try social “experiments” by integrating black personnel or outpacing the general public in terms of racial policies (MacGregor 1985, 17-19; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 207).

Yet, such an argument fails to explain why Army leaders willingly challenged such social norms in the past. If social norms alone dictated the Army’s treatment of black soldiers, then they should not have served in the Army under any circumstances. Yet beginning with the American Revolution, General Washington brought 5,000 black soldiers into the Continental Army, even though this was even more in conflict with social norms in that time period than in the 20th century (Hope 1979, 11; Nalty 1986, 4-15). During the Civil War, approximately 180,000 black soldiers served in the Army, comprising around 10% of the Union Army, service which again challenged the social norms of the day (Astor 1998, 32). In both the Spanish-American War and World War I, black soldiers served as part of the Army. In fact during World War I and World War II, the public was upset when the Army passed over black draftees for service for white draftees (McNutt 1943; MacGregor 1985, 19), which demonstrates that the
public (through their draft boards) actually wanted the Army to utilize more black soldiers rather than less. Had the Army been responding solely to public norms, then the Army would have accepted as many black soldiers as volunteered, thus reducing the need for white soldiers, instead of trying to maintain a 10% quota during and after World War II.

While social norms do not explain the Army’s use of quota during and after World War II, social norms might explain the Army’s resistance to integrated units. As mentioned earlier, 63% of Americans opposed integration (National Defense Research Institute 1993, 184). In fact, the Army’s integration, though it resulted only from the direct involvement of President Truman, occurred ten years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, one could argue that the Army’s segregation policies only reflected the public’s belief in segregation.

Yet, Army leaders still chose to violate social norms when it was in the interest of the organization. Both in previous wars in regards to African Americans and, as will be discussed in the next section, Army leaders challenged public beliefs in regards to women’s service. Thus, while social norms might explain the Army’s commitment to segregation, such a commitment in fact made it easier for the Army to protect its sense of mission.

A final argument might be made that the Army actually wanted to change its policies, but the political leadership refused to allow such changes. In fact, there are more examples of U.S. political leadership yielding to Army leaders regarding race policies than the reverse (except for President Truman). During World War I, the Army’s establishment of a training program for black officers at Fort Des Moines, Iowa elicited little political backlash; in fact, over 300 Congressional leaders from both the House and Senate supported the camp (Scott 1919, 83-85). During World War II, Roosevelt directed Marshall to make changes to the Army’s policies, but Marshall was the reason for less changes and not Roosevelt (MacGregor 1985, 17; Nalty 1986,
A few years later, President Truman was clearly in the lead in changing racial policies in the Army, while Army leaders attempted to slow his changes; Secretary Kenneth Royall, General Omar Bradley, and other Army leaders continually attempted to undercut the Fahy Committee’s arguments and actions to end segregation (to be discussed in the next section). In these instances, it was certainly the Army leadership and not the political leadership that was refusing to change policy.

In the final analysis, strategic resistance to change in order to protect the mission best explains the Army’s actions regarding African Americans. While social norms might explain the Army’s resistance to integration, it does not explain the Army’s resistance to black soldiers, in general.

Tactics of Resistance

Constituencies of resistance within the Army employed five tactics of resistance in this case: ignoring the force for change, political use of expertise, moving changes to the periphery, suppression, and denial.

Ignore

As discussed in Chapter 2, ignoring a force for change is classified as a tactic of resistance when an organizational constituency is aware of the force for change and the constituency chooses not to acknowledge that force. In the case of African-Americans, Army leaders employed this tactic in the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II.

During the Spanish-American War, the Army ignored the combat performance of black soldiers. From junior officers through generals, a number of Army officers attested to the
performance of black soldiers including Teddy Roosevelt and John Pershing (Nalty 1986, 77; see also Baldwin 1898; Leavell 1898; Wheeler 1898; Wygant 1898; Jackson 1919; Nalty 1986, 77). Notably, five black soldiers received the Medal of Honor for their actions at the Battle of Tayacoba while attempting to resupply U.S. forces in Cuba (Nalty 1986, 71). Additionally, both the 23rd Kansas militia volunteers and 8th Illinois militia volunteers were led completely by black officers and performed well under strenuous conditions (Illinois State Adjutant General 1898; Kansa State Adjutant General 1899), and black officers of the 9th U.S. Volunteers successfully performed garrison, stability, and reconstruction duties in Santiago under the military governorship of Leonard Wood (Nalty 1986, 72).

Yet after the war, the Army made no effort to change or examine its limitations on black combat units beyond the four segregated regiments. Blacks continued to serve in segregated units and whites continued to hold leadership positions, even though performance during the war had provided evidence, of which the leadership was aware, to challenge these policies.

Army leaders also ignored personnel demands during World War I and World War II in order to maintain a segregated organization. Over 2 million African Americans registered for the draft during World War I, but the quota system and requirement for segregated training prevented them being put to use beyond segregated units (Nalty 1986, 108; Mershon and

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68 John “Black Jack” Pershing led the 10th Cavalry Regiment during the Spanish-American War, and he credited his unit with saving Roosevelt’s Rough Riders from being overrun during fighting on San Juan Hill (Nalty 1986, 77). He later became the leader of the American Expeditionary Force during World War I.
Schlossman 1998, 6-7; Bryan 2003). This was in spite of the fact that the draft boards of the time sent more black draftees than white draftees to serve (Williams 1970, 21-23). The same occurred in World War II; when the segregated units were full, no more black draftees could be utilized in the positions and units in which they were actually needed (McNutt 1943; MacGregor 1985, 8). Even when the draft boards had 300,000 black draftees by 1943 that had yet to be accepted by the Army because the Army had already filled all of its segregated units, the Army leadership forced the branches and sub-services to create more segregated units rather than integrate (MacGregor 1985, 23-26). Thus, the Army ignored personnel demands, and the availability of black personnel, in order to maintain segregation.

Political Use of Expertise

The Army employed the political use of expertise as a tactic to resist the influence of political groups and leaders during World War I, World War II, and after World War II. During World War I, groups such as the NAACP sought to increase the number of black officers (Nalty 1986, 107-110). During World War II, the NAACP and other political groups sought an end to segregation within the Army. After World War II, President Truman through the Fahy Committee imposed integration on the Army and other services.

The Army staff used its expertise over organizational matters to resist forces that sought to increase the number of black officers during World War I. When Secretary of War Newton

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69 In total, more whites served in the military; but by percentage of population, more blacks served (ibid.).
Baker, motivated by Leonard Wood, first sent a letter to Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott regarding the establishment of a training program for black officers (Baker 1917), the response was pessimistic. Brigadier General Joseph Kuhn who was serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff and Chief of the War College Division wrote:

That colored officers should not be assigned to white organizations requires no argument…. Whether or not they should be utilized as officers is, in the opinion of the War College Division, more of a political than a military question, but in general it is believed that our colored citizens make better soldiers if commanded by white officers than they do under officers of their own race (Kuhn 1917).

Yet, as has been discussed, the only evidence of black officers commanding black soldiers was the case of the Spanish-American War which included two African-American National Guard units, both of which received commendations. Additionally, if black officers had no potential, then why West Point have three African-American graduates by this time? Kuhn, in fact, had no evidence for his statement. Even given this resistance, Secretary Baker with the support of General Leonard Wood did establish a training camp at Fort Des Moines for 1,250 officers and non-commissioned officers who eventually made up the leadership of the 92nd Infantry Division in World War I (Wood 1916; Nalty 1986, 110). In this instance, the political use of expertise was unsuccessful in the short-term.70

Political use of expertise was also used during and after World War II. At the beginning of the war, political groups such as the NAACP, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the

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70 However, the Army’s policies towards black officers returned to pre-war policies immediately afterwards—the training camp at Fort Des Moines was closed and there were no opportunities, other than West Point, for black soldiers to become officers. Between the end of World War I and World War II, the only black officer to graduate West Point was Benjamin Davis, Jr. who graduated in 1936 (DOD 1982, 136). When he graduated, he became the second black officer in the Army at the time along with his father, Benjamin Davis, Sr. (DOD 1982, 106-109).
National Youth Administration, and the Urban League lobbied President Roosevelt to increase the number of black leaders and end the policy of segregation. To demonstrate his commitment to civil rights, Roosevelt brought together Army leaders and civil rights groups to discuss the Army’s segregation policies (NAACP 1927; Nalty 1986, 138). As a result of this meeting, he directed the War Department to open all branches and positions in the Army to black service members. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall agreed to open more positions but only within segregated units and only while maintaining a quota of 10% black soldiers in the Army (Patterson 1940; MacGregor 1985, 17; Nalty 1986, 139). But the Army leadership argued that any further changes including integration or a change in leadership policy would harm morale and weaken national defense, particularly given that segregation had proven effective during World War I (Leonard 1944; MacGregor 1985, 17-23). The Army’s Adjutant General wrote in a 1940 memorandum that “no experiments should be tried…at this critical time” (Adjutant General 1940 as quoted in MacGregor 1985, 17). As a result, segregation remained the policy throughout the war.

Army leaders used expertise most explicitly following World War II during the hearings of the Fahy Committee. Lieutenant General Gillem, author of the Gillem Report, was extremely reluctant to support any policy that was too far “ahead of the country” (Fahy Committee 1949g, 274). In responding to General Lee’s composite platoons that were put into action at the end of

71 As noted previously, President Roosevelt also made a number of military-related personnel postings favorable to civil rights leaders: Colonel Benjamin O. Davis was promoted to brigadier general, Colonel Campbell C. Johnson was appointed as Special Aide to the Director of Selective Service, and Judge William H. Hastie was appointed Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War (Nalty 1986, 139).

72 In October 1945, Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall had established a board led by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem to study the most efficient employment of black personnel in the Army. Within six weeks of its establishment, the Gillem Board reported that segregation was too inefficient, that blacks could and did serve in combat heroically and effectively, and that segregated units at the division-level often had leadership problems. Issued on April 27, 1946, War Department Circular No. 124 entitled “Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy” made eighteen recommendations regarding black servicemembers in the Army including
the war, Gillem dismissed them as representative of possible Army policy because they were composed of volunteers and they faced a “crisis,” i.e. war, though he did not explain how this war was different from the war that all other Army units had faced (Fahy Committee 1949g).

General Omary Bradley also testified before the Fahy Committee and was dismissive of the Army’s experience in World War II with integration. He defended the Army’s policies towards black personnel as better than any other organization in the United States as evidence by the re-enlistment rates: “I believe that the Negro soldier, in general, considers his lot, from his viewpoint, a good one…. I challenge anyone to show me any large-scale business or government enterprise in the United States where the Negro has achieved faster advancement, more responsibility, and greater remuneration than in the United States Army….” (Fahy Committee 1949e). Like Gillem, Bradley was hesitant “to force integration on the Army before the country is ready” (Fahy Committee 1949e). When asked about General Lee’s composite platoons, Bradley was dismissive of their record and attributed their success to unique circumstances:

Charles Fahy: ‘The incidents during the war where it was done in platoons and companies, do you know the record of that outfit?’

General Omar Bradley: ‘It’s pretty hard to state a record, except from the comments made by the various commanders, and by and large they were very favorable. You must remember, of course, that that was a particularly selected group who had volunteered for such service and the platoons consisted very largely of non-commissioned officers who had volunteered to take reductions in order to serve in those platoons. So, they were very high-grade men’ (Fahy Committee 1949e).

maintaining a quota of black personnel based on their representation in the civilian population; that black units, though maintained strictly as segregated units, should be grouped with white units; that all black officers, though assigned only to black units, be recruited, trained, and promoted without regard to race; and that black units be stationed where “community attitudes are most favorable” (U.S. War Department 1946). The Gillem Board report maintained the Army policy of segregated units, but it did establish an “ultimate objective” of “the effective use of all manpower made available to the military…without regard to antecedents or race” (U.S. War Department 1946; MacGregor 1981, 156). However, to the great consternation of the Fahy Committee, Army leadership in this report and in the hearings before the committee, refused to identify exactly when such an objective should be put into practice.
Bradley’s statement that these were “high-grade men,” though, is questionable given the testimony of some of the commanders of these units (see Lee 1966, 700-706). Bradley raised the issue with the Fahy Committee regarding how “such a system of complete integration might seriously affect morale and thus affect battle efficiency” (Fahy Committee 1949e), but he did not note how the Army’s own policies negatively affected such morale.

Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall was even more resistant than either of these senior officers. In a meeting before the committee on March 28, 1949, Royall reiterated to the committee that “the Army is not an instrument for social evolution” (Fahy Committee 1949e). Royall was particularly resistant to black officers in command of white personnel and expanding the role of black personnel in combat units:

The history of two wars has demonstrated that in general Negro troops have been less qualified than white troops for the performance of certain types of military service, for example, service with the infantry or with other units requiring troops to—quoting from the Gillem Report—‘close with the enemy….’

These questions are even more compelling when the question of command arises. It is true that there are two or three instances of white officers serving under Negro officers…. But my understanding is that in those situations white enlisted men were not serving directly under Negro officers or non-commissioned officers. And in my opinion—and I believe in the opinion of nearly all of the experienced Army men and officers—it would be most difficult—and unwise from the standpoint of national defense—to require any substantial portion of white soldiers—whether from the South or other sections of the country—to serve under Negro officers or particularly under Negro non-commissioned officers (as quoted in Fahy Committee 1949e, 505-508).

Throughout the hearings of the Fahy Committee, Army leadership attempted to use its expertise to prevent the imposition of integration (see also Fahy Committee 1949a; Fahy Committee 1949b; Fahy Committee 1949c; Fahy Committee 1949f). Instead of presenting all of the information regarding black soldiers and officers—their performance in the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II; the full findings of the composite platoon experiments—
they chose to offer only select information, basing the weight of their opinion and testimony on their roles in the organization rather than on the weight of all of the findings. However, the Fahy Committee was not convinced and President Truman forced integration on the Army.

**Move to Periphery**

Army leadership moved changes to the periphery of the organization during and immediately after World War II in response to political groups and operational demands. In response to political groups and attention from the President, General Marshall agreed to open up new positions for black soldiers during World War II, but only within segregated units (as discussed in the previous section) and in ways that kept black soldiers out of combat units. After World War II, Army leadership accepted that black soldiers would serve as a significant portion of the Army, but sought to keep them at the edge of the major service commands.

Army policy continued to assign the large majority of black soldiers into the combat service functions: approximately 50% of black soldiers served in support and general service roles compared to 21% of whites (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 54). Starting in 1943, the Army reassigned some black combat units from the field and coastal artillery to service units and decommissioned the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments so that their personnel could be reassigned to logistical units (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 56). Additionally, the Army and particularly the Army Air Force specifically created new segregated units just to absorb new recruits rather than opening up combat units to black soldiers (MacGregor 1985, 17-34). Such action protected
those units that were considered more important from being affected by the increase in black personnel.

At the end of World War II, the Army was faced with the dual challenges of drawing down its troop strength along with the need to maintain a large standing force (Nalty 1986, 224). In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, Truman Gibson (President Roosevelt’s appointed aide for personnel matters) articulated the view that black personnel would no longer be peripheral to the Army’s personnel needs: “Nevertheless...there is growing doubt among representative Army officers whether the Army is making the most efficient use of the 10-12% of available manpower represented by Negroes. It is widely recognized that in a future emergency, this 10-12% might represent the margin necessary for military success” (Gibson 1945). Such views were not restricted to Gibson, as the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel foresaw an even larger representation of black soldiers of up to 15% of the organization as the Army decreased in size to 1.8 million from 8 million (Nalty 1986, 223-224).

The Army services recognized this increase in black representation but nevertheless recommended maintaining black soldiers in the peripheral functions of the organization. In a 1945 study entitled “Participation of Negro Troops in the Postwar Military Establishment,” the Army’s Ground, Air, and Support Services wrestled with how to use black soldiers in the post-war environment given their acceptance that “Negro troops will participate in the postwar military establishment” (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Services Forces 1945). The Army Support Services report recommended that black units be no larger than company size, black personnel be assigned to non-technical positions only, and white officers should hold most of the command positions in black units (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Services Forces 1945). The Army Air Forces concluded that black servicemembers were ill-suited for the Air Force due to “lack of initiative,
ingenuity, accuracy, speed, and pride…troops are much more inclined to laziness, indifference, and unsoldierly qualities than white troops” and recommended that black personnel be accepted for pilot training after “careful screening” and should only serve in “separate combat flying units” (Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Forces 1945, 78; 90). The Army Ground Forces made similar recommendations, arguing that its units remain segregated and kept to a minimum size (Headquarters, U.S. Army Ground Forces 1945). By continuing to keep black soldiers at the periphery of the organization, the Army leaders attempted to continue to protect its core units even after World War II.

Denial

Denial is a tactic of resistance by which organizational leadership attempts to shift responsibility for an issue or problem onto something other than the organization. In regards to the Army and segregation, Army leadership sought to shift responsibility to the American public during World War II and afterwards during the hearings of the Fahy Committee.

To Army leaders, racial issues were a social problem. Shortly after President Roosevelt convinced General Marshall to open more positions to black soldiers (but within the 10% quota), he appointed Judge William Hastie, former dean of Howard Law School, as the Civilian Aide on Negro Affairs to the Secretary of War (MacGregor 1985, 17-19; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 101). Hastie made a number of recommendations to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff General George Marshall to end the problems caused by segregation, but neither man accepted these problems as the Army’s. Instead, Marshall argued that changing the Army’s
policies “would be tantamount to solving a social problem which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation” (Marshall 1941 as quoted in MacGregor 1985, 18-19).

Denial was also employed during the Fahy Committee hearings by grafting responsibility for the Army’s pace of change onto the public’s pace of change. Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem was extremely reluctant to support any policy that was too far “ahead of the country” (Fahy Committee 1949g, 274). Like General Gillem, General Omar Bradley was hesitant “to force integration on the Army before the country is ready” (Fahy Committee 1949e). Like Marshall before them, Gillem and Bradley saw segregation as a problem that would be solved by the Army only after it was solved by the public. However, as demonstrated earlier, these tactics did not convince the Fahy Committee.

Suppression

The final tactic of resistance utilized in this case is suppression. By suppressing internal voices for change that challenged the Army’s policies, the Army leadership was able to minimize these forces. These voices challenged the standing policies through official reports and studies conducted during World War II.

Two internal reports challenged the Army’s policies towards black soldiers. The first was the Chamberlain Plan conducted during World War II. Early in the war, the Army assigned the Organization-Mobilization Group of G-3 (Operations) to study its segregation policy. As discussed earlier, the Chamberlain Plan of 1942 argued in favor of putting black soldiers directly
into all Army units at a ratio of one black soldier to every nine white soldiers, in effect putting an end to segregation. According to this report, segregation wasted manpower and funds and “aggravated if not caused in its entirety” racial problems within the Army (as quoted in MacGregor 1981, 24).

If Chamberlain’s report had not been well-known or had not been sent to the appropriate leadership, one might not consider the Army leadership’s response an act of resistance. However, Chamberlain sent his proposal to important officers and individuals throughout the Army: the Deputy Chief of Staff, the operations division (G-3), the Army Air Corps commander, the Army Ground Forces commander, and the Army Services of Supply commander (Lee 1966, 154). In response, the operations division felt that “the proposal is inadvisable due to the certainty that internal strife, dissension, and lowered morale would result” (as quoted in Lee 1966, 154). General Lesley McNair, commander of the Army Ground Forces, responded: “I am unalterably opposed to the incorporation of negroes in small units with white soldiers. Inevitably, such action would weaken the unit, since it would introduce men of comparatively low intelligence...” (as quoted in Lee 1966, 155). The sharp response to Chamberlain’s report indicates at least implicit suppression.

A second study that met explicit suppression was that of General Lee’s composite platoons conducted at the end of World War II. Though the composite platoons proved to be successful, top Army leadership resisted the implications of Lee’s experiment and the report that was written to examine how these platoons performed in combat. General Brehon D. Somervell, commander of the Army Services Forces, argued against releasing the findings of the report because it would encourage Congress, the media, and political groups such as the NAACP to call for greater desegregation within the Army (MacGregor 1985, 46-57). Prior to the actual
formation of the composite platoons, Lieutenant General Walter Smith, Chief of Staff of Allied Expeditionary forces wrote:

Although I am now somewhat out of touch with the War Department’s negro policy, I did, as you know, handle this during the time I was with General Marshall. Unless there has been a radical change…[integrated platoons] will place the War Department in very grave difficulties. It is inevitable that this statement will get out, and equally inevitable that the result will be that every negro organization, pressure group and newspaper will take the attitude that, while the War Department segregates colored troops into organizations of their own against the desires and pleas of all the negro race, the Army is perfectly willing to put them in the front lines mixed with white soldiers, and have them do battle when an emergency arises. Two years ago I would have considered [integrated platoons] the most dangerous thing I had ever seen in regard to negro relations (Smith 1944 as quoted in Lee 1966, 690).

Had General Smith expected the composite platoon experiment to fail, it is likely that he would not have been so concerned with whether it became public; a failed experiment, in fact, would have bolstered the Army’s preferred policies. Instead, the success of the composite platoons challenged the Army’s segregation policies (MacGregor 2985, 46-57).

General Omar Bradley also sought to delegitimize the study’s findings. He argued that the cohesion between blacks and whites was a result of the unique situation of combat; that the Germans they fought were below average in combat capabilities; and that the volunteers were above average in ability and did not accurately reflect most black soldiers (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 143). Bradley called for more experimentation, arguing that these studies were inconclusive (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 143).

Given these disagreements and his own opinions, General Marshall supported Somervell and Bradley and hid the report from the public. In a letter to John McCoy, Marshall stated: “It is further agreed that the results of the survey of the Information and Education Division should not be released for publication at this time, since the conditions under which the platoons were organized and employed were most unusual” (Marshall 1945). As a result, the report was
suppressed and withheld from the public (Merson and Schlossman 1998, 143). Though they had proof of the combat capabilities of black soldiers and the ability of white and black to work together, Army leadership resisted the implications of such findings.

As demonstrated above, Army leadership has strategically resisted forces for change related to the integration of African Americans into the organization. Table 2 below captures the forces for change, the tactics employed, the outcome, and the degree to which the resistance was successful.

In the final analysis, the service of African Americans threatened the Army’s sense of mission. While white men had been the Army’s preferred source of personnel, it was by no means the only group capable of successfully serving in combat. Only powerful political leaders could force the organization to change its policies, a change that challenged this sense of mission but inevitably made the organization and the country stronger. The table below summarizes the forces for change, tactics of resistance, and outcomes discussed in this case.

Table 2: Resistance to African Americans – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African-Americans</td>
<td>Performance Assessments</td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership did not take into account reviews of black soldiers in Cuba</td>
<td>After war, no change to organizational treatment of black units, regardless of their performance</td>
<td>Yes – Army did not increase number of combat units; maintained whites as officers in black units; no change in organizational treatment of black combat units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American War</td>
<td>Performance Assessments</td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership did not take into account reviews of black soldiers in Cuba</td>
<td>After war, no change to organizational treatment of black units, regardless of their performance</td>
<td>Yes – Army did not increase number of combat units; maintained whites as officers in black units; no change in organizational treatment of black combat units</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>Demand for Personnel / Draft Policies (demand for personnel and draft policies that recruited more black personnel than could be utilized)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership kept quota at 10% of force, even though draft boards had more blacks than whites available for service</td>
<td>Increased number of black personnel in service, but limited number of combat units; kept all units segregated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Groups (wanted more opportunities for black soldiers and specifically for blacks to become officers)</td>
<td>Organizational Leadership (Leonard Wood supported establishment of black officer training)</td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise – Army leadership tried to argue that black soldiers would not follow black officers</td>
<td>Political groups wanted more black officers and more black combat units and were able to work through Leonard Wood and Newton Baker to establish black officer training program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Demand for Personnel / Draft Policies (demand for personnel and draft policies that recruited more black personnel than could be utilized)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership maintained quota knowing of shortages, even though more black personnel were available and integrated units would allow for faster personnel resupply</td>
<td>Maintained segregation; combat units kept at 5%; organizational quota of black personnel maintained at 10%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political Groups (wanted end to segregation, more black units, more black combat units, and more black officers)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Move to the periphery – Army recognized interests of political groups, but only opened more service units to blacks</td>
<td>Political groups desired more representation for blacks and end to segregated units; Army maintained segregation, but opened up more positions to blacks, although these were service positions</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Force For Change</td>
<td>Internal Force For Change</td>
<td>Tactic of Resistance</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Leadership (Roosevelt needed political support, so forced Army to open more positions to blacks)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise / Denial – Army argued that such actions would harm “morale” and argued that it was a “social problem” and not an Army problem</td>
<td>Army opened more service positions, but did not change its quota of blacks representing no more than 10% of the service</td>
<td>Somewhat – Marshall responded to opening more positions, but able to convince Roosevelt of need to maintain basic policies; argued that it was a “social problem” not an Army problem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Studies and Assessments (Chamberlain Report, etc. demonstrated ability of black soldiers and the benefit of integration)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Suppression – Army kept studies secret</td>
<td>Senior unit commanders responded to such studies that desegregation would negatively affect morale, regardless of the findings</td>
<td>Yes – Unit Commanders maintained segregation and use of black troops in service units, even though studies demonstrated that desegregation would not harm combat effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand for personnel (increasing enlistment of black personnel, rise of Cold War manning requirements)</td>
<td>Move to the periphery – Army tried to increase the number of black personnel without changing policies of World War II</td>
<td>Maintained segregated units, kept black soldiers subordinate out of command and in service positions</td>
<td>Somewhat – policies would have been put in place, except for the intervention of political leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Leadership (Demanded end to segregation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise / Denial – Army tried to argue that the system worked and desegregation would affect morale</td>
<td>Army leaders (Gillem, Bradley, Royall) tried to dismiss previous studies and claim that the Army was already implementing president’s guidance through the Gillem Report</td>
<td>No – Fahy Committee nor the president were convinced, and Army was forced to change policy in 1951; the Army began desegregation in 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Force For Change</td>
<td>Internal Force For Change</td>
<td>Tactic of Resistance</td>
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<td>Successful Resistance?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Studies and Assessments – Study of Lee’s “composite platoons” and Gillem Report recommended end to segregation at unspecified point in the future</td>
<td>Suppression – Army leadership was aware of studies and assessments, but chose not to implement them (except for parts of Gillem Report)</td>
<td>Even in light of performance of “composite” platoons serving in white companies during combat, no change to policy following World War II</td>
<td>Yes – Army leadership ignored the findings and suppressed implications by arguing that soldiers did not represent the typical black soldier</td>
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</table>

**Women**

Women have a long history of service in the U.S. Army. Since the American Revolution, women have served in every major conflict; as of 2012, 70,000 women serve in the Army comprising 14% of the total active force (Friedl 1998, 11; Skaine 1999, 50; U.S. Department of the Army 2012e).

Over the years, a number of external and internal forces have applied pressure to the Army in regards to women. From World War I through the current Iraq and Afghanistan wars, political groups, organization leadership, operational demands, and studies and reports have applied pressure to change the Army’s policies towards women.

Yet, these forces have been resisted. Particularly in response to women in command positions and in combat, constituencies of resistance in the form of organizational leadership have attempted to stop forces for change from impacting the Army. In this section, I analyze the strategic resistance and tactics that have been utilized to protect the Army’s mission.
History

Women have served in the Army since its inception. In the American Revolution, women served as soldiers and nurses. In the Civil War, women served in both the Union and Confederate Armies as scouts, nurses, soldiers, and spies (Holm 1982, 6); in the Union Army alone, over 6,000 women served as nurses (Holm 1982, 8; Reeves 1996). Over forty years later, 1,200 women nurses cared for typhoid victims in Army camps during the Spanish-American War (Holm 1982, 8). However, these women were never a permanent part of the Army; after each of these wars, women were removed from service or their roles were filled by men (Holm 1982, 9).

The first service by women as an official part of the Army occurred in 1901 with the establishment of the Nurse Corps. The Nurse Corps was composed only of women, and only women were allowed to serve, and they did not qualify for retirement, veterans’ benefits, or equal pay (Holm 1982, 9; Gavin 1997, 43).

During World War I, the Army utilized women’s service to a very small degree particularly compared to that of the other services. The Navy recruited over 11,000 women and the Marine Corps recruited 350 women to serve as clerks, radio controllers, and in office-related positions that were considered socially appropriate so that men could serve in combat and combat-related positions (Friedl 1998, 11). The Army, however, utilized no women during the war even though General John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), requested them. In November 1917, General Pershing specifically requested 100 female

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73 For more on the Nurse Corps and the Army Nurse Corps, see (Bellafaire n.d.; Cosner 1988).

74 This policy changed in 1944 (Gavin 1997, 43).

75 The Marines held out longer than the rest of the Navy in recruiting women, but severe shortages due to combat demands for men drove their integration of women into headquarter units to free men from clerical duties to go to combat units (Holm 1982, 12). The Marine Corps argued that only 40% of the clerical duties performed by men could be done equally well by women and that it would require three women to replace two men (Holm 1982, 12).
soldiers who would serve as telephone operators (and who could speak French), jobs held exclusively by women at that time (Holm 1982, 13; Gavin 1998, 77-94). While Pershing did receive telephone operators, his request that they be female soldiers was ignored.

Women’s service greatly expanded during World War II as the first official women’s organization came into existence. What started out as the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in 1942 became the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) in 1943. The demand and need for women to serve in particular positions grew extensively over the course of the war; at one time, the Army Chief of Staff for Operations argued in favor of 1.5 million strong WAC force (Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 65). However, recruiting would not reach this number, as the highest number of women personnel serving in the WAC at any one time during World War II was 93,542 in April of 1945 (Treadwell 1991, 765) and the highest authorized strength of the women’s corps was 100,000 personnel (Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 104).

The WAC should have been dissolved at the end of the war according to the law that brought it into existence, but a small number of high-ranking military officials saw a place for it even though such support was not without reservations. As a result of personal and consistent support from Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower, Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of June 1948, which established the WAC as a permanent part of the Army (Treadwell 1991, 748; Morden 2000, 26-54). The WAC was the only means by which women could serve in the Army for decades to follow.

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76 According to the original act, existence of the WAC was based only on involvement in the war; no provisions were made for a peace-time force (Morden 2000, 25-26).

77 One argument that seemed to finally win out as put forth by Congressman Harry Sheppard (D-CA): “Let the draft fill up the shortages which men alone can fill . . . but let us not take a man away from a farm, home, or school . . . to be a telephone operator. There are and always will be jobs . . . women can do better” (as quoted in Morden 2000, 53).
The WAC was a major step towards institutionalizing women’s service in the Army. Women were put in the same chain-of-command as the Chief of Staff, all training and logistical concerns were now done by the Army Staff, and women were now bound by the same military rules of discipline as the rest of the Army (Morden 2000, 13). Though they could not be assigned combat roles, women could be assigned beyond their original jobs to non-combat positions including pay officer, intelligence agent and driver (Morden 2000, 13-14). In the early years of the WAC, women could be assigned to 406 of the Army’s 628 military occupational specialties (MOSs) and fill 1.3 million positions in the Army (Morden 2000, 23).

The next significant changes to women in the service would occur during the Vietnam War era. The shift to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970’s spurred a need to bring more volunteers into the Army, including women, to maintain the Army’s desired end strength; congressional interest in women’s military service generated by debates over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972 brought political focus on the Army to end separate promotion lists; and a number of studies and reports that concluded favorably in support of women’s service increased women’s role in the Army (Holm 1982, 186; Treadwell 1991, 224; Griffith 1997, 188-194; Morden 2000, 403-404). In 1972, the Army opened all positions to women except those that met one of three criteria: the physical demands were beyond the capabilities of

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78 In April 1972, DOD’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower wrote a memo stating that “separate organizations and restricted assignments do not provide adequate career opportunity for women” and predicting the ratification of the ERA the next year, which would immediately lead to the end of the women’s corps as well as the separate promotion lists (Kelly 1972 as quoted in Morden 2000, 311). In response, Secretary of the Army Robert Froehlke through the Army Assistant Secretary for Manpower directed the Army Staff to prepare to transition all women and men into the same promotion list and to ensure that all non-combat jobs could be held by both men and women. Any jobs that could not be held by women had to be justified by commanders (Hull 1973 as quoted in Morden 2000, 310).
women, the position was considered “socially undesirable,” or involved combat (Holm 1982, 274). This opened 437 of 485 MOSs to women (Morden 2000, 264).  

In the post-Vietnam era, the central point of debate regarding women in the Army has been service in combat. Since the first days of the WAC, women had been barred serving in combat or combat units; during World War II, only a handful of female drivers were even allowed to carry a gun (Morden 2000, 13-14). The first woman credited with serving in combat, Captain Linda Bray led an assault against a suspected enemy position during Operation Joint Cause in December 1989 in Panama (Bray 2008; Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 337-341). As the commander of a military police company, Captain Bray led her unit to capture what turned out to be a dog kennel that was used as a weapons cache by Panamanian military forces.  

Overall, 800 Army women took part in the invasion of Panama in 1989 (Stiehm 1996, 69).

Two years later during the first Gulf War, women took on a much greater operational role, both in combat and total numbers. In that war, over 41,000 women (from all services) took part in the conflict, five women were killed, and two were held as prisoners of war (Cornum 1992, 1996; Lavandera 2011).

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed women into combat even more. As of June 2013, women are still officially barred from serving in combat, but they are “attached” to

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79 The positions that remained closed included but were not limited to infantryman (11B), armor crewman (11E), combat engineer (12B), field artillery crewman (13B), Pershing missile crewman (15E), Honest John rocket crewman (15F), light air defense artillery crewman (16F), ground surveillance radar crewman (17K), smoke and flame specialist (54C), and artillery surveyor (82C) (U.S. Department of the Army 1976, 4-A-1).

80 The specifics of what actually happened and Captain Bray’s role in the event is contested (Skaine 1999, 63-64; Bray 2008; Breuer 1997, 139-140). While Captain Bray certainly led her unit in a combat environment, she was not directly engaged in combat, i.e. she did not fire her weapon at an enemy nor receive fire from enemy forces, even though the media reported differently (ibid.). When this event occurred, women were still officially barred from combat according to Army policy and Bray was not ordered to conduct a combat operation; any combat action happened unintentionally.
combat units. Such actions meet the Army’s stated policy of barring women from combat units, but it places them in the same combat situations as many men (Alvarez 2009).

Changes, though, have occurred. In response to operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan, Secretary Leon Panetta, in February 2012, officially changed the combat exclusion policy to allow women to serve in more tactical units and allow women to be co-located with combat units, meaning they could be stationed with but not a part of combat units (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 1-4; McGregor 2012). Additionally, the Army opened 13,139 more positions to women, including 6 MOSs that were previously closed (Department of Defense 2012, ii). On January 24, 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that he would lift the ban on women in combat (Londono 2013a). However, the plan of implementation by the Army and other services as well as the positions that may remain closed will not be released until May 15, 2013 (ibid.). This plan, though, has been pushed back to August 20, 2013 (Shinkman 2013).

As of May 2013, however, Army policy still bars women from the major combat branches of the organization and, by default, its highest ranks. Women are currently allowed to serve in 66% of Army positions, but almost none of these positions are in the combat branches of infantry, armor, and field artillery (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 2). Service in these branches, however, is critical for reaching the senior-most ranks in the Army; every Army Chief of Staff since 1903 made his career in the infantry, armor (or cavalry), or field artillery branches. The first female four-star Army general was promoted to that rank in 2008 (in the support branch of logistics); just over 4% of Army generals today are women (Doll 2007, 1; Hames 2008;

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81 On January 24, 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that DoD will lift the ban on women in combat and combat branches; however, each of the services may request a waiver to continue to ban women from specific units or occupational specialties (Londono 2013; Smith 2013). Secretary Panetta ordered the Army to submit a plan for combat integration by May 15, 2013 (McGregor 2013).
Broadwell 2012). In total, 42 women have achieved the rank of general in the history of the U.S. Army (Doll 2008, 77). As Senator John Glenn noted, “One of the ways you advance in a military career is either performance in combat or prospective performance in combat” (as quoted in Culler 2000, 37). Without such prospective performance, women are kept from the highest Army positions of command.

Forces for Change

Both external and internal forces for change have acted on the Army regarding women’s service. External forces for change include demand for personnel with particular skills, political groups, and political leadership. Internal forces for change include studies and assessments, organizational leadership, and operational experience. These forces have been strategically resisted, as I will address in the next section.

External

Demand for personnel to fill specific jobs and, eventually, the need to fill the Army’s ranks due to the transition to an all-volunteer system have pressured the Army in World War I, World War II, and Vietnam. During World War I, the Army and the other services needed personnel to fill particular jobs in order to allow men to serve in combat units (Holm 1982, 12; Friedl 1998, 11). In the early years of World War II, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall recognized the fact that the Women’s Army Corps could replace men in support positions to allow them to serve on the front lines (Treadwell 1991, 17). Following the transition to an all-volunteer force in 1973, women’s service was not about replacing men but about filling the size demands of the force overall (Janowitz and Moskos 1979, 171-218; Morden 2000, 403-404; Burrelli 2012, 2). That same year, the Secretary of the Army directed the expansion of the WAC because the Army could not maintain the desired 13 divisions for active duty without
women’s service (Morden 2000, 263-264). As a result, the Army leadership willingly approved a plan to increase the size of WAC from approximately 10,000 women to 23,800 women by 1978 (Morden 2000, 264). In October 1973, Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams approved another plan to increase the WAC to 50,400 personnel (Morden 2000, 267). During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, women represent 14% of the Army, or approximately 70,000 personnel (U.S. Department of the Army 2012e). Though women not specifically assigned to combat units, their service was required; an attempt by U.S. Congressmen to remove women from combat outposts in Iraq in 2005 was eventually dropped because their absence would have placed too much stress on the Army to conduct operations (Associated Press 2005a; Seabrook 2005; Tyson 2005b).

Political groups also served as forces for change in World War I and World War II. During World War I, these included women suffragist and national defense groups such as the Young Women’s Christian Association, the Women’s League for Self-Defense, and the American Council for Education (Holm 1982, 14). In World War II, groups such as the Women’s Ambulance and Defense Corps called for the integration of women to fill the needs of the Army and other armed forces in such roles as ambulance drivers, ambulance officers, and “anything helpful to replace a man in the event of war” (as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 16).

Starting in World War II, political leadership has been a consistent force on the Army regarding its policies towards women. Representatives Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA) and Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) with the support of President Franklin Roosevelt and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, applied political pressure on Army leadership to integrate women into the war effort through the establishment of the Women’s Army Corps (Treadwell 1991, 16-21; Morden 2000, 5-12; Jensen 2008, 141).82

82 First Lady Roosevelt actually proposed that women serve in anti-aircraft defense gunnery, a combat-related function (Treadwell 1991, 17). This organization had the specified goal “To Replace Men” in support jobs so that
Three decades later in 1972, Army leadership viewed Congressional support for the Equal Rights Amendment as an indicator of future Congressional action and intervention (Holm 1982, 186; Morden 2000, 310-311). In March 1973, Secretary of the Army Robert Froehlke directed the Army Staff to make plans for combing male and female promotion lists, identifying additional jobs that could be held by women, and ending the WAC (Morden 2000, 310). At the same time, the Army began its transition to the all-volunteer force. Most likely as a result of the combination of these forces, the Army leadership willingly instituted a number of changes including expanding the size of the WAC and opening a large number of MOSs to women (Morden 2000, 264-268).

Members of Congress again played a significant role in the early 1990’s, as Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) pushed her colleagues and leaders of the Army to accept women into combat roles (U.S. House 1990, 8-13). In 1994, Secretary Aspin lifted the “Risk Rule” that had previously been adopted in 1988 and granted women the opportunity to serve in “all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat” (Aspin 1994).

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83 According to the “risk rule”, “Risks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and duration of such risks are equal to or greater than the combat units with which they are normally associated within a given theater of operations. If the risk of non-combat units or positions is less than comparable land, air or sea combat units with which they are associated, then they should be open to women” (Secretary of Defense [Frank Carlucci] 1988).

84 According to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s memorandum on January 13, 1994: “A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground as defined below: B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.”
External studies and reports have also exerted pressure on the Army. In 1976, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service (DACOWITS)\(^8\) board requested that all combat exclusion policies be lifted (Breuer 1997, 97).\(^9\) In 1989, DACOWITS recommended that combat specialties be opened to women for a four-year period in order to assess impact on the force (Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 341). In 2006, a RAND study found that the Army could possibly be violating its own combat exclusion policy because women serving in combat outposts met the formal guidance but not the intent of the law (Harrel, et al. 2007, 45). The 2011 Military Leadership Diversity Commission on Women in the Services recommended an end to combat exclusion because women’s inability to serve in combat units negatively impacts leadership diversity in the services (Miles 2011). The DACOWITS commission made similar recommendations in its 2010 and 2011 annual reports for an end to women’s combat exclusion and to “open all related career fields/specialties, schooling and training opportunities” to women (U.S. Department of Defense Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service 2011, iii).

**Internal**

Internal forces for change include organizational leadership, studies and reports, and operational experience. Organizational leadership was an early force for change. In November

\(^8\) DACOWITS was established in 1951 under George C. Marshall to advise the Secretary of Defense on how to increase the enrollment of women in the armed forces and improve the use of their capabilities for the national defense (U.S. Department of Defense Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service 2012).

\(^9\) In 1991, the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces recommended opening a large number of MOSs to women, however it supported barring women from combat MOSs (Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 360). In addition, it recommended that quotas should not be used to limit or determine the number of women who should serve in the Army or any of the armed forces and that assignment should be based on who is “best qualified” (The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 1992, 1). Women’s service in combat operations in the Air Force and Navy fared better. The House Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 repealed the ban on women flying combat air missions, and in 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the Navy to lift its ban on women serving on combat ships.
1917, General Pershing requested telephone operators, jobs held exclusively by women, who could speak French (Holm 1982, 13; Gavin 1998, 77-94). Additionally, Pershing wanted them to be uniformed personnel along the lines of the British Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) under his command just like any other soldier or like the women of the Nurse Corps (Treadwell 1991, 6). Other Army agencies including the Quartermaster, Ordinance, Medical Corps, Central Post Office, and Central Records Office, having seen the success of the British WAACS, also requested female soldiers (Treadwell 1991, 6; Gavin 1998, 77-78). Like the Navy and Marine Corps, the leaders of these organizations saw the role that women could play in replacing men in some jobs.

Internal studies and reports also pressured the Army. As early as 1928, Army G-1 (Personnel) wrote a report on the “inevitability” of women’s service in the next war, given likely war demands and the economic and social changes happening in the country (Treadwell 1991, 13). Over a decade later in 1942, a series of secret tests known as “Battery X” tested women’s abilities to manage anti-aircraft guns on the eastern coast of the United States in the case of German invasion; the results indicated that women could successfully conduct all tasks while maintaining high unit morale (Holm 1982, 66-67; Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 69-70). In 1974, a study by the Army’s Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) based on computer models found that women could fill 8% of enlisted strength (54,400 personnel) and 16% of officer strength (26,400 personnel) without damaging combat capabilities (Morden 2000, 370). A concurrent study by the Army’s Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) report came up with a much higher number: a unit of 50% women had no impact on capabilities (Morden 2000, 371). In 1975, a study facilitated by TRADOC’s Army Research Institute (ARI) and Army

87 These WITA models were built specifically to test the assumption that having too many women in any one unit would degrade combat capabilities (Morden 2000, 369).
Forces Command (FORSCOM) sought to test these numbers in the Women Content in Units Force Development Test (also known as the MAX WAC study) and found that unit strength up to 35% women did not adversely affect the capabilities of the units (Morden 2000, 370-372). This spurred another study conducted during the Army’s annual mobility exercise in Germany which found that units composed of up to 10% women did not reduce combat capabilities (Morden 2000, 373). In 1976, the Women in the Army (WITA) study found that the MAX WAC study along with the original MILPERCEN and TRADOC studies were indeed reliable (Morden 2000, 374).88

Beginning in the 1980’s, operational experience acted as a significant force for change as women became more involved in combat operations. Captain Linda Bray’s leadership of a military police company that captured a weapons cache during Operation Joint Cause in Panama became a significant event noted within the Army and in the media (Breuer 1997, 139-140; Bray 2008; Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2010, 337-341).89 Even more women served two years later in the first Gulf War. Overall, 41,000 women (from all services) took part in the Gulf War.90 During the ground war, five women were killed and two were held as prisoners of war, both POWs coming from the Army (Cornum 1992, 1996; Lavandera 2011).

The most recent operational experiences that have acted as internal forces for change are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have exposed women to combat in ways far beyond the Army’s original policies. In both wars, operations place them in the same situations as many

88 The assessment of which MOS a woman could fill was based on the distance to the line of combat (see U.S. Department of the Army 1982, 5-5).

89 As noted in a previous footnote, the degree of combat in which Captain Bray took part is contested. During this time, women were still officially barred from combat.

90 Prior to the Gulf War, 800 Army women took part in the invasion of Panama in 1989 and 170 Army women took part in the invasion of Grenada in 1983 (Stiehm 1996, 69).
combat units, and more women have been involved in combat than any previous war (CNN 2005; Parker 2005; Schleicher 2006; Norris 2007; Alvarez 2009; Myers 2009). Through April 2012, there have been 139 women killed and 800 women wounded (Dvorak 2012). In Iraq, 60% of female casualties were due to hostile acts (Nordland 2012). In Afghanistan, 30 out of the 45 women killed were killed by hostile fire (icasualties.org. n.d.).

In unique ways, women have extended the Army’s capabilities in these conflicts: due to local customs in Iraq and Afghanistan that prevent male soldiers from speaking with local women, female soldiers have taken on new roles with special operations forces because they are allowed to talk to these women. In 2009, the Army’s Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) composed solely of women began working alongside special forces units under the command of U.S. Army Special Operations Command so that more information about local situations could be gathered (Jordan 2011; Lowe 2011).

Due to the success of the CSTs, the Army plans to have 25 such teams by 2016 (Associated Press 2011).

Strategic Resistance to Change

Analyzing the Army’s response to forces for change according to the analytical framework of this project indicates resistance to change with the intent of protecting the mission. Based on the external and internal forces for change identified above, there is indication of strategic resistance to change in the primary features of promotion pathways and structure. This is identified in the table below:

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91 “Hostile acts” and “hostile fire” mean that they have been killed in action by enemy fire or actions. This is opposed to “non-hostile” events such as accident or sickness.

92 This model is based on the Marine Corps’ Female Engagement Teams (FETs) (Martin and Mauer 2011). Though these are tactical teams that interact directly with the local population, they are not considered combat assignments.

93 The first fatality in the CST program was 1st Lieutenant Ashley White, killed by an IED in Kandahar, Afghanistan on October 22, 2011 (Associated Press 2011).
Table 3: Strategic Resistance to Women

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<th>Functional Component</th>
<th>Combat</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Training             | Not Applicable  
| Structure            | Yes    |
| **Secondary Features** |  |
| Materiel/Technology  | Not Applicable |
| Doctrine             | Not Applicable |
| Education            | Not Applicable |
| Awards               | Not Applicable |
| Facilities           | Not Applicable |
| Actions by leaders to resist FFCs? | Yes |

There is indication of strategic resistance to change in the feature of promotion pathways in regards to the ranks women could achieve in the Army. From its beginnings through Vietnam, the highest rank a woman could achieve was colonel, a rank reserved only for the director of the WAC (Morden 2000, 12-13). The first woman to be promoted to general officer did not occur until 1970, and this was in the nurse corps (Morden 2000, 231). Additionally, promotion was dependent only on the positions available in the WAC, not the entire Army (Morden 2000, 269-273). Until 1972, a woman could not command any unit that had men, but men could command units that had women (Morden 2000, 273). Essentially, this policy strategically barred women from every single command position outside of the WAC.95

There is also indication of strategic resistance to change in the feature of organizational structure in regards to the positions women could hold in the organization. From 1942 until

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94 As discussed previously, “not applicable” means that there is no force for change or that there is no indication of strategic resistance. In this case, women received the same training as men (for the particular MOSs in which they were assigned); they used the same materiel and equipment; followed the same doctrine; received the same education; and received the same awards (other than combat). Though women were and are assigned separate facilities, there has not been a specific force for change that has impact this feature separately from the features of promotion pathways and structure.

95 Unless explicitly authorized to do so by the Secretary of War/Secretary of Defense (Morden 2000, 14).
1972, women were limited to those positions open to them in the WAC (as discussed above). As of 1972, women could serve in all but 48 of 485 occupational specialties, though they were still excluded from infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense, and certain engineer units (Morden 2000, 265-289). But even given women’s combat experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, women are still barred, as of February 2013, from eighteen combat MOSs that represent 30% of all Army positions (Tan 2012). As discussed previously, these structural limitations also have a direct impact on women’s promotion pathways and potential, given that every Army Chief of Staff began his career in a combat branch. Additionally, only 4% of Army generals today are women but make up 14% of the organization (Doll 2007, 1; U.S. Department of the Army 2012e).

The alternate explanations besides strategic resistance to change in order to protect the mission include ignorance about forces for change, that women actually degraded capabilities, political pressures, and social norms. Potentially, one could argue that the Army’s response to the forces for change identified previously were not intentional resistance intended to protect the mission but rather due to one of these other reasons. However, I find these explanations lacking, and strategic resistance to change is the most compelling explanation for the lack of change by external and internal forces for change regarding the Army’s policies towards women.

The first alternate explanation is that the Army leadership was not aware of the forces for change and the Army’s need for women, however evidence suggests that they were well aware of such forces. For instance, John Pershing specifically asked the Army Staff for women soldiers to serve in the AEF in World War I, but they sent him contractors instead (Holm 1982, 13; Gavin 1998, 77-94). In World War II, George Marshall directed his staff to work with Congresswoman Rogers so that they could change her bill into something more amenable to the
Army’s interests because they did in fact realize that her bill would have significant effects on
the Army (Haislip 1941; Treadwell 1991, 17). Also during World War II, the Army Chief of
Staff for Operations even considered a WAC of 1.5 million women (Monahan and Neidel-
Greenlee 2010, 65). In planning for the transition to the all-volunteer force, the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel adapted plans to increasing the WAC to 24,000 and then to 50,000
due to the end of the draft, a plan eventually overcome by the merging of promotion lists and the
end of the quota (Morden 2000, 263-318). After Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, Chief of
Staff at the end of the Vietnam War, recognized that women were “…fifty-two percent of the
population…. And if we ever get in another war, we’re going to have to use them a lot more than
we have in the past” (as quoted in Sorley 1992, 352). Army leaders were very aware of the
forces for change regarding women.

A second explanation is that women actually degraded capabilities and that the resistance
to forces for change was an attempt to prevent such degradation. But, there is little evidence to
suggest that women actually did degrade capabilities. Even before the Army integrated women,
evidence from the British Army (an organization similar to the U.S. Army) indicated that
women’s service was beneficial (Treadwell 1991, 32-33). In World War II, reviews of women’s
service, demands from certain members of the Army leadership, and the myriad studies and
reports—from the 1942 “Battery X” study, to the studies of the 1970’s including the WITA,
MAX WAC, WEEM, and WOSM studies—all indicated that women improved rather than
degraded capabilities (Treadwell 1991, 6-10; Morden 2000, 370-372; Monahan and Neidel-
Greenlee 2010, 69-70).96 The sheer number of studies conducted in the 1970’s indicates that

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96 General Paul, the head of Army G-1, following World War II stated: “Experience of World War II proved that
women play a vital role in the military effectiveness of any nation. And American women, through their services in
the Women's Army Corps, showed that, contrary to dogmatic opinion, the previously untapped potentiality of
womanpower could be directed into the channel of personnel power with positive results. The record shows that
Army Staff leaders were also aware of the implications of the studies but did not agree with the findings (U.S. Army Research Institute 1977; Morden 2000, 370-372). One might argue that they did not trust the methodology or accuracy of the reports, but the fact that there were at least six different studies and that follow-on studies directed by Army Staff personnel indicates disagreement with the findings rather than a desire for thoroughness.

More important, though, is the absence of evidence from these studies on the negative impacts on the Army’s capabilities. Since the formation of the WAAC in 1942, no study has been found that provides evidence of the degree to which, or the means by which women degrade Army capabilities, including any negative impact on morale and unit cohesion.

The third possible alternate explanation is political pressure that impeded the Army from changing policy. This would seem to be the most compelling argument, given that congress was the strongest impediment to the passing of the WAC Integration Act in 1948 and more recent Congressional attempts to remove women from forward operating bases in Iraq in 2005 (Treadwell 1991, 746-749; Tyson 2005a; Tyson 2005b). Such an alternate explanation, though, is weakened by the very fact that Army leadership was able to overcome both of these situations. If Congress was applying pressure, either overtly or covertly, to the Army in order to marginalize women’s service, we should see more examples of Congress successfully resisting the Army’s attempts to increase women’s service, but we do not see this; Army leadership was able to get their way in the instances of expanding women’s service.

A final explanation is the influence of social norms, an explanation that hinges on the possibility that the Army’s actions were intended to prevent loss of public support. However, Army leaders, as in the case of African Americans, demonstrated a willingness to challenge
social norms regarding women. In the early days of women in the Army, there was a great deal of public pushback on the WAC in 1942 and 1943, including a slander campaign that permeated the armed forces and the media (Treadwell 1991, 191-218; Morden 2000, 10-11). Yet even given this lack of public support, the Army in no way reduced its recruitment of women in the service; in fact, as discussed previously, the Army only expanded WAC roles during this time (Morden 2000, 192). Additionally, leaders of the War Department including the Secretary of War and the commander of the Army Services Forces all issued rebuttals to the media’s statements and attributed such statements to Nazi propaganda (Treadwell 1991, 204-205). In this situation, the Army’s actions towards women cannot be explained in terms of social norms because leaders demonstrated a willingness to confront public opinion when it did not meet the Army’s own interests.

Social norms also do not explain the Army’s policies regarding women in the latter part of the 20th century. Since Vietnam, public support for women in the military and particularly women in combat has increased. In 1980, a Gallup poll found that 44% of Americans supported allowing women to hold “combat jobs,” and the survey noted that this number would likely by higher if there were a perception of threat to national security (Hay and Middlestead 1990, 11-12). A 1992 Gallup survey found that 55% of respondents believed that women should be allowed to serve in combat jobs (Gallup 2013c). In 2005, another Gallup survey found that 67% of people supported women’s service in combat positions (Gallup 2005). As of 2013, this percentage remains around 70% (Simpson 2013). The Army’s reactions to women in the service

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97 An Army Military Intelligence Service investigation of the slander campaign found that it was not a Nazi propaganda effort but rather the result of false comments made by soldiers in the armed forces and media personnel (Treadwell 1991, 205-208).

98 Given that the Army’s main task is to protect national security, it would seem prudent to ask the question this way, but this is not the case in these polls.
and in combat, at least in the past few decades, cannot solely be attributed to social norms or public opinions. Yet even if public opinion were more strongly against women’s service, particularly in combat, then this would not explain the Army’s willingness to diverge from public opinion when it meets the organization’s immediate interests.  

In the final analysis, strategic resistance to change best explains the Army’s actions regarding women. While other explanations such as social norms may offer some explanatory value, they do not fully explain all of the Army’s policies regarding women.

Tactics of Resistance

The Army leadership and other constituencies of resistance employed a number of tactics that had implications for women in the Army. These tactics include ignoring the force for change, moving changes to the periphery, offering something of lesser value, political use of expertise, and suppression.

Ignore

One of the first instances of ignoring a force for change was the Army Staff’s reaction to General Pershing’s request for female soldiers to act as telephone operators during World War I. General Pershing and other Army agencies including the Quartermaster, Ordinance, Medical Corps, Central Post Office, and Central Records Office, having seen the success of the British WAACS, requested female soldiers but received female contracted personnel instead (Treadwell 1991, 6; Gavin 1998, 77-78). Additionally, Major General James Harbord, the Commander of

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99 However, there is still vocal opposition to women in the armed forces and in combat (e.g. Mitchell 1989, 1998; Ablow 2012; The Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood n.d.), however this is generally a minority opinion.

100 The individual in charge of hiring these women for the War Department, 1st Lt. Ernest Wessen, is said to have hired them with the promise of full military rights and privileges knowing that they would serve as civilians (Gavin 1997, 78).
the American service and supply branch, requested 5,000 women to serve in clerical duties as part of an official women’s corps (as the Navy and Marine Corps had done) in order to free the men holding these positions to enter combat units. Instead, the War Department filled his request with 5,000 “limited service” men who were unskilled at such duties (Holm 1982, 13; Treadwell 1991, 7).\(^{101}\)

In response to these requests, General Tasker Bliss responded that he did not support “the desirability or feasibility of making this most radical departure in the conduct of our military affairs” (Bliss 1918 as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 7). One can comfortably assume that both Bliss and the rest of the Army Staff knew that the request was for women soldiers and they most likely knew that both the Navy and the Marines had enlisted women. Still, they ignored Pershing’s and Harbord’s request and sent contractors and limited service soldiers (Holm 1982, 13; Gavin 1998, 77-94). Instead of utilizing women as soldiers in the Army, the Army Staff ignored this force for change.

The Army Staff also responded to the operational demands of World War II in the same way, even though an internal study conducted during the interwar years argued in favor of using women in the war effort. While women did serve during World War II, it was a result of the involvement of political leadership and not solely because of operational demands (the Army’s response to political leadership will be discussed subsequently). Additionally, in 1928, Major Everett Hughes of Army G-1 wrote a report on the “inevitability” of women’s service in the next war, given likely war demands and the economic and social changes happening in the country (Treadwell 1991, 13). He argued the Army needed to take the initiative in preparing how it would train and socialize women in Army operations, else "this ignorance [of Army activities], coupled with man's intolerance, may be, fatal" (Hughes 1928 as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 14).

\(^{101}\) “Limited service” meant that they were considered incapable of serving in combat.
For three years, Hughes’ plan moved around the G-1 office for analysis and comments but with no action taken. In 1931, the final comment was added to the report: “General B. [Albert Bowly, head of G-1] says may as well suspend; no one seems willing to do anything about it” (as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 15). No subsequent internal study would be conducted on women in the Army for over thirty years.

**Move to Periphery**

The first instance of moving changes to the periphery of the organization was in response to Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers’ bill prior to World War II that sought to establish a U.S. version of the British WAAC. In the initial bill, Congresswoman Rogers wanted a women’s corps that had full military status with the same rank and pay structure, benefits, and eligibility for promotion, and would follow the same policies and guidelines as any other Army unit (Treadwell 1991, 17). Recognizing that Rogers would not be deterred, the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for personnel at the time wrote to Marshall:

> Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers has been determined for some time to introduce a bill to provide a women’s organization in the Army. We have succeeded in stopping her on the promise that we are studying the same thing, and will permit her to introduce a bill which will meet with War Department approval. Mrs. Roosevelt also seems to have a plan. The sole purpose of this study is to permit the organization of a women’s force along lines which meet with War Department approval, so that when it is forced upon us, as it undoubtedly will be, we shall be able to run it our way (Haislip 1941 as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 17).

While General Marshall and others on the Army Staff realized that women would serve in the Army in the war effort, they wanted women to serve outside of the regular Army in an auxiliary unit along the lines of the Nurse Corps or the Civilian Conservation Corps (Treadwell 1991, 16-18). Keeping this organization separate helped protect the Army from women being officially part of the organization.
As a result, some of the Army personnel worked with Congresswoman Rogers to develop a plan that organized women into an auxiliary corps. In May 1942, Congresswoman Roger’s revised bill passed both houses of Congress to establish the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). This bill allowed women to serve in the new organization, but this service was alongside and not within the Army as General Marshall and the War Department preferred. Moreover, women would not be granted medical care after leaving the service; they would not have the same re-employment rights as Army personnel; they received less pay; and they utilized a completely different rank structure (Treadwell 1991, 19-20). The women of the WAC were assigned to a woman-only company-size elements (150 people) with one of the following jobs: “clerks, typists, drivers, cooks” or “unit cadre” (Morden 2000, 8).

**Offer Something of Lesser Value**

Instead of greater inclusion of women, political groups in World War I received something of lesser value from the Army leadership. In an attempt to win support from women’s rights groups, Secretary of War Newton established a Director for Women’s Programs in 1920 (Holm 1982, 17). Under the leadership of Anita Phipps, this office’s purpose was to maintain positive relationships between the War Department and women’s organizations such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the American War Mothers (Treadwell 1991, 11). Newton wanted to maintain support without actually having to bring women into the Army.

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102 Due to problems with administration and regulations of commanding an auxiliary branch of service, in July 1943, the WAAC became the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) (Treadwell 1991, 220). This was an official part of the Army, but it was a specific branch of service in which all women served. When the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 passed after World War II which made the WAC permanent, a number of provisions kept women’s service strictly controlled: women could only make up 2% of each service; only one full colonel or Navy captain per women’s service was authorized; it imposed a 10% limit on the number of female lieutenant colonels; it established separate promotion lists for men and women; women could not enlist until age 21 without parental consent but at age 18 with parental consent (men were allowed to enter at age 18, with the minimum age of 17 with parental consent); and women could be discharged for being pregnant, having children, or having an abortion (Holm 1982, 120-130). The Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 also initiated the policy of excluding women from combat; this was codified by Congress in Title X of the U.S. Code in 1956 (Culler 2000, 16; Erwin 2012, 17).
Over a ten year period, Director Phipps used her office to lobby in favor of greater women’s service in the Army but was rebuffed by senior Army leaders. According to a plan she submitted to the War Department in 1926, a “Women’s Service Corps” could mobilize 170,000 women to serve in a time of war (Treadwell 1991, 12-14). The Army G-4 (in charge of Army logistics) replied to Director Phipps’ recommendation, "To consider the development of a training organization for women workers in the beginning of a major emergency appears unthinkable” (as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 13). The Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel wrote to the Chief of Staff that Director’s Phipps’ plan for a women’s corps would only prove to be "a powerful machine difficult to control and endowed with possibilities of hampering and embarrassing the War Department" (as quoted in Treadwell 1991, 13). In the end, her plan was disregarded, and Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur in 1931 deemed the position of Director for Women’s Program to hold no value and closed the office (Treadwell 1991, 12).

Political Use of Expertise

Political use of expertise was also employed as a tactic of resistance regarding women’s admittance into West Point. Given that West Point is a key requirement for most senior officer positions, granting access to West Point gave women a greater chance to command and lead the Army at the very highest levels. The pursuit for women’s entry into the academies began in 1972 as a result of Senate intervention (Holm 1982, 306). In 1974, the issue re-emerged with public hearings on the issue and in April 1974, all three services endorsed a statement by Deputy

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103 Through 1970, the only female general was Brigadier General Anna Mae Hays who achieved the rank of Brigadier General in the Nurse Corps on June 11 of that year (U.S. Army Center of Military History 2011). Through 1972, there were no women in the Army of the rank of two-star general or above (U.S. House 1972). The first woman four-star general in the Army was General Ann Dunwoody who was promoted on November 14, 2008 (Hames 2008).
Undersecretary of Defense William P. Clements, which supported continued exclusion of women from the academies on the grounds that the primary goal of such institutions was to train combat officers, positions in which women would never serve (Holm 1982, 307). Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway stated during the hearings, “Admitting women to West Point will irrevocably change the Academy. The Spartan atmosphere—which is so important to producing the final product [combat leaders]—would surely be diluted” (as quoted in Holm 1982, 308). Though the Army and the other services attempted to use their expertise to prevent women’s entry into West Point, Congress opened the academies’ doors to women with the passage of the Stratton Bill in 1975.104

Army leadership also attempted to use political use of expertise to prevent Congress from ending the WAC. General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, was able to persuade Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway not to support DOD’s 1973 plan to end the WAC (Morden 2000, 312-313).105 However, Abrams died in 1974; afterwards, Secretary Callaway changed his mind on the issue and supported an end to the WAC (Morden 2000, 315). In 1978, the WAC was officially ended (Morden 2000, 392).

Political use of expertise was also used in the 1990 Congressional hearings on women in the Army and their role in combat conducted by the House Armed Services Committee. In this hearing, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder encountered resistance from the Army leadership while pushing for a four-year test of lifting the combat restrictions on women. In response, the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel stated, “I do not feel the test is necessary. I think

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104 In a written statement to Congress in 1977 one year after the admittance of women to the academies, John Ahearne, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, stated, “Women are performing as well as men at the Academies, and we anticipate few problems” (U.S. House 1977, 171).

105 DOD was responding to the possible passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. In December 1973, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense wrote a memorandum to all of the services stating, “It is the intent of the Secretary of Defense to eliminate all laws and regulations which make an unnecessary distinction in the treatment of men and women….and [further] to assure that women are accorded equal treatment” (as quoted in Morden 2000, 303).
that we can learn what is needed to be learned through other means…we continually look at the capabilities of women soldiers and how they fit into various organizations” (as quoted in U.S. House 1990, 50). He further testified that the current combat exclusion policy was “in consort with the intent of Congress and the will of the American people” (U.S. House 1990, 27). When asked directly whether he saw a role for women in combat operations, General Ono responded, “In regard to the combat arms, we are able to recruit the sufficient numbers of male to be members of our combat arms without the females” (U.S. House 1990, 50-51).

Senate hearings in 1991 following the Gulf War again examined the combat exclusion policy. Senator John Glenn (D-OH) chaired these hearings in Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, and as Senator Glenn pointed out in his opening remarks, the committee sought a “middle ground” regarding the position on women in combat. He pointed out that, “Historically, women have always played an important role in our military forces in time of war or national emergency. They volunteered to fill support jobs to free men to fight and their contributions and sacrifices are a matter of record” (U.S. Senate 1991, 796).

Senators also posed questions regarding the “risk rule,” the combat exclusion policy established in 1988 by the Department of Defense. In response to questions regarding the possibility of changing the “risk rule,” General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, stated:

I do not believe you should change the law. You should keep it the way it is. As you know, the Army is not governed by the law. Ours is policy. Our policy is reviewed, as I said, very carefully, very deliberately, and I -- my personal view is that that policy is sound, and I would continue that policy, even if you saw fit to overturn the law, which I urge you not to do (U.S. Senate 1991, 833).

This position was echoed one day later by General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and commander of the forces that fought the first Gulf
War. In a hearing chaired by Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), General Schwarzkopf also opposed changing the regulation:

> On women in combat, I -- my position on women in combat has never changed. Unfortunately, the women in combat issue is being argued in the arena of women's rights. I am a very strong supporter of women's rights, having two daughters in college right now, and I am very much a supporter of women's rights. But the question of women in combat should not be argued in the arena of women's rights, as far as I'm concerned. It should be argued in the arena of national defense. The question is what is the best place for women to serve within the armed forces that will contribute to the defense of our nation and at the same time allow them an equal opportunity to succeed in the armed forces, the same opportunity that every man has. But the first consideration has to be one of what's best for the defense of the nation. I personally do not believe that it's in the best interest of the defense of the nation if 50 percent of every infantry battalion is female. I don't think that it's going to serve our nation's defense if we try and put women in infantry battalions that are going to be involved in trench warfare, bayonet fights, and hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. I just -- and there's no other nation in the world that feels that way either. Absolutely none has women down in their infantry units (as quoted in U.S. House 1991, 968).¹⁰⁶

As led by Generals Vuono and Schwarzkopf, no senior Army leader spoke in favor of granting women the right to serve in combat during either hearing.

**Suppress**

Early actions by women in combat and studies and reports were suppressed by the Army. Immediately after Captain Linda Bray’s actions in Panama became public, all Army women in the country were forbidden from speaking to the media (Breuer 1997, 140). After returning to her unit in 1990 following the war, Bray received a negative Officer Evaluation Report (OER), which significantly degraded her career opportunities; though debated, Bray argues that this was because of her combat actions (Bray 2008). Although a General not in her chain-of-command told her to appeal the OER, she resigned her commission (Ruffin 2009, 66-68).

¹⁰⁶ Though not of comparative military stature to the United States, Norway and Denmark opened their combat infantry units to women in 1985 and 1988, respectively (Mulrine 2013).
Army leaders also tried to suppress the studies conducted during the 1970’s by conducting their own studies. In 1975 in response to some of the studies discussed earlier, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt. General Harold G. Moore asked the Army’s personnel command to re-test the models to figure out how many women could be accepted into the Army without degrading capabilities because he thought the previous numbers were unacceptably high (Morden 2000, 371). However, the new models indicated even higher numbers than the previous tests (Morden 2000, 370-371). Moore sent the report to the Army’s Assistant Secretary for Manpower Affairs but recommended that the findings of the report be kept from the public, a request to which the Assistant Secretary agreed (Morden 2000, 371).

In 1976, General Moore ordered yet another study, the Women in the Army (WITA) Study. Conducted by both General Moore’s staff and the Army’s Center for Military History, the WITA study found that the MAX WAC along with the other studies were indeed reliable (Morden 2000, 374). Moore finally accepted the study’s findings and distributed the study throughout the Army.

Major General Julius W. Becton of the Army’s Operational and Test Evaluation Agency also disagreed with the MAX WAC report. He argued that the methodology and assessment techniques were flawed. Major General Becton ordered a second assessment of the study’s data, but the findings were the same (Morden 2000, 372). Still unconvinced, Becton, under direction from the Army Chief of Staff, conducted his own analysis which found that the upper limit for women in a unit while still maintaining combat effectiveness was 20% (Morden 2000, 372).

107 The WITA study viewed the issue of combat like all previous studies and as the majority of the Army viewed it, as a linear battlefield with clear lines of demarcation between front lines and rear echelons. The assessment of which MOS a woman should be able to fill rested on where on the battlefield the MOS was likely to perform his or her assigned mission, i.e. the distance to the line of combat separating friendly from enemy (see U.S. Department of the Army 1982, 5-5).
When the MAX WAC study was made public in October 1977, Becton’s study which challenged MAX WAC was included as an appendix (U.S. Army Research Institute 1977).\textsuperscript{108}

As demonstrated above, forces for change regarding women in the Army have been strategically resisted through the employment of a number of tactics of resistance. The table below captures the forces for change, the tactics employed, the outcome, and the degree to which the resistance was successful.

Table 4: Strategic Resistance to Women -- Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Operational Demands (need for women to fill support roles to allow men to serve in combat positions; other services recruited women but not the Army)</td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership chose not to recruit women, even though other services did so</td>
<td>Navy and Marine Corps both utilized women in certain positions as members of the service, but Army did not</td>
<td>Yes – no integration of women into the Army as military personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{108} Moore and Becton were not the only senior leaders to have problems with the MAX WAC findings. In the foreword to the MAX WAC study, Lt. General Dewitt Smitt, Jr, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and who was the officer in charge of the study, wrote “The MAX WAC study was extremely useful and provides some insight to the U.S. Army in evaluating the roles of women. The MAX WAC test in itself \underline{\textit{does not}} provide an empirical basis to objectively establish an upper bound on the potential number of women in support roles” (U.S. Army Research Institute 1977, Foreword). However, the conclusions of the Army Research Institute were much different, finding “little or no relationship between unit performance (as measured by the ARTEP [Army Training and Evaluation Protocol]) and the number of EW [enlisted women] in the unit, up to the percent here tested” (U.S. Army Research Institute 1977, I-3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World War II</th>
<th><strong>External Force For Change</strong></th>
<th><strong>Internal Force For Change</strong></th>
<th><strong>Tactic of Resistance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Outcome</strong></th>
<th><strong>Successful Resistance?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Groups (lobbied for greater service for women in the war effort, including in the Army)</td>
<td>Operational Leadership (Pershing requested female telephone operators; other chiefs requested clerical workers)</td>
<td>Offer something of lesser value – Army did not increase service of women, but did establish a Women’s Office after the war to build support for the organization</td>
<td>Army leadership established a directorate to maintain women’s support but did not act on any of the recommendations presented by the office</td>
<td>Yes – Women’s Office made recommendations on increasing women’s service, but recommendations ignored; office disbanded shortly thereafter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Demands (Women needed to relieve men from combat support duties to fill combat positions)</td>
<td>Studies and Reports – Hughes study argued for the “inevitability” of women’s service in the next war; “Battery X” study</td>
<td>Ignore – Army sent female contractors and limited service soldiers</td>
<td>Army HQ sent contractors instead of uniformed personnel as Pershing requested</td>
<td>Yes – by sending contractors, Army leadership able to keep women from official service as part of the organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Leadership (Roosevelt and Congressional personnel lobbied for service by women)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership was well aware of potential for manpower and needs, but chose not to act</td>
<td>Though Army leadership made plans and conducted studies on women’s service, they did not act on them of their own volition; instead action, only came with political involvement</td>
<td>Yes – Army resisted operational demands as a force for change in and of itself; however, could not resist involvement of political leadership (see next row)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Move to periphery – Army leadership recognized that women would serve, so attempted to keep women in an auxiliary organization</td>
<td>Army leadership under direction of Secretary of the Army George Marshall able to change Congresswoman Roger’s bill to make the WAAC an auxiliary organization</td>
<td>Somewhat – Army did establish the WAAC/WAC, but women’s service was strictly controlled</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam Era</td>
<td>Operational Demands (Increase demand for women caused by transition to all-volunteer force in 1973)</td>
<td>Internal Force For Change</td>
<td>Tactic of Resistance</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Successful Resistance?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam Era</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>The transition to all-volunteer caused the Army to plan an increase in WAC size up to 50,400 personnel; open all but 48 MOSs to women (no combat positions)</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>No – West Point was forced to accept women; WAC officially ended in 1978 and women moved to same promotion lists as men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Political Leadership (Congressional effort to allow women in combat)</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>Army was forced to open West Point to women in 1975 upon passage of the Stratton Bill; and placed men and women on the same promotion list</td>
<td>Yes – Chief of Staff of the Army and other senior leadership testified in favor of maintaining status quo policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Operational Experience (Woman served in combat in Panama)</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>Woman who took part in invasion of Panama left the Army soon after conflict; no change to combat policies</td>
<td>Yes – No changes to women in combat policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post 9/11</td>
<td>Operational Experience (Women took part in combat in an asymmetrical combat environment)</td>
<td>Ignore – Army leadership did not recognize women’s combat as evidence that women should be allowed in combat units</td>
<td>Women were kept in combat environment under rubric of being “attached” to combat units, but not as official combat soldiers</td>
<td>Yes – Army leaders ignored the fact that they were violating the spirit of the combat exclusion policy</td>
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**Homosexuals**

Homosexuals have long been barred from service in the U.S. Army, although forces for change over the past two decades have exerted pressure on the organization to adapt its policies. Since at least 1921, the Army sought to screen homosexuals with the intent of barring them from service based on medical assumptions about their psychological fitness (Spitzer 1981; Frank 2009, 4; Borch 2010). Beginning during the presidency of Bill Clinton, political leadership and external research exerted pressure on the Army to change its policies (National Defense Research Institute 1993; Korb 1994; Burrelli and Feder 2009). These forces for change, though, met resistance. In this section, I analyze the Army’s strategic resistance to homosexuals.

**History**

The Army first resisted homosexuals based on a belief in their lack of mental fitness. In the early 20th century, the Army prevented homosexuals from joining based on medical opinion that homosexuality was a mental disorder (Spitzer 1981; Mondimore 1997; Houts 2000; Frank 2009, 4; Borch 2010). Starting in 1921, the Army implemented standardized mental screening tests in an attempt to better detect homosexuality, the presence of which would be grounds for barring enlistment (Burrelli 1994, 18; Lehring 2003, 80-84). Such standards remained in place.
through World War II, and military leaders during WWI as well as WWII excluded homosexuals on grounds of a lack of psychological fitness (Scott and Stanley 1994, xi). 109

Prior to World War II, Army policies did not specifically address homosexuals as a personnel category (Frank 2009, 4-10). However, Army policy did ban homosexual acts through a ban on sodomy (Burrelli 1994, 17-18; Lehring 2003, 75-77). Though the Army discharged both homosexuals and heterosexuals for sodomy, such discharges were primarily applied to homosexuals (Lehring 2003, 75). 110 Following World War II, the Army’s policies barring homosexuals differentiated between homosexuals as a category of personnel and sexual acts.

Army policy explicitly barred homosexuals from service starting in 1950. Army Regulation 600-443 set forth the policy that homosexuals “will not be permitted to serve in the Army in any capacity and prompt separation…is mandatory” (U.S. Department of the Army 1953). This regulation further separated homosexuals into three categories depending on the degree of policy violation, with each category having different rules as to the process of discharge ranging from allowing the person to submit a letter of resignation to general court-martial. 111 This policy differed from later policies implemented in 1981 in that confessions of homosexuality were not grounds for immediate removal from service (U.S. Department of the Army 1953; Borch 2010, 190). In these instances of confession, unit commanders could decide

109 Though originally placed on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, it was not until 1973 that the American Psychiatric Association delisted homosexuality as a mental disorder (Spitzer 1981). Interestingly, the forerunner to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203. This document was written in 1943 by a committee under the leadership of Army Brigadier General William C. Menninger to aid in the assessment and screening of military recruits (Houts 2000).

110 In 1943, the Army discharged 1,625 soldiers accused of being homosexual (Borch 2010, 194). From 1951 to 2003, only two heterosexuals were discharged under Article 125 for sodomy (Lehring 2003, 77).

111 Class I individuals were those who assaulted or coerced another person into homosexual acts, or conducted such acts with a child under the age of 16. Class II individuals were those who conducted homosexual acts which did not “fall into the category of class I.” Class III pertained to “those rare cases wherein personnel only exhibit, profess, or admit homosexual tendencies and wherein there are no specific, provable acts or offenses…” (U.S. Department of the Army 1953).
whether or not to remove the service member from service based on other considerations such as the individual’s performance record (Scott and Stanley 1994, xi).  

Under President Jimmy Carter, military policy explicitly stated that homosexuality and military service were mutually exclusive. On January 16, 1981 one week before the president left office, President Jimmy Carter’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, W. Graham Claytor, approved a policy that stated “homosexuality is incompatible with military service” (Scott and Stanley 1994, xi; Frank 2009, 10). This policy was extended under President Ronald Reagan (Burrelli 1994, 19), and it was the official policy until 1993 (Burrelli 1994, 19). As in the Carter administration, the policy treated homosexuality as “incompatible with military service” and detrimental to the “discipline, good order, and morale” of the armed forces (U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14 1982 as quoted in Burrelli 1994, 19). This was different from previous policies in that individuals could now be discharged for a “propensity” to act rather than for acting. Also unlike the previous policies, discharges were given based on an individual’s claim of homosexuality, even if they did were not found to engage in homosexual acts. 

112 The first individual in the armed forces to openly challenge the policy on homosexuality was Leonard Matlovich, an Air Force sergeant who had served in Vietnam. On March 6, 1975, Matlovich wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force declaring his sexual orientation and requesting that he be granted a waiver from Air Force regulations that provided for the discharge of homosexuals (Shilts 1993, 202-203). However, Matlovich was not immediately discharged as evidence was gathered by the Air Force and he was given a hearing. In his UCMJ hearing, a possible deal was offered to Matlovich to remain in the Air Force if he signed a contract to never practice homosexual acts (Shilts 1993, 237). He refused.

113 According to Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 of January 28, 1982: “(1) Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts; (2) Bisexual means a person who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual or heterosexual acts; (3) A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires” (U.S. Department of Defense 1982, 1).

114 Between 1980 and 1990, approximately 1,500 individuals were removed from the armed forces per year (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 9). However, if the investigation determined someone was a homosexual, individuals would be discharged under an honorable or general discharge except in cases in which the homosexual acts involved fraternization or acts with a minor.
The Army’s policies changed significantly under President Bill Clinton. President Clinton announced the new “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy on July 19, 1993 (commonly referred to as DADT). President Clinton had originally formulated the policy as “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” but the last part was not made part of his public statements (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 1-3). The official policy as signed by Secretary Les Aspin stated, “A person’s sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter and is not a bar to service unless manifested by homosexual conduct” (as quoted in Burrelli 1994, 28). But the effect was to still homosexuals serving openly in the Army.

While DADT would remain in place for nearly two decades, some unsuccessful attempts were made to repeal it. In 2005 and 2007, Democratic members of Congress led by Representative Martin Meehan (D-MA) introduced the Military Readiness Enhancement Act (MREA) which would have ended DADT and stopped all discharges on the basis of sexual orientation (U.S. House 2005; U.S. House 2007b). Some Congressional members tried again in 2009 under the leadership of Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) to pass the MREA (Miller and Davis 2009). However, the MREA was never presented on the floor of the either the House of Representatives or the Senate for a full vote (U.S. House 2009).

Homosexuals were granted the right to serve openly during the administration of President Barack Obama with the support of Democratic members of Congress. As a candidate, President Obama promised to lift the ban and reconfirmed his commitment in his State of the Union Address in 2010 (Associated Press 2008; McGreal 2010; Webley 2010). Though Republicans in Congress generally opposed lifting the ban, both houses were controlled by the

115 According to Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics under President Reagan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the policy was not tough enough because it did not immediately allow for a dishonorable discharge for homosexuality (Korb 1994, 221).
president’s own party and had support from Democratic leaders (Zimmerman and Romm 2009; Eleveld 2010).

With the support of DoD leadership, the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the Army and other services was lifted in 2011. In hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen called for an end to DADT and the exclusion of homosexuals from serving openly (U.S. Senate 2010, 82-86; Bumiller 2010). Soon after their testimony, Secretary Gates initiated a 10-month DoD-wide study to survey the impact of DADT’s repeal on military readiness and unit cohesion, which found that a repeal would not adversely affect DoD capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense 2010). This study was followed by a nine-month training and education plan for leaders on the new policy, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta certified that all training had been completed as of July 22, 2011 (Stanley 2010; Branigin, Wilgoren and Bacon 2010; U.S. Department of Defense 2011). On September 20, 2011, DoD lifted the ban on homosexuals, allowing them to serve openly in all branches of the armed forces. Today, homosexuals are allowed to serve openly in the Army.

Forces for Change

Three forces for change influenced the Army’s policies towards homosexuals. External forces included political leadership and studies and reports. Additionally, studies and reports internal to the Army served as a force for change.

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116 Admiral Mullen posed the issue of lifting the ban as a moral issue, while Secretary Gates indicated that he was acting according to the guidance of President Obama (Bumiller 2010).

117 Until that time, individuals could still be discharged under DADT, however DoD issued a statement on July 8, 2011 that it would no longer separate individuals because of their self-identification as homosexuals (Tilghman 2011).
External

Political leadership was a strong force for change regarding the Army’s policies towards homosexuals. As a candidate for president, Bill Clinton made at least two public promises to end the ban on homosexuals in the armed forces (Korb 1994, 225). Clinton’s preferred change to the policy was to remove it completely, but he met strong resistance from the top leadership of the Army and the other services (as will be discussed in the next section). While he failed to lift the ban, he succeeded in adapting the policy to what is commonly referred to as “don’t ask, don’t tell” (Burrelli and Feder 2009).

President Barack Obama also acted as a force for change. As a candidate, President Obama promised to be a “fierce advocate” and promised to work towards ending the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the armed forces (as quoted in McGreal 2010). Later as president, Obama worked closely with Democratic leaders and DoD leadership to lift the ban (as discussed in the previous section).

A number of external studies and reports challenged the Army’s position on homosexuals. A 1988 study by the Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center (PERSEREC) concluded that homosexuality “was unrelated to job performance” (as quoted in Lehring 2003, 131). A second PERSEREC study in 1989 made similar conclusions. A GAO report in 1992 initiated by Congress made no claim as to whether homosexuality was or was not incompatible with military service, though it did point out that “some U.S. allied nations…have policies that permit homosexuals to be members; and police and fire departments in several major U.S. cities have removed employment restrictions without adverse effects on mission” (Government Accountability Office 1992, 3). According to a RAND study in 1993, homosexuals serving openly in the armed forces would not have a negative effect on unit cohesion (National Defense Research Institute 1993). These findings indicated that a policy that
allowed homosexuals to serve in the armed forces could be implemented successfully if the policy was clearly and consistently communicated; if emphasis was placed on behavior rather than acceptance; and if leadership were strongly involved (ibid.).

Internal

The internal force for change regarding the service of homosexuals in the Army was a DoD report conducted in 2010. Though the survey was conducted at the DoD level, it surveyed each of the armed forces. Entitled *Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated With a Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”* the critical aspect of the review was a survey of over 115,000 armed services personnel (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, 63). The report was intended to “assess the impact of a repeal [of DADT], should it occur, to military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, recruiting, retention, and family readiness” (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, 63). Overall, a strong majority of respondents surveyed stated that lifting DADT would have positive to little impact on unit effectiveness (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, 63-72).

Strategic Resistance to Change

As opposed to the previous cases examined in this chapter, the Army’s resistance to homosexuals was not limited to one particular feature. Until the lifting of the ban in 2011, open homosexuality prevented a person from serving in the Army in any capacity under any

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118 In conducting their study, the authors specifically looked at the integration of blacks and women in the armed forces as examples.

119 Additionally, those respondents who believed they were or had served with a homosexual answered 3\% to 8\% higher regarding “positive, mixed, or no effect on aspects of unit cohesion” (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, 72). However, nearly 60\% of Army combat arms respondents stated that repeal of DADT would have negative consequences on their unit’s effectiveness in field conditions (Department of Defense 2010, 74). As a result of these findings, both Secretary Bob Gates and Chairman Mike Mullen used the findings of the report to justify their support of repealing DADT. Based on the survey, Secretary Gates argued that there was “low risk” in repealing DADT (as quoted in Williams 2010). Chairman Mullen stated the day the report was released in November 2010, “I fully endorse [the] report, its findings and the implementation plan” (as quoted in Halloran 2010).
conditions (U.S. Department of Defense 1982; U.S. Department of Defense 1993b; Burrelli and Feder 2009, 3-4). Resistance was total and complete, not limited to a particular feature or component.

Alternate explanations to protecting the mission include homosexuals’ lack of fitness for service, organizational instability caused by the presence of homosexuals, lack of support in the general public, and political pressure. All of these explanations fail to account for the Army’s response to forces for change in this case.

Though homosexuals were accused of being psychologically unfit for service for many years, the evidence demonstrated otherwise. One could conceivably argue that the Army’s resistance until 1973 was based on medical opinion rather than a desire to prevent homosexuals from serving (Spitzer 1981). But even earlier in 1957, evidence suggested otherwise. A Navy report led by Captain S.H. Crittenden found that “the concept that homosexuals pose a security risk is unsupported by any factual data” (as quoted in Lehring 2003, 131). However, the report was kept secret for over two decades (Gibson 1978), an act of suppression perhaps by the Navy (as the organization in charge of the study) though not necessarily by the Army. As described earlier, at least three unclassified reports since 1988—from PERSEREC, GAO, and RAND—all found no evidence to suggest that homosexuals were unfit, psychologically or otherwise, for service.

Another argument is that the presence of homosexuality would truly disrupt unit cohesion to such a degree that the organization would become incapable of accomplishing its assigned tasks. In fact, Congress codified this view in the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 571), that homosexuality in the military is an “unacceptable risk…to morale, good order, and discipline” (as quoted in Burrelli and Feder 2009, 3). Army leadership of the time
supported this view saw the presence of homosexuals as grounds for people who disagreed to leave the organization; General Colin Powell told U.S. Naval Academy cadets that they should resign their commission if the presence of homosexuals violated their individual morality (Ray 1994, 89). Whether or not Powell believed that officers (or how many) would actually resign cannot be determined, though the resignation a large number of soldiers and officers from the service would truly be a severe threat to the organization.

This explanation mirrors another explanation: that the general public would not have supported the Army if homosexuals were allowed to serve. This is important as the Army relies on volunteers from the general public for all of its personnel needs. In June 1994, only 53% of Americans supported allowing homosexuals to serve openly and 41% were opposed (CNN 2010). In a CNN poll conducted in 2010, 69% of Americans supported allowing homosexuals in the military and 28% opposed (CNN 2010; O'Keefe 2010).

While initially persuasive, both of these arguments overlook the Army’s previous experiences with African Americans and women. While the public’s and organizational views on the service of blacks and women were extremely negative, the Army integrated both groups without significant destabilization or negative effects on recruitment or capabilities (see previous sections in this chapter).

Finally, political opposition could explain the Army’s response. From this perspective, the Army was resisting homosexuals not because of a desire to protect the mission but because they were responding to political leadership. In Congress, the service of homosexuals was opposed by Senators on both sides of the aisle, led by Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Bob Dole (R-KS) (Korb 1994). Because of this opposition in Congress, Clinton paused his attempt for six months to give DoD, under the leadership of SECDEF Les Aspin and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, time to
study the issue which also led to Congressional hearings in both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (Korb 1994; Burrelli and Feder 2009, 2). Just over a decade later, opposition to the Military Readiness Enhancement Act originally introduced in 2005 prevented it from passing (Stone 2007; Zhou 2007). Under President Obama, there was strong opposition to the lifting of DADT by Republican members of Congress (Hulse 2010; Jaffe 2010; Mandell 2010).

The problem with this argument is that political leadership was not united against allowing homosexuals to serve, as the presidents (both Clinton and Obama) supported lifting the ban. If the Army leadership was responding solely to political pressure, they could have sided with the president as commander-in-chief rather than with Congress. Their actions are better understood by the explanation that they supported certain political leadership based on their preferred outcome and not because of reflexive response to or opposition by political leadership.

In the final analysis, strategic resistance to change best explains the Army’s actions regarding homosexuals. I recognize, though, that the Army was legally barred from allowing homosexuals in the service; but in this case, there were opportunities for Army leaders to recommend changes to the policy and support such change had they been so inclined (as will be discussed in more detail below). Given these opportunities, the evidence and analysis still indicates strategic resistance: the resistance is intentional, directed at forces for change, and with the intent to protect the sense of who does and not belong in the organization (i.e., the mission). The tactics by which the Army resisted forces for change will be discussed subsequently.
Tactics of Resistance

In response to external forces for change regarding homosexuals in the service, the Army employed three tactics of resistance: ignoring the force for change, political use of expertise, and sabotage.\(^\text{120}\)

Ignore

The Army ignored the various studies and reports conducted on the impact of homosexuals serving in the organization. This is in spite of the fact that PERSEREC is a DoD entity and GAO is a U.S. government entity. RAND, while not officially a government organization, is a federally funded research and development center that is closely aligned with the Department of Defense. Additionally, the 1993 RAND report was solicited by the Secretary of Defense (National Defense Research Institute 1993, iii) which indicates that there is high likelihood that it was shared amongst the service leadership.

If the Army leadership were not ignoring these kinds of reports, then there should have been a different response to the removal of homosexuals with critical skills during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Between 2004 and 2009, the armed forces discharged at least 58 homosexual Arabic linguists of which at least 9 were discharged from the Army, skills that were critical to operations at a time when the Army and other services were actively recruiting people with Arabic language skills (Associated Press 2009; Nasaw 2009).

The argument could be made, however, that Army leaders were only following the stated policy and that their intent was to follow the law. But as demonstrated in the previous case of women’s service in combat outposts in Iraq, Army leaders have demonstrated an ability and willingness to intervene against policy when so inclined or at least not enforce policies.

\(^{120}\) Though there was an internal force for change in this case, the DoD study conducted in the impact of lifting the ban on homosexuals, there is no evidence that the Army leadership specifically attempted to resist it.
detrimental to their immediate needs (Tyson 2005b). Given the need for Arabic language skills and the cost and time associated with training such skills, one might expect to see a similar action by Army leaders in regards to gay Arabic linguists. The presence of women in combat outposts violated the given policy, just as homosexuality violated the given policy; yet in the latter case, there is no evidence of intervention even given that, according to the RAND study, the presence of homosexuals had no negative effects on unit capabilities and the critical need of people with Arabic language skills.

Political Use of Expertise

During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Army Chief of Staff, and the other service chiefs used political expertise to resist changes to the ban on homosexuals. While Congressional leadership also resisted President Clinton’s move to lift the ban on open homosexuality, General Colin Powell’s resistance played a role in removing political power from the president and adding support to that of Congressional leaders. Even though President Clinton met resistance from Congressional leaders including Senator Sam Nunn (GA), a member of his own Democratic party, Democratic members controlled the majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives. Had General Powell supported President Clinton, it would likely have been more difficult for Congressional leaders to oppose the president’s preferred policy.

In a hearing on July 20, 1993, General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with all of the other service chiefs testified that homosexuals serving openly in the service were detrimental to unit cohesion (U.S. Senate 1993, 758-764). Speaking as the Chief of

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121 Overall, GAO estimated that the armed forces discharged at least 300 homosexual personnel with critical language skills (Associated Press 2006). The estimated cost in training and recruiting is tens of millions of dollars (Associated Press 2006).
Staff of the Army, General Sullivan stated, “Open homosexuals will disrupt small unit cohesion. When cohesion is disrupted, readiness suffers…. Both open self-definition and same-gender sexual orientation would disrupt cohesion and consequently readiness” (U.S. Senate 1993, 762). The chiefs argued that opposition to homosexuality was rooted in morality and religious views, and these things could not be changed even if addressed through training and education (U.S. Senate 1993, 758-764, 764).122

General Powell was particularly resistant to Clinton’s proposed change. According to General Powell, “Acceptance of open homosexuality in the military would adversely impact the ability to deploy forces worldwide” (U.S. Senate 1993). General Powell also differentiated between the integration of blacks and homosexuals in the armed forces and argued that attempts to draw parallels were “invalid” (Horner and Anderson 1994, 251). According to Powell, “skin color was a ‘benign non-behavioral characteristic while sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics’” (as quoted in Lehring 2003, 97). This political use of expertise helped buttress Congressional opposition to Clinton’s preferred policy, which resulted in the DADT policy; Congress leaders, in fact, used General Powell’s expertise to help justify their own position on the issue of homosexuality in the military.

Similar arguments were made almost two decades later in hearings regarding the lifting of DADT. In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that was reviewing the 2010 DoD report on the repeal of DADT, General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, raised concerns about lifting the ban in terms of its impact on the Army’s capabilities: “As such, I believe that the implementation of the repeal of DADT in the near term will: (1) add another level of stress to an already stretched force; (2) be more difficult in our combat arms units; and,

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122 This claim is interestingly similar to early-20th century Army officials who cautioned that the Army should not “get ahead” of the public in regards to social issues.
(3) be more difficult for the Army than the report suggests” (U.S. Senate 2010, 86). The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, also did not support lifting the ban in 2010 nor did General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (U.S. Senate 2010, 91-94). The Secretary of the Navy felt that the report’s recommendations could be implemented with minimal disruption and did not recommend delaying the lifting of the ban. In this instance, the Army’s political use of expertise failed and DADT was lifted.

**Sabotage**

Under the Clinton policy of DADT, Army leadership chose not to fully implement the policy the way that it was intended, which allowed unit commanders to pursue homosexuals beyond the boundaries of policy appropriateness. Though active pursuit to find homosexuals in the Army was not officially banned prior to 1993, it was specifically addressed by President Clinton and Secretary Aspin within the DADT guidance. The final guidance stated that commanders could consider “available information,” but the limits of such information were not fully defined in the policy (U.S. Department of Defense 1993a).

Numerous allegations of pursuit have been made against the Army, and the number of expulsions because of DADT did increase after the policy was implemented. These have primarily been regarding criminal investigators patrolling bars and clubs for homosexuals as well as the attempt to get individuals under investigation to identify other known or alleged homosexuals (Shilts 1993; Cammermeyer 1994; Langeland 2002; Lehring 2003, 115-121; Gershick 2005; McGowan 2005). However, a 1998 report by DoD’s Office of the Assistant

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123 However, he stressed that change should come from Congress and not the courts: “I do believe any change in the law is best accomplished through the legislative process and not judicially” (U.S. Senate 2010, 88).

124 Originally, Clinton intended the policy to be “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” but the pursue clause was left out of his formal statements about the policy (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 1-3).
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness reported that the increase in discharges for homosexuality beginning with the DADT policy was due to individuals’ claims of homosexuality and not due to commander’s pursuit of homosexuals (U.S. Department of Defense 1998), though it is not clear why homosexuals would self-identify more after, than before, the policy. The increase in the number of discharges indicates that something within the organization was causing more discharges.

The argument could be made that any pursuit of homosexuals was due to confusion about the stated policy and what did or did not constitute “available information.” However, the policy guidance put forth following the DADT instruction was clear. According to Department of Defense Instruction 5505.8 put into effect on February 5, 1994, “No DCIO [Defense Criminal Investigation Organization] or other DoD law enforcement organization shall conduct an investigation solely to determine a Service member’s sexual orientation” (U.S. Department of Defense 1994). Clarifying the original DADT policy, this guidance clearly bans investigations intended solely to discover homosexuals.

Army commanders did not follow the original policy, so it was re-emphasized five years later. In 1999 following the murder of PFC Barry Winchell, Secretary of Defense William Cohen (under President Clinton) again directed all of the armed forces to design training programs to teach investigators in the services on what were and were not appropriate investigation techniques (Scott and Stanley 1994; Lehring 2003, 117).

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125 In 1993, 683 individuals were discharged under DADT. The number of discharges peaked in 2001 with 1,227, but this dropped significantly by 2002 with only 885 discharges. Other than for a few years at the end of the 1990’s and beginning of this decade, the number of discharges hovers around 700 (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 9-10). As with the previous policies, most of these discharges were honorable discharges; through 1998, 98% of discharges under DADT were honorable (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 5).

126 PFC Barry Winchell of the U.S. Army was killed by other members of his unit at Fort Campbell, Kentucky allegedly for being gay.
Though it is not likely that senior Army officials instructed junior commanders to pursue homosexuals, their lack of emphasis on stopping investigations that went beyond the purview of the policy, in spite of the 1993 and 1994 guidance, and the personal experiences of homosexual soldiers demonstrates that such pursuit was likely condoned though not explicitly directed. This selective oversight of investigatory overreach does indicate strategic resistance by some unit commanders.

As demonstrated above, forces for change regarding homosexuals in the Army have been strategically resisted through the employment of a number of tactics of resistance. The table below captures the forces for change, the tactics employed, the outcome, and the degree to which the resistance was successful.

Table 5: Strategic Resistance to Homosexuals -- Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

| Homosexuals | External Force For Change | Internal Force For Change | Tactic of Resistance | Outcome | Successful Resistance?
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<tr>
<td><strong>Clinton Era</strong></td>
<td>Political Leadership (President Clinton attempted to lift ban on homosexuals in the military)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise / Sabotage – Chairman and Secretary argued in Congressional hearings that lifting the ban would be detrimental to morale and combat effectiveness; pursuit of homosexuals</td>
<td>Army under the leadership of Colin Powell and other general officers spoke against president’s policy; did not implement “don’t pursue” aspect of policy</td>
<td>Yes – President unable to lift ban on homosexual service in face of Army and military leadership opposition in support of Congressional opposition; “don’t pursue” not implemented</td>
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127 However, DoD and the armed services denied that such pursuit occurred and argued that the large majority of discharges were due to claims of homosexuality independent of any investigations (Reinert 2005). After 2001, DoD-wide discharges due to homosexuality dropped from 1,227 in 2001 to 634 in 2010 (Burrelli and Feder 2009, 10).
<table>
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<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
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<td><strong>Obama Era</strong></td>
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<td>Ignore – Studies that demonstrated the lack of negative impact on capabilities not recognized by organizational leadership</td>
<td>Leadership continued to support a ban on homosexual service</td>
<td>Yes – Studies did not impact positions of organizational leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise – Army Chief of Staff argued in Congressional hearings that ban should not be lifted</td>
<td>DADT lifted with qualified support of Chief of Staff of the Army; No specific tactic of resistance employed against DoD study</td>
<td>No - Chief of Staff did not fully support lifting DADT but stated that Army would still be able to accomplish assigned tasks if ban were lifted</td>
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**Hypotheses**

Taken together, the cases of resistance to fully integrating blacks, women, and homosexuals shows similarity in the tactics employed by the Army depending on whether the force for change is internal or external (Hypothesis 1). The Army is more successful at resisting internal forces for change (Hypothesis 2). Finally, the Army does not demonstrate learning in its resistance to change (Hypothesis 3).

**H1 – Similarities/differences in tactics of resistance?**

The first hypothesis of this project provides insight on whether the tactics of resistance are similar or different depending on whether the force for change is an external or internal force for change. In analyzing the three personnel cases, the initial conclusion is that the tactics of resistance utilized against external and internal forces for change are indeed different, except that ignoring a force for change was used against both internal and external forces. In response to 10 internal forces for change, Army leadership ignored the force for change or suppressed it.
response to 17 external forces for change, Army leadership utilized tactics of resistance including ignoring the force for change, political use of expertise, moving changes to the periphery, offering something of lesser value, sabotage, and denial.

Out of the 10 internal forces for change that influenced the Army in regards to personnel, the Army ignored 4 of them. The Army ignored performance assessments of black soldiers during World War I; requests for women to serve as soldiers during World War I; studies and reports related to women’s service in World War I; and the operational experience of women in the Iraq and Afghanistan war (see previous tables at the end of each section).

Suppression was also used against 4 internal forces for change. Prior to World War II, the Army leadership suppressed its own Chamberlain Report which argued that greater efficiency and combat power could be improved through integration and that segregation “aggravated if not caused in its entirety” the racial problems in the organization (Chamberlain 1942 as quoted in MacGregor 1985, 23-33). During World War II, both the Hughes Study and the experiment of General Lee’s composite platoons challenged fundamental notions about black soldiers’ ability to fight and the impact of integration on unit cohesion under combat conditions (MacGregor 1985, 46-57; Merson and Schlossman 1998, 126; 141-143). During the Vietnam era, a number of studies that examined women’s impact on combat effectiveness (e.g. WEEM, MAX WAC, WITA, etc.) all found that women’s presence had no negative effects on such capabilities, yet these were suppressed by Army staff leadership (Morden 2000, 367-380).

The most-often employed tactic of resistance used against external forces for change was the political use of expertise. This strategy was employed 7 times against external forces for change. This was used in all three cases analyzed in this chapter, and all tactics were employed against policy entrepreneurs and political leadership. In the case of African Americans, this was
used as a tactic of resistance during World War I, World War II, and post-World War II; in the case of women, used during Vietnam and post-9/11; and in the case of homosexuals, this was used during both the Clinton and Obama eras.

In 4 other instances, external forces for change were ignored. Particularly in regards to the demand for personnel, which was the most immediate wartime necessity, there is no evidence that this force for change by itself influenced the Army to adapt its policies in any particular way. In the instances of black personnel in World Wars I and II, and women during World War II, the Army resisted the demand for personnel; it was only with the influence of other external forces for change that the Army accepted them beyond its preferred policies (see previous sections).

Overall, these findings support this hypothesis except that ignoring a force for change is used against both internal and external forces. Looking across all cases, we see that there are indeed differences between tactics employed against internal forces and external forces. In regards to ignoring the force for change, this may be a unique tactic in that it is applied regardless of whether the force is internal or external; this will be tested in the following chapters.

*H2 – Success at resisting internal/external forces for change?*

The second hypothesis of this project provides insight into whether organizations will more successfully resist internal or external forces for change. In the tables at the end of each section, I have identified whether or not instances of resistance were successful or not based on what the force for change was trying to accomplish and whether or not that policy change was achieved. The findings indicate that the Army is indeed more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change.
The Army successfully resisted internal forces for change more often than it resisted external forces for change. Out of 10 instances of internal forces for change, the Army was able to resist all of them except for one. In this instance, the Army leadership, including those in charge of personnel, conducted numerous additional studies in an attempt to demonstrate that the MAX WAC study was flawed. However, after all of the studies confirmed their original findings, they eventually made all of the findings public. In one additional instance, Army leadership was partially successful when General Leonard Wood helped establish a training program for black officers at Fort Des Moines, Iowa during World War I. Although the training camp was established, it was closed after World War I and the policies regarding black officers reverted to the pre-World War I policies.

Out of 17 instances of external forces for change, the Army was able to resist 9 of them. Of the 9 the Army was unable to fully resist, 4 of these were resisted to some degree. By “some degree,” I mean that there was a small amount of change that did not reflect the full implications of the force for change. Usually, the Army achieved this through a negotiation with the force for change. Such an instance includes the Army leadership’s ability to prevent President Roosevelt (under pressure from civil rights groups) from opening a large number of positions to black soldiers during World War II by opening just enough positions to satisfy the president and his political needs (Nalty 1986, 237-240).\textsuperscript{128}

In 3 instances, external forces for change imposed their intended changes on the Army. In 1951, President Truman imposed integration on the Army. In 1974, Congress opened West Point to women. And in 2010, President Obama lifted DADT to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the Army and all armed services.

\textsuperscript{128} When the Army established officer candidate schools in 1941 to train volunteers to serve as officers, all schools except for the Army Air Corps were integrated (MacGregor 1984, 23-33). The only requirement for entrance to OCS was an Army General Classification Test score of 110 (Astor 1998, 166).
Looking at these external forces for change, the Army was overall very successful at resisting or reducing the impact of these forces. Out of the 17 external forces for change, the Army reduced the impact of 14. Indeed, in the three instances of change mentioned above (racial integration; women’s entrance to West Point; and lifting DADT), actual change required the direct involvement of Congress or the president. Even when the president is involved, the Army leadership is sometimes able to resist. As with President Roosevelt’s influence in the cases of both women and black soldiers, passive involvement is not enough—it requires involvement to the degree of President Truman’s Fahy Committee or President Obama’s lifting of DADT. These cases indicate an extraordinary ability to resist external forces for change.

These cases also generally highlight the weaknesses of internal forces for change. In all three cases, the most significant changes came from outside the organization. At least in regards to changing an organization’s mission, these cases seem to indicate that change must come from outside the organization.

Notably, the instances in which the Army leadership was unable to resist either internal or external forces for change were a result of focused and sustained involvement by senior-most organizational and political leaders. This suggests, overall, that the Army is extremely successful in resisting the majority of instances of both internal external forces for change over time, even if in fact the Army eventually changed its policies.

What is also notable in these cases is that demands for personnel is not a powerful force for change. Had President Roosevelt not intervened during World War II, the Army would have kept most positions closed to African Americans, and the Army would have faced even more shortages in 1943. Had it not been for the involvement of Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers or President Roosevelt during World War II, the Army may not have changed its policies. In
neither case did demand for personnel, by itself, lead to integration of either group. In fact, integration, in all three cases, resulted only from pressure by political leadership.

_H3 – More skilled at resistance?_

The third hypothesis of this project provides asks whether organizations become more skilled at resistance over time. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that organizations learn over time and therefore become more skilled at resistance. Based on an analysis of the Army’s resistance in regards to personnel policies, I see no evidence of organizational learning in regards to strategic resistance.

According to the literature, organizational learning should be evident in two ways:

- Evidence of assessment of routines and changes in these routines based on historical experience (Levitt and March 1988; see also Fiol and Lyles 1985; Amburgey et al. 1993; Barnett and Carroll 1995; Argote 1999)
- Evidence of organization members’ reflection on a past experience to inform understanding of a current situations (Argyris and Schon 1978)

In terms of the Army’s resistance to forces for change in personnel policies, such evidence might be study groups or commander’s boards that were identified to analyze the ability to protect its World War I policies of segregation against outside political groups; a change in the conduct of assessments or internal studies to make them more convincing to Congressional members or the President; or references to past instances of resistance in command memorandums, letters, or documents. In my analysis, none of these were present.

Lack of learning, though, is not due to a lack of opportunities or instances from which to learn. In all of these cases, particularly the cases of women and black servicemembers, there were numerous instances of applied force and resistance that could have provided the Army with
opportunities to learn from its experiences of resistance. The integration of black soldiers occurred over a fifty year time span; the integration of women occurred (and continues to occur) over a sixty year time span. Yet, even with these multiple instances of experiencing force for change and employing resistance, I do not see evidence of the Army learning to resist. Each instance of resistance to change seemed to be a discrete activity; while the beliefs about women, blacks, and homosexuals had historical legacies within the organization, the actual resistance did not seem to be a learned activity.

**Conclusion**

In regards to understanding strategic resistance to change, I find that there is consistency to the Army leadership’s use of tactics of resistance employed against internal and external forces for change; that they are more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change; but that there is little evidence of learning.

In regards to policy, there are important implications for understanding how the Army will deal with future personnel changes. The role of women in combat will continue to face the Army. Secretary Panetta’s commitment to lifting the ban on women in combat beginning May 15, 2013 (McGregor 2013) will provide an opportunity to assess whether the Army will continue to resist women in some of its combat arms branches, or in specialized combat units such as Special Forces or Ranger units.

The service of homosexuals may also pose challenges in the coming years because of issues over spousal benefits. Heterosexual married couples currently receive health benefits, housing allocation, and survivor benefits that are not be available to homosexual couples. While Secretary Panetta extended many of these benefits to homosexual couples including housing privileges, there are over 100 other benefits currently denied them because of the Defense of
Marriage Act (Londono 2013b). Whether there will be resistance to further extension of these benefits is yet to be determined.

Resistance, though, is not limited to personnel. Personnel changes have been a central concern of the Army in the 20th century, but threats to mission extend beyond blacks, women, and homosexuals. Operations, though a distinctly different aspect of the Army than personnel, can be as much of or greater than personnel changes. Operational threats to the mission in the form of counterinsurgency will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONS

This chapter will explore the Army’s resistance to forces for change related to counterinsurgency operations, both in the conduct of such operations and in the development of permanent counterinsurgency capabilities. The case of counterinsurgency demonstrates that the tactics of resistance depend on whether the force for change is internal or external; that the Army is more successful at resisting internal forces for change versus external forces for change; and that there is little learning in regards to such resistance.

The preeminent external force for change is insurgency itself. Along with the operational environment, other external forces for change that have pressured the Army regarding counterinsurgency operations and capabilities include policy entrepreneurs, political leadership, and think-tanks and research centers. Internal forces for change include internal studies and reports, organizational insurgents, leadership, mavericks, and operational experience. The primary constituency of resistance to change in the case of counterinsurgency has been Army leadership, particularly the Chief of Staff and Army Staff, although other generals have resisted forces for change.

Army leadership has resisted counterinsurgency operations and capabilities in an effort to protect the Army’s sense of mission. As discussed in previous chapters, the Army’s sense of mission is the norms, values, and beliefs related to the conduct of conventional ground operations against other professional military organizations. Counterinsurgency is antithetical to the operations of professional military organizations: it utilizes irregular and asymmetric combat against irregular and guerilla forces and requires political, economic, and social engagement (as well as development) to achieve success (Kitson 1971; Taber 2002; Sepp 2005; Galula 2006; Hammes 2006; Trinquier 2006; Kilcullen 2009). Another way to describe the
The difference between the two modes of warfare is that conventional military activities focus on combat operations, while counterinsurgency operations prioritize the political, economic, and social aspects necessary to develop stability and security in a particular area, country, or region.

This chapter will explore three instances of resistance to counterinsurgency. The first section of the chapter examines the Army’s involvement in the Philippine-American War at the beginning of the 20th century, which included counterinsurgency operations against both Filipino nationalists and Moro tribal groups. The second instance is the Vietnam War, the Army’s most debated counterinsurgency effort of the last century. The last instance of change is the U.S. Army’s experience during Iraq and Afghanistan.

After exploring these instances of resistance, the final section of the chapter addresses the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2. In the case of counterinsurgency operations, there is evidence that the Army reacts differently to internal and external forces for change. As with the cases of personnel, the evidence suggests that the Army is more successful at resisting internal forces. Finally, as in the case of personnel, there is no evidence of learning to resist; instead, each act of resistance seems to be a discreet response to a force for change. In the next section, I will give a broad overview of how counterinsurgency operations have affected the Army and how they threaten the Army’s mission.

**Counterinsurgency – Background, Context, and Impact on Mission**

The conduct of counterinsurgency and the development of counterinsurgency capabilities threaten the Army’s mission, a challenge that has been noted extensively (Weigley 1984, 161, 557-592; Krepinevich 1988; Nagl 2002, 43-51; Aylwin-Foster 2005, 8-9; Waghelstein 2006; Serena 2010). Fundamentally, counterinsurgency is different from conventional warfare: rather than fighting uniformed soldiers organized into units, this mode of warfare is directed towards
defeating individuals and non-state actors who seek to use unconventional and irregular methods in order to delegitimize or overthrow the established political or social order. Instead of maneuvering on open plains with large tank, infantry, and field artillery forces, counterinsurgency battles are usually small-unit actions of ambush or counter-ambush. In counterinsurgency operations, final victory is achieved through political, economic, and social mechanisms rather than tactical combat operations (Kitson 1971; Taber 2002; Sepp 2005; Galula 2006; Hammes 2006; Trinquier 2006; Kilcullen 2009).

Prior to the 20th century, the U.S. Army’s activities were much closer to counterinsurgency operations than conventional operations, which suggests that the former is actually more conventional (or at least more common) than the latter. From the American Revolution until the very end of the nineteenth century, with only a few exceptions, the U.S. Army’s operational focus was domestic operations directed towards the pacification of the various indigenous tribes (Yates 2006, 3-7). Recognizing, though, that these conflicts were not exactly counterinsurgency (though there were most certainly “irregular” in today’s parlance), they were most certainly not the type of warfare as understood to be conventional or traditional by current Army leaders (ibid.).

The Army’s focus began to shift after the Civil War. Under the intellectual and organizational leadership of General William Tecumseh Sherman and Emory Upton, the Army began to mirror the most successful military models in Europe; these armies were organized,

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129 This definition seeks to amalgamate a number of definitions: see Kilcullen (2006, 2), U.S. Departments of the Army and Marine Corps (2006, 1-1), Moore (2007, 3), U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2009, GL-5). Counterinsurgency is sometimes referred to as small wars, low-intensity conflicts, unconventional wars, military operations other than war, stability operations, small wars, contingency operations, or “savage wars of peace” (De Atkine 1999, 1-2; Birtle 2004, 3-4; Ucko 2011, 15).

130 During the 19th century, the Army’s primary task was domestic counterinsurgency against Native American tribes (Weigley 1984, 74-292). Exceptions were the War of 1812, the Mexican War (1846-1848), and the Civil War (1861-1865), however the Civil War also included extensive counterinsurgency operations (Birtle 2004, 23-54).
efficient, and built on a model of professionalism (Ambrose 1964; Weigley 1962, 110-113; Weigley 1984, 274-282; Cassidy 2003, 132-135). Most importantly, this shift focused on the large-scale combat experienced in the Civil War. Additionally, the Franco-Prussian War motivated General Sherman to send Emory Upton on a tour of Europe with specific guidance to study the German military system (Huntington 1985, 234; Cassidy 2003, 132). At the same time, advanced schooling for officers, including the forerunner of today’s Command and General Staff College, and professional military journals supported this turn towards professionalism in conventional operations (ibid.).

Because of Sherman and Upton’s changes, the post-Civil War Army was one in which officers started to develop a profession of arms centered on a vision of warfare embodied by what is today called conventional operations. While the new professionalism sought to develop a “science of warfare,” it came at the expense of other types of political-military operations including counterinsurgency (Huntington 1985, 255). Above all else, “efficiency in combat”--meaning the application of force in conventional operations--became the goal of the Army professional officer (Huntington 1985, 256).

Counterinsurgency operations threatened the Army’s sense of mission in three ways. First, counterinsurgency is a political activity. Though combat activities are necessary, the true operational goal of counterinsurgency is the development of a stable political system that has the trust and buy-in of the local population (Sepp 2005; Department of the Army and Marine Corps 2007; Kilcullen 2009; Ucko 2012). The Army’s post-Civil War professionalism stressed a strong recalcitrance to become overtly involved in politics of any kind (Janowitz 1977; Weigley

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131 These included the *Cavalry Journal* and *Military and Service Institution* (ibid.).

132 To paraphrase Clausewitz, all war is inherently political. This observation is appropriate for both counterinsurgency and conventional operations but even more so for the former as there is no separation between ends and means.
1984; Huntington 1985; Cohen 2002a). Counterinsurgency, however, inherently draws the Army into political involvement (whether by supporting the Shias in Iraq or the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, or by helping local community leaders develop political frameworks for their villages) despite having no organizational inclination to become involved in political development.

Second, counterinsurgency challenges the importance of large maneuver units. Compared to conventional operations, counterinsurgency is a small-unit operation and devalues the importance of large units. Counterinsurgency is usually waged at the company level (which is commanded by a captain, a person of relatively junior rank), platoon level (lieutenant), or squad-level (commanded by a non-commissioned officer). Compared to conventional conflict, there is little battlefield “command” occurring because larger units become enablers of lower units, not vice versa. Thus, effectiveness in counterinsurgency is based on small units, while career progression in the Army is built upon command of large units; if the Army’s promotion system reflected the demands of counterinsurgency, the most senior-ranking (and experienced) officers would command the smallest units. Current promotion pathways, though, reflect the demands of conventional operations; as individuals gain experience and rank, they look for and are given command of units of increasing size from battalion, to brigade, to division, to corps, and to Army-level.

Finally, the development of counterinsurgency capabilities threatens the organizational integrity of the Army. Given the Army’s performance in recent operations, national security

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133 Conventional warfare is about adaptability in combat maneuver, but the procedures that enable such maneuver are standardized. Firing a rifle, shooting a tank, bandaging a wound, laying a mine, and assaulting a bunker are small-unit operations that take training and expertise but are similar to other actions of the same type. The “art” of warfare in conventional operations comes at the highest levels of command and control. The Normandy landings and island hopping campaigns in World War II, the Incheon landing during the Korean War, and the “left hook” of the first Gulf War required division and larger units and thus validated the Army’s system that tied promotion to experience and command gained over years and decades of experience. Only commanders of the experience of Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Schwarzkopf could have overseen such operations.
professionals and experts (from both inside and outside the government) have put forth ideas that would separate the Army into conventionally-focused units and counterinsurgency-units units, the latter of which includes advisory brigades, constabulary units, or stabilization and reconstruction divisions (Nagl 2002; Wilson et al. 2003; Perito 2004; Congressional Budget Office 2005; Schultz 2005; Metz and Hoffman 2007). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in 2007, “The U.S. Army today is ... an organization largely organized, trained, and equipped in a different era for a different kind of conflict” (Gates 2007). Such counterinsurgency-specific units could draw away resources from established organizational priorities that could lead to a reduction of conventional capabilities by redirecting budgetary priorities to support a more counterinsurgency-centric organization.

For all of these reasons, the capabilities necessary to succeed in counterinsurgency operations threaten the Army’s sense of mission. In the following sections, I will explore three cases of strategic resistance to counterinsurgency.

**Philippine-American War**

The Army’s first foray into counterinsurgency in the 20th century was the Philippine-American War. In this conflict, U.S. Army forces fought against Filipino nationalists in the northern islands and Muslim tribesmen in the southern islands. It would prove to be a challenging and dangerous experience.

During the Philippine War, three forces for change impacted on the Army. First, the war itself acted as a force for change in two ways – on the conduct of the operations and on the institutionalization of the operational lessons after the end of conflict. Unique to the Philippine War as compared to the other major counterinsurgency effort of the 20th century in Vietnam, Army leadership fought the war as a counterinsurgency, despite conflicting ideas about the
proper strategy. Second, after the end of the war, however, the Army leadership did resist institutionalization of the experiences of the war by ignoring forces for change even in the face of a desire by the political leadership to conduct more, not fewer, operations of this sort.

The third force for change was political leadership. Following the Philippine War, U.S. political leaders intended for the U.S. Army to conduct more operations rather than fewer that required counterinsurgency tactics and strategies. In resistance to these efforts, the Army used its expertise of warfighting to push such responsibility to the Marine Corp.

In this section, I will provide a brief outline of the history of the Philippine War followed by analysis of the forces for change and the resistance to such forces. Following the historical overview and a discussion of the forces for change, I illustrate how the resistance to these forces can be attributed to intentionality rather than ignorance, political roadblocks, lack of organizational capability, overwhelming strategic threats, or accident. I then identify the tactics of resistance used to prevent the forces for change used by the Army.

History

The Philippine-American War was preceded by, and intimately tied to, the Spanish-American War. When the United States declared war on Spain following the sinking of the USS Maine in 1898, the Army marched (or rather, sailed) to battle in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In the Caribbean, American forces quickly defeated Spanish forces in conventional operations and asserted control of their new territories (Tierney 2006, 99-106). In the Philippines, U.S. forces under Admiral George Dewey destroyed the Spanish naval forces in the

134 By the end of the war in Cuba, the “splendid little war” was an unheralded success in the eyes of the public, American politicians, and journalists. In a 1902 report to Congress, Secretary of War Elihu Root stated, “I know of no chapter in American history more satisfactory than that which will record the conduct of the military government of Cuba” and attributed the success directly to General Wood (as quoted in Arnold 2011, 81). The “Puerto Rican campaign” barely lasted through the summer of 1898 and included both naval and land engagements, but American forces would defeat the Spanish there, too, leading to the transfer of authority of the island to the United States that continues today (Trask 1981, 336-368).
Battle of Manila Bay in May 1898. Three months later in August 1898, U.S. forces seized the city of Manila; and on August 14, 1898, two days after the official ceasefire, Spanish forces yielded to the authority of the United States (Trask 1981, 95-105; 411-435). As part of the Treaty of Paris of December 1898, the United States took responsibility for the Philippines (Trask 1981, 450). Having easily defeated the Spanish, it was then the “burden” of the United States to pacify and “uplift” the Filipinos to an acceptable level of civilization (Jones 2012, 103).135

Some Filipino nationalists disagreed, and conflict with the new occupying force began within months of the ousting of the previous occupying force. Emilio Aguinaldo, a young nationalist who had been recruited by U.S. military and diplomatic leadership to help defeat the Spanish, led these forces (Birtle 2004, 209-210; Tiernedy 2006, 107). Believing that he had been promised independence for the Philippines in exchange for helping the Americans against the Spanish, a promise the Americans did not fulfill, Aguinaldo declared war on the Americans on February 5, 1899 (Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 20).136 But within only a few days of that declaration, 15,000 American personnel defeated Aguinaldo’s 30,000-strong Army of Liberation.

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135 Rudyard Kipling wrote “The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands” specifically to address the United States’s obligation to bring development the people of the Philippines. Others, including some U.S. politicians, agreed. Albert Beveridge, a Republican Senator from Indiana, commented in 1898 that giving the Filipinos control of their own country “would be like giving a razor to a babe and asking it to shave itself” (as quoted in Jones 2012, 95). The question of independence, in fact, would be central to the war itself, as Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino forces against the Spanish and the subsequent leader of the Filipino forces against the Americans, claimed he was promised Philippine independence by Commodore Dewey in exchange for his support against the Spanish (Jones 2012, 86-87). After much thought and prayer, President McKinley decided that the United States had a responsibility to educate and “uplift” them, a position also held by his second-term vice-president, Theodore Roosevelt (as quoted in Jones 2012, 103).

136 There is disagreement as to whether Admiral Dewey or other American diplomats made such promises to Aguinaldo, if Aguinaldo misunderstood, or if he made it up (Arnold 2009, 15).
in an intense battle outside of the capital city of Manila that resulted in over 3,000 nationalist and only 59 American deaths (Linn 2000, 42-64; Tierney 2006, 107-108; Arnold 2009, 17).\footnote{137 At the time, American forces totaled 800 officers and 20,000 soldiers under the command of Major General Elwell Otis; Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation’s estimated size was between 15,000 and 40,000 (Linn 2000, 42). The Battle of Manila actually included a few different skirmishes in the month of February 1899, but the biggest battle was on February 5 in which Americans suffered 238 casualties with 44 killed and the Army of Liberation took 4,000 casualties with 700 assumed to be killed (Linn 2000, 52).}

Aguinaldo initially attempted to fight the Americans conventionally but eventually opted for waging an insurgency. By the end of the summer of 1899, only a few months after their defeat at Manila, the consistent defeats, poor morale, and lack of supplies and equipment eventually reduced the once 30,000-strong nationalist force down to 4,000 people who were loyal to their individual company commanders rather than Aguinaldo (Linn 2000, 137). Recognizing that his forces were outmatched, Aguinaldo dispersed his personnel around the main island of Luzon to conduct hit-and-run attacks against the American forces beginning in November 1899 (Birtle 2000, 110; Arnold 2009, 21).

The pacification of Luzon and other northern islands proved tremendously difficult and required a fine balance between politics of “attraction” and policies of “compulsion” (Linn 1989, 2000; Boot 2002, 99-128; Arnold 2009, 36-72). Beyond the many combat skirmishes, the American forces realized that their challenge was political as much as military, because local support was critical to establishing local stability and security. General Elwell Otis, commander of U.S. forces, attempted to establish a governance structure under four departments of the Military Division of the Philippines in order to provide a structure that could be operated and filled by locals (Linn 2000, 199). Given the state of the insurgency and the general animosity towards the Americans, this was a difficult goal to achieve. One American commander stated, “whenever we rebuild civil government in towns and cities we must necessarily use the very element we have kicked out, that is prominent Filipinos to fill local offices…[however] lead
people…declined to take any part in organization of a civil government” (as quote in Linn 1989, 124). The American officer in charge of town of Lucban wrote to his wife that he did “not expect a single person to vote…[because] the edge of a bolo and the hand of an assassin are the price they would pay for taking that oath and holding office under American rule” (as quoted in Linn 1989, 125). In some areas, shadow governments run by the *insurrectos* paralleled the American structure and sometimes it was the same people filling both roles (Boot 2002, 113). Finally, U.S. forces captured Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901 and shattered the remaining nationalist forces soon thereafter (Arnold 2009, 47-48; 66-70).

The Philippine-American War ended just a year later. On July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt declared victory and granted a “full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who have participated in the insurrections” (Roosevelt 1902). Over the course of the war in the north, over 125,000 total U.S. personnel served in the Philippines, 200,000 Filipinos and 4,234 Americans died, and the total cost to the U.S. government totaled over $170 million (Tierney 2009, 112), equivalent to approximately $4.5 billion today (in 2013).

While the Army fought nationalists in Luzon, a completely separate situation met the Army in southern Philippines. In the south, the Moro Province consisted of the largest island Mindanao and a collection of 372 smaller islands in the Sulu Archipelago; the challenges faced there would prove even more grinding, frustrating, and dangerous (Birtle 2004, 159-182; Arnold 2009, 66-70).

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_Roosevelt’s declaration of the end of the Philippine War coincided, intentionally, with the end of a special committee that investigated alleged atrocities during the war. Accusations of torture (particularly the “water cure”), forced re-settlements, and executions of prisoners raised the concerns of the American public and media (Boot 2002, 122-123; Jones 2012, 269-272). On January 31, 1902, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led the Committee on the Philippines to investigate these accusations, and over a four-month period, Army and Marine Corps soldiers and officers testified before the committee (Jones 2012, 270-324). On June 28, 1902, Senator Lodge adjourned the hearings, having generally (but not completely) succeeded in protecting the president from the negative publicity of the hearing (Jones 2012, 324). Just a few days later, President Roosevelt officially ended the war._
Most of the American efforts focused on the island of Mindanao, which consisted of approximately 40,000 Christian Filipinos and 275,000 Muslims (Arnold 2011, 7). The island was known for its harsh terrain and weather; its tribal and clan organizations headed by a datu (with each tribe consisting of dozens to thousands of people); the rule of Muslim law; active slavery; piracy; and long-standing feuds between tribes that lasted for generations (Arnold 2011, 2-7).

The goal of the U.S. Army in Moroland was pacification, a goal that was only superficially achieved by the end of U.S. intervention. Between 1902 and 1913, various military governors of the Moro Province—General Leonard Wood, General Tasker Bliss, and General John Pershing—attempted to establish control over and “civilize” the Moros (Fulton 2007, Arnold 2011). The Moros, though, did not want to be civilized, nor did the tribal leaders want to yield control over their lands or people to a central government (Birtle 2004, 164). The Moros, however, were far from an organized force and never coordinated their military actions; instead,

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139 “Moroland” had never been welcoming or accommodating to foreigners. Prior to American intervention, the Moros had been left largely alone by the Spanish. According to Spanish General Don Julian Gonzalez Panado: “The reduction of Mindanao [the Moro region] is an undertaking which requires, time, resources and perseverance. The complete dominion of this territory cannot be obtained by a single campaign, however decisive, nor is it feasible to change in a few months the social and political conditions of a heterogeneous population composed of tribes and families of distinct civilization and religion” (as quoted in Arnold 2011, 255). General John Pershing studied and referred to General Panado’s notes during his time as Moro governor (Arnold 2011, 255).

140 In 1910, Secretary of War J.M. Dickinson made a special report to President Taft on the condition of the Philippines and the United States’ role in the country. In discussing the ability of the Filipinos of the northern islands to self-govern, Dickinson believed that they would one day (though far off) reach such a level as to allow the United States to grant them such a right (Dickinson 1910, 7-8). However, of the Moros he felt differently: “The Moro Province presents greater difficulty…. The Moros are Mohammedans, and are firmly fixed in their religious beliefs. They are warlike, manly, independent, and have a strong hostility for the Filipinos. They have no conception of a republican form of government. The only government of which they know is autocratic. They are peaceful now because they have been subjected to military power and are controlled with firmness and justice, which they appreciate. The main province of our army among the Moros is merely to keep the peace among them. They would have to be essentially re-created to make of them an integral governing part of a republican government uniting them with the Filipinos” (Dickinson 1910, 8).
they fought in small clan groups and sometimes as individuals.\textsuperscript{141} When fighting offensively, they used insurgent tactics of hit-and-run and ambush, and when fighting defensively, they fought from their bamboo and mud forts known as \textit{cottas} (Birtle 2004, 164-165). It was against one of these \textit{cottas} that Army forces fought the last major battle in 1913, when John Pershing led a combined Army and Philippine scout force against a Moro force (Arnold 2011, 228-243).

Over the course of the eleven-year conflict in Moro province, American force strength averaged 12,000 personnel per year, while combat casualties totaled just over 100 U.S. soldiers during the entire conflict (Arnold 2011, 248). In 1920, control of the Moro Province was given to the Philippine government with few permanent changes affected upon the territory (Arnold 2011, 254). Essentially, the U.S. simply withdrew from the Moro Province.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Forces for Change}
\end{center}

Both external and internal forces for change acted on the Army as a result of the Philippine War. During the war, the insurgency served as an external force for change. After the war, political leadership also served as an external force. Finally, the lessons of the conflict acted as an internal force for change.

\begin{center}
\textbf{External}
\end{center}

Two external forces exerted influence on the Army in this case. First, the actual insurgency itself served as a force for change. Second, after the Philippines, political leaders attempted to pressure Army leaders to conduct similar operations in Central America.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{141} The most psychologically devastating tactic of the war with the Moros was a suicide attack known as \textit{juramentado} (Arnold 2011, 126; 185). In this, a Moro warrior would attack U.S. soldiers (assumed to be Christian) with the expectation of being killed in the process, which would then grant the individual direct access to heaven. To try and stop such actions, U.S. forces would dig up the remains of \textit{juramentados} and bury them with pig parts which would block their entrance to heaven (Birtle 2004, 165).}
The experience of fighting an insurgency was the most significant force for change during the Philippine War. Unlike future similar conflicts, senior military officers accepted the fact that they were engaged in a counterinsurgency and responded accordingly. Senior officers including Arthur MacArthur, Elwell Otis, Adna Chaffee, Leonard Wood, and John Pershing had distinctly different ideas about how to execute a counterinsurgency operation, particularly on the issue of how much punitive pressure had to be applied to the general public in order to weaken their support for insurgents (Linn 1989, 2002; Boot 2002, 114-115; Birtle 2004, 120-135; Arnold 2009). However, they all agreed that they were fighting an insurgency (ibid.).

What is unique about the Philippine conflict compared to those that would follow is that during the conflict, the Army leadership did not resist the implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy. Each of the senior Army leaders involved already had counterinsurgency-like experience due to participation in the Indian Wars or Mexico, experience which made for an easier transition to counterinsurgency in the Philippines (Birtle 2004, 3-189; Bell 2005). Thus, the Army’s success was not due to organizational preparedness but rather due to the fortune of having the right individuals with the right experience in the right leadership positions. In other words, counterinsurgency capabilities did not naturally permeate throughout the organization.

Additionally, political leaders sought to push the Army to do more rather than less counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency-like operations. Following the Philippine War, events and uprisings in Cuba, China, and Nicaragua attracted the attention of political leaders who wanted the Army to intervene (Birtle 2004, 180-182). Though the Army intervened in Cuba in 1906, the War Department was uninterested in sending soldiers to the Caribbean (Millett 1980, 164). Army leaders, as will be discussed subsequently, sought to avoid such operations and shift counterinsurgency responsibilities to the Marine Corps.
Internal

The internal force for change was the operational experience of the war. These were the experiences, either formally or informally recorded, that those who took part in the conflict carried forward after the end of hostilities. The lessons of the Philippine War have proved remarkably enduring across other counterinsurgency efforts. Counterinsurgency required an extensive number of personnel, many more than needed to fight the conventional war in the Philippines.\(^{142}\) Securing the population and winning legitimate support of the population was paramount, and U.S. forces had to balance the strategy of winning over the population with compelling the population to succumb to U.S. control.\(^{143}\) The decentralized nature of the conflict meant that junior commanders—lieutenants, captains, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)—rather than generals played a far more important role in the overall success of the war.\(^{144}\)

Making it more challenging, counterinsurgency required a particular character of leadership that...
Intelligence, not combat power, was supreme (Birtle 2004, 117). Finally, in order to achieve the overall goals of the war, the Army had to prioritize political considerations over military considerations, and when applying combat force, the Army had to maintain awareness of the political ramifications (Linn 1989, 124-131; Birtle 2004; 108-139; Teirney 2006, 123-139; Arnold 2009, 63-72).

Strategic Resistance to Change

Yet given these forces for change, analysis of the Army indicates that there was no change to the primary elements of the Army and only minimal change to the secondary elements of the Army in favor of greater counterinsurgency capabilities. While the Army leadership successfully implemented a counterinsurgency strategy in the Philippines, this success was due to individual experience and knowledge (including that of John Pershing, Leonard Wood, Adna Chaffee, Arthur McArthur, and others) rather than organizational preparation. In the table below, I have identified the features on which forces for change have exerted pressure and whether there is indication of strategic resistance:

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145 General John Pershing noted that success in these operations required officers with tact, patience, acute awareness, and familiarity with the local situation, and such officers were rare (Birtle 2004, 162). Another problem was the short duration of officers’ deployments to theatre. Pershing called the short duration of commanders’ tenures in the Moro Province “ridiculous and absurd” (as quoted in Arnold 2011, 252). A tour lasted approximately fourteen months (Birtl 2004, 162; Arnold 2011, 252), and the Army’s personnel rotation system moved people in and out of theatre independent of the operational and tactical needs (Birtle 2004, 162).

146 “Any officer can rapidly adapt himself to the [military] details of this type of warfare. What is more difficult is to understand the exact relation between the political and the military action, and the amount of each that should be used as the operation progresses” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1935 as quoted in Birtle 2004, 249).
Table 6: Strategic Resistance to Counterinsurgency – Philippine-American War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions by leadership to resist FFCs?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic resistance describes the Army’s response to the forces for change during and after the Philippine War, as one would expect the Army to prepare for counterinsurgency operations because of the challenges it faced in the conflict. However, there is no evidence of institutionalized adaptation in promotion pathways, training, or structure, even though these aspects were found wanting based on the operational experience of the war (Linn 1989, 2000; Birtle 2004, 147-189; Teirney 2006, 107-139; Yates 2006; Jones 2012).

Promotion pathways remained the same, as the official promotion requirements placed emphasis solely on combat performance rather than their success in the non-combat components of the conflict. In regards to training, General Leonard Wood and General John Pershing both felt that preparing for counterinsurgency operations such as those in the Philippines detracted from the Army’s ability to train for conventional operations (Vandiver 1977, 419-422; Birtle

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147 In this case, “not applicable” means there was no force for change that impacted this feature; neither awards nor facilities had any relevancy to the Philippine insurgency.

148 Granted, officers such as John Pershing, Leonard Wood, and Hugh Scott established their careers in the Army and were rewarded because of their success in Cuba and the Philippines. However, this was because they were successful in their jobs and not just because they were successful in these types of operations. In examining John Pershing’s Officer Evaluation Report (Pershing Box 319), his listed successes focused on combat, not political or economic works. This means that the official promotion requirements—those requirements embedded in the system—were set in a way that rewarded combat, not counterinsurgency (or pacification) successes.
Structure also remained the same, as the regimental structure remained the core organizational body of the Army with no adaptations for counterinsurgency or pacification actions.

There was some change in the secondary features of the Army as a result of the Philippine War. While there is adaptation in materiel, this change did not significantly influence any of the other elements. This change was reflected in the integration of the .45 caliber revolver rather than .38 caliber pistol because the .38 could not kill an attacking Moro tribesman quickly enough (Wood 1904, 637). However, such adaptation was only minimally necessary during the Philippine War because of the fact that the U.S. Army of the early 1900’s already possessed what it needed to prosecute the war, given that the equipment and small arms of the Americans were vastly superior to the weapons of the Filipinos (Linn 1989, 2000). Additionally, the fundamental Army doctrine remained the same (Birtle 2004, 136-137).

In terms of education, as will be discussed below, there was a small change but not a significant shift in focus.

While intentionality cannot specifically be tested, eliminating alternative explanations can raise intentionality as the most likely explanation. Alternative explanations include

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149 Throughout his time in the Philippines, while engaged in the political-military work of pacifying the island, Pershing placed great emphasis on the “practice march,” a brigade-level training exercise which focused on every aspect of attack, defense, and logistical operations (Vandiver 1977, 419-422). Both during and after the Philippine War, training exercises focused on conventional battle maneuvers. Even training exercises in the Philippines led by John Pershing focused on conventional operations rather than counterinsurgency operations (Pershing Box 321). A maneuver exercise held in New York in 1904 in which John Pershing served as the assistant to the Chief of the General Staff stressed maneuver warfare with regiment size elements (Pershing Box 321). A decade later, the maneuvers held as part of the Mexican Punitive Expedition focused strictly on battalion-level maneuver exercises rather than guerilla operations (Pershing Box 321).

150 The act of juramentado led to the change from a .38 caliber to a .45 caliber pistol, the latter of which could kill an attacker at close range while the former tended not to not kill or pass through the attacker (Fulton 2007, 2009). According to General Leonard Wood: “It is believed that the .45-caliber revolver is a much better weapon, for all purposes demanding the use of a revolver…. Instances have repeatedly been reported during the past year where natives have been shot through and through several times with a .38-caliber revolver, and have come on, cutting up the unfortunate individual armed with it” (Wood 1904, 637).

151 While some might argue that the Army did indeed shift strategy, this shift was only during the immediate war. It is true that there was definitive adaptation in the strategy of the war while the war was being fought, but this was not captured after the war (Birtle 2004, 108-139).
ignorance about the nature of counterinsurgency, concern for a greater national security threat, political guidance, the inability to improve counterinsurgency capabilities, or accident. I find these arguments lacking, and organizational resistance to change with the intention of protecting the mission is the most compelling argument to explain the Army’s lack of adaptation.

The lack of institutionalization of counterinsurgency capabilities was not due to the Army leadership’s lack of knowledge about the specific nature of counterinsurgency and the differences between it and conventional operations. Every Chief of Staff of the Army between the end of Spanish-American War and the end of World War I served in the Philippines during the time of the insurgency (Bell 2005; U.S. Army History Center 2012). In fact, the leadership of the Army through World War I had their entire careers defined by the pacification efforts of the Indian Wars and the Philippines, given that most had not served in the Civil War and no other conventional war occurred until World War I. More pointedly, though they disagreed as to how to balance the two-pronged nature of counterinsurgency between “attraction” and “compulsion,” all of these leaders including Arthur McArthur, Leonard Wood, and John Pershing understood that success depended on gaining the political support of the populace and starving the insurgents of such force, not on brute force. Brigadier General Franklin Bell, Army Chief of Staff from 1906 to 1910, reflected this position when he stated in 1900, “It is desirable that a Government be established in time which is based upon the will of the governed. This can be accomplished satisfactorily only by obtaining and retaining will of the people” (as quoted in Birtle 2004, 119). Such an awareness of the political aspect of the conflict demonstrates a

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152 Other post-World War I Chiefs of Staff included John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and George C. Marshall. The Philippines was where the Army’s junior officers of this era got their first combat experience (Millet and Maslowski 1984, 321).
perceptive understanding of the nature of insurgency and the path to implementing a successful counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{153}

At the time, there was no significant change in the security environment that might explain why the Army expunged the lessons of the Philippines. The Venezuelan Crisis of 1902 raised the specter of Britain and Germany in the Western Hemisphere, but it was primarily a naval concern (Livermore 1946; Morris 2001, 177-192). While Japan’s seizure of Manchuria and the banning of Japanese students in white schools in San Francisco led to the Japan War Scares of 1906 and 1907, they were, if anything, a naval concern (Morris 2001, 484-485).\textsuperscript{154} Though Germany demonstrated itself a threat with the sinking of the \textit{Lusitania} and in the discovery of the Zimmerman telegram, entry into World War I was still a highly contentious political debate.\textsuperscript{155}

Judging by the most likely national security threat of the time, the Army should have placed more emphasis on preparing itself for pacification duties. The main concern of the United States during the first decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was Mexico, and the key to Mexico, for the Army, was the post-conflict pacification effort rather than the conventional aspect of the war (Birtle 2004, 179). Army planners forecasted a need of over 400,000 soldiers to pacify the country, though the total strength of the armed forces of the United States totaled only 30,000 personnel (Birtle 2004, 179). Even then, Army planners sought to focus their forces on a

\textsuperscript{153} Between 1898 and 1902, almost every Army officer served in one of the countries involved in the Spanish-American War: Cuba, the Philippines, or Puerto Rico (Birtle 2004, 100).

\textsuperscript{154} Some historians argue that Roosevelt and Elihu Root, his Secretary of War, thought the entire issue overblown (Esthus 1959, 439).

\textsuperscript{155} Even in 1917, entry into the war was opposed by many political leaders and Americans: “During the green April of 1917, as America entered ‘The Great War,’ a United States Senator cornered a General Staff officer and asked the critical question of the intervention: ‘Good Lord! You’re not going to send soldiers over there, are you?’” (Millet and Maslowski 1984, 328). Even though the study of the Franco-Prussian War heavily influenced Emory Upton, neither the United States leadership nor its people saw Germany as an existential threat (Meyer 2006, 11-12).
“merciless crusade against bandits and guerillas” while leaving “the dirty job of re-establishing order in the provinces” to a local constabulary force that the Army would organize after intervention (Major Melvin Rowell, 1916, “The Military Strength for Armed Intervention in Mexico” as quoted in Birtle 2004, 179-180).

Additionally, there was no pressure by political leadership to reject the lessons of the Philippines, and in fact, the political leadership wanted the Army to conduct more Philippine-type actions. American political leadership wanted more military intervention abroad, particularly in China, Central America, and the Caribbean, which the Army leadership and War Staff fought against (Millet and Maslowski 1984, 317-321; Birtle 2004, 181-182). Although there was a strong anti-imperialist group within U.S. politics that attempted to assert itself on the Army’s actions in the Philippines, there was not a strong political force from either the imperialists or the anti-imperialists to prepare the Army for a different type of combat.\footnote{Political pressures began to shift noticeably in 1915 with the rise of the “Preparedness Movement.” Led by Leonard Wood (now retired), Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Stimson, and other political and business leaders, this group believed that the United States would become involved in World War I and all of the armed forces (including the Army) needed to be prepared appropriately. Following the Preparedness Movement, other political and social activities raised political pressure on the President and the Army for new capabilities: the Plattsburg Movement (a volunteer officer training program established in New York which trained over 10,000 personnel), the National Defense Act of 1916, and the Naval Act of 1916 all drove a number of modernization efforts within the Army and other services (Millet and Maslowski 1984, 321-325). The Anti-Imperialists League included Mark Twain, Grover Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison amongst others (Jones 2012, 105-106).}

It is also possible that the Army leadership simply believed that counterinsurgency and pacification efforts could not be trained or learned, so there was no use in actually trying to instill the lessons of the war. Lieutenant Colonel Bullard wrote that pacification was “largely personal…[and depended] more upon the wisdom, tact, personality, and disposition of the officials applying it than upon any defined governmental policy or definite legislative acts” and he actually advocated against the development of pacification doctrine (as quoted in Birtle 2004, 178). The commandant of the Command and General Staff College argued that governing
foreign populations was unique to the specific circumstances that any official guidelines would only confuse rather than help the situation (Birtle 2004, 250).

But such an argument is not convincing as soldiers did train for and become proficient at counterinsurgency operations. That counterinsurgency and pacification efforts cannot be learned would mean that every single officer and soldier who served in the Philippines happened to be the exact type of person that Lieutenant Colonel Bullard identified—this is likely not the case, and these individuals did learn how to conduct pacification however imperfectly. Additionally, the Army’s own success at fighting native populations in the United States demonstrated an ability to learn about and win such wars (Birtle 2004, 60-67). Like conventional warfare, there is no training scenario or preparation that perfectly matches the reality of counterinsurgency; training is intended to allow soldiers and officers to be familiar with broad generalities that can then be tailored to fit the situation. Arguing that training cannot prepare soldiers and officers for counterinsurgency is to say that all training, even for conventional operations, is irrelevant.

The final possibility other than strategic resistance that explains the Army’s lack of institutionalization of counterinsurgency is accident. Accident, though, can only explain outcome in the absence of a force for change or due to ignorance and the latter has already been addressed. If the Army failed to adapt because of accident, this would mean that Army leadership failed—not refused—to understand that counterinsurgency was different from other forms of war, or that it attempted to implement changes and failed. Operational experience, in and of itself, demonstrated that counterinsurgency was different from conventional warfare given that the tactics of conventional operations did not work sufficiently, thus demanding new ones. While it could have been possible that the Army attempted but failed to implement changes, thus supporting accident as an explanation for lack of adaptation, there is no evidence to indicate any
attempt to implement changes except for in materiel (as discussed previously) and in education (as will be discussed below).

By intentionally inhibiting or undercutting forces for change, the Army leadership was able to protect the organizational mission. To accomplish this resistance, Army leadership employed tactics of resistance.

Tactics of Resistance

In resisting the forces for change of the Philippine War, U.S. Army leadership employed two tactics of resistance: ignoring the force for change and the political use of expertise.

Ignore

While there were small changes to the Army as a result of the operational experience in the Philippines, these changes occurred in discrete areas of the organization only because certain individuals below the leadership level made an effort to capture these lessons. The Army’s overall response was to ignore the operational experiences.

While small changes occurred in the Army’s education system, they were not due to systematic involvement by the Army’s leadership. At the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, following the Philippine War, Colonel Charles Miner instituted small curriculum changes to include assessments of regions of possible future intervention, classes on the treatment of civilians, and the use of concentration camps (Birtle 2004, 176-177). But, Elihu Root, Secretary of War, directed these changes, as he wanted Army officers to be ready for duty outside of the United States (Birtle 2004, 176). While these classes reflected the operational experience of the Philippines, CGSC still overwhelmingly focused on
preparing officers for conventional operations (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1967, 3-14).\footnote{157}

Small changes also occurred in the curriculum of West Point, but these changes were a result of the experiences of an individual officer and not ordered by the Army leadership. As superintendent, Colonel Hugh Scott (who had served as governor-director of the Moro Province prior to John Pershing), initiated changes to expand the technical engineering focus to include liberal arts courses that would aid them in fulfilling the types of responsibilities he had experienced in the Philippines (Birtle 2004, 177). But overall, the books and studies of the Army’s education system “changed very little” because of the Philippine War (Birtle 2004, 136).

These changes, while important, did not fundamentally change the Army’s priorities or capabilities and were not directed from the Chief of Staff or Army Staff levels. Rather, the application of force by infantry, cavalry, and field artillery continued to be the core focus of the Army, not the establishment of local security, political and economic development procedures, and development of diplomatic skills that would be associated with counterinsurgency. As discussed earlier, ignorance and accident cannot explain why the operational experience of the Philippines was ignored.

Political Use of Expertise

By using their claim of expertise in military operations, Army leadership avoided conducting more operations like the Philippine War in the years following that experience. This instance of resistance is also closely associated with denial, in that the Army leadership denied

\footnote{157 When the Command and General Staff College’s School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry started in 1881 (and was renamed the General Service and Staff College in 1902), its primary purpose was to prepare officers for what is now known as “joint operations” between infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The original design of the program was based around students serving in one of three companies—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—which would drill and train together. Officer students studied military operations and took courses on field fortifications, outposts, signaling, and military law, but they also took classes on geometry, algebra, trigonometry, grammar, and history of the United States (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1967, 3).}
responsibility for stability and contingency operations in Central America and the Caribbean; instead, Army leaders shifted responsibility to the Marine Corps.

The Army leadership following the Philippine War wanted to keep the United States and the Army out of pacification and counterinsurgency efforts. In both 1906 and 1911, uprisings in Cuba and China garnered political interest, but the Army leadership recommended not getting involved (Birtle 2004, 181). In 1912, President Taft sought to send the Army to Cuba again for pacification duties, but Chief of Staff Leonard Wood called it “extreme and foolish” (as quoted in Birtle 2004, 181). Soon thereafter, Taft wanted to send U.S. forces to Nicaragua but Secretary of War Henry Stimson recommended sending the Marine Corps instead of the Army to intervene in Nicaragua (Birtle 2004, 181-182). Stimson argued that the Army as the bulwark of American power would raise too much antipathy both domestically and internationally; the Marines, on the other hand, would carry much less political risk (Boot 2002, 145; Birtle 2004, 182). Taft agreed, and the Marines began their long involvement in Central America and the Caribbean (Boot 2002, 145; Birtle 2004, 182).

The Army’s resistance, though, did not reflect an intention to avoid all types of conflict but only counterinsurgency-type operations. Secretary Stimson’s argument for sending the Marines rather than the Army was not about political risk; sending U.S. forces, regardless of their service, would still be viewed as foreign interventionism both by the country itself and by domestic groups such as the Anti-Imperialist League. Fundamentally, the Army leadership found these types of operations “institutionally unrewarding” (Birtle 2004, 182; 231). Unlike counterinsurgency, conventional warfare brings opportunities for career advancement (through command), individual and organizational prestige, and, most importantly, opportunity for victory; counterinsurgency, except in rare cases, offers none of these (Boot 2002, 100).
Stimson’s political maneuvering to shift responsibility for these operations became official Army-Navy policy in 1927 when the Marine Corps was assigned responsibility “for emergency service in time of peace for protection of the interests of the United States in foreign countries” and the Army would provide forces only “in exceptional circumstances” (Joint Board 1927 as quoted in Birtle 2004, 239). The Marine Corps, similarly, did not want to take on these tasks, but it was a less powerful organization and therefore lacked the political influence to shift responsibility back onto the Army (Millet 1980, 164; Birtle 2004, 182).

Army leadership also conducted studies to bolster their position against intervention in Mexico. In “A Study of the Pacification of Mexico and Establishment of a Civil Government,” an Army War College committee noted that the Army could do very little in Mexico, and that the people of that country would have to “work out their own salvation” and treated intervention with skepticism (as quoted in Birtle 2004, 181). Although the Army did become involved in Mexico in 1916—known as Pershing’s “Punitive Expedition”—its actions were limited (Millet and Maslowski 1984, 320). Given that pacifying and developing a country was so difficult, the Army leadership did not want to take on the responsibility.

Thus, the Army strategically resisted forces for change regarding counterinsurgency that resulted from the Philippines War. I identify the forces for change, tactics of resistance, outcome, and the degree to which the resistance was successful in Table 2 below.

In the final analysis, the Army resisted the experiences of the Philippines. The aspects of counterinsurgency that the Army did relatively well—combat actions, offensive attacks—it continued to do well. Those aspects it did not do well—developing local political leadership, supporting economic development—it continued to not do well. Pacification capabilities were

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158 Even when given these tasks, the commandant of the Marine Corps insisted that his organization’s primary responsibilities were to guard ships and provide security for naval bases (Millet 1980, 164).
never made priorities, and the Army leadership avoided more such responsibilities as much as possible. Instead, Army leadership strived to develop the capabilities of bigger forces (brigades and divisions) to fight against other armies. By ignoring the experiences of the Philippines, using its expertise in a political manner, and denying responsibility for similar operations, it was able to protect its core functions and primary features that defined its sense of mission. These tactics are summarized in the table below.

Table 7: Strategic Resistance to Change – Philippine-American War – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency (Filipino nationalists and Moro tribes)</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>Army employed a counterinsurgency strategy against Filipino insurgents due to individual experience of leadership, not institutionalized organizational capabilities</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Leadership (President and Secretary of War wanted Army to conduct more operations in Central America)</td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise / Denial – Army leaders argued that such use of Army forces was inappropriate</td>
<td>Army avoided service in Nicaragua; Marine Corps given responsibility for duties in Central America and Caribbean</td>
<td>Yes – Army transferred responsibility to USMC, which conducted numerous pacification duties until World War II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Lessons (organizational learning and lessons taken from Philippine operations)</td>
<td>Ignore – while small changes made in education, these were an effect of the people who led the education institutions and not organizational priorities</td>
<td>Slight changes made to education, but no changes to training, structure, or promotion requirements</td>
<td>Yes – able to protect core functions and focus on developing conventional combat capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vietnam War

No war of the 20th century challenged the Army’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency more than the Vietnam War. Numerous scholars have pointed to the Army’s failure to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy during the war as well as the failure to change afterwards (Komer 1972; Krepinevich 1988; Crane 2002; Nagl 2002).159 But while these scholars accurately recognize the Army’s failure to increase its counterinsurgency capabilities given experience and lessons Vietnam, they implicitly attribute lack of change to inertia rather than resistance. This section will examine the Army’s strategic resistance to counterinsurgency in and after Vietnam and the tactics employed.

Both external and internal forces for change applied pressure to the Army during and following the Vietnam War. External forces for change include the insurgency, political leadership, policy entrepreneurs and think-tanks and policy-focused organizations. Internal forces for change include operational experience resulting from the war, studies and reports, mavericks, and insurgents. In response to these forces for change, constituencies of resistance in the Army utilized tactics of resistance including ignoring the force for change, waiting out, moving changes to the periphery, suppression, quarantine, and denial.

History

U.S. Army involvement in Vietnam began with U.S. military support to the French.160 In August 1950, President Harry Truman sent a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) of

159 Other scholars point to the Army’s failure in Vietnam as a result of failures by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McMaster 1997), inappropriate meddling in military operations by politicians which limited the ability of the Army to succeed (Summers 1982), and poor senior leadership (Sorley 1999, 2011). Though they disagree as to why, all of these scholars generally agree that the Army did not implement a successful counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam and turned away from counterinsurgency in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.

160 U.S. involvement in Vietnam actually began in 1945 when members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) helped train the Viet Minh to fight against Japanese occupying forces (Westheider 2007, 1-2).
35 personnel to provide oversight of military equipment and supplies being provided to French forces fighting against Vietnamese independence forces known as the Viet Minh (Collins 1991, 1; Westheider 2007, 5). Three years earlier in 1947, President Truman outlined the “Truman Doctrine,” a policy which lent support to anti-Communist forces around the world but focused specifically on supporting such forces in Greece and Turkey (Jones 1992, 123). Vietnam, then, expanded the Truman Doctrine to Southeast Asia. Though officially a joint command, MAAG was commanded by Army officers. \[161\] Between 1950 and 1954, MAAG oversaw $1.1 million in economic support and $746 million in equipment provided to the French (Collins 1991, 1).\[162\]

The defeat of the French in Vietnam led to increased U.S. commitment to the South Vietnamese government. The day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu on July 19, 1954, the Geneva Accords brought the Franco-Vietminh War to a close (Westheider 2007, 6-7). Additionally, the Geneva Accords split Vietnam along the 17th parallel into communist North Vietnam and democratic South Vietnam. Fearing a spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia pending the fall of South Vietnam, an idea known as the “domino theory,” President Eisenhower directed more involvement.

Beginning in 1955, U.S. forces began to directly train, advise, and assist South Vietnamese military forces fighting against forces supported by North Vietnam (Collins 1991, 123; Eckhart 1991, 11-12). Though MAAG-Vietnam was capped at 342 personnel, it was able to unofficially increase the number of Americans to 700 by bringing trainers into country on “temporary duty” and as contractors without officially assigning them to MAAGV service

\[161\] The first MAAGV commanders, both Army officers, were Brigadier General Francis Brink (1950-1952) and Major General Thomas Trapnell (1952-1954) (Eckhart 1991, 7).

\[162\] In 1950’s dollar amounts. By 1954, the U.S. was funding 80% of the French costs of prosecuting the war (Westheider 2007, 5).
Between 1955 and 1959, training focused on conventional operations based on the Army’s experience in Korea (Collins 1991, 12; Westheider 2007, 9). Not until 1959 did the focus shift to counterinsurgency training, when the South Vietnamese government pressured MAAGV leadership into accepting that internal subversion, not an attack by conventional forces, was the major threat (Collins 1991, 12-16; Ives 2007, 84-85). However, this training was primarily focused on counterguerilla operations rather than counterinsurgency operations, meaning that operations focused on destroying enemy combatants rather than developing local political, economic, and social capacity to win the support of the people (Birtle 2007, 310-313). Though training support increased throughout the 1950’s, the commander of MAAGV still planned for a drawdown of troops in the spring of 1960 (Collins 1991, 16).

Rather than draw down, U.S. commitments increased in 1960. In that year, the nascent but growing insurgency opposed to the South Vietnamese government formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) and named its military section the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), pejoratively called “Viet Cong” by the South Vietnamese government which identified them as Vietnamese communists (Westheider 2007, 10).

Assuming the U.S. presidency in 1961, John F. Kennedy sent an additional 400 Army Special Forces soldiers to conduct training and advising operations with the Montagnard tribes of the Vietnamese highlands (Birtle 2007, 315). Additionally, he sent two helicopter companies, ostensibly identified as logistics units, to support infiltration operations against Viet Cong forces (Westheider 2007, 10; Birtle 2007, 315). By December 1961, approximately 3,200 personnel

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163 Prior to 1955, the MAAG was responsible for all support to Indochina including both Laos and Cambodia; in 1956, MAAG-Vietnam focused solely on support to the South Vietnamese government (Eckhart 1991, 13).
were assigned to MAAGV (Collins 1991, 26; Westheider 2007, 10). This number increased to 16,500 by 1963 and to 23,300 by 1964 (Westheider 2007, 10-11).

A major command and control change occurred in February 1962, when U.S. Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (USMACV) was established under General Paul Harkins of the Army. USMACV held responsibility for liaison operations with the South Vietnamese government and military operations, while MAAGV maintained control of advisory and training operations (Collins 1991, 28). Between 1962 and 1965, USMACV under General Harkins continually increased in size but remained focused on training and advising the South Vietnamese Army to conduct counterguerrilla, not counterinsurgency, operations (Birtle 2007, 316). Throughout the Vietnam War, an Army general would serve as the USMACV commander in country even though it was officially a joint command (Eckhart 1991, 42).

U.S. combat forces entered Vietnam in 1965 following the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964. Under the command of General William Westmoreland, U.S. forces turned away from the training focus of the previous years and towards conventional, direct-action operations (Krepinevich 1988, 164-168; Westheider 2007, 15). The first Army combat engagement in November 1965 at the Ia Drang Valley would exemplify the war to follow; while Army forces achieved a tactical victory, they were unable to translate success on the battlefield to strategic success in the war (Krepinevich 1988, 168-169; Westheider 2007, 16). Throughout the war, Westmoreland would follow an attrition strategy, ordering a number of large-unit “sweep” missions (Krepinevich 1988, 166-172; Rogers 1989; Birtle 2007, 374-375).164

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164 The success of attrition was measured by the number of enemy killed, i.e. the “body count,” as a metric of success but which proved to be unrelated to the actual success of U.S. forces in defeating the insurgency (Gartner and Myers 1995, 377-380). By the end of 1965, 184,000 U.S. personnel were deployed to Vietnam, and by the end of 1967, there were 500,000 personnel (Westheider 2007, 10-20).
Beginning with the battle of Ia Drang, the Army set a course for fighting the war that focused on attrition over pacification. Attrition was associated with large-scale, conventional operations; it was the preferred strategy of General Westmoreland and the strategy associated with his (and other Army leaders’) understanding of the Army’s mission. Pacification was associated with the non-combat aspects of counterinsurgency: protecting local populations, developing political structures to support the people, and training and advising military and defense forces to support such operations. Throughout the Vietnam War, Army leaders prioritized attrition at the expense of pacification (Cosmas 2006, 485).

A second major turning point in strategy occurred as a result of the Tet Offensive in 1968. On January 30, 1968, Viet Cong forces simultaneously attacked five cities, 36 provincial capitals, and 50 hamlets, a tactical loss but a strategic victory for the Viet Cong. As a result, President Lyndon Johnson lost public support and initiated moves to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam (Westheider 2007, 23-25). Under the command of General Creighton Abrams who took over USMACV from General Westmoreland in June 1968, U.S. forces pursued a policy of “Vietnamization” which focused on turning responsibility of the war back over to the South Vietnamese (Sorley 1992; 256-258; Westheider 2007, 26). The last major ground offensive occurred in 1970, and in 1971, President Nixon ordered a halt to all offensive operations; by August 1972, all U.S. combat troops were removed from the country (Westheider 2007, 26-27).

The end came in 1973. The Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973 and simultaneously a cease-fire was declared (Westheider 2007, 27). As of March 1973, the last U.S. forces in Vietnam were the Marines who guarded the U.S. embassy in Saigon (Westheider 2007, 26-27).

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165 Even so, there were 543,000 U.S. personnel in Vietnam at the beginning of 1969 (Westheider 2007, 25).

166 Only 24,000 U.S. personnel remained in Vietnam by the end of 1972 (Westheider 2007, 27).
In April 1975, North Vietnamese forces invaded and seized Saigon, thereby taking control of South Vietnam (Westheider 2007, 29).

Forces for Change

A number of forces for change acted on the Army during the Vietnam War. External forces included the insurgency, political leadership, policy entrepreneurs, and think-tanks and policy groups. Internal forces included mavericks, insurgents, operational experience, and studies and reports.

External

The most significant external force for change was the insurgency, itself. From the Army’s earliest involvement in Vietnam, Viet Cong forces challenged the U.S. allied-South Vietnamese government for power and legitimacy (Cosmas 2006, 3-22). While the insurgency and the pacification effort are sometimes referred to as “the other war” (Anderson 1982; Anderson 2002, 150-152), they were as much a threat as the North Vietnamese regular forces (Andrade 2008, 147).167 As of April 1964, U.S. estimates put the number of Viet Cong controlled villages at 866 out of 2,538, an increase of over 100 from less than a year prior (Pentagon Papers 1969, IV.B.4 43). A 1965 CIA report estimated the Viet Cong size at 150,000 personnel (Krepinevich 1988, 150), and by 1966, this estimate increased to 220,000 (Krepinevich 1988, 180). Throughout the war, the insurgency proved an implacable challenge.

The most significant external political force for change during the Vietnam War was President John Kennedy. Kennedy believed that the communist insurgencies and “wars of national liberation” in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam were a rising threat to U.S. national security

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167 The debate over whether the insurgency or the North Vietnamese regular forces was the larger threat is beside the point for the purpose of this project; defeating both was necessary to win the war (Andrade 2008).
(Marquis 1997, 13; Ucko 2011, 11), and he wanted the Army and the other services to be able to counter such insurgencies. Kennedy viewed his predecessor’s strategic approach of “massive retaliation” as inappropriate for a new type of war the U.S. was likely to fight. Turning from Eisenhower, Kennedy instead sought a “flexible response” policy that utilized unconventional warfare capabilities (Blaufarb 1977, 53; Marquis 1997, 13-14).

As an external force for change, Kennedy sought to impose a shift in the Army focus in favor of greater counterinsurgency capabilities, and he took a very personal and direct interest in the topic (Kennedy 1961; Krepinevich 1988; Ives 2007, 14-15). In November 1961, Kennedy held a unique meeting with all of the Army’s senior leadership (Krepinevich 1988, 31). According to then-Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, President Kennedy stated, “I want you guys to get with it. I know that the Army is not going to develop in this counterinsurgency field and do the things that I think must be done unless the Army itself wants to do it” (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 31).

In a more official action, in January 1962, Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum 124 which stated “subversive insurgency (‘war of liberation’) is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare” (White

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168 Kennedy was particularly concerned by Soviet president Nikita Kruschev’s commitment to supporting these “wars of national liberation,” a commitment Kruschev made in a speech in January 1961 (Blaufarb 1977, 52). This provoked Kennedy to ask the question, “What are we doing about guerilla warfare” (as quoted in Blaufarb 1977, 52)? However, even before this speech, insurgency and Communist activities in Southeast Asia, Central and South American, and North Africa raised presidential concerns (Blaufarb 1977, 52-53). Additionally, Kennedy had visited Vietnam in 1951 and had conducted his own historical research on these types of conflicts (Blaufarb 1977, 53-55).

169 On May 25, 1961 approximately a month after the Bay of Pigs incident, President Kennedy stated before Congress: “I am directing the secretary of defense to expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with our allies, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations and sub-limited, or unconventional wars. In addition, our Special Forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented” (as quoted in Marquis 1997, 13). President Kennedy then directed the Department of Defense to allocate $400 million towards Special Forces capabilities (Sasser 2011).

170 Kennedy also expanded the role and budget of the Army’s Special Forces to increase their capabilities in counterinsurgency operations (Bundy 1961; McClintock 1992, Chapter 6).
House 1962). This focus on politico-military conflict applied to all of the armed forces and agencies including USAID, CIA, and the Department of State (ibid.).

Another significant external force for change was policy entrepreneurs. Major General Edward Lansdale was an Army-turned-Air Force officer with extensive counterinsurgency experience. Lansdale had served with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, and remained on duty after the war through 1948 in the Philippines; it was there that Lansdale received his first, and most in-depth, experience in counterinsurgency as he worked with the Philippine government, and specifically with Ramon Magsaysay, in suppressing the Hukbhalahap Rebellion.\textsuperscript{171} As a result of his experience and knowledge about both insurgency and counterinsurgency gained in the Philippines, Lansdale was strongly critical of the U.S. approach to the Vietnam conflict (Gibbons 1995, 474).

Lansdale was an influential actor in the early years of Vietnam under President Kennedy.\textsuperscript{172} Early in 1961, he offered a plan to unite all of the pacification efforts of USAID, CIA, and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) under a central management program, a proposal that impressed President Kennedy (Blaufarb 1977, 166). During his years in Vietnam as the head of the Senior Liaison Office (SLO), Lansdale maintained constant contact with Army leadership (General Westmoreland and, later, General Abrams) on the political, social, and economic conditions in Vietnam and how they affected the stability of the country (e.g. Lansdale

\textsuperscript{171} Lansdale is considered to be the model for “Colonel Edwin Hillandale” in Eugene Burdick’s “The Ugly American” (Gibney 2006).

\textsuperscript{172} Under Lansdale were a few well-qualified counterinsurgency personnel, including Sam V. Wilson who worked with Lansdale at least as early as 1959 (see Wilson 1959).
He attempted to influence Army leadership as much as possible, even though he had no formal power over them.

Other policy entrepreneurs came from other government agencies in Vietnam. Rufus Phillips was in charge of Rural Affairs, the USAID-controlled pacification effort in the early years of the war. As early as spring 1963, Phillips and other Rural Affairs personnel approached Brigadier General Richard Stilwell about adapting USMACV policies (Phillips 2008b, 152). Phillips provided Stilwell with both oral and written reports on the actions of the South Vietnamese troops and the inappropriate use of U.S. airpower that resulted in civilian deaths which were harming U.S. interests in the country. In one of the last memos provided to Stilwell in July 1963, Phillips wrote:

…so long as actions taken in the war contribute to winning the people, they contribute to winning the war. When they do not contribute to winning the people, they contribute to losing the war…. [We should] absolutely prohibit any attack by U.S. aircraft or pilots on…targets where the absence of women and children cannot be positively determined…. This war is not an isolated phenomenon. The actions that we take, or support, here in Vietnam, must be viewed in that context, and as they may be made to appear long after our major involvement here has ended (Phillips 1963 as quoted in Phillips 2008b, 153).

Unobserved artillery fires (i.e., no Army personnel verified where the artillery landed or if it hit the intended target) and air bombing became a significant impediment to success in Vietnam under both General Harkins and General Westmoreland.

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173 An extensive number of memorandums to General Westmoreland and General Abrams are on record at George Washington University’s National Security Archives in Washington, D.C. (see Lansdale 1966; 1967; and 1968). While there is an extensive amount of material that documents communication from Lansdale to Westmoreland, there is not a single document from Westmoreland to Lansdale (though there are other documents on file from other sources to Lansdale). This could be due to the material that was available or archivists’ choices, however judging by other sources, it is most likely indicative that Westmoreland held the same dismissive attitude of Lansdale that Taylor and other senior Army officers held.

174 Stilwell had supported Edward Lansdale in the Philippines, fighting the Huk insurgency (Phillips 2008b, 6).
Another force for change was think-tanks, study groups, and reports external to the Army. Stephen Hosmer at RAND conducted one of the most focused studies. In April 1962, Hosmer brought together the world’s then-experts on counterinsurgency for a five-day conference in Washington, DC.175 The attendees included David Galula (a French officer famous for his role in the Algerian conflict), Edward Lansdale, Frank Kitson, Samuel V. Wilson, Charles Bohannon (an American involved in the pacification effort in Vietnam from the first years of the war), and Rufus Phillips (an American also involved in the pacification effort since the early days of Vietnam) (Hosmer 2006, xi). The ideas and approaches offered in this seminar reflected the experiences of numerous insurgencies and represented a completely different approach to the Vietnam War than that pursued by Army leadership.176 Following the conference, Hosmer distributed a report widely through the military services and amongst the political leadership in charge of the war.

Internal

Internal forces for change in this case include mavericks, insurgents, studies and reports, and operational experience. Two key individuals served as mavericks, Brigadier General William Yarborough and Brigadier General William Rosson. Yarborough was the commander of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center in 1961 when President Kennedy authorized Special

175 In the foreword to the new edition of the conference report released in 2006, Hosmer comments on the level of expertise that took part: “Each participant could claim firsthand experience with guerrilla or counterinsurgent operations in one or more of the following post-World War II conflicts: Algeria, China, Greece, Kenya, Laos, Malaya, Oman, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Three of the participants had led or operated with anti-Japanese guerrilla or guerrilla-type units in Burma and the Philippines during World War II” (Hosmer 2006, iii).

176 As Frank Kitson commented about the conference: “Although we came from such widely divergent backgrounds, it was as if we had all been brought up together from youth. We all spoke the same language. Probably all of us had worked out theories of counterinsurgency procedures at one time or another, which we thought were unique and original. But when we came to air them, all our ideas were essentially the same. We had another thing in common. Although we had no difficulty in making our views understood to each other, we had mostly been unable to get our respective armies to hoist in the message” (Hosmer 2006, iv).
Forces to wear the Green Beret and expanded the size of the Special Forces by 3,000 personnel. William Rosson had worked with Edward Lansdale in Vietnam in the early 1950’s as a member of the Saigon Military Mission and was later appointed the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) Special Warfare Division (Krepinevich 1988, 65). In 1962, these two individuals traveled to Vietnam to assess the use of Army special operations forces which had been put under the operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency (Krepinevich 1988, 71). Their written report and subsequent conversations with General Taylor highlighted that USAMCV was employing Special Forces incorrectly for offensive, direct-action operations rather than in the pacification effort (Krepinevich 1988, 71). This was in contrast to the role intended by President Kennedy. Rosson also noted that USMACV’s method of employment of Special Forces was done with the implicit, if not explicit, approval of General Paul Harkins, then-Commander of Military Advisory Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) (Krepinevich 1988, 71).

An organizational insurgent in this case was John Paul Vann. In the earliest years of the war, Vann served as a military advisor to the South Vietnamese Army. After the first major battle of the war, Vann publicly stated to the media that the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac that it had been “a miserable damn performance” by the South Vietnamese Army, a comment that was in direct contradiction to the official position taken by General Harkins (Sheehan 2009, 277). Vann realized that operations in Vietnam were going awry and upon returning to the United States, and he attempted to provide a realistic appraisal of the situation by speaking directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

177 This office, as pointed out in the Stilwell Report, was incapable and improperly supported to actually integrate special operations and conventional forces into leveraging their capabilities to fight counterinsurgencies (McHale 1996, 29). At best, it was an attempt to address Kennedy’s focus on counterinsurgency at the Army Staff level without actually changing the organization, structure, or authorities of the Army’s staff system.

178 Vann was known to both Sam Wilson and Ed Lansdale (Sheehan 2009, 496).
Studies and reports on the Army’s ineffective strategy came from inside the organization. The Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) conducted one of the first such studies in 1962, then under the command of Army Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr. This report on the actions of the South Vietnamese found that sweep operations were counterproductive. Instead of sweeps, the report recommended that commanders and units should focus and place more emphasis on civic action and the civil aspects of the conflict (Phillips 2008b, 152). Above all, the report stated that abuses by South Vietnamese soldiers were driving the population towards the Viet Cong and such actions had to be stopped (ibid.).

Other studies and reports identified more weaknesses with the attrition strategy. Brigadier General Richard Stilwell was the lead coordinator of the 1961 study “Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War.” In his report, he noted that the Army had capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency operations: “The capabilities [in developing internal defense] which the Army can quickly harness, without derogation of its other missions, far exceed the level of utilization which has thus far been approved, for programming or planning, within or without the Department of the Army” (Stilwell 1961, vi). Stillwell made a number of recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Army regarding counterinsurgency, the most controversial being that the Army as a whole should take responsibility for such operations rather than just Special Forces:

Given the magnitude of contingent demands, world wide, for counter-insurgency/counter guerilla training and operational assistance, that the Special Forces now be considered an ancillary, rather than primary, source for meeting such requirements; that henceforth the Army as a whole, in which individuals with the requisite skills and leadership abound, be considered the main reservoir; and that detailed planning initiate now as regards the modalities of selection, organization into and training as teams, equipping and readying for deployment (Stilwell 1961, xviii).
Stilwell also pointed out that even with President Kennedy’s focus on counterinsurgency, such prioritization “has not led to coordinated planning for low intensity areas. The reality of this planning void has been affirmed by senior level career civil servants and military planners” (Stilwell 1961, 20). Stillwell also made recommendations regarding expanding counterinsurgency education for officers and extending the responsibility and authority of the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Just prior to this study, the Army Staff in 1966 conducted a study entitled the “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” or PROVN, which emphasized the need to shift Army units towards more stabilization and pacification efforts. The study’s key recommendation was that the failure of a coherent and effective pacification effort was the root of the problems in Vietnam and that “the Vietnamese people are, and must remain, the true and paramount objective of all U.S.-Government of Vietnam efforts” (Krepinevich 1988, 182; Sorley 1992, 192-193; PROVN as quoted in Birtle 2008, 1217). Additionally, the study highlighted that political efforts within South Vietnam were far more important than the military activities (Birtle 2008, 1217). It also pointed out that conventional tactics including search and destroy, reconnaissance by fire, and the use of unobserved artillery fire undercut the goals of U.S. forces; instead, troops needed to focus on winning the “village

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179 The PROVN report was initiated by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson. Johnson asked for the report after meeting with Bernard Fall (an expert on Vietnam and the French-Indochina War) and realizing that much of his information about the country was incorrect (Birtle 2008, 1216).

180 However, political actions could not succeed without a minimal level of security in the areas: “Socio-economic programs must be closely tied to the pace of the security effort. Attempts to win allegiance from the population…by the distribution of commodities or services without reasonable assurance of continued physical security are invitations to failure…bags of bulgur wheat have never been known to kill an insurgent” (PROVN 1962 as quoted in Birtle 2008, 1218). He also noted that misconduct by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops negatively impacted the Army’s strategic goals (Birtle 2008, 1228).
war” by remaining in an area long enough to understand the local situation and assure the local people that security would be maintained (Birtle 2008, 1228). 

Operational experience was the final internal force for change. Besides the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served in Vietnam, this experience was reflected in the Army’s leadership after the war. General Creighton Abrams, who assumed command of USMACV after General Westmoreland, became Army Chief of Staff in 1972. After Abrams, every Chief of Staff until 2003 had Vietnam service (Bell 2005, 148-165). Overall, though, these experiences were viewed negatively: “Many officers sought to erase Vietnam from the Army’s corporate memory, feeling uncomfortable with the ignonimy of failure of believing that the lessons and experience of the war were of little use to the post-Vietnam Army” (Vincent 1988, 690-691).

Strategic Resistance to Change

Given these forces for change, there is evidence of the Army’s strategic resistance; these forces would have had an impact on the Army to a greater degree had resistance not stopped or impeded them. Both during and after the Vietnam War, Army leaders sought to protect the Army’s mission of conventional operations by resisting these forces which would have pushed the organization towards greater counterinsurgency capabilities. In the table below, I have identified the features on which forces for change have exerted pressure and whether there is indication of strategic resistance:

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181 In opposition to other scholars (Krepinevich 1986, Sorley 1999, Nagl 2002), Birtle (2008) argues that Westmoreland in fact supported the basic strategy of pacification and its primacy over killing the enemy and was not opposed to counterinsurgency operations. Instead, Birtle argues that Westmoreland was necessarily focused on stopping the North Vietnamese main forces as a precursor to more focused pacification efforts (Birtle 2008).
Table 8: Strategic Resistance to Counterinsurgency – Vietnam War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Functional Component</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions by leadership to resist FFCs?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no evidence of institutionalized change in promotion pathways, training, or structure (Blaufarb 1977; Krepinevich 1988; Sorley 1999; Nagl 2002; Birtle 2007, 478-482; Phillips 2008a). As evidenced by the Army’s performance in Iraq and Afghanistan three decades later, counterinsurgency was not institutionalized in the Army’s mission.

There is, however, evidence of resistance to change in doctrine and education. While President Kennedy pushed the Army to institutionalized counterinsurgency, there were quite a few doctrinal manuals written during Vietnam that focused on counterinsurgency operations. Between 1951 and 1974, the U.S. Army published at least 32 doctrinal manuals related to some aspect of counterinsurgency including FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces* (1961); FM 31-22, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* (1963); FM 31-73, *Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency* (1965); and FM 100-20, *Field Service Regulations—Counterinsurgency* (Birtle 2007, 500-504). However, the Army’s capstone document published shortly after the Vietnam War, FM 100-5 *Operations* (1976), made no mention of counterinsurgency and focused solely on conventional warfare (this will be discussed in more detail in the next section). While

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182 In this case, there was no force for change that acted on materiel, awards, or facilities.
doctrine changed somewhat, it largely focused on counter-guerilla operations rather than counterinsurgency operations (Ives 2007, 124). Looking solely at the number of manuals written, one might argue that counterinsurgency was well-institutionalized within the Army. However, the absence of counterinsurgency in FM 100-5 trumped the number of publications on the topic because 100-5 was the doctrinal basis of all other warfighting concepts.

In terms of education, there was little change in response to the operational experience of Vietnam. Overall, the officer programs (including for captains, majors, and colonels) showed very little response to the need for counterinsurgency education; overall, officer education programs focused less than 15% of their coursework on counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War years (Krepinevich 1988, 49-50). While one might expect the educational programs to focus on counterinsurgency given the challenges faced in Vietnam, this was not the case.

In regards to the Vietnam case, alternate explanations to intentional resistance are ignorance about the nature of counterinsurgency, a significant shift in the international security environment, or political pressure. Army leadership was fully cognizant about how counterinsurgency differed from conventional warfare (Krepinevich 1988, 27-55; Westmoreland 1989, 58; Eckhart 1991, 64-69; Cosmas 2006, 478; Nagl 2008, 131). The very fact that President Kennedy established a “Special Group—Counterinsurgency” and issued NSAM 124 indicates that senior political leaders intended to ensure that Army leaders understood this

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183 I will not address two other alternate explanations that I previously examined in the Philippine case: the inability to improve counterinsurgency capabilities or accident. In a RAND study of 89 counterinsurgencies, the findings indicated that insurgent forces conclusively achieved their goals in only 15 out of 40 conflicts between 1934 and 1975 (Connable and Libicki 2010, 170). While these indicate that counterinsurgencies are difficult, it does not demonstrate that they are unwinnable, which in turn supports the evidence that an army can improve its counterinsurgency capabilities assuming that the army is not a perfect counterinsurgent force at the beginning of the conflict. In regards to accident, this would only be the case if due to ignorance (which is discussed above) or if the Army leadership attempted to implement institutionalized change but failed. There is no evidence of the latter (The latter two have been dealt with extensively in the literature (Blaufarb 1977; Krepinevich 1988; Birtle 2007, 361-418; Ives 2007; Arnold 2009, 217-236).
difference (as will be discussed in the next section).\textsuperscript{184} That the Army had dozens of doctrinal manuals related to and addressing counterinsurgency (as mentioned above) also indicates organizational awareness of its differences from conventional operations. Additionally, the Army’s very resistance to counterinsurgency operations, as will be discussed in the next section, indicates that that the organization’s lack of change was not a misunderstanding or due to ignorance; if it were based on a lack of knowledge or ignorance, then the forces for change that corrected this misunderstanding (studies and reports, mavericks, organizational insurgents, etc.) should have been enough to achieve change.

In regards to the international security environment, there was no significant change between the time periods before and after the Vietnam War. After Vietnam, the Soviet Union did not end its support for “wars of national liberation” (Tierney 2006, 236). But, neither did new threats arise in the international system; the Soviet Union was still the only conventional threat. While the Yom Kippur War of 1973 demonstrated the effects of modern technology on the battlefield (Davis 2008, 54-55), there was no real change in threats that faced the United States.

In fact, the number of insurgencies in the world only increased during this time. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, insurgencies occurred in the Philippines, Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Congo, Burundi, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sudan, Brazil, and Nicaragua (Fearon and Latin 2003, 7-10; Gompert and Gordon 2008, 376; Connable and Libicki 2010, 160-162; 199-201). Insurgency was still a significant aspect of the international security environment after the Vietnam War.

\textsuperscript{184} To demonstrate his personal interest in the Group, President Kennedy assigned his brother Robert Kennedy as a member (Blaufarb 1977, 67).
Another possible explanation for the lack of institutionalization is interference by political leaders. As discussed previously, President Kennedy strongly supported increased counterinsurgency capabilities. However, President Richard Nixon oversaw the final years of the war. In the Nixon Doctrine (also called the Guam Doctrine), Nixon specifically stated in July 1969 that the United States would not take a first-hand involvement in internal conflicts:

I believe that the time has come when the United States, in our relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our treaty commitments, our treaty commitments, for example, with Thailand under SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]; but, two, that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves (Nixon 1969b).

From this, one might argue that the president intended the Army to have no future role in counterinsurgency, and that its resistance was due to political guidance. But, Nixon also laid out the U.S. responsibility in providing effective advisory and assistance capabilities:

Well, there is a future for American counterinsurgency tactics only in the sense that where one of our friends in Asia asks for advice or assistance, under proper circumstances, we will provide it. But where we must draw the line is in becoming involved heavily with our own personnel, doing the job for them, rather than helping them do the job for themselves (Nixon 1969b).

Nixon did not completely cut U.S. or Army involvement in counterinsurgencies, but he wanted to shift responsibility to the governments of the countries in which the insurgencies were fighting. Still, this did not relieve the Army of its responsibility to maintain counterinsurgency capabilities for advisory responsibilities, as the Army would have probably been the most likely organization to provide such “advice or assistance.” Even given his “détente” policies, Nixon reiterated U.S. support to “furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance

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185 Though President Ford was in office during the fall of Saigon, Nixon oversaw the final years in which the Army had a significant role.
with our treaty commitments” against communist forces four months after the Guam speech, in an address to the American public in November 1969 known as the “Silent Majority” speech (Nixon 1969a).

Thus, strategic resistance to change best explains the Army’s resistance to forces for change related to counterinsurgency. The next section identifies the tactics of resistance utilized in order to resist these forces for change.

Tactics of Resistance

In response to the forces for change identified in this case, Army leadership employed a number of tactics of resistance: ignoring the force for change, waiting out, moving changes to the periphery, political use of expertise, suppression, quarantine, and denial.

Ignore

Army leadership ignored external groups with expertise who tried to influence the organization through studies and reports such as Stephen Hosmer’s RAND report on counterinsurgency. After its original publication, the 1962 symposium report was “widely distributed” in Washington to the Army and the other military services, the CIA, the State Department, the President’s Special Group (Counterinsurgency), and the White House (Hosmer 2012). However, its acceptance was like a “rock dropped down a long well” with no significant response from the recipients (Hosmer 2012). While one could argue that the report was inaccurate or incorrect, its relevance to counterinsurgency is evidenced by the fact that it was re-published in 2006 in its entirety because of the conflict in Iraq. Neither the report itself nor

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186 Even given President Kennedy’s interest in counterinsurgencies, the report was most likely stopped by General Taylor and others on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) who did not support a counterinsurgency effort.
follow-on reports specifically addressing six counterinsurgencies garnered any response from the Army or any other organization engaged in Vietnam operations (Elliott 2010, 22).

**Waiting Out**

The Army employed a tactic of waiting out against President Kennedy. Army General Maxwell Taylor was the chairman of the president’s Special Group – Counterinsurgency. General Taylor, even though he was the chairman of the group, was not fully invested in counterinsurgency and instead wanted to focus the Army on war in Europe against the Soviets. He was not alone in this view. General Lemnitzer, General George Decker (Army Chief of Staff, 1960 to 1962), and General Earle Wheeler (Army Chief of Staff, 1962 to 1964), were also not persuaded by the President’s argument to shift towards more counterinsurgency capabilities (Pentagon Papers 1971, U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-April 1965; Blaufarb 1977, 207; Krepinevich 1988, 36-37; Marquis, 1997, 17). As General Maxwell Taylor himself stated, the Army reacted to presidential pressure as “something we have to satisfy. But not much heart went into the work” (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 37).

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187 Hosmer received his PhD from Yale, had traveled to Indonesia in 1955 just as the French were withdrawing, and had served in the Air Force’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Elliott 2010, 20).

188 With his myriad responsibilities as president, Kennedy delegated responsibility for coordination and development of U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities to a committee which turned out to only hamper his goals. This committee was the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), established on January 18, 1962 by National Security Action Memorandum Number 124, “to insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency (‘wars of liberation’) is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare” (Kennedy 1962; Blaufarb 1977, 68). The group was chaired by General Maxwell Taylor.

189 Taylor’s book *The Uncertain Trumpet* was an attempt to convince politicians and the public of the possibility of mid-intensity conflict, i.e. conventional conflict, along with nuclear conflict; Kennedy appointed Taylor because he thought Taylor’s book demonstrated support for his own ideas regarding wars of national liberation.

190 General Lemnitzer believed that the Kennedy administration was “oversold” on insurgency and counterinsurgency (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 26-27). General Decker is famous for his comment that “any good soldier can handle a guerilla,” a comment he made directly to President Kennedy (as quoted in Blaufarb 1977, 80). General Wheeler’s view was that “the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military” (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 37). Taylor believed that “all this cloud of dust [referring to counterinsurgency] that’s coming out of the White House really isn’t necessary” (as quoted in Krepinevich 1988, 37).
To wait out the President, Army leadership made changes to the periphery of the organization (to be discussed in the next section). Kennedy, though, viewed the Army’s actions as less than committed. In a January 1962 memorandum written to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, President Kennedy stated, “[I am not satisfied] that the Department of Defense, and in particular the Army, is according the necessary degree of attention and effort to the threat of insurgency and guerilla warfare” (as quoted in Hennessy 1997, 23).

**Move to Periphery**

The Army was able to protect the core features of the organization by moving changes to the peripheral, secondary features. In response to Kennedy’s emphasis on counterinsurgency, some changes were made to the educational programs for officers. In the Infantry Officer Basic Course (the course that all new infantry officers attend), only 2% of the course was directed towards counterinsurgency in 1963; 16% was directed towards counterinsurgency in 1965, but most of this was still focused on combat activities such as search-and-destroy, rather than the pacification activities (Krepinevich 1988, 49). The Infantry Officer Advanced Course (the course attended by all infantry officers who are preparing to take command of a company) focused 15% of their curriculum on counterinsurgency in 1965 and 7% on counterinsurgency in 1969, a perplexing change given that the war was proving more difficult over time and one would predict that more emphasis would be put on counterinsurgency rather than less (Krepinevich 1988, 49). In the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the counterinsurgency courses were never more than 5% (Krepinevich 1988, 50).

The Army’s more senior officer courses were little different. In 1968, The Army War College (attended by individuals of the rank of colonel) began a three-week program on internal defense operations (Krepinevich 1988, 52). By 1972, this instruction period dropped to two
weeks; by 1975, it was down to two days (Davis 2008, 49). The Army’s Command and General Staff College also focused primarily on large-unit actions (Krepinevich 1988, 51-52). While, there were 40 hours of instruction dedicated to counterinsurgency in 1977, by 1979 this was down to 2 hours (Waghelstein 2006, 116; Davis 2008, 49). Between 1973 and 1980, the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College and Army War College focused on counterinsurgency and small wars was less than 5% (Mariano 2012, 16-17).

Another method of moving changes to the periphery was to create new counterinsurgency offices that in actuality did not have any control over the organization’s activities. Soon after President Kennedy’s directive to develop counterinsurgency capabilities, the Joint Chiefs created a new office to oversee counterinsurgency development. This office was led by Brigadier General William Rosson as Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations (DCSOPS) Special Warfare Division and was tasked with oversight of special operations (Krepinevich 1988, 31). In his new capacity, General Rosson worked under Army Chief of Staff General George Decker and was given responsibility to be Decker’s point-person on doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to increase the Army’s capabilities in counterinsurgency. However, Decker did not like the position, its implications for the Army, or the fact that it was forced on the organization (Krepinevich 1988, 43). Decker told Rosson to focus on Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units and to stay away from infantry and armor units, the Army’s core combat components (Krepinevich 1988, 43). All decisions regarding force requirements for those core branches would be made by Decker and Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett (Vice Chief of Staff of the Army) (Krepinevich 1988, 43). Thus, Rosson’s ability to influence the organization was hampered from the start.
Political Use of Expertise

General Westmoreland used his expertise to stop Edward Lansdale from changing the U.S. strategy in Vietnam towards counterinsurgency. In a 1965 memorandum, Henry Cabot Lodge gave Lansdale responsibility for the civilian coordination effort of pacification (primarily with CIA and USAID personnel) and ordered that the U.S. military forces would provide “such support as you [Lansdale] may deem necessary to further our effort in the field” (Lodge 1965 as quoted in Gibbons 1995, 184). When Westmoreland found out about the memorandum, he intervened with Lodge, stating that such a move would prove “extremely injurious to the U.S. effort in Vietnam” (Westmoreland 1965 as quoted in Gibbons 1995, 185).191 As a result of Westmoreland’s involvement, Lodge took away Lansdale’s authority to coordinate military efforts towards pacification; instead, the pacification effort would be coordinated by a committee of U.S. agency personnel (Gibbons 1965, 154). 192 The committee approach, though, meant that the pacification effort would never take priority. Because the committee structure allowed each agency (including the Army) to control its own people, any organization could stop its support at any time. Therefore, Lansdale had little impact on either the Army’s strategy or on the overall U.S. strategy in Vietnam (Blufarb 1977, 223-224).

Suppression

The Army leadership employed suppression against insurgents and internal studies and reports. While the policy of suppressing officers’ reports from the field was a consistent theme in the early years of the war under General Harkins (Cosmas 2006, 484), John Paul Vann was

191 Lodge’s original plan would have transferred U.S. military personnel to the authority of Lansdale and the pacification effort, independent of Westmoreland (Gibbons 1995, 184).

192 Westmoreland said of Lansdale: “[Lansdale was] well known for his dislike of bureaucratic machinery…[and] should not be given the responsibility for the day to day coordination of any major programs. He is simply not disposed to accept such responsibilities nor do I believe his group has the depth or the strength to do so” (as quoted in Gibbons 1995, 184).
one of the few organizational insurgents who attempted to ensure that the senior-most military leaders understood the operational reality of the war. When Vann returned to the United States in 1963, Lt. General Barksdale Hamlett attempted to get Vann a meeting with the joint chiefs. But Vann was strongly opposed by General Maxwell Taylor, General Victor Krulak, and General Paul Harkins (Sheehan 2009, 336-386). Just hours before he was supposed to brief the full Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, prevented him from meeting with the Chiefs (Kross 2007; Sheehan 2009, 340-341).

Army leadership also suppressed internal reports that attempted to push the organization towards greater counterinsurgency activities. In response to Lieutenant General McGarr’s report on the lack of efficacy of sweep operations, General Harkins dismissed his findings out of hand (Phillips 2008b, 152). In response to the PROVN report, Westmoreland did not act on the recommendations of the report and instead labeled it as a “conceptual document” (Krepinevich 1988, 182). While one could argue that these reports were accidently overlooked, the fact that so many reports came to similar conclusions regarding the Army’s problems in Vietnam gives evidence to the assertion that they were intentionally suppressed. Additionally, the senior levels of the individuals and groups conducting the studies would have made them difficult to write-off as illegitimate or wrong.

Additionally, Army leadership suppressed the operational lessons of Vietnam by purging any influence of counterinsurgency. While the Army was already void of counterinsurgency capabilities in the primary features of promotion pathways, structure, and training, leadership also sought to remove counterinsurgency from peripheral features, under the guidance of General William DePuy who was the first commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 1973 to 1979 (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 2011). DePuy’s
restructuring and reorientation of the Army’s operations and organizational priorities was based around rewriting its pinnacle doctrinal handbook, Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*, which defined how the Army would conduct military operations (Davis 2008, 55).

DePuy directly intended the new doctrine to refocus the Army on the battlefields on Western Europe and suppress counterinsurgency. This manual was written both as an assessment of Army capabilities and with the intention to move the Army away from counterinsurgency:

> It [FM 100-5] is written in recognition of the fact that the entire United States Army, from Private to General needs to focus on a form of combat in which the Army of today has had no battlefield experience. In a sense, this manual takes us out of the rice paddies of Vietnam and places it on the Western European battlefield against the Warsaw Pact (DePuy 1976, 194).

Further, to the detriment of all other types of military operations, the follow-on 1982 version focused exclusively on conventional operations in Western Europe; it removed all chapters that discussed unconventional operations, stability operations, and military operations against irregular forces that had been part of the 1962 version of the manual (Davis 2008, 55-56).

One might argue that this movement away from counterinsurgency was not intended to suppress the lessons of Vietnam, but DePuy’s view of counterinsurgency is seen in articles written later in his career. Of the forces in favor of counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War, DePuy dismisses them:

> This bit of good work [counterinsurgency] seemed to resonate beautifully with the self-image of America on the march, providing a practical Yankee antidote against subversion and insurgency in the Third World…. The theory of counterinsurgency was one thing, but the reality of Vietnam was quite another (DePuy 1985, 352).

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193 One chapter, Chapter 14, “Military Operations in Special Environments,” did focus on non-European battlefield environments but it still focused on the conduct of conventional operations in these environments and not on the unconventional operational requirements (Davis 2008, 56).
DePuy’s comments are important for two reasons: they demonstrate that counterinsurgency was well known by the Army and its leadership (DePuy was the operations officer for MACV during this time and also had served as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Action on the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and that he expressly rejected counterinsurgency in favor of conventional operations. By suppressing the lessons of Vietnam, Army leadership resisted its impact on the organization and its mission.

Quarantine

In order to keep mavericks from influencing the Army’s operations in Vietnam, General Taylor kept them away from command positions. In 1962, General Taylor recommended to President Kennedy that he send General Paul Harkins to command USMACV (Krepinevich 1988, 64). This recommendation was made, though, in light of the fact that other officers had more experience with counterinsurgency, including both Generals William Yarborough and William Rosson (Krepinevich 1988, 64-65). Yarborough, in particular, was closely associated with the Army’s Special Forces and counterinsurgency operations. General Rosson had more experience in Vietnam than any other senior Army officer. He served four tours of duty in Vietnam (Sullivan 2004). In 1954, already considered an expert on affairs in Indochina, Rosson (as a lieutenant colonel) served under the third MAAG commander (Eckhart 1991, 10). He served as chief of staff under General Westmoreland (Cosmas 2006, 215). In 1968, Rosson was put in charge of a sub-command of MACV with operational control of the both Marine and Army units (Eckhart 1991, 74).

These individuals were considered for command, but Taylor felt that promoting officers who were further down in the rank structure would imply that something was wrong with the senior leadership (Blaufarb 1977, 82; Krepinevich 1988, 65). In contrast to counterinsurgency-
leaning officers, Harkins believed firmly in the ability of conventional forces with conventional operational capabilities and tactics could win in Vietnam (Blaufarb 1977, 83; Krepinevich 1988, 65). By keeping counterinsurgency-minded officers out of command, he helped keep counterinsurgency out of the Army.

Denial

Army leadership denied that the insurgency was their responsibility. Instead, the Army leadership viewed the insurgency as the responsibility of the South Vietnamese government. Though USMACV was tasked with winning the war in Vietnam, it continually denied responsibility for implementing a counterinsurgency strategy.

Army leadership recognized that the South Vietnamese government was incapable of fighting its own counterinsurgency early in the conflict. Visiting Vietnam in 1960, General Lyman Lemnitzer along with the MAAVG Commander at the time recognized that the Viet Cong insurgency strategy was a severe threat (Eckhart 1991, 19-20). But, the government, army, and leadership of South Vietnam were inadequate to meet these challenges (Eckhart 1991, 15-22). The early attempts at counterinsurgency run by the South Vietnamese government, the Strategic Hamlet Program and its predecessors the Agrovilles, proved to be ineffective at stopping the spread of the insurgency (Zasloff 1961; Osborne 1965; Birtle 2007, 319; Ahern 2010, 78-82). A senior adviser to President Kennedy who visited South Vietnam as early as 1962 considered the program “worse than useless” (Hilsman 1998).

But even though Army leadership recognized the failure of the South Vietnamese government to conduct effective pacification, they denied taking responsibility for the actual conduct of pacification. Though they recognized as early as 1960 the failure of the South Vietnamese Army, they refused to allocate significant Army assets beyond advise and assist to

One could argue that the advise and assist operations were an attempt at successful counterinsurgency and not a tactic of minimizing U.S. Army involvement in the pacification effort of the war. Yet, the failures of these operations, the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese Army, and the failure of the South Vietnamese government’s pacification effort were noted very early in the war (Cosmas 2006, 439). Throughout the build-up of combat forces between 1965 and 1968, the focus on the advise and assist operations declined (Cosmas 2006, 430). The issue, then, is that Westmoreland and USMACV did not take more direct responsibility for the pacification effort. By maintaining a strong demarcation between conventional operations and the advise and assist operations, Westmoreland effectively denied responsibility for the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. Even given the findings of the PROVN study and the downward progress of the pacification effort, Westmoreland did not allocate more U.S. Army forces to winning the “village war” (outside of Special Forces). While the North Vietnamese conventional threat did appropriately require the allocation of units and combat resources, so did the failing counterinsurgency effort.

Thus, the Army strategically resisted forces for change in the case of counterinsurgency during and as a result of Vietnam. The forces for change, tactics of resistance, outcome, and the degree to which the resistance was successful are identified in the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Insurgency (Operations against Viet Cong)</th>
<th>Denial – Westmoreland saw this as the responsibility of South Vietnamese forces</th>
<th>Army leadership viewed insurgency as responsibility of South Vietnamese government</th>
<th>Yes – did not implement counterinsurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational Experience (Lessons taken from Vietnam operations)</td>
<td>Suppression – DePuy sought to remove experiences from 100-5, the capstone doctrinal manual</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency was purged from Army doctrine, training, and organizational structure</td>
<td>Yes – no changes to core functions or branches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waiting Out / Move to Periphery – small changes made at the periphery of the organization that protected core features</td>
<td>Small changes made to educational programs, but service leadership made minimal changes while Kennedy still in office</td>
<td>Somewhat – services made no significant changes to structure, processes, or organizational capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise – Westmoreland convinced U.S. leadership in Vietnam not to put Lansdale in overall control of resources/units</td>
<td>Westmoreland was able to sway U.S. leadership and prevent Lansdale from taking authority over Army forces in the conduct of pacification activities</td>
<td>Yes – No commitment of Army conventional forces to the pacification effort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore – Hosmer and other individuals had no impact on Army</td>
<td>Studies on pacification and its role in Vietnam had no changes on Army priorities in country</td>
<td>Yes – No changes to operations or strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppression – Reports were considered research but had no operational impact</td>
<td>Studies and reports on pacification were downgraded</td>
<td>Yes – No changes to operations or strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Force For Change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal Force For Change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tactic of Resistance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td><strong>Successful Resistance?</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Insurgents (in the form of John Paul Vann)</td>
<td>Suppression – Kept from speaking to JCS</td>
<td>Vann was kept from briefing JCS and providing input on Army strategy</td>
<td>Yes – Insurgent input kept out of decision-making process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavericks (in the form of Generals Yarborough and Rosson)</td>
<td>Quarantine – Kept out of command positions; put in offices that could be controlled</td>
<td>Those knowledgeable about pacification and its role in counterinsurgency made no impact on Army</td>
<td>Yes – Army leadership kept actions from influencing main forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (2001 – 2013)**

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the greatest operational challenge to the Army’s mission since Vietnam. Like Vietnam, these operations required (and still require) the Army to conduct counterinsurgency operations. But unlike Vietnam, the Army has responded with a relatively strong counterinsurgency effort. However, strategic resistance to change still played (and plays) a role in the Army’s conduct of and response to these wars.

Numerous forces for change have acted on the Army in this case. External and internal forces for change that have pressured the Army include an insurgency, political leadership, mavericks, think-tanks and policy-focused organizations, and organizational leadership. In response to these forces for change, the Army utilized tactics of resistance including the political use of expertise, denial, ignoring the force for change, and quarantine. The primary constituency of resistance, as with previous instances in the case of counterinsurgency, was Army leadership.

**History**

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began as a result, both directly or indirectly, of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. Army was the first of the armed forces to put
personnel in Afghanistan, less than a month after the attacks (Jones 2010, 91-95). Just eighteen months later, the Army led the U.S. assault against Iraq to achieve regime change in that country (Ballard et al. 2012, 77-85). In Iraq, U.S. forces faced an insurgency within months of its victory over Iraqi conventional forces; in Afghanistan, the insurgency built strength over a number of years. Together, these wars are the Army’s most significant counterinsurgency operations since Vietnam.

Although Afghanistan was the earlier operation of the two, it was the secondary theater of conflict in terms of its challenges and importance. In Afghanistan, the interest of U.S. leadership in maintaining a “light footprint” coincided with an operational environment that was relatively permissive for coalition forces, meaning that coalition forces could travel and conduct operations without being attacked (Jones 2010, 109-124). Between 2001 and 2006, total U.S. forces in Afghanistan never exceeded 25,000 personnel and U.S. casualties were less than 100 per year (Belasco 2009, 62-63; icasualties.org n.d.). Following the defeat of the Taliban in the winter of 2001, there were only 9 suicide attacks against alliance forces between 2002 and 2004 (Jones 2010, 207).

For the first years of Afghanistan, the Army followed a counterinsurgency strategy. Lieutenant General David Barno (U.S. Army) ran U.S. operations from 2003 to 2005, though U.S. forces at the time totaled just two combat brigades (approximately 10,000 soldiers) and some Special Forces personnel (Kaplan 2013, 319). Along with the experienced U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Barno sought to develop support for the Afghan government by building interagency and international support to protect the people of Afghanistan by investing in reconstruction efforts, developing local governance structures, training Afghan security forces,
and pursuing insurgent groups (Ballard et al. 2012, 114-119; Kaplan 2013, 320-321). Barno’s counterinsurgency strategy was his own; his successor, General Karl Eikenberry, focused almost exclusively on training the Afghan army and pursuing insurgents (Kaplan 2013, 322). By 2006, the number of suicide attacks had increased to 140 per year (Jones 2008, 7), but from 2006 to 2008, U.S. forces still focused primarily on training Afghan security forces (Ballard et al. 2012, 180-189).

By 2006, the number of suicide attacks had increased to 140 per year (Jones 2008, 7), but from 2006 to 2008, U.S. forces still focused primarily on training Afghan security forces (Ballard et al. 2012, 180-189). As of 2013, success in Afghanistan, meaning a country capable of resisting Taliban and Al Qaeda forces without coalition support, continues to be elusive. In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal oversaw a “surge” force in Afghanistan of 30,000 additional troops focused on “disrupting” al Qaeda and other terrorist groups while minimizing civilian casualties (Ballard et al. 2012, 230-246; Kaplan 2013, 325-327). The surge was minimally successful, and just over a year later in June 2010, General David Petraeus replaced McChrystal to lead U.S. forces in Afghanistan (Ballard et al. 2012, 256). At best, progress under General Petraeus was uneven (Ballard et al. 2012, 259-264; Kaplan 2013, 338-348), and his successor General John Allen continues to focus on developing Afghan security forces in support of the Afghan government.

U.S. forces are set to leave Afghanistan by 2014 (Ballard et al. 2012, 265).

In Iraq, U.S. forces almost immediately faced an insurgency after the initial invasion of 2003 but Army leadership was hesitant to enact a counterinsurgency strategy. Political leadership, particularly in the early years of the war, did not want to recognize that an insurgency was occurring in Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, particularly, was accused of refusing to recognize that there was an insurgency in Iraq for the first years of the war (Milbank 2005; Borger 2005) and corrected the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

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195 At least through 2006, commanders in Afghanistan were instructed to use the term “counterterrorist” operations rather than “counterinsurgency” (Jones 2010, 209).

196 In 2006, suicide attacks reached 140 per year (up from six in 2004); armed attacks increased three-fold from 1,558 in 2005 to 4,542 in 2006; and the number of remote IED attacks doubled from 2005 to 2006 (Jones 2010, 207). With the increase in violence, a U.S. military commander assumed control of the NATO force in Afghanistan in 2007 for the first time since the invasion.

197 Political leadership, particularly in the early years of the war, did not want to recognize that an insurgency was occurring in Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, particularly, was accused of refusing to recognize that there was an insurgency in Iraq for the first years of the war (Milbank 2005; Borger 2005) and corrected the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
and 2006, U.S. Army generals, including General Tommy Franks, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, and General George Casey, led U.S. forces in Iraq. These leaders focused on keeping the number of U.S. forces small in order to streamline the process of handing over the country’s security to Iraqi forces and preventing Iraqi dependency on coalition forces (Ballard et al. 2012, 143).  

The Iraq strategy changed when General David Petraeus took over command in January 2007. Under his leadership, the “surge” strategy brought in 30,000 more soldiers; deployed U.S. forces amongst the civilian population; worked hand-in-hand with political leadership to win the support of the Iraqi people; and brought Sunni forces into the security apparatus of Iraq (Kaplan 2013, 259-269). Scholars and Iraq experts disagree as to whether the turn-around in Iraq is directly attributable to General Petraeus and the “surge” (Robinson 2008; Ricks 2009; Knowlton 2010), but violence did significantly drop during the years 2007 and 2008 (Petraeus 2007; Petraeus 2008). As a result of the security improvements and the status of forces (SOFA) agreement between the governments of Iraq and the United States, the last U.S. combat forces withdrew from Iraq in August 2010 (NBC News 2010) and all U.S. forces left Iraq as of December 18, 2011 (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 671).

Forces for Change

A number of forces for change have pressured the Army in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan. Internal forces for change included mavericks, organizational leadership, and

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Staff Peter Pace for using the term “insurgent” (Associated Press 2005). The role that such a position played on the Army’s resistance to enacting a counterinsurgency strategy will be discussed in a subsequent section.

198 But as one counterinsurgency expert stated of the strategy, “[the strategy] did not talk about what you had to do to defeat an insurgency. It was not a counterinsurgency plan” (Sepp 2006 as quoted in Ballard et al. 2013, 143).
operational experience. External forces for change included the insurgencies, political leadership, and think-tanks and policy-focused organizations.

Internal

In this case, mavericks were a significant force for change. From 2003 to 2004, then-Major General David Petraeus followed a counterinsurgency approach as commander of the 101st in the northern city of Mosul, achieving a great deal of success and stability (Smith 2003; Porter 2006; Klein 2007). In the city of Tal Afar in 2005, then-Colonel (now Major General) H.R. McMaster conducted classical counterinsurgency operations to pacify the restive city (Porter 2006; Ricks 2006). In Baghdad in 2004, then-Major General Peter Chiarelli focused his 1st Cavalry Division on making sure trash was picked up, sewers were cleaned, and as many jobs as possible were funded with coalition funds while fighting the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr (Chiarelli and Michaelis 2005; Pirnie and O'Connell 2008, 41-42). In the western province of Al-Anbar in 2006 and 2007, Colonel Sean MacFarland executed a number of counterinsurgency actions, and he was able to win the support of the Sunnis in the region to fight Al Qaeda groups in what is now known as the “Anbar Awakening” (Michaels 2007; Russell 2011, 112-123). Even though these mavericks helped achieve successes in some parts of Iraq in the first few years of the war, they were the exception rather than the rule.

The most significant internal force for change was organizational leadership. In January 2007, General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey as commander in Iraq and

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199 McMaster received direct praise from President Bush in March 2006 (Woodward 2008, 36-37). According to Bob Woodward (2008, 37), “Some superiors saw him as a handful, a renegade who too often did things his own way. But few questioned his competence and ingenuity.” McMaster was passed over twice for brigadier general; he received his first star only after General Petraeus returned from Iraq to take control over the promotion board (Kaplan 2008; CBS News 2009). Other officers promoted under Petraeus’ oversight included Sean MacFarland, Michael Garrett, Colleen McGuire, eight special operations officers, and other officers of the Stryker units (Kaplan 2008). The promotion board included other counterinsurgency-type generals: Peter Chiarelli, Stanley McChrystal, and John Mulholland (Kaplan 2008). McMaster was then passed over once for Major General but was promoted upon the subsequent consideration (Ricks 2011; Wright 2012).
implemented a new counterinsurgency strategy commonly known as the “surge.” With the “surge” strategy, Petraeus pushed U.S. forces to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency. Though there was (and continues to be) debate on whether the surge provided long-term stability to Iraq, Petraeus’ effort produced dramatic results in reducing the level of violence (Ricks 2009; Walt 2009; Corn 2010; Feaver 2011, 88-92).

The final internal force for change in this case is the operational experience garnered from these operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Army’s own official lessons learned organization, has published hundreds of reports, handbooks, and newsletters related to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and “the number of newsletters alone number between 400 and 500” (Colonel Robert Forrester, Deputy Director of CALL, as quoted in Brooks 2012). The Army Center for Military History has published at least two historical narratives of the conflict in Iraq; its Military History Teams (MHTs) have captured a number of lessons and over 80 terabytes of information from both conflicts (Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn 2005; Wright, Reese, and Wallace 2008; Moore 2013). In 2010, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7) published a pinnacle lessons learned document of the wars, *Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (2012). Beyond written documents, personal experiences of soldiers and commanders who have served in either Iraq or Afghanistan (or both) bring a huge amount of knowledge into the organization; as of 2010, approximately 60% of the Army had served at least one combat tour overseas (Zoroya 2010). All of these experiences and lessons represent a force for change that will exist within the organization for many years after the end of hostilities.

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200 Though difficult to quantify, hundreds of memoirs and first-person accounts have been written about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Amazon.com 2012).

201 In total, over two million U.S. military personnel have deployed on at least one combat tour (Martinez and Bingham 2011).
External

The most immediate external force for change was the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the insurgency was nascent but recognizable. Lieutenant General David Barno who assumed command of U.S. forces in October 2003 recognized that security was unstable particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the country (Ballard et. al 2012, 116). This instability was partly due to residual Al Qaeda forces in the country but, more importantly, also to a number of Taliban forces that sought to destabilize the newly-formed Afghan government and take away the Afghan people’s support from the new government (Ballard et al. 2012, 116-117). Though the insurgency brought minimal violence for the first years, it grew steadily stronger over time.

In Iraq, the insurgency grew much stronger, much more quickly. Al Qaeda-affiliated militants, Sunni groups, former Baathists, and Shiite militant groups all sought to take control of the country away from the U.S.-sponsored government and to undercut the legitimacy of U.S. forces (Finer 2006; Pirnie and O’Connell 2008). Beginning in 2005, Iraqi civilian casualties totaled at least 200 per month; by 2006, the number increased to at least 700 per month; and at least 1,629 civilians were killed in December 2006 (icasualties.org n.d.). Between 2004 and 2008, U.S. casualties totaled over 800 per year (icasualties.org n.d.). The bombing of the Shiite Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraq in February 2006 incited even more instability (Knickmeyer and Ibrahim 2006; Woodward 2008a, 107), threatening what some observers both inside and outside the U.S. government considered an Iraqi civil war (Feldman 2006; Sambinas 2006; Wright and Ricks 2006).

Political leadership has been the most significant external force for change for the Army in this case in regards to both the organization and operations. In 2005, President Bush supported Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 which stated, “[Stability operations] shall
be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005, 2). This act had the profound effect of making the governance and economic aspects of counterinsurgency equal in importance to direct-action, conventional capabilities.202

At the height of violence in Iraq, political leadership intervened directly to affect operations. Extensive maneuvering inside the National Security Council and the White House led to a shift in the administration’s view of the most appropriate strategy for the war.203 In 2007, President Bush replaced General Casey with General David Petraeus. Along with the change in commanders, Bush also pushed for a “surge” strategy of an additional five combat brigades to deploy to Iraq (Bush 2007). Besides the decision to invade Iraq and Afghanistan, this was President Bush’s most direct involvement in either wars.

Finally, think-tanks and policy-focused organizations also attempted to impact the Army. These included the RAND organization, which published a number of studies meant to influence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond (Dobbins 2003), America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Dobbins et al. 2003), The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building (Dobbins et al. 2007), and Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War (Dobbins 2007). In 2006, RAND also re-issued Stephen Hosmer’s conference report from over four decades earlier, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962. From 2003 to 2007, RAND published over a dozen reports specifically on the topic of counterinsurgency, but none

202 In 2009, DoD Directive 3000.05 was changed to DoD Instruction 3000.05; this will be discussed subsequently.

203 For a full discussion of the shift in opinion that occurred in the White House from mid-2006 to early 2007 and the various individuals involved, see (Feaver 2008; Woodward 2008; Wehner 2008; Bergen 2011, 266-296).
had any real effect on the strategy in either Iraq or Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{204} Other reports came from think-tanks and policy-focused groups including the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which published numerous reports specifically on the security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{205}

A more direct force for change came from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think-tank in Washington, DC, that played a central role in convincing the president of a new strategy for Iraq in 2006. While President Bush and others in the administration were already concerned about success in Iraq, Dr. Frederick Kagan of AEI supported by retired Army general Jack Keane recommended a plan that became the foundation of the “surge” strategy (Kagan 2007; Woodward 2008a, 276-281).\textsuperscript{206} This would eventually become the official strategy supported by President Bush in 2006 and implemented by General David Petraeus in 2007 (Feaver 2008; Woodward 2008a, 277-282; Kaplan 2013, 200).

Strategic Resistance to Change

In response to these external and internal forces for change, the Army has strategically resisted adaptation in its primary elements and many of its secondary elements. In the table below, I have identified the features on which forces for change have exerted pressure and whether there is indication of strategic resistance:

\textsuperscript{204} See RAND website research area designated as “Counterinsurgency Operations.”

\textsuperscript{205} For an overview of the research conducted by these organizations related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see: Center for New American Security, Iraq and Afghanistan (CNAS 2012); Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iraq and Afghanistan (CSIS 2012).

\textsuperscript{206} According to Bob Woodward, the military leadership did not know of true nature of Keane’s involvement until it was too late to stop him (Woodward 2008).
Table 10: Strategic Resistance to Counterinsurgency – Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions by leadership to resist FFCs?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been no change in the Army’s promotion pathways that would incentivize or develop counterinsurgency capabilities. There has been discussion of developing a “skill identifier” which identifies soldiers and officers as a foreign advisor who has special experience in such a role (Casey 2008), but without such activities being a requirement for promotion, this is just as likely to hurt as to help an individual’s promotion potential (Gambrell 2011).

Additionally, such a skill identifier, as of 2012, has not been implemented so the ramifications of the program are not yet identifiable (Wuestner 2012). Instead, the current personnel evaluation policies are still based on the traditional Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and the Officer Record Brief (ORB), which narrowly define success based on command of ever-larger units, which then determines an individual’s ability to progress upwards in rank and responsibility (Wardynski et al. 2010, vii). The Army personnel system is still designed to promote and reward those who are capable of leading conventional units against other units in conventional operations, but it does not select for those who might have skills, capabilities, and personal attributes that are more appropriate for counterinsurgency operations (Wardynski et al. 2010, vii).
Training requirements also do not reflect recent operations. The six training requirements for all three of the Army’s brigade variants (the basic fighting element of the Army’s current structure) focus on offensive and defensive operations. While one of the six primary training requirements for each of the three types of brigades is to conduct stability operations, the tasks associated with this training do not reflect the role that the Army played in developing local security capabilities, facilitating political relationships, and developing economic capabilities of the host nation. More importantly, Army units are not allowed to train for counterinsurgency/stability operations until they are ordered to prepare for such an operation pending an actual deployment (U.S. Department of the Army 2007, 9-1; Kaplan 2013, 45-46).

Structure has also not changed. While the Brigade Combat Team organization was able to be adapted in theatre to meet operational demands, the BCT structure was organized in the years prior to Iraq and Afghanistan and not as a result of these experiences (Shanker 2002; Hsia 2009; Army Capabilities Integration Center 2012). Additionally, the changes made to fit the needs of counterinsurgency in recent years have not been institutionalized as a permanent part of the BCTs.

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207 The three types of brigades are the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Each type has almost exactly the same training requirements, i.e. the “Mission Essential Task List” or METL.


209 These include but are not limited to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); Mobile Training Teams (MiTTs); Asymmetrical Warfare Group (AWG); Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs); the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT); the US Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center; Stability Operations Information Cells (SOICs); Counter-IED Teams; Economic and Political Intelligence Teams (EPICs); Female Engagement Teams (FETs); Village Stability Operations (VSO) Teams and the Village Stability Platform (VSP); the DOD Ministry of Defense Advisory (MODA) program; the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations (CCO); the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO); the
Materiel and technology have also changed little. The most obvious technological change in the recent operations was the acquisition of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP, which the Army reluctantly acquired only with emphasis directly from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (Lamb et al. 2009; Weiner 2010). Biometrics gathering devices also proved their usefulness in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while there has been a specific office set up to develop such technology; its permanence is not certain (Biometrics Information Management Agency 2012). The Army has made permanent shifts in materiel only in the area of individual soldier weapons and equipment that facilitate the kinetic, direct action aspect of counterinsurgency operations that are just as applicable to conventional warfare as to counterinsurgency.

Doctrine has changed in the sense that the Army has published a new counterinsurgency manual, but the pinnacle doctrinal manuals of the Army still overwhelming focus on conventional operations. Since 2006, the Army has published at least seven new manuals focused on non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency, the most famous being *FM 3-24, U.S.*

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210 Currently, the Army has no plans to buy more MRAPS and is continuing to develop its preferred vehicle more suited to conventional conflict. Instead of the MRAP, the Army is moving MRAPS to storage locations around the world until a mission demands them (Woodhouse 2011; Shanker 2012). MRAPS will replace some HMMWVs, but the Army’s intended future vehicle will be the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) (Army Times 2012; Wilkers 2012). The degree to which this new vehicle will incorporate design functions that allow it to survive IEDs versus the ability move on a conventional battlefield is yet to be determined.

211 This includes personal protective equipment (PPE) such as body armor; communication equipment; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment; and small-unit weaponry including lighter machine guns, night optics and sites, and squad machine guns (Army Capabilities Integration Center 2012, 9-12). These materiel purchases, however, were not resisted to the same degree as the MRAP; they required less financial commitment, but more importantly they fit within the paradigm of a more agile individual soldier capable of improved performance that is beneficial in both the kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency as well as in conventional conflict.
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual first published in 2006.\textsuperscript{212} Overseen by General David Petraeus while commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 3-24 attempted to provide counterinsurgency guidance based on the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan and analysis of historical counterinsurgency efforts (Miller 2011).\textsuperscript{213}

Though FM 3-24 stands out, the Army’s capstone operations manual ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations does not specifically address counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{214} Within the capstone manual, counterinsurgency is considered to be part of “wide area security,” one of two broad operational activities along with “combined arms maneuver:” “Army forces simultaneously and continuously combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations through a blend of combined arms maneuver and wide area security” (U.S. Department of the Army 2011c, 2-3). This manual does not specifically address counterinsurgency directly or independently even once (U.S. Department of the Army 2011c). Instead, the manual focuses on the direct action aspects related to wide-area security: “The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of


\textsuperscript{213} While General Petraeus oversaw the effort along with Lieutenant General James Mattis, USMC, the lead author of the project was Dr. Conrad Crane of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (Nagl 2010, 118). Crane was supported by approximately 20 other authors in the writing of the manual (Military.com 2006), including Sarah Sewall of Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights.

\textsuperscript{214} Until 2011, the capstone doctrinal manuals of the U.S. Army were FM 3-0, Operations and FM 1-0, The Army. In 2010, the Army initiated a complete revamp of its doctrine with a project called “Doctrine 2015” with the intent of making these manuals “more collaborative and successful” through the use of shorter capstone documents and processes to allow more input from soldiers and commanders (GEN Martin Dempsey as quoted in United States Army Combined Arms Center 2012, 1). With this project, the capstone documents, now requiring approval directly from the Chief of Staff of the Army, are ADP 1, The Army; ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations; ADP 7-0, Training; and ADP 6-22, Army Leadership.
advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative” (U.S. Department of the Army 2011c, Glossary-1). Whether or not the non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency will be given greater or equal resourcing to develop such capabilities is yet to be determined, but as of now they are left out of the capstone doctrine.

Education has adapted somewhat, but this adaptation occurred only during the conflict. As of 2008, the Command and General Staff College’s Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Program, the school through which nearly all junior field grade officers pass, included over 200 hours of counterinsurgency classroom time along with 40 hours of electives focused on counterinsurgency (Feickert 2008, 6). Previously, CGSC courses only had 30 hours focused on counterinsurgency (Feickert 2008, 6).

Such a focus seems to indicate a strong turn towards counterinsurgency, but total hours can be misleading. While the total number of hours is important, the percentage of core curriculum time spent on counterinsurgency-related issues has remained relatively stable over the past few years. From 2001 to 2012, the percentage of time (as opposed to total hours) of the core curriculum at the Army’s Command and General Staff College (focused on educating majors) increase from about 8% to just under 20% (Mariano 2012, 16). In 2012, about 18% of the core curriculum was dedicated to “small wars” topics (Mariano 2012, 16). The Army’s War College (focused on educating colonels) has actually reduced the amount of time within the core curriculum spent on small wars from about 8% to under 5% between 2001 and 2012 (Mariano 2012, 17). Looking at the two schools combined from 1973 to 2012, the average percentage of curriculum hours spent on counterinsurgency-related topics was “relatively steady” at 7% (Mariano 2012, 18).
There are no awards specific to the skills and actions associated with counterinsurgency. In 2010, British Major General Nick Carter who commanded ISAF forces in southern Afghanistan proposed a medal for “courageous restraint” when soldiers’ actions protected human lives (Starr 2010). Speaking for the ISAF Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, a spokesman later stated:

Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. In some situations our forces face in Afghanistan, that restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those combat actions that merit awards for valor (Lieutenant Colonel Tadd Sholtis as quoted in Starr 2010).

At the time, civilian casualties were a major concern in Afghanistan, coalition military leaders considered civilian casualties the most dangerous threat to the success of the ISAF mission as it pushed the people away from supporting the coalition. Such a medal would have reinforced protection of civilians, one of the most significant aspects of any successful counterinsurgency; yet, such a medal never materialized. As of now, there are still no medals or awards specifically focused on counterinsurgency skills.

The one feature with the greatest change is facilities. Because commanders in Iraq realized that officers did not understand the fundamentals of counterinsurgency when they arrived in Iraq, General Casey established a COIN Academy to facilitate a short training for all officers in a five-day introduction to counterinsurgency (Ricks 2006). In fact, Army leaders had not received any counterinsurgency training prior to deployment (Ricks 2006). However, no such counterinsurgency academy has ever existed in the United States. Today, the Counterinsurgency Center located in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas does send trainers to conduct pre-deployment seminars on counterinsurgency but only to those units that are deploying (U.S.

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215 An Afghanistan COIN Academy, also based on a five-day model, was established in April 2007 (Sheikh 2007).
Army Counterinsurgency Center 2011). They do not make regular, consistent visits to non-deploying units.

There has also been change in the Army’s major training facilities. At the National Training Center (NTC) in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana, mock villages were set up to train soldiers in the basics of interacting with local populaces and forces and in the conduct of counterinsurgency (Calder 2008; Davidson 2011, 118-123; Kaplan 2013, 131-132). 216

Ignorance about the nature of counterinsurgency, pressure from political leadership, and a change in the international security environment could all be offered as alternative explanations. 217 These explanations for the Army’s failure to adopt counterinsurgency capabilities, however, lack explanatory value.

Army leadership cannot be accused of ignorance about the nature of counterinsurgency and how it differs from conventional operations. In fact, the Army leadership demonstrated acute awareness of such differences over the years: the publication in 2006 of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Departments of the Army and Marine Corps 2007); the Army’s annual organizational strategic document, the Army Posture Statements, indicate a recognition of the differences between the two modes of war; 218 the Joint Chiefs of Staff report Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lesson from the Past Decade of Operations which was

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216 However, these are only 10-day and 12-day exercises and do not take into account the lengthy engagements necessary for trust-building and stability operations experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army does, however, have a model for such extended training in the Ranger School program (seven weeks) and the Special Forces Qualifying Course “Robin Sage” exercise (which lasts four weeks).

217 That counterinsurgency cannot be trained has been addressed; the very fact that the Army has achieved some degree of success in these wars indicates that this is not persuasive. Accident is also not a valid argument, as this would only be due to ignorance about the nature of counterinsurgency or a failure to implement changes (the former is addressed above).

218 See Army Posture Statements from 2007-2012.
endorsed by CJCS General (U.S. Army) Martin Dempsey indicates a number of differences, the most notable perhaps, “Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat…” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 2012, 2); and actions, comments, and writings by senior Army leaders including General George Casey (the previous Army Chief of Staff) and General Ray Odierno (the current Chief of Staff) indicate awareness of these differences (Kagan and Kagan 2008; Garamone 2010; Casey 2012; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 298-300). The Army leadership of today is more acutely educated about counterinsurgency than any previous generation of leaders.

Even in the beginning stages of the wars, a few Army leaders and national security organizations recognized the insurgency in Iraq. General John Abizaid, then the commander of U.S. Central Command, stated in July 2003 that U.S. personnel were facing a “classical guerilla-type campaign” (Shanker 2003). Major General Peter Chiarelli, who eventually became Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, stated in May 2004 that in his area of operation he was facing a “classic insurgency” (as quoted in Wilson 2004). Additionally, a CIA report from the fall of 2003 argued that the number of insurgents was as high as 50,000 people (Borger and McCarthy 2003). RAND published at least two studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency, including America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (published in 2003 and led by Ambassador James Dobbins) and Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (published in June 2004 and led by Bruce Hoffman). Both stressed the insurgent nature of the conflicts, but most Army commanders ignored them.219

In the early years of Iraq, General George Casey recognized the growing insurgency in the country. General Casey saw that U.S. forces were facing an insurgency but he was hesitant

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219 The possibility that these warnings never reached Franks or Sanchez is highly unlikely; their response to these reports was to ignore them. This will be addressed subsequently.
to enact a full counterinsurgency strategy; he recognized the primacy of political reconciliation and economic development, but he argued that success depended on handing over security responsibility to Iraqi forces as quickly as possible (Woodward 2008a, 6). By the fall of 2004, Casey had appointed then-Colonel (now Major General) William Hix, counterinsurgency expert Kalev Sepp, and other analysts within his command to study the insurgency problem and put together a campaign plan to counter it (Porter 2006; Woodward 2008a, 33). In October 2005, General Casey established the Counterinsurgency Academy in Iraq to teach Army officers the basics of counterinsurgency; still, he saw the Army’s true responsibility in Iraq as preparing Iraqi forces to fight the insurgency rather than fighting it themselves (PBS Frontline 2007).

Unfortunately, the Iraqi forces proved unable to conduct an effective counterinsurgency effort and the operations limped along until the security environment finally reached its worst levels in 2005 and 2006.

Another alternate explanation for the lack of change is pressure from political leaders. As discussed previously, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld de-emphasized the insurgent nature of the conflict in the early years of the Iraq War (Associated Press 2005b; Borger 2005; Milbank 2005). Additionally, General Casey was under political pressure in the early years to keep casualties low and to implement the President’s “stand-up/stand-down” strategy, whereby Iraqi forces replaced American forces as quickly as possible as well as achieving victory and demonstrating combat success (Packer 2006; Feaver 2008; Woodward 2008, 6; Feaver 2011, 99). But when this policy changed in late 2006, Casey did not alter his own strategy.

According to Kalev Sepp, General Casey told U.S. commanders in Iraq, “There is a counterinsurgency effort, but your primary effort must be directed at making the Iraqis fight this war for themselves, so you will concentrate on training Iraqi security forces while conducting your other operations. But this is your top priority” (PBS Frontline 2007).

A related argument is that Army officials did not believe that the American public wanted to be involved in counterinsurgency. As Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker stated, “The American public does not want to do anything different [i.e. get involved in a long war]” (Schoomaker as quoted in Woodward 2008, 174). But, the Army does not take its orders from the American public, it takes them from political leaders. Deferring to the American public over political leadership is both a challenge to the traditional U.S. civil-military command relationship: by using the American public as an excuse to not conduct counterinsurgency operations, they are overstepping their political leadership.
both keep casualties low and to implement the President’s “stand-up/stand-down” strategy, whereby Iraqi forces replaced American forces as quickly as possible (Packer 2006; Feaver 2008; Woodward 2008a, 6; Feaver 2011, 99). If this same guidance by political leaders had continued throughout the war, then it would be difficult to classify Casey’s actions as strategic resistance.

However, political leadership changed its focus in favor of a counterinsurgency effort in 2006 and the Army leadership failed to follow suit. If General Casey was only responding to guidance from political leadership, he should have been more willing to change course as soon as President Bush changed policies in favor of the “surge” strategy. Instead, Casey resisted Bush’s change in strategy (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 302-305).

Political leadership has affected the Army’s emphasis on counterinsurgency at the beginning of the 2012, but it has not removed the Army’s responsibility for institutionalizing counterinsurgency capabilities. In January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta with the support of President Obama released new strategic guidance for the entire DoD (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). As part of this guidance, Secretary Panetta specifically addresses how U.S. armed forces should maintain counterinsurgency capabilities:

Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. *However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations* [emphasis original] (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 6).

Though many observers inside and outside the Army, and the wider DoD, have mistakenly interpreted Secretary Panetta’s guidance as a complete dismissal of all counterinsurgency operations (Davidson 2012), this guidance does not state that the Army and other armed forces are not responsible for maintaining counterinsurgency capabilities. Rather, it states only that the
force will not be sized for “large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 6). This document is extremely important, as it is the first post-Iraq strategic guidance.

Additionally, the Army itself recognizes the Secretary’s guidance to include, and not exclude, responsibility for counterinsurgency and stability operations. According to its own U.S. Army Capstone Concept issued in December 2012 by Training and Doctrine Command:

In accordance with this guidance [SECDEF guidance discussed above], the joint forces must…succeed in the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces: counterterrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression…provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. The Army, as part of the joint force, must provide the land component forces necessary to accomplish each of these primary missions (U.S. Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command 2012, 10).

In no way has President Obama or Secretary Panetta indicated that the Army can forego its responsibility to maintain its counterinsurgency capabilities or that it should purge its lessons gained from the past decade of war. The Army officially recognizes that political leadership expects it to be able to execute these types of operations. Fundamentally, this document indicates that the Army recognizes the importance of counterinsurgency capabilities in meeting future security challenges, but as discussed previously, it has resisted the development of such capabilities.

A final alternate explanation for why the Army has failed to institutionalize counterinsurgency capabilities is that a significant change in the international security environment. Prior to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army’s main overseas operations were stability operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Between 2011 and 2013, the two largest involvements of U.S. forces were in Libya and Mali, operations much closer to Iraq and Afghanistan-type operations than conventional operations. The Army’s own 2012 Army
Posture Statement sees the future strategic environment as heavily influenced by these types of threats:

A series of powerful global trends continue to shape the current and future strategic environment: increased demand for dwindling resources, persistent regional conflict, empowered non-state actors, the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular and irregular warfare, terrorism and criminality (U.S. Department of the Army 2012a, 5).

The same assessment has been made by the Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats (the Marine Corps being the other U.S. ground operations force), which predicts counterinsurgency-like operations in South America, Central Africa, and Southeast Asia to be the most likely U.S. interventions in the coming years (Sanborn 2011). The major peer competitor in conventional warfare, China, has not significantly altered its capabilities or strategies since before the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the actual Chinese military threat is strongly debated (e.g., Samuelson 2008, Glaser 2011, Japan Times 2012). Overall, there has been no major change in the strategic environment from the pre-Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts to explain the lack of institutionalization of counterinsurgency capabilities and the importance of such capabilities has only increased. This leaves strategic resistance as the most compelling explanation for the Army’s resistance to counterinsurgency.

Tactics of Resistance

In resisting internal and external forces for change, Army leadership employed a number of tactics of resistance. These include denial, the political use of expertise, ignoring forces for change, and quarantine.

Denial

Army commanders denied responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, only doing so when political leadership intervened. Instead of conducting
counterinsurgency themselves—meaning taking direct responsibility for local security and getting directly involved in developing governmental services necessary to win the support of the local population—the majority of commanders saw their role as developing the Iraqi and Afghanistan forces to do it on their own (Kagan and Kagan 2008). At the top of the chain in Iraq, General George Casey sought to push responsibility to the Iraqis for their own security, even when they proved inadequate (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 90-99). From General John Abizaid, the U.S. Army general who led U.S. Central Command and oversaw both wars, the guidance was the same: Iraqis had to take the lead in providing for their own security (Gordon and Trainor 2012, 90).

One could argue that a refusal to accept responsibility for local security was intended to help support stability rather than undercut it. A dictum of current counterinsurgency theory, paraphrased from T.E. Lawrence, is that it is better to let the local forces do something imperfectly rather than to do it for them. The problem with this argument, though, is that the security forces in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 were not just imperfect, they were failing and it was evident (U.S. House 2007a, 11-19). Lawrence’s dictum in no way intimates that it is better to let local forces fail rather than do it for them; local security is absolutely necessary to achieving the goals of counterinsurgency. Even as violence was increasing in 2006, General Casey supported reducing U.S. forces from 15 to 10 combat brigades, thereby lowering the Army’s ability to provide security even more so (Woodward 2008a, 59). The very failure of the Iraq and Afghanistan security forces to provide security, recognized by leadership, did not result in an assumption of responsibility by U.S. forces. Even when the political leadership indicated that it

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223 General David Petraeus is the exception. When he assumed command in Iraq in 2007, he instructed all U.S. forces to deploy amongst the local population centers and work directly with local security forces.

224 Additionally, Lawrence was an insurgent and not a counterinsurgent.
desired a change in strategy, Army commanders in Iraq continued to stress that turnover to Iraqi forces was the key to success, knowing that the Iraqi military was not ready to assume responsibility.

**Political Use of Expertise**

Army leaders attempted to use expertise against political leadership to prevent movement towards a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.²²⁵ Within the Bush administration, some National Security Council staff members²²⁶ recommended a change in strategy in Iraq prior to 2006. Yet even as security in Iraq worsened in that year and President Bush pushed for a new strategy, Army leadership in Iraq argued that the best way to win the conflict was to quickly transition security responsibility to Iraqi security forces (Woodward 2008a, 4). However, President Bush vetoed this strategy and appointed a new commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, who would execute a new strategy (Kaplan 2013, 243).

General Casey nor the Army Chief of Staff supported this strategy, but they failed persuade the president. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker along with CJCS Michael Mullen felt that sending more brigades to Iraq would over-extend the force and make the U.S. vulnerable to other security threats including North Korea (Woodward 2008a, 249-250). When President Bush proposed committing five brigades to Iraq in December 2006, Schoomaker pointed out that in fact it was a commitment of fifteen brigades in order to achieve the typical unit rotation cycle of two years at home for every one year deployed (Feaver 2011, 108).

²²⁵ In Afghanistan, there was no political pressure to move towards a counterinsurgency strategy; thus, there was no resistance.

²²⁶ These included Stephen Hadley (National Security Advisor), Meghan O’Sullivan, J.D. Crouch, and Bill Luti (Woodward 2008, 60-61; 230).

²²⁷ Even after David Petraeus was identified as the new Iraq commander in January 2007, the previous commander was arguing against additional troops (Woodward 2008, 309-310).
point, however, President Bush was not heeding the advice of Schoomaker, General Casey, nor General John Abizaid, USCENTCOM commander (Woodward 2008a, 250-290). As discussed previously, President Bush had already decided to act on the “surge” strategy supported by its proponents including NSC staffers, AEI, and Jack Keane.

Ignore

Army leadership ignored the recommendations of think-tanks and policy-focused organizations. Although RAND and the American Enterprise Institute both offered alternative strategies in Iraq, the Army leadership both in the U.S. (Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker) and in Iraq (General George Casey) ignored the recommendations. The latter organization, AEI, was able to influence strategy in Iraq by going directly to the president and his advisers (Kaplan 2013, 199-200; 233-239). Because these organizations had no direct influence over the Army, Army leaders could ignore their recommendations.

The Army leadership has also ignored the operational experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted above, the promotion pathways, training requirements, and structure of the Army have not changed in any way that would institutionalize the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no true institutionalization unless the three primary elements of the organization are changed.

An alternative argument to resisting changes to the three primary features mentioned above is that Army leadership is ignorant about the role that promotion pathways, training requirements, and structure play in institutionalizing certain capabilities. Such an argument would mean that Army leaders are ignorant about the role that key development positions such as Executive Officer and Operations Officer (while avoiding certain positions such as adviser or trainer) play in their own career paths; how training requirements drive their units’ training
cycles (from platoon through brigade operations) and thus the mastery of certain skill sets; and how the adaptations to organizational structure in Iraq and Afghanistan (as noted above) were critical to achieving success.

Yet even if the Army leadership does not understand the need to change promotion pathways, training SOPs, and organizational structure to adjust to counterinsurgency, there is still no evidence in any of the other elements (e.g. doctrine, education) to indicate attempted change. If the Army were not ignoring the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, we should see evidence of at least attempted change in at least one of the features, but there is no such evidence. Thus, the evidence suggests that the Army is ignoring the experiences of these wars.

Quarantine

The Army leadership attempted to quarantine the influence of mavericks. Lieutenant General Barno commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and was the first Army leader to enact a counterinsurgency strategy in either war, but he received received a follow-on assignment as the assistant chief of staff for installations, a job that had no influence on overseas operations or the organizational capabilities of the Army (Kaplan 2013, 321). He retired from the Army a year later (Kaplan 2013, 321).

The two most outspoken mavericks early in these conflicts were then-Colonel H.R. McMaster and General David Petraeus. After executing the first successful counterinsurgency operation in Iraq in 2005 (Kaplan 2013, 172-173), McMaster returned to the United States to be passed over for Brigadier General in both 2006 and 2007 (Kaplan 2008). General Richard Cody who was Vice Chief of the Army at the time considered counterinsurgency-minded officers “the flavor of the month” (Kaplan 2013, 281). General George Casey reportedly stated that McMaster would have been promoted if he “weren’t such a smart-ass” (Kaplan 2013, 281). But
McMaster is one of the most imminently qualified officers of his era: besides his experience in Iraq, he won a silver star (the third highest Army decoration for valor) for leading his tank company against 80 Iraqi vehicles in the Battle of 73 Easting during the first Gulf War; holds a PhD in history and has published a widely respected book focusing on the Joint Chiefs of Staff role in influencing strategy during the Vietnam War; attended West Point; and has held policy and strategy fellowships, including at the Hoover Institution (U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 2012).

In 2008, acting-Secretary of the Army specifically and intentionally organized a hand-picked board to choose the next batch of one-star generals, a board which was chaired by David Petraeus (Kaplan 2013, 282). As a result, McMaster received his first star; yet, only with the (likely) support of David Petraeus, himself a counterinsurgency-capable officer.

Whether or not General David Petraeus was quarantined after his return from service in Iraq is debatable. In 2005, following two assignments in Iraq as commander of the 101st and then as the Multi-National Security Transition-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Petraeus’ scheduled next posting was as superintendent of West Point (Kaplan 2013, 126). Though this is a respected assignment, it is also usually “terminal,” meaning that officers retire after their service there; as a result, Petraeus’ impact on the Army would have been stopped there (Kaplan 2013, 126). But at the urging of the acting Secretary of Army Francis Harvey, Petraeus was assigned as commander of the Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. However, this too was an atypical assignment; a commander with Petraeus’ experience would more likely have been assigned as the Chairman’s assistant or as the director of the Joint Staff (Kaplan 2013, 128). Yet according to at least one analyst, Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker assured Petraeus that his follow-on assignment after the Combined Arms Center would be as commander in Iraq to replace George...
Casey (Kaplan 2013, 129). Understanding the degree to which Petraeus’ assignment to the Combined Arms Center was an act of quarantine is made more difficult by the fact that the Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, was not a supporter of David Petraeus, but neither was he an enemy (Kaplan 2013, 127).

The final decision to put Petraeus in command in Iraq was not made by Army leadership, thus it is difficult to determine whether he had their support. According to Fred Kaplan (2013), Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker assured Petraeus that his post-Leavenworth job would be commander in Iraq (129). However, President Bush made the final decision, and the recommendation of Petraeus seems to have come from civilians rather than Army leadership. However, even after President Bush officially identified Petraeus as the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, he was refused permission to speak with unit commanders in country or to be briefed on the state of operations (Woodward 2008a, 310). Such refusal suggests quarantine.

The Army’s treatment of mavericks, though, is better understood by looking at individuals such as H.R. McMaster. General McMaster has since received his second star and, as of 2013, commands Fort Benning, Georgia and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, a position in which he is responsible for educating and preparing combat soldiers and captains in the combat arms (Riquelmy; Fort Benning Public Affairs Office 2013). While this position does have some impact on preparing soldiers for combat, he does not directly impact promotion

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228 Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, General Peter Pace, told Secretary of Defense Gates that all of the Chiefs agreed that Petraeus should take command in Iraq, even though there was some dissent from other Army leaders (Woodward 2008, 307).

229 According to Gordon and Trainor (2012, 302-303), the idea to send David Petraeus came for a group of civilian and retired military generals who met with President Bush in December 2006. This group included Eliot Cohen, General (retired) Barry McCaffrey, and Steven Biddle. This group also included Jack Keane, a retired Army general who had pushed the “surge” strategy with Fred Kagan (Kaplan 2013, 238; Gordon and Trainor 2012, 302-303). Keane was also Petraeus’ personal mentor during their time in the Army (Woodward 2008).

230 Due to his appointment as CIA director in 2011 and subsequent departure from public service, it is impossible to determine whether and how constituencies within the Army might have strategically resisted his further influence on the organization.
pathways, training requirements, or organizational structure. In the future, if he is appointed commander of Training and Doctrine Command or Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, this would indicate support for his viewpoints; a position in a staff, logistics, or another education-focused posting would indicate quarantine. The resistance to his views on warfare is yet to be determined. But his impact on the future of the Army can be assessed intermittently. From 2008 to 2010, McMaster served as Director of Concept Development and Learning, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) at the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (Joyner 2008). In 2009, Brigadier General McMaster oversaw publication of the Army Capstone Concept, “Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016 - 2028” (Kim 2009; U.S. Department of the Army 2010b). McMaster stated of this new concept, “We have to be able to defeat the enemy…and also conduct a broad range of activities while conducting stability operations…. The biggest change is that we’re recognizing some of the limitations in technologies that were designed to improve situational understanding and awareness…” (as quoted in Harlow 2009). However, an analysis of the Army Posture Statement from 2010 to 2012 indicates a focus on conventional operations, cyber security, and a return to technological dependency more in line with the Cold War than the post-9/11 world. 231 These priorities indicate a resistance to the positions and views of McMaster and those like him and indicates quarantine rather than institutionalization.

231 See Army Posture Statement from 2010 to 2012 (U.S. Department of the Army 2010a, 2011a, 2012). In the 2012 Army Posture Statement, the Cold War is the frame of reference for the “role of the Army:” “First, our Army must prevent conflict just as we did during the Cold War [emphasis original]. Prevention is most effective when adversaries are convinced that conflict with your force would be imprudent. The Army’s ability to win any fight across the full range of operations as part of a Joint Force must never be open to challenge. It must be clear that we will fight and win, which requires a force with sufficient capacity, readiness, and modernization” (U.S. Department of the Army 2012a, 5-6). Such a statement demonstrates no recognition of the challenges faced in conducting counterinsurgency over the past decade, nor the true manner in which these wars have been fought.
Thus, the Army employed a number of tactics of resistance in this case. In the table below, I have identified the forces for change, the tactic employed, the outcome, and degree to which such resistance was successful in each instance in the table below.

Table 11: Strategic Resistance to Counterinsurgency – Iraq and Afghanistan Wars – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Afghanistan Insurgency (Army faced insurgency in both theaters of war)</td>
<td>Operational Experience (as it affected institutionalization)</td>
<td>Denial – Army leadership denied that counterinsurgency was Army responsibility and pushed it to local security forces</td>
<td>Army in Iraq/AFG focused primarily direct-action operations</td>
<td>Yes – Army maintained operational focus until leadership change and overwhelming violence in Iraq circa 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Leadership (in the form of President George W. Bush)</td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise – Army leadership focused on turning over security to local Iraqi forces; did not support “surge” strategy</td>
<td>Lessons captured in reports and historical documents but not institutionalized</td>
<td>No – However, the Army maintained preferred strategy until 2007 when president forced “surge” and leadership change on Army in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think-Tanks and Policy-focused organizations (in the form of RAND, CSIS, etc.)</td>
<td>Ignore – No response to RAND, CSIS, or AEI reports</td>
<td>No change based on studies from RAND, etc. in early years of Iraq</td>
<td>Yes – no change in operational priorities and focus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Force For Change</td>
<td>Internal Force For Change</td>
<td>Tactic of Resistance</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Successful Resistance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Leadership (in the form of General David Petraeus)</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td>Army did not resist changes in operations or priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan with leadership change in 2007</td>
<td>No Resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavericks (General David Petraeus, Colonel H.R. McMaster, Colonel Sean McFarland, etc.)</td>
<td>Quarantine – McMaster refused promotion repeatedly</td>
<td>Leaders who conducted counterinsurgency operations were not stopped, but lessons were not extended beyond their area of operations and individuals were controlled</td>
<td>Yes – Individuals controlled until political leadership intervened; their influence expanded only when they received direct political backing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypotheses**

First, looking across the instances of resistance, there is similarity between the tactics of resistance depending on whether the forces for change are external or internal (Hypothesis 1). Next, the Army was more successful in resisting internal than external forces for change related to counterinsurgency (Hypothesis 2). Finally, the Army does not seem to demonstrate learning in regards to strategic resistance to counterinsurgency (Hypothesis 3).

**H1 – Similarities/differences in tactics of resistance?**

In terms of the Army’s response to counterinsurgency, we do see similarities in the tactics of resistance depending on whether the force for change is internal or external. Tactics employed to resist eight internal forces for change include suppression, quarantine, and ignoring the force for change. Tactics used to resist nine external forces for change include waiting out, ignoring the force for change, the political use of expertise, moving changes to the periphery, and denial.
As with the previous cases of personnel, we see the Army using the tactic of ignoring the force for change in response to both internal and external forces for change. In these cases, ignoring a force for change is applied to the internal force for change of operational experience and the external force for change of think-tanks and other policy focused organizations. That this tactic of resistance is employed against both internal and external forces challenges the hypothesis of this project, yet it is consistent with the cases discussed in the previous chapter on personnel.

Ignoring a force for change seems to be a unique tactic applied to both internal and external forces. In analyzing the six cases explored in this and the previous chapter, we see similarities in the forces for change against which ignoring the force for change is employed. In each instance of its employment, the force for change against which it is employed has little power over the organization. Thus, this seems to indicate that ignoring a force for change is a default tactic of resistance against weak forces for change.

Out of the eight internal forces for change that impacted on the Army in regards to counterinsurgency, the second-most most common tactic of resistance (3 counts) was suppression. In each of these instances of resistance, the Army actively attempted to inhibit, undercut, or delegitimize the force for change. During Vietnam, studies and reports were downgraded in importance; insurgents were kept from accessing leaders and policymakers; and operational experience was intentionally removed from doctrine.

The other tactic of resistance employed against internal forces for change was quarantine (2 counts). In both Vietnam and Iraq, mavericks (Generals Yarborough and Rosson in Vietnam; General Petraeus and Colonel McMaster in Iraq) evaluated or conducted operations in a manner different from the Army’s preferred operational approach. In response, the Army leadership
minimized the impact of these individuals and constituencies on the organization as a whole. In addition, none of these mavericks ever achieved the position of Chief of Staff of the Army or vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, two of the most important positions for influencing organizational priorities.

Of the nine external forces for change, the most common tactic of resistance besides ignoring the force for change was the political use of expertise (3 instances). In all three cases, the Army leadership used expertise politically to resist the impact of political leadership and policy entrepreneurs. As in the previous personnel cases, the political use of expertise is both a common and effective tactic of resistance. While political leadership overcame this tactic in the case of Iraq, it was only through a change in operational leadership.

Two instances in this case are of particular note because of the lack of resistance. The first instance was the lack of resistance in regards to the operational experience in the Philippines during the conflict. This is not surprising, given that the leadership and mid-level officers of the Army at the time spent their formative years on the American frontier conducting operations that were, if not exactly counterinsurgency, close to it. John Pershing was already a “guerilla warrior” given his experiences on the frontier (Smythe 1973), but so were Arthur MacArthur, Elwell Otis, and Frederick Funston. Even if they did not view counterinsurgency as the Army’s mission, their professional experiences prepared them to do so in an efficient and effective manner.

The second instance of non-resistance occurred in Iraq (and then Afghanistan) following the change of leadership in early 2007. When General David Petraeus assumed responsibility for U.S. operations in Iraq, the strategy shifted to counterinsurgency operations and protecting the
population. This lack of resistance, though, can be attributed to the fact that the main source of resistance was leadership, which was removed when General Petraeus assumed command.

H2 – Success at resisting internal/external forces for change?

In the case of counterinsurgency, the Army was generally successful at resisting both internal and external forces for change but more successful at resisting internal forces for change. In both the Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan cases, political leadership intervened in order to try and force the Army to adapt its capabilities and strategies. However, the Army was able to resist all internal forces for change.

Of the nine external forces for change, the Army was able to resist all but two. In the case of Vietnam, President Kennedy was able to force a small degree of change on the Army but only at the periphery of the organization. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush did eventually influence the Army’s primary strategy. By implementing a change of leadership in Iraq along with a “surge” strategy, President Bush forced change on the organization. However, it took direct, prolonged effort by the president to achieve this change, an important finding in regards to any ideas about how President Kennedy might or might not have changed the Army and how much time he would have needed to accomplish such change.

The Army successfully resisted all eight instances of internal forces for change. The one instance in which one might argue that the Army was unable to resist was the assumption of command by General Petraeus in Iraq. However, in this instance, it was the source of resistance itself—the Army leadership in the field—that changed, which in turn weakened any other latent constituencies of change (i.e. the Army Staff or operational staff in Iraq). Notably though, this lack of resistance lasted only as long as General Petraeus was in the position of greatest influence as a leader; the resistance to institutionalization of these operational experiences reemerged after
his departure from the Army because Petraeus only exerted influence over the Army in Iraq and
not over the organization as a whole. As of today, there is no indication of institutionalized
change in favor of counterinsurgency.

A particularly important point in this case is that the experience of war itself did not lead
to a change in strategy. The findings of this chapter indicate that operational experiences and the
operational lessons of counterinsurgency, by themselves, do not overcome organizational
resistance to change. As predicted in the military innovation literature, failure in war (as in
Vietnam) does not readily lead to organizational change (Rosen 1988, 135); these findings also
indicate that neither does success, as in the cases of the Philippines and Iraq. The Philippine
War, Vietnam, and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts all indicate that the Army’s resistance to
change is stronger than the operational experience of counterinsurgency.

H3 – More skilled at resistance?

The third hypothesis examines whether an organization learns to resist. This case further
demonstrates that the Army does not learn to resist; although it employs tactics of resistance in
order to strategically resist forces for change, there seems to be a lack of learning.\footnote{As discussed previously, evidence of organizational learning includes assessment of previous routines and the success of those routines (Levitt and March 1988; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Amburgey et al. 1993; Barnett and Carroll 1995), or leadership’s reflection on a past experience to inform their understanding of a current situation (Argyris and Schon 1978).}

This could be due, to some degree, to the Army’s success at resisting forces for change in
the case of counterinsurgency. In the case of the Philippines, the Army successfully resisted all
forces for change. In the case of Vietnam, the Army resisted all forces for change except for
President Kennedy, and whether or not President Kennedy would have forced more change on
the Army is impossible to determine. However, if we take President Truman’s imposition of
integration on the Army as an instance involving both a strong force for change and strong resistance, we might have seen a very different outcome.

The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are similar. The only failure to resist was General Casey and Schoomaker’s inability to convince President Bush to not implement the “surge” strategy under the command of a counterinsurgency-disposed officer. For all intents and purposes, the Army has been extremely successful in resisting forces for change in this case; as of now, there is no evidence that the Army has adjusted any of its primary features in its core combat capability in a way that institutionalizes counterinsurgency. Thus, its failure to learn to resist may be better explained by its success at resisting than a failure to learn.

Conclusion

The Army has a long history with counterinsurgency operations. However, Army leadership has been extremely reluctant to conduct such operations or adapt the Army in favor of greater capabilities. It was the shift in the Army’s mission following the Civil War, ushered in by the ideas of Emory Upton and the leadership of William Tecumseh Sherman, that such historical experience was sidelined in favor of a new mode of warfare.

The case of counterinsurgency in the Army demonstrates that the tactics of resistance used against forces for change depends on whether the force for change is internal or external to the organization; that the organization is more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change; and that organizational learning does not occur. While the first two aspects of resistance support the hypotheses of this project, the third does not.

The implications of the findings of this chapter are perhaps the most relevant for national security, given the most likely security environment the United States will face in the coming decades. Even if counterinsurgency goes away, as the Army would prefer, insurgency will not.
Iraq and Afghanistan are only the latest iteration of a very old form of warfare (Asprey 1994). As the Army looks for new threats, it will be China, Iran, or perhaps a resurgent Russia that will fit the Army’s mission most appropriately. But until one of those opponents acts, the Army will likely find itself in smaller theatres of operations and with responsibilities that are closer to counterinsurgency than to conventional warfare. As some analysts predict, “Involvement in irregular warfare and stabilization operations in weak and failing states will be [the Army’s] most common activity—perhaps its only major one” (Metz and Hoffman 2007, 2).

Currently, there is a high degree of individual experience in these types of operations given the number of soldiers who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan over the years. Though the individual experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are still fresh at the individual level, this “ad hoc” institutionalization will exist for only a short period. Because the lessons, tactics, and operations have not been institutionalized at the organizational level, they will rapidly degrade over time as individuals leave the Army or simply forget. The half-life, i.e., the rate at which these lessons decay, of effective counterinsurgency capabilities will hardly extend much longer than a unit’s chain-of-command; experience, command relationships, and standard operating procedures unique to each unit will change as new leadership takes charge, thus disrupting and degrading capabilities.

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233 There are heated discussions both outside and inside the Army on the Army’s future responsibilities in counterinsurgency. For a very small example of these discussions, see (Godson and Shultz 2010; Gorka and Kilcullen 2011; Betz 2012; Betz et al. 2012; Bumiller 2012; Gray 2012; Ward Gventer 2012). For the debate within the Army as it is reflected publicly, see the discussion between Lieutenant Colonel (retired) John Nagl and Colonel Gian Gentile in Joint Forces Quarterly 58 (July 2010).

234 The loss of experienced officers is of particular concern (Kane 2012; Barno 2013).
 CHAPTER 5
TECHNOLOGY

This chapter will explore the Army’s resistance to forces for change related to technology. The instances of resistance explored in this chapter demonstrate that the tactics employed against forces for change depend on whether the force for change is internal or external; that the Army is more successful at resisting internal forces for change versus external forces for change; and that there is little learning in regards to such resistance.

In the case of technology, both external and internal forces for change have acted on the Army. External forces have included political leadership, changes in the security environment, and other organizations. Internal forces have included boards and reports, experiments and studies, organizational insurgents, organizational leadership, and operational experience.

As discussed in Chapter 2, strategic resistance is intentional and focused on a force for change. The forces for change discussed in this chapter, both internal and external, exert pressure on the Army to push it towards internalization and allocation of resources towards new technology. In these instances of resistance, Army leadership employed tactics of resistance to protect the organization’s sense of mission. As in previous cases, the primary constituency of resistance was Army leadership, particularly in the form of the Chief of Staff and Army staff.

Technology in and of itself is not a threat to the Army; rather, it is the way that it is employed and the implications of such changes that make it a threat. As discussed in previous chapters, the Army’s sense of mission is the norms, values, and beliefs regarding the conduct of conventional ground operations against other professional military organizations. The technologies explored in this chapter are not inherently “bad” for the Army, but the way in which internal and external forces sought to impose them on the Army threatened its mission.
This chapter will explore two cases of resistance to technology and one case of technology used as a form of resistance. The first case is airplanes, which entered the Army in 1909. In these early years, aviators supported ground units by providing reconnaissance and targeting artillery fire. Very soon, however, motivated and innovative officers began to test methods to apply combat power directly from airplanes, moving the technology to a lead role rather than supporting role. The second case is the resistance to nuclear weapons. After nuclear weapons helped end World War II, political leaders saw U.S. nuclear primacy as a means of balancing the threat of rising communist forces (Mahnken 2008, 15). Under President Dwight Eisenhower, respect for nuclear weapons rose to reverential levels for their assumed abilities to maintain international stability, relegating all other forms and methods of warfare to secondary, even irrelevant roles, most especially that of the Army. Finally, the last case examines how helicopters provided a means by which the Army could resist the Air Force’s attempt to take away the Army’s ability to develop and control organic air capabilities (i.e., air capabilities controlled by Army commanders).

After exploring these instances of resistance, the final section addresses the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2. First, does the Army resist internal and external forces for change differently? In the cases of technology explored in this chapter, there is evidence that the Army reacts differently to internal and external forces for change. Second, is the Army more or less successful at resisting internal forces for change versus external forces for change? As with the cases of personnel and counterinsurgency, the evidence suggests that the Army is more successful at resisting internal forces. Finally, is there evidence of learning in regards to strategic resistance? As in previous cases, there is no evidence of learning; instead, each act of resistance seems to be a discreet response to a force for change.
Technology – Background, Context, and Impact on Mission

Armies and technology are intertwined. Technology provides the means by which armies increase their ability to carry out their mission – destroying other military forces. As noted by Martin van Creveld (1991), “war is completely permeated by technology and governed by it” (1). Yet as war is dominated by technology, so too are armies dominated by technology; while armies pursue technologies in order to be more effective at their mission, that same technology can have unintended consequences for those same organizations. Military organizations might not welcome certain technologies or the organizational implications of internalizing such technology, even if the promises of those technologies are great.

Over the centuries, a number of technological “revolutions” have affected concepts of war. The longbow, gunpowder, cannons, the telegraph, trains and railways, and rifled barrels have all sparked fundamental changes in warfighting because they changed fundamental methods and paradigms of how wars could and should be fought (Krepinevich 1994; Cohen 2002b; Volkman 2002). These changes were important not just because they allowed armies to conduct old means of warfighting better, but because they “fundamentally [altered] the character and conduct of conflict” (Krepinevich 1994).

But while a new technology may have the potential to fundamentally alter warfare, it will not necessarily immediately lead to a new way of warfighting but will be resisted. New technology will nearly always be utilized in a way that fits old concepts of warfare (Cohen 2002b, 240). As noted by Barry Posen (1984), “A new technology will normally be assimilated to an old doctrine rather than stimulate change to a new one” (55). Just because a new technology is developed does not immediately mean that it will be used in a new way; perhaps this is due to lack of imagination, but resistance can also cause new technologies to be used in old ways. As noted by Carl Builder (1989) specifically regarding the Army, “Until the past few
decades, the Army was notorious for its reluctance to embrace new technologies or methods” (24).

The U.S. Army’s development of tank and tank fighting capabilities is an example of a new technology that was limited by old paradigms of warfighting. At the time, the infantry was the king of battle, and all other combat forces supported it as the main effort. By subordinating the tank to the infantry, this new technology would develop along lines that fit within the paradigm and interests of the established infantry branch (Steadman 1982; Johnson 2003, 73). In 1918, the first manual on tank tactics stated, “tanks are essentially an Infantry supporting arm or an auxiliary to the Infantry and only on rare occasions should they act independently” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 36). The 1920 manual stated further, “The tank is primarily an aid to the advance of the infantry engaged in a vigorous offensive either in the assault of works or in open warfare situations” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 72). In 1922, War Department policy stated, “The primary mission of the tank is to facilitate the uninterrupted advance of the riflemen in the attack” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 73). When independent of the infantry, tanks had the responsibility (in terms of both operations and equipment) to attack relatively soft targets in the enemy’s rear area of operations rather than engage other enemy tank forces (Johnson 2003, 198; Cameron 2008, 461). As of 1943, the Army field manual for armored divisions still stated, “the primary role of the tank is to destroy enemy personnel and automatic weapons” (FM 17-100 1943 as quoted in Johnson 2003, 192).235

Though tank operations improved through the course of World War II, Army tank operations were ill-suited to the reality of World War II tank warfare. Throughout the war, Army leaders failed to employ tanks in a way that maximized their speed, flexibility, and combat

235 Anti-tank operations, i.e. protection from enemy tanks, were to be conducted by specialized anti-tank units (Johnson 2003, 192). These anti-tank units, though, proved to be nearly completely ineffective (Gabel 2009).
power; instead, tanks’ capabilities remained muted due to their subordination to the infantry and infantry tactics (Steadman 1982, Johnson 2003, 221-229). Because of experiences against the Germans, Army tank divisions adjusted their standard operating procedures from infantry support to combined arms warfare (working in conjunction with infantry, artillery, and air forces) during the course of the war, but tank operations overall proved sub-standard to German capabilities (Steadman 1982; Cameron 2008, 451).

Thus, the old way of doing things limited the capabilities of tank technology. While Allied tank forces eventually defeated German tank forces, this resulted from the U.S. Army’s superior ability to replace wounded personnel and damaged equipment faster and to utilize artillery and air support effectively, not because of better tank technology or tank tactics (Johnson 2003, 218-229; Cameron 2008, 462-463). But while tanks did not in and of themselves truly change or improve the Army’s ability to conduct warfare, neither did they threaten the Army’s mission and the primacy of the infantry (Steadman 1982).

In this chapter, I examine cases in which the Army resisted technology (or in one case, resisted the removal of certain technology) which challenged the mission by limiting or making irrelevant the primacy of ground operations. In this project, I have defined the Army’s mission as the conduct of conventional ground operations against other professional military organizations, thus a threat to the importance or significant of ground operations is a threat to the organization’s mission.

In the case of airplanes, forces for change sought to divert the responsibility and primacy of winning wars from ground forces to air forces. Strongly influenced by the experiences of

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236 Reflecting on the poor performance of U.S. tanks and tank operations in 1945, General George Marshall noted, “Another noteworthy example of German superiority was in the heavy tank. From the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1945 the German Tiger and Panther tanks outmatched our Sherman tanks in direct combat. This stemmed largely from different concepts of armored warfare held by us and the Germans, and the radical differences in our approach to the battlefield” (Marshall 1945 as quoted in Johnson 2003, 200).
World War I and the theories of airpower articulated by Hugh Trenchard and Guilio Douhet (two of the first military airpower theorists), forces for change sought to shift the Army’s priorities (both in terms of concepts of warfighting and allocation of resources) towards airplanes (Moore 1958; Hurley 1964; Copp 1980; Daso 2000). Army ground commanders, however, saw the plane as a subordinate technology to their own units: like artillery (and tanks), airplanes existed to support ground forces (Raines 2000, 4). Yet as early as 1922, air power supporters sought to increase financial resources and political influence of the Army’s air arm (Nalty 1997; Tate 1998; Johnson 2003). The Army leadership, which had the most to gain from the maintenance of the organization’s mission and the most to lose from its change, resisted these forces because air power threatened the Army’s sense of mission and the primacy of ground combat.

In the case of nuclear weapons, forces for change threatened the Army’s mission in its totality by rendering ground operations irrelevant. Because of the role that nuclear weapons played in maintaining peace and stability in the national security strategy of President Dwight Eisenhower, the Army and its mission became inconsequential (Trauschweizer 2008, 29). In this case, nuclear weapons did not just threaten to change the mission, they threatened to eliminate the mission. Instead of fulfilling its mission of conducting ground combat, such as against Soviet forces in Europe, the Army’s role became that of a post-nuclear occupation force (Bacevich 1997, 322, U.S. Congress 1947). In this new paradigm of warfare brought by nuclear technology, national leaders expected the Army to serve as an occupying force or as a peace enforcement organization if nuclear weapons struck within the United States (Bacevich 1986, 16). Thus, the Army strongly resisted nuclear weapons for the same reason as airplanes in that they threatened the primacy of ground combat.
In the case of helicopters, the threat to the Army was actually the removal of a key piece of technology. Following World War II and emphasized by experiences in Korea, Army leadership came to view organic air support for ground operations as a necessity on the modern battlefield (Weinert 1991, 1-24; Bradin 1994, 79-88; Cheng 1994, 3-46; Williams 2005, 49-62). However, the separation of the Air Force from the Army in 1947 threatened the Army’s ability to control its own close air support. According to the National Security Act of 1947, the newly-formed Air Force had broad control of “sustained offensive and defense air operations” while the Army maintained responsibility only for “such aviation…as may be organic therein” (National Security Act 1947, Sec. 205 (f), (e)). Given these limitations, conflict between the departments over control of air capabilities lasted for well over two decades as the Army leadership sought to resist Air Force control of air power technology. However, along with support from political leadership and the peculiarities of some of the early inter-service agreements (as will be discussed), the Army used helicopters as a mechanism by which to resist the Air Force’s attempts to inhibit its air capabilities.

Thus, in the following sections, I explore the Army’s resistance to these technologies, or in the case of helicopters, the use of the technology to resist other forces.

**Airplanes**

No technology more fundamentally changed warfare in the early 20th century than airplanes. Rather than viewed as the new horizon of combat, Army leaders saw airplanes as a threat to the superiority of ground forces. For the Army, the airplane was and should be “just another piece of equipment” (Raines 2000, 4).

To the Army, only the infantry could win wars. According to the Army’s 1914 *Field Services Regulations*, “The infantry is the principal and most important arm, which is charged
with the main work on the field of battle and decides the final issue of combat” (U.S. War Department 1914, 69). The 1923 version of the Field Services Regulations further emphasized the importance of the infantry, in that “the mission of the infantry is the general mission of the entire force” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 96). Airplanes, then, did not exist outside the paradigm of ground combat; they existed to support, not to replace, the infantry soldier.

Through the early decades of the 20th century, aviation became something more than just a mechanical capability, it became a new mode of warfare. To the aggravation of senior Army personnel and the more established branches of the Army, some officers, political leaders, and members of the public did not agree with the assessment of the airplane as “just another piece of equipment” and were not afraid to act on their own opinions. These airpower supporters saw the wars of the future happening in the sky and fought by pilots, not on the ground fought by infantry soldiers.

In this case, I examine the Army’s resistance to airplanes. I will first provide a brief outline of the history of airplanes in the U.S. Army followed by an analysis of the forces for change and the resistance to such forces. Following these sections, I will illustrate how strategic resistance best explains this resistance. I then identify the tactics of resistance used by the Army to prevent forces for change from affecting the organization’s mission.

History

In 1907, the Army established its first air organization. As part of the Army’s Signal Corps, the Aeronautical Division was officially given responsibility for “all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects” (as quoted in Hennessey 1958, 15). As of its origination, Captain Charles deForest Chandler along with a corporal and private first class constituted the entirety of the Aeronautical Division. Two years after the establishment of
the Aeronautical Division, the Army purchased its first airplane from Orville and Wilbur Wright (Hurley and Heimdahl 1997, 14). The first military test flight occurred on March 3, 1911 (Hennessey 1958, 40).

In 1914, the Aeronautical Division was re-born as the Aviation Section, and the airplane was put to its first operational usage within two years. Airplanes and aviators of the 1st Aero Squadron accompanied Brigadier General John Pershing’s Punitive Expedition in March 1916, in pursuit of Pancho Villa (Hennessey 1958, 167). During the expedition, the Aviation Section conducted reconnaissance and carried messages and mail to and from the expeditionary party. Though they requested bombsights and carried a few machine guns on their planes, none of the planes directly engaged Pancho Villa’s troops (Hennessey 1958, 167).

On April 6, 1917 under the command of Major Ralph Royce, the 1st Aero Squadron left for Europe to take part in World War I (Hennessey 1958, 176). Though initially plagued by difficulties in airplane production, the Air Service destroyed 776 enemy planes, flew 150 air raids, dropped 138 tons of bombs, and took 18,000 reconnaissance photographs (Mortensen 1997, 69). The Air Service pilots did well but were not decisive in World War I compared to the British and French (Mortensen 1997, 69). During the war, the Air Service suffered 569 airmen killed/wounded, 654 deaths due to accidents and illness, and 290 planes and 37 balloons lost (Mortensen 1997, 69).

On May 20, 1918, the Aviation Section separated from the Signal Corps. President Woodrow Wilson, who felt that General Squier, Chief Signal Officer, could not adequately

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237 This test flight was piloted by Lieutenant Benjamin Foulois and Robert F. Collier (a civilian and owner of Collier’s magazine). Foulois and Collier flew 106 miles from Laredo, Texas to Eagle Pass, Texas. During the flight, they dropped messages to military units and tested the effectiveness of a wireless radio, appropriate tasks given that the airplane belonged to the Signal Corps (Hennessey 1958, 40). In these early years, other tests included aerial bombing (utilizing small, hand-dropped bombs), air-to-ground attack (utilizing a rifle), and aerial reconnaissance (utilizing cameras and signaling mechanisms) (Hennessey 1958, 45-47; Chandler and Lahm 1979, 89-91).
provide command and control for both the Signal branch as well as meet the quickly increasing production demands for airplanes, directed the change (Mortensen 1997, 50). This meant that Army aviation answered only to the Secretary of War and, most importantly, this allowed the Air Service to control its own equipment and finances separate and distinct from the Signal Corps (Mortensen 1997, 50).

Thus was born the Army Air Service in the final months of World War I.\textsuperscript{238}

Organizationally, the most immediate question was whether the Air Service was a separate branch of service within the Army. The issue, though, was put to rest by the National Defense Act of 1920, which cemented the Air Service within the Army and made it a combat branch on par with the infantry, cavalry, and artillery (Maurer 1987, 44).

While the Air Service achieved much in terms of demonstrating and achieving air capabilities, the Army’s air forces would truly come into their own during the years of the Army Air Corps.\textsuperscript{239} The U.S. Army Air Corps came into existence on June 2, 1926 when President Calvin Coolidge signed the Air Corps Act of 1926 into law (Shiner 1997a).\textsuperscript{240} At the Secretary of War level, a new Assistant Secretary took sole responsibility for aviation issues. In addition,

\textsuperscript{238} As a result of the war, the Army’s air forces saw a dramatic increase in personnel to 200,000 pilots and support personnel, of which 25\% served outside of the United States (Mortensen 1997, 51). However by June 1919, this number was back down to 27,000 (Maurer 1987, 5). The Air Service, as with the entire Army, continued to massively draw down its numbers throughout 1919; at the end, the Air Service was authorized 11,000 men of which 1,340 were officers. General Charles Menoher, the first Chief of the Air Service, requested that this number be increased to 46,500 men, but his request was denied. The National Defense Act of 1920 did increase the number slightly to 17,516 men, 1,516 of which were officers (Maurer 1987, 9).

\textsuperscript{239} It was during the Air Corps years that pilots crossed the Pacific from California to Hawaii; established air endurance records of continuous flight; practiced night flying; established the Air Tactical School at Maxwell Base, Alabama to teach bombing theory; and established a cadet-training program at Randolph Field, Texas (Shiner 1997b, 109-117). All of these things provided the groundwork for an air arm thoroughly engrained with strategic bombing and capable of autonomous operations.

\textsuperscript{240} At the time, President Coolidge recognized that air power was a serious issue, but, first and foremost, he believed strongly in controlling the military and its cost (Tate 1998, 31-40). The Air Corps Act represented a compromise with Congressional supporters, which favored a conservative approach to addressing the air power issue by granting some leeway to air power enthusiasts but within Coolidge’s priority of controlling the budget (Tate 1998, 39-48).
the act formed an Air Section within the General Staff to address all aviation issues regarding planning and resourcing (Maurer 1987, 192). During the years of the Air Corps, almost 5,000 personnel were reassigned from other branches of the Army into the Air Corps (Maurer 1987, 209).

In 1935, the creation of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force within the Air Corps marked a critical movement towards independence of the Army’s air arm and the development of the country’s air capabilities.241 This model was in the mind of the earliest pilots who during World War I saw the possibility and requirements for air power for both tactical and strategic battles. In war planning but not in actuality, the GHQ Air Force consisted of 5,200 officers, 46,000 enlisted personnel, and 2,300 planes (Maurer 1987, 283). With the financial support of Congress and the President, the GHQ Air Force and the Chief of the Air Corps worked to increase the number and capabilities of Army airplanes (Shiner 1997c, 135-136). Under the direction of General Frank Andrews, Commander of the GHQ Air Force, the Army Air Corps received its first order of thirteen B-17 bombers, the famous “Flying Fortresses” that would define and symbolize U.S. strategic bombing through World War II (Shiner 1997c, 144-149).

Germany’s advance through Western Europe had significant impact on the Air Corps. Watching Hitler advance into Austria and Czechoslovakia in the final years of the 1930’s on the heels of the Luftwaffe, President Roosevelt and other leaders saw the true effects of air power (Shiner 1997c, 154). As a result, President Roosevelt held a secret meeting on November 14, 1938 to outline a plan to increase the number of planes and capabilities of American air forces.

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241 GHQ Air Force was first recommended by the Lassiter Board of 1924, a board of General Officers chaired by Major General William Lassiter (Shiner 1997a, 97). Along with calling for a GHQ Air Force, the Board recommendations included increasing the size of the Air Service to 4,000 officers, 25,000 enlisted personnel, and 2,500 cadets between 1924 and 1934 (Shiner 1997a, 97). The findings of the Baker Board of 1934, led by former Secretary of War Newton Baker, were that a GHQ Air Force set up during peacetime would maintain unity of command while also increasing the country’s air defense capabilities (Maurer 1987, 322).
With General Arnold and Deputy Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, along with other military and civilian leaders, he outlined a plan to substantially increase the number of airplanes in the U.S. inventory (Shiner 1997c, 155). On January 12, 1939, President Roosevelt submitted a plan to Congress that increased the air arm to 6,000 planes, which Congress approved and granted $300 million to the Air Corps for that purpose (Shiner 1997c, 156).

The establishment of the Army Air Forces on June 20, 1941 by authority of Army Regulation 95-5 was another milestone in the development of the air arm, but there were still coordination problems, particularly with the General Staff. For instance, senior air officers and other interested parties recognized that the Air Forces did not control fundamental issues such as organizational finances and budget (McClendon 1996, 95). Additionally, the newly-formed Air Staff existed along with the General Staff, but the latter still had priority in planning and establishing strategic priorities (McClendon 1996, 94-95; Nalty 1997, 181-183).

As a result of President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9082 of February 28, 1942, the Chief of the Army Air Forces assumed command and control for all issues related to air operations, capabilities, logistics, and personnel (McClendon 1996, 96). According to this presidential directive, General Hap Arnold was now designated Commanding General of the Army Air Forces and was made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McClendon 1996, 98-99). This action re-organized the Army into three distinct bodies: Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply. According to War Department Circular No. 59, issued on March 2, 1942 and authorized by Executive Order No. 9082, the Army Air Forces mission was “to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide

242 President Roosevelt stated, “My recognition of the growing importance of air power is made obvious by the fact that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces is a member of both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Air Forces, both in the Army and in the Navy, have a strong voice in shaping and implementing our national military policy” (as quoted in McClendon 1996, 98-99).
air force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations” (as quoted in McClendon 1996, 96). A dedicated air mission was further enshrined as of July 21, 1943 when War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, stated “Land power and air power are coequal and interdependent; neither is an auxiliary of the other” (as quoted in (McClendon 1996, 99).

After World War II, Congress and the president settled the issue of air independence once and for all with the establishment the Department of the Air Force in 1947. Army leaders had accepted, for various reasons, air independence. Recognizing the potential for numerous budgetary and coordination challenges after the war, General Marshall supported the establishment of a three-organization War Department under the control of a civilian secretary, believing that it would facilitate national security policy planning (Wolk 1997, 389). His successor felt similar, and Secretary of the Army General Dwight Eisenhower strongly supported a War Department with an independent Air Force (Wolk 1997, 390). In December 1945, Eisenhower said of an independent Air Force, it “seems to me to be so logical from all our experience in this war—such an inescapable conclusion—that I for one can’t even entertain any long any doubt as to its wisdom” (as quoted in Wolk 1997, 390). President Harry Truman, too, fully supported air independence, stating “air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and sea power” (as quoted in Wolk 1997, 391). In 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, which brought the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the newly-formed Department of the Air

243 In fact, opposition came from Navy leaders who feared the Air Force would take away naval aviation assets (Wolk 1997, 388-393; Correll 2008a). To address the concerns of the Navy and find a compromise between the Army and Navy Departments, Major General Lauris Norstad representing the Army and Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman representing the Navy actually negotiated the draft bill that became the National Security Act of 1947 (Boyne 2007, 30-32).
While Army and Air Force arguments over control of air capabilities would continue (as will be discussed in the section on helicopters), the Air Force finally achieved its independence just as air proponents had sought for so many decades prior.

**Forces for Change**

A number of external and internal forces pressured the Army in regards to airplanes. External forces included political leadership and Germany’s early use of airplanes during World War II. Internal forces for change included organizational insurgents, studies and boards, tests and experiments of airplane capabilities, and operational experience.

**External**

The main external force for change was political leadership, a force which acted on the Army almost from the very beginning. In May 1913, Congressman James Hay of West Virginia offered a bill to establish an Aviation Section, an organization still within the Signal Corps but officially distinct. Under Hay’s bill, the air arm would increase to 60 officers and 260 enlisted personnel (previously, the allocation had been only 30 officers). New pilots would still come from the officer ranks, had to be unmarried and under 30 years old, must volunteer for aviation duty (except during times of war), and could serve no longer than four years. The bill also accounted for increased pay for both officers and enlisted personnel averaging 40% to 50%.

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244 Truman believed that such reorganization would be more efficient, save money, and maintain better civilian control of the military (Hogan 1998, 38).

245 This arrangement changed two years later to today’s Department of Defense.

246 Representative Hay, a member of the House Military Affairs Committee, had failed once in 1913 to achieve independence of the air arm (Hurley and Heimdahl 1997, 27-28). This move was motivated and supported by Lieutenant Paul Beck, however other members of the Aviation Section including Lieutenant Billy Mitchell did not support independence (Hurley and Heimdahl 1997, 28). This separation was also strongly opposed by the War Department (McClendon 1996, 15). Hay tried yet again for independence in 1914, but both Captain Billy Mitchell and Lieutenant Hap Arnold opposed the separation (McClendon 1996, 16-17).
depending on training and position. The bill passed easily through both the House and Senate and became law on July 18, 1914 (Hennessey 1958, 110).

Two years later, Senator Joseph Robinson (Arkansas) called for an investigation of the Aeronautical Section in January 1916. He argued that officers within the Section and in the Signal Department had withheld information related to the slow progress made in training, poor equipment, and lower-than-claimed numbers of personnel who had actually achieved flight status. In defense of the Signal Corps, General Scriven argued that much of the impropriety was due to the desire of some of the aviators for a new and distinct air arm within the Army and that their ambition impeded their military bearing (Hennessey 1958, 153). As a result, the Chief of the Aviation Section and the commander of the Aviation School were relieved from their positions; these acts demonstrated a willingness by senior Army officers to ensure that air power enthusiasts remained in check to senior leadership but that political leaders remained keenly interested and involved in the Army’s air power activities.

Congress made numerous other attempts to affect the Army’s air capabilities. After World War I, Senator Harry New attempted to establish a federal department of aviation and an independent air organization based on the British Royal Air Force (Shiner 1997a, 74). The House Military Affairs Committee, in 1926, held hearings on plans submitted by Mason Patrick that would provide for an independent air arm (Copp 1980, 48). In 1924, a nine-person committee appointed by the Speaker of the House and chaired by Florian H. Lampert (R-WI) was tasked with investigating military aeronautics (Shiner 1997a, 97). In 1925, the Morrow Board, headed by Dwight Morrow who was a friend of President Calvin Coolidge, studied the

247 Due to production challenges including shortages of proper equipment and trained personnel, American companies produced 7,000 aircraft by the end of the war but only 3,500 combat-capable models (Mortensen 1997, 47). The first American war planes were not even completed until February 1918, and only 1,200 airplanes reached France by the end of the war (Mortensen 1997, 47).
issue of air independence. During the hearings, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Foulois stated, “I am convinced that aviation will never reach its proper place in the scheme of national defense so long as it remains under the control of the War Department General Staff” (as quoted in Shiner 1997b, 102-103). Congressman William Rogers in 1933 led an investigation of Army aircraft purchasing (Cropp 1980, 159). In total, no less than fifteen external commissions and boards reviewed the role of air power in the U.S. armed forces between World War I and World War II (Copp 1980, 299; Shiner 1997a; Shiner 1997b).248 Congressional leaders maintained consistent interest in air power, both due to national security interests and as a reflection of public sentiment towards all things aviation.

The second external force for change was intervention by President Roosevelt who responded to the rise of Germany. With the rise of the *Luftwaffe*, President Roosevelt recognized the role that airpower would play in the coming war (Shiner 1997c, 154-155).249 A secret meeting between Roosevelt and the senior Army personnel on November 14, 1938 would be an important turning point during which he made all of his senior military advisors aware of his emphasis on air power (Shiner 1997c, 155; Johnson 2003, 167). President Roosevelt instructed the War Department to make plans to reach a force of 10,000 airplanes (Johnson 2003, 168). Less than a year later on September 1, 1939 when General Arnold submitted his plan for GHQ Air Force to assume responsibility for securing the western hemisphere, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall gave his full support even over the disagreements of the

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248 These included the Bingham Committee of 1929 (Tate 1998, 69), the Howell Commission of 1934 (Copp 1980, 250), and the McSwain hearings of 1935 (Copp 1980, 294-299). Tired of the numerous appearances before Congress, Hap Arnold commented about his appearance before the McSwain hearings: “Same people—same bored Congressmen…same flashing picture-taking cameramen” (as quoted in Copp 1980, 298).

249 This position was argued by a number of administration advisors and associates: Joseph Kennedy, Charles Lindberg, and William Bullit (the U.S. ambassador to France) (Johnson 2003, 167). Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated, “Air power has decided the fate of nations; Germany, with her powerful air armadas, has vanquished one people after another” (as quoted in Tate 1998, 172).
War Staff (Shiner 1997c, 158). According to General Hap Arnold, the “Air Corps had achieved its Magna Carta” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 168).

**Internal**

The major internal force for change was organizational insurgents who pushed for greater airplane capabilities and independence for the Army’s air arm. Colonel Billy Mitchell is the most famous insurgent of this era who fought for a completely independent air arm. He believed that “a Department of Aeronautics co-equal with the Departments of War and Navy should be created at once…Only then will there result real national protection combined with economy” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 84). In 1919, he wrote: “…the principal mission of Aeronautics is to destroy the aeronautical force of the enemy, and, after this, to attack his formations, both tactical and strategical [sic], on the ground or on the water…. The secondary employment of Aeronautics pertains to their use as an auxiliary to troops on the ground for enhancing their effect against hostile troops” (Johnson 2003, 82). Mitchell’s view of airplanes and air power was in direct contradiction to the Army’s vision and mission.

Mitchell sought to influence the Army by going directly to the public. On numerous occasions, he publicly criticized the War Department and the Army’s control of air capabilities. In a statement before the Senate in the hearings that led to the National Defense Act of 1920, Mitchell argued that airpower would not be a “a decisive element in combat” until the air arm gained independence from the Army (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 82). After he led the sinking of the *Ostfriesland* in 1921, he stated, “the future individual equipment of the sailor on a battleship would have to consist of a parachute to come down in after being blown up in the air” (as quoted in Shiner 1997a, 95). Such a comment was a direct insult to the Navy, implying that U.S. airpower would dominate both the ground and the sea in future wars, and that the Navy would be
a useless branch of the military. During the Lampert Committee hearings of 1924, Mitchell accused Army and Navy officers testifying on behalf of their organizations of lying (Shiner 1997a, 98). In 1925 after the crash of a Navy airship, Mitchell stated that it was the “direct result of incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of the national defense” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 87). In 1921, he staged mock bombing attacks against major cities including New York and Philadelphia, primarily for the media reaction (Johnson 2003, 83).

Mitchell not only refuted the Army, he motivated other officers to follow his methods (Johnson 2003, 89). Reflecting on Mitchell’s court martial (to be discussed subsequently), Ira Eaker (who would become a lieutenant general during World War II) stated, “…we [junior air officers], in council, after talking it over and deliberating carefully, thoroughly, decided we’d rather stand with Mitchell for a principle and for the future of airpower than to save our necks and skins” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 89). As a result, a number of young air officers testified on Mitchell’s behalf during the court martial (Daso 2000, 112). While Mitchell would not live to see the Army Air Forces, the officers who followed in his wake—including Hap Arnold, Ira Eaker, and Carl Spaatz—rose to the highest levels of command in the Army Air Forces and the subsequent Department of the Air Force.

Throughout the interwar years, air officers continued to speak against the Army’s relegation of airplanes and air capabilities to peripheral importance in testimonies to the various boards and oversight committees. Before the Howell Commission of 1934, the air officers who testified argued that the only way to protect the United States from air attack and to maintain a credible air capability was as an independent organization separate from both the Army and the Navy (Johnson 2003, 160). As one such officer argued:
Our most rigid and conventional institution has been the Army…. It has vigorously opposed every innovation in warfare, every contribution of science; it has held on to the pike when the muzzle loader was available; it held on to the muzzle loader when the breech load was a fact…. In the Air Force we have the only agency with direct access to the fundamental objectives in war…with a spirit that is immunized from the effects of Army doctrine by a growing consciousness of its own independent power in war…. A casual survey of the evidence now available, must be convincing, that the creation of a separate and independent Air Force is the rational, simple, and inevitable solution to this problem (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 160).

Such was the vision that the insurgent air officers had of the capabilities and the promise of the airplane.

Extensive testing and experiments were also a major and consistent force for change in the development of airplanes. The first test of air bombing occurred in January 1910 in Los Angeles, California. On January 19, 1910, Lieutenant Paul Beck and another aviator dropped three dummy bombs (weighted sacks) from a height of 250 feet while traveling at 40 miles per hour. Unfortunately, the bombs were almost completely inaccurate (Hennessey 1958, 45). But testing continued for a year, and a more successful test occurred in January 1911. This time, the pilots dropped 36-pound bombs and were able to hit a 20-foot target from a height of 1,500 feet. Adding a communication aspect to the experiment, Beck also tested a self-designed wireless radio (Hennessey 1958, 45).

Young pilots also tested air-to-ground attack and reconnaissance capabilities. In August 1910 at Sheepshead Bay outside of New York City, Lt. Jacob E. Fickel fired a rifle from 100 feet and hit a 15 foot square target two out of four times (Hennessey 1958, 47). In January 1911, at the same time as Beck’s bombing tests, Lt. John C. Walker was the first person to execute aerial photography as he took pictures of an Army parade field (Hennessey 1958, 47).

Billy Mitchell’s sinking of the German ship *Ostfriesland* in 1921 was one of the most important test of airplane capabilities. Though a German ship, it was owned by the Navy
(having been seized after World War I), and Mitchell’s 1st Provisional Air Brigade sank it in 21 minutes with six bombs (Shiner 1997a, 94). The event gained wide media attention for the capabilities of the Army’s air arm (Shiner 1997a, 95-96; Tate 1998, 16; Cooke 2002, 123-125). Following this and other tests, Mitchell made a number of public speeches and wrote a number of articles for newspapers and magazines about airpower, stating that, “armies will never come into contact on the field of battle” (as quoted in Shiner 1997a, 96).

Another internal force for change was operational experience. Initially in World War I, planes initially conducted pursuit and reconnaissance, but bombing (day or night) was minimally effective due to weight limitations, poor munitions, and bombsight technologies (Mortensen 1997, 36). This changed considerably over the course of the war; by 1917, a bomber could carry over five-hundred pounds of bombs more than ninety miles and drop them on a target using relatively accurate sights (Mortensen 1997, 36-40). Though operational experience did not prove the effectiveness of airplanes during World War I, it demonstrated the potential of airplanes.

Finally, internal boards and commissions pressured the Army but to varying degrees. In 1923, the Lassiter Board established by Secretary of War John Weeks distinguished between the “air service” role of the air arm and the “air force,” the latter referring to its strategic bombing role (Johnson 2003, 86). It found “our Air Service to be in a very unfortunate and critical situation” due to reduced personnel and equipment following World War I and argued that “it is indispensable to be strong in the air at the very outset of war” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 86). While Army leadership superficially agreed that the air arm needed a great deal of support and money to achieve its national security objectives (the Lassiter Board recommended an allocation of $25 million per year), they would not support the air arm at the expense of other branches

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250 However, Mitchell did break the rules agreed upon with the Navy by dropping six bombs in twenty-one minutes. The agreement had been to allow the Naval officers to inspect the ship for bomb damage after a certain number of bombs, but Mitchell ignored the required inspection and continued bombing (Shiner 1997a, 94-95).
(Tate 1998, 19-20). Other internal boards included the Menoher Board (1919), the Joint Army and Navy Board (1921), and the Drum Board (1933). These boards, however, varied in their impact on the Army’s treatment of its air arm because the officers appointed to serve on them were hand-picked by Army leadership (to be discussed below).

**Strategic Resistance to Change**

Analyzing the Army’s response to forces for change according to the framework of this project indicates resistance to change with the intent of protecting the mission. Based on the external and internal forces for change identified above, there is indication of strategic resistance as identified in the table below:

Table 12: Strategic Resistance to Airplanes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Component</th>
<th>Combat</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Secondary Features</th>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Awards</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actions by leaders to resist FFCs? Yes

Army leaders limited the ability of air supporters to demonstrate their capabilities in training. Between 1916 and 1935 due to budget limitations, there were few large maneuver exercises to test interactions between ground and air assets (Raines 2000, 18). Yet while the number of maneuver exercises did not result from actions by the Army, the conduct of the few exercises that did occur demonstrates how traditional Army commanders viewed air power. One such exercise was the annual War College exercises begun in 1923 (and continued through
During this exercise, proponents of air power sought to highlight the differences between air and ground concepts for warfare. But while the representatives of the Air Corps Tactical School who attended sought to publicize their ability to strike targets deep behind the front lines of combat, the War College exercise planners placed restrictions on air operations so that they would not outpace ground operations (Finney 1955, 13). By emplacing such restrictions, ground commanders maintained air power as a supporting asset while at the same time limiting the impetus to adjust standard operating procedures for combined operations.  

Army leadership also attempted to maintain strict control of the air service at every opportunity in regards to their place in the overall organizational structure. Even before World War I, as evidenced by Senator Hay’s attempt, political leaders were trying to separate the air service from the Army. After World War I, Senator Harry New proposed an independent federal aeronautics division that would be equal with the Army and Navy, but General John Pershing opposed the plan and General Mason Patrick (later to be chief of the Air Service) accused aviators who supported the plan of doing so only for career and promotion enhancement (Shiner 1997a, 74). When General Patrick himself first called for the establishment of an Air Corps (along the lines of the Marine Corps’ relationship with the Navy), the War Department disapproved each and every recommendation on the basis that it would lead to the “ultimate creation of a unified air force” with detrimental outcomes for the department (as quoted in Tate

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251 During this time, training and the development of standard operating procedures fell to the Air Corps Tactical School. Along with the members of Air Corps Board, the School developed standard operating procedures largely independent of Army intervention (Finney 1955, 18; Muller 1998, 174). The motto of the School was, appropriately, “We Make Progress Unhindered by Custom” (Finney 1955, vii). Except when air proponents attempted to influence overarching Army strategic concepts that clashed with the prioritization of ground forces (Finney 1955, 34), the War Department seems to have left them alone due to neglect, lack of interest, or a focus on other priorities; from a strategic resistance perspective, such action appears to be an attempt to quarantine them.
1998, 36). Only the President’s Morrow Board, which led to the Air Corps Act of 1926, resulted in the establishment of the Air Corps (Tate 1998, 46-48).

Army leaders’ resistance to the Air Corps only continued. Under subsequent chiefs of staff, particularly Charles Summerall and Douglas MacArthur, Army leadership refused to cut funding from other branches to support the expansion of the Air Corps, even given the congressional mandate of the five-year extension plan identified in the Air Corps Act of 1926 (Tate 1998, 67-89). In fact, both chiefs acted to keep congressional air proponents from intervening in the Army’s control of its funding and personnel (ibid.). Before a 1930 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriates, MacArthur argued that the budget of the Army must not take into account the “eccentricities of any individual or group,” a comment directed towards supporters of air power (as quoted in Tate 1998, 89). Without respite until 1939 and Germany’s invasion of Poland, Army leaders including both the Chief of Staff and the General Staff fought back all supporters who would increase the air service at the expense of any other branch of the Army (McClendon 1996, 47-92; Shiner 1997c; Tate 1998; Johnson 2003).

While Army leaders resisted air power because of its threat to the sense of the mission, air power investments also threatened to divert funding from other branches that Army leaders considered more critical to the mission. In the early 1920’s, the Lassiter Board called for a commitment of $90 million to the Air Service, a sum that represented more than one-third of the

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252 The War Plans Division further stated, “To remove the Air Service from [its] coordinating influence [with other Army branches] would be a step fraught with grave, if not indeed, disastrous consequences” (as quoted in Tate 1998, 37). General Hugh Drum even argued that General Patrick should withdraw his request entirely (Tate 1998, 37).

253 However, the Morrow Board also recommended against a separate air service equal to the Army and Navy (Hurley 1964, 106).

254 MacArthur had a particularly difficult interaction with Congressperson Ross Collins over the fiscal year 1933 budget for which Collins sought to reduce the size of the Army officer corps from 12 thousand to 10 thousand personnel and use the savings to support aviation and mechanization efforts (Tate 1998, 95). MacArthur, though, was able to gain enough support from the Senate to defeat the effort (Tate 1998, 96).
Army budget; achieving this amount of investment would have required cutting funds from other branches and capabilities (Tate 1998, 30-31). Somewhat understandably, Army leaders did not commit to the Lassiter Board’s plan. Just a few years later when Congress called for the expansion of the Air Service in 1926 to 1,800 planes, the Air Corps still stood at 1,555 airplanes in 1933 (Johnson 2003, 158). In 1933, Brigadier General Oscar Westover, then the assistant chief of the Air Corps, submitted a plan that called for over 4,400 planes to support Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur’s plan to defend the United States from foreign attack (Johnson 2003, 157-158). MacArthur, in turn, ordered a board of generals headed by General Hugh Drum, deputy Chief of Staff, to assess these numbers; it recommended a limit of 1,800 aircraft “if additional aircraft could be procured only at the expense of other arms and services” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 158). The Baker Board (also an internal War Department Board), established by the War Department only a year later, made the same recommendation that an increase in planes not be made “at the expense of the rest of the Military Establishment” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 159). Throughout the interwar years, Army leaders wanted to minimize the financial impact of air capabilities on other capabilities, and given the shrinking federal budget of those years, such trade-offs become even more important.

The War Department particularly refused to buy bombers, the key aircraft to an independent air force capable of long-range bombing. When the Air Corps requested B-17 bombers in 1937, the bombers that would become known as the “Flying Fortresses” in World War II, the War Department refused on the basis that it was beyond national policy given that the planes would be able to “bomb points in Europe and South America and return without refueling” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 163). Yet, in and of itself, the ability to fly to Europe and South America was not a justification to resist the B-17 that makes sense when compared to the
rest of U.S. capabilities. Just two decades prior, the Navy had demonstrated the ability to transport hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers to Europe, yet no military officer would think to criticize the Navy for this capability. In fact, such a capability was yet another demonstration of the benefits rather than the shortcomings of the B-17 bombers.

Such a capability, one would expect, should have been a benefit rather than an impediment given the responsibility of the GHQ Air Force in 1935. The Drum Board of 1933 had specifically based its own recommendations of the GHQ Air Force specifically on the Army’s “Red-Orange” contingency war plan (built on the scenario of attacks by both Britain and Japan), which Secretary of War George Dern approved in 1934 (Tate 1998, 138-139). Given this scenario, General Frank Andrews, the first commander of GHQ Air Force, specifically wanted such bombers to be able to support operations in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama and protect the entirety of the western hemisphere (Tate 1998, 164-167). Additionally, the experience of World War I demonstrated the impact of being behind in air capabilities at the beginning of a war as the U.S. had only 23 planes in 1915 (Hennessey 1958, 120; 156), and given the challenges of production, only 1,200 U.S. planes reached France before the end of the war (Mortensen 1997, 47).

Bombers, then, were critical to national war plans, yet Army leadership still rejected the B-17. Instead, Army leaders purchased B-18 airplanes instead, a 2-engine model with less range and bombing capability (Tate 1998, 165).255 While they were cheaper, their decreased range and ability to carry fewer bombs inherently made them capable only of supporting ground troops rather than carrying out long-range bombing runs (Shiner 1997c, 145-146), and these same reduced capabilities made them inadequate for oceanic defense (Tate 1998, 167). Thus, by

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255 It must be recognized, though, that the immediate cause of the Army’s choice not to purchase B-18 bombers was that it crashed during testing due to pilot error (Tate 1998, 165).
choosing an airplane that had less range and less ability to carry bombs, the Army leadership sought to limit airplanes only to supporting ground units: the B-18, by design, could only support ground troops while the B-17, by design, was a strategic bomber. General Andrews, though, lobbied for the B-17 throughout his tenure as commander of GHQ Air Force (Tate 1998, 168), which ended in 1939.  

There was also little change in Army-wide doctrine, even though there was a distinct difference between the emerging air doctrine, as developed by air supporters, and overall Army doctrine. The doctrine and planning material used at the Air Service Tactical School focused on the strategic bombing and air force roles as early as the 1920’s (Johnson 2003, 91). In 1923, General Patrick published a pamphlet entitled “Fundamental Conceptions of the Air Service” which stressed the strategic bombing and counter-aviation roles and placed support to ground units as the third most important function of the air arm (Johnson 2003, 91-92). A 1924 and 1926 air service pamphlet entitled Bombardment also stressed that bombing was too powerful a combat capability not to prioritize (Johnson 2003, 93). As early as 1925, the commandant of the Air Tactical School claimed, “bombing has developed to the point where it is accurate and destructive” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 93). The 1930 version of Bombardment stated plainly, “Bombardment aviation, under the circumstances anticipated in a major war, is the basic arm of the Air Force” (as quoted in Johnson 2000, 94).

To the Army and its leadership, only the infantry could win wars and all other branches supported the infantry, a concept enshrined in the Field Services Regulations from 1917 through

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256 Like Billy Mitchell before him, General Andrews lost his rank of general (to become a colonel) and assumed a new command in San Antonio, Texas in 1939.

257 In September 1939, General George Marshall authorized the Air Corps to purchase B-17s and gave it specific responsibility for hemispheric defense after Germany invaded Poland (Shiner 1997c, 158). As of 1939, U.S. forces included 800 combat-capable aircraft compared to 3,600 German aircraft, 2,000 British aircraft, and 1,700 French aircraft (Shiner 1997c, 162).
1939 (Johnson 2003, 96). Within its doctrine, the Army overall did not recognize a view of warfare that treated airpower as a capability distinct from ground forces. The 1917 edition of the *FM 100-5: Field Services Regulations* identified four roles for airplanes: strategic reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, artillery observation, and protection of friendly air observation posts (Raines 2000, 8). Not until the *Field Services Regulations* of 1941 were the air and infantry branches put on equal footing:

No one arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms and services is essential to success. The characteristics of each arm and service adapt it to the performance of its special function. The higher commander coordinates and directs the action of all, exploiting their power to attend the ends sought (U.S. War Department 1941, 5).

However, even this was not wholehearted support for air operations. While recognizing that the air service may conduct “independent attacks against enemy objects on land and sea,” the manual stated that when independent attacks are deemed impossible by the operational environment, the leadership of the air arm “should unhesitatingly attach for definite operations part or all of the aviation to units of the ground forces” (U.S. War Department 1941, 12-14). Not until 1943 (as discussed previously) did official doctrine recognize equality between air and ground forces.

There are two alternate explanations to strategic resistance. The first is that Army leaders misunderstood the role that airplanes could play. If they were ignorant about what air power advocates were trying to accomplish, then their resistance could be attributed to ignorance rather than protection of the mission. However, as early as 1915, senior Army leaders recognized the role that such bombing planes could play. Brigadier General Scriven published an analysis of European military airplanes, including “bombing aircraft” (as quoted in Raines 2000, 9). This study was published by the War College Division of the General Staff and also by the *Field Artillery Journal*. 

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Another alternative explanation is that Army leaders truly believed that airplanes and air power were inconsequential and that the attention they received (both politically and financially) detracted from the real business of war fighting. In fact, strategic bombing had yet to demonstrate its role in battle prior to World War II, even if it had demonstrated potential. In his annual report of 1935, Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur wrote, “So far as tactical and strategic [air] doctrine is concerned, there exists two great fields of Air Force employment; one fully demonstrated and proved, the other conjectural” (as quoted in Shiner 1997c, 149). The use of the airplane in combat conditions had mixed results; the Air Service did well but was not decisive in World War I (Mortensen 1997, 69).

There was ample evidence, however, to suggest that air power and strategic bombing did have a role beyond supporting ground forces. Furthermore, the Army leadership never attempted to disprove air advocates through other tests and experiments, and in fact, experiments and tests only offered more evidence in favor of airpower advocates than against them. The numerous cross-country and cross-ocean trips of the 1920’s demonstrated the potential weakness of America’s isolation from Europe (Shiner 1997a, 87-90)—if airplanes could carry bombs from the United States to Germany, they could just as easily carry bombs from Germany to the United States. Additionally, the bombing of the Ostfriesland in 1921 demonstrated the ability of planes to destroy large targets, and the intervention of the ocean liner Rex in 1938 demonstrated the ability of planes to intercept ships and provide for coastal defense (Shiner 1997c, 148). If Army leaders truly believed that air power and strategic bombing were inconsequential except in their support of ground forces, it would have been relatively easy to develop other experiments to test the claims of air power advocates and, more importantly, to convince political leaders not to support air power advocates. Thus, if Army leaders only resisted because they believed strategic
air power was a bankrupt concept, there should be evidence of more attempts to disprove air power through tests and experiments. The problem, though, is that these tests likely would have only supported the claims about strategic bombing because nearly every test and experiment during the interwar years verified the role of air power.

Tactics of Resistance

In resisting airplanes and their implications, Army leaders employed three tactics of resistance: political use of expertise, suppression, and ignoring the force for change.

Political Use of Expertise

Army leaders used organizational expertise to attempt to convince external political forces that career interests rather than national security interests motivated air power advocates. In 1919 before congressional hearings, General John Pershing opposed Senator New’s bill for an independent air arm and argued that aviators were only concerned with their own promotions (Shiner 1997a, 74; Johnson 2003, 51-52). Pershing stated that “aviation is not an independent arm and cannot be for a long time to come, if ever” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 52-53). Only a few years later in 1925, before the House Military Affairs Committee, General Fox Connor of the General Staff accused airmen of trying to “escape control by the Chief of Staff” in pursuit of a “promotion scheme” (as quoted in Tate 1998, 45-46).

Army leaders also argued that the diversion of finances to the air arm was detrimental to national security. While it is true that the Army suffered from budget shortfalls during this time, the air arm suffered as well; but instead of lobbying for more resources overall, these leaders lobbied to re-direct funds from air forces to ground forces. The term used by Army leaders was “stabilizing” the budget, but the goal was to cut the Air Corps budget and funnel the money to other branches (Tate 1998, 94). General Hugh Drum made this argument in 1925 to the Board of
Aviation Inquiry, stating, “the establishment of a separate Air Force independent of the Army, no matter what the form of organization, cannot be justified on any sound grounds…[because] it favors a special class, to the detriment of the whole of National Defense” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 101).

In his final year as chief of staff in 1930, General Charles Summerall made a similar argument. He argued against any increase in aviation assets because “there has been no parallel development of the related antiaircraft defense” (as quoted in Tate 1998, 88). In reality, Summerall was concerned with the fact that the 1931 budget cut the overall War Department budget by $65 million. Thus, when the Air Corps’ budget went from $40 million to $34 million, the Assistant Secretary for Air was able to convince the Bureau of the Budget to reallocate $2 million from other branches, thereby increasing the Air Corps allocation to $36 million (Tate 1998, 88). Summerall’s successor, Douglas MacArthur, also opposed political proponents of air power (Tate 1988, 88).

The weakness of such arguments is that air power was a part of the national defense structure and the entire national defense institution had budget gaps. In regards to General Drum’s argument, building the air service was as much a part of building the nation’s defense capabilities as increasing the size of the infantry. Also, while it is rational to argue in favor of more antiaircraft capabilities, it is not clear why Summerall portrayed the increase in Air Corps spending as detrimental to antiaircraft abilities. In fact, one would expect a service chief to applaud spending on his service, regardless of the area. The real problem that these leaders had with the air service is that it threatened to take funds away from ground forces. While air power was indeed relevant to the country’s national security, it took priority and funds away from the branches that they considered more important to the Army’s mission.
Suppression

In response to the leaders of the airpower insurgency, Army leaders attempted to suppress their rise at every turn. When the air arm was still subservient to the Signal Corps, General George Scriven, Chief Signal Officer, refused to approve funds to experiment with machine guns or bombs from airplanes (Moore 1958, 46). Scriven wanted to keep the airplanes as a reconnaissance asset, not as a bombing or fighting asset. After World War I began, Scriven reported to Congress that “airplanes are the most tremendous implement of reconnaissance…the modern war has ever seen. As a fighting machine, the aeroplane has not justified its existence” (as quoted in Moore 1958, 48). While it is true that the airplane did not turn the tide of World War I, it did demonstrate success in that it increased the ability of military forces to apply combat power.

The War Department also tried to control the air service’s influence on the media. Following tests by Captain Chandler using Lewis machine guns in air-to-ground combat in June 1912, Chandler and other pilots involved spoke to reporters about placing the armaments on planes (Moore 1958, 36). Yet in response to these statements, a spokesman from the War Department’s General Staff stressed to the media that airplanes were only reconnaissance assets and not combat assets (Moore 1958, 36; Chandler and Lahm 1979, 224). The extradition of Mitchell (as discussed below) was also an attempt to keep him away from the media.

Of all the air power insurgents, Billy Mitchell received the most noticeable attention. During the Lampert Committee hearings of 1924, Mitchell accused Army and Navy officers testifying on behalf of their organizations of lying (Shiner 1997a, 98). Because of these comments and his earlier speeches and articles that criticized the Army, Mitchell lost his position as Assistant Chief of the Air Service, was reduced in rank, and sent to San Antonio, Texas to serve as the air officer of the VIII Corps Area (Shiner 1997a, 98; Tate 1998, 38). By banishing
him to Texas, Army leaders attempted to suppress his influence on internal and external
supporters of air power.

While Mitchell is famous for his court-martial, the hearing itself was not directly an act
of suppression by the Army (Murray 1998, 107). Following two high-profile crashes in 1925 of
a dirigible and a seaplane, Mitchell made disparaging comments about the Army and Navy
(Shiner 1997a, 98-99). President Calvin Coolidge personally ordered the court-martial on the
basis that Mitchell’s comments were detrimental “to good order and military discipline” (as
quoted in Shiner 1997a, 99). The military judges found Mitchell guilty, but he resigned in
February 1926 rather than serve a five-year suspension from service (Shiner 1997a, 100).258

Though Mitchell was not court-martialed for his views on airpower, senior Army officers
saw his trial as yet another opportunity for air insurgents to argue their viewpoint to political
leaders and the public, an opportunity that needed to be stopped. One Army general observed
that the “the War Department is on trial” for its treatment of airpower rather than Billy Mitchell
(Hurley 1964, 104-105). According to a New York Times article of the day, Secretary of War
Dwight Davis was planning to read the “riot act” to any air officers who were out of line in
publicizing their views as had Mitchell (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 68).

One officer, in particular, received punishment for his support of Mitchell. During the
court martial, Hap Arnold used an official mimeograph machine in the Chief of the Air Service’s
office to print pamphlets supporting Mitchell’s position on air power and the Army’s
mismanagement. Arnold was caught and threatened with his own court martial, but was instead
sent to Fort Riley, Kansas (Shiner 1997b, 103; Daso 2000, 113-120). Like Mitchell before him,

258 Yet while President Coolidge directed the court-martial, no senior Army officer sought to intercede. In fact,
General Charles Summerall attempted to serve as a judge in Mitchell’s court martial to avenge disparaging
comments Mitchell had made about Summerall’s strategy of protecting the Hawaiian islands from air attack (Hurley
1964, 103-104). Mitchell recognized this, and he was able to have Summerall and two other officers removed from
the court-martial panel for reasons of “prejudice and bias” (Hurley 1964, 104).
he was banished, but he maintained his career trajectory to eventually serve as commander of the Army Air Forces in World War II.

Army leadership made similar attempts to suppress aviation-minded officers in later years. When the Howell Commission of 1934 called witnesses to testify about the Air Corps’ performance in the air mail fiasco, General Douglas MacArthur appointed General Charles Kilbourne to control the testimony of all Army officers (Tate 1998, 147). General Kilbourne warned that all air officers be familiar with the War Department’s official position that any expansion of the air arm not be done at the expense of the other branches, with a warning that he expected all personnel to “conform to these principles” (as quoted in Johnson 2003, 159). While he did allow a number of air officers to testify before the commission, he refused to reimburse them for their travel expenses to and from Washington, D.C. (Tate 1998, 148). Though Kilbourne attempted to suppress their positions, all air officers requested by the Howell Commission eventually testified.

Army leaders also attempted to suppress the findings of internal boards and reports. While a number of internal War Department boards studied the issue of airplanes, the personnel appointed on the board were predisposed to support the Army’s perspective rather than that of air advocates. The Menoher Board of 1919 consisted of five senior artillery officers. Unsurprisingly, they found that the air arm must remain part of the Army, that the cost of airplanes was detrimental to the nation’s defense, and that aviation officers were mistaken in their support of an independent air arm (Tate 1998, 9-11).

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259 The air mail fiasco of 1934 resulted from the Air Corps’ failed attempt to assume responsibility for all air mail delivery in the country. In that year, President Franklin Roosevelt cancelled the contracts of all airlines that carried mail for the U.S. Post Office (Shiner 1997b, 122). In the first week of flying the mail, 6 Army aviators died (Shiner 1997b, 125). Over the three months during which the Air Corps flew the mail, 12 aviators died and 66 planes crashed (Shiner 1997b, 125; Correll 2008b).
In response to the sinking of the *Ostfriesland*, John Pershing attempted to undercut the implications of the event through suppression. After the test, a Joint Army-Navy board headed by Pershing reviewed the findings and conclusions of the event (Moore 1958, 59). It was not surprising, then, that the board refuted Mitchell’s claim that airplanes would replace ships in coastal defense. According to the report issued by the board, “The battleship is still the backbone of the fleet…the airplane has not revolutionized modern naval warfare” (as quoted in Moore 1958, 80). By siding with the Navy, the Army’s historical antagonist in all things bureaucratic, Pershing undercut Mitchell’s claims. Pershing was the last word on all things in the Army from World War I until his end of tour as the Chief of Staff in 1924, and he did not want an independent air arm (Moore 1958, 73).

In 1934, the Baker Board was established by Secretary of War George Dern as a result of the failures of the Air Corps during the air mail fiasco in the spring of 1934 (Shiner 1997b, 125-126). The board, led by former Secretary of War Newton Baker, was tightly controlled by the War Department Staff: only three of the 11-member panel were aviators, and both the agenda and the list of witnesses were dictated by the War Staff (Shiner 1997b, 126). Though the board did recommend the establishment of the GHQ Air Force, it also unsurprisingly recommended against separating the Air Service into its own branch (ibid.).

Ignoring the Force for Change

Finally, as discussed previously, Army leaders ignored operational experience in World War I including that of both allies and the U.S. While it is true that aviation was not a decisive element of the war (Mortensen 1997, 69), it did demonstrate capabilities never before seen on the battlefield. While it is not reasonable to expect Army leaders to have supported strategic bombing or an independent air arm solely due to the experiences of the Air Service during this
conflict, the battles of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne campaigns, in particular, demonstrated the effects of airplanes and the importance of air superiority (Mortensen 1997, 65-66; Muller 1998, 153).²⁶⁰

Pershing’s resistance to airplanes for anything other than ground support manifested itself even before U.S. flyers entered the war. Before major U.S. involvement, Major Raynal Bolling led a team of officers to assess European aircraft and air capabilities (Mortensen 1997, 48). In their assessment, they recommended a ratio of 2 bombardment to each 1 observation plane for the Air Service, but General Pershing and the War Staff cut the number to 3 bombardment for every 4 observation planes, a substantial change in force ratio (ibid.).

Again, while it is not logical to expect overwhelming support for airplanes, it would be logical given these experiences to expect at least some degree of support for investigation of air capabilities from Army leadership. Yet, as discussed throughout this section, the post-World War I Army sought primarily to control the Army air arm, viewing it more as a threat to other branches than accepting it as a new and permanent aspect of warfare. Ignoring the experiences of World War I best describes the Army’s response to this experience.

Thus, the Army strategically resisted forces for change that sought to develop airplanes and their related capabilities. The table below identifies the forces for change, tactics of resistance, outcome, and the Army’s success at resisting.

²⁶⁰ In the battle of St. Mihiel, over 1,400 aircraft took part (Mortensen 1997, 66).
Table 13: Strategic Resistance to Airplanes – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airplanes</th>
<th><strong>External Force For Change</strong></th>
<th><strong>Internal Force For Change</strong></th>
<th><strong>Tactic of Resistance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Outcome</strong></th>
<th><strong>Successful Resistance?</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership (supporters in Congress who pushed for airplane development)</td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise (Attempted to convince Congressional leaders that too much investment of air arm weakened national defense)</td>
<td>Political leadership continued to push for more independence for the air arm (Air Corps Act, etc.)</td>
<td>Somewhat – Until President Eisenhower’s involvement in 1939, Congressional leaders could make changes to budget and authority of air arm but were not successful in getting an independent air force</td>
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<td>Intervention by President Roosevelt, motivated by enemy threat (development and demonstration of air capabilities by German forces)</td>
<td>No resistance, even if there was still latent opposition in the War Staff</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff General Marshall dropped opposition to Army Air Forces in 1939</td>
<td>No – paired with the emphasis of intervention FDR, Marshall stopped resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational insurgents</td>
<td>Suppression (Attempted to keep air proponents in line and maintain control of them)</td>
<td>Insurgents lobbied inside and outside the organization for greater independence and allocation of resources</td>
<td>Yes – insurgents had little impact on the organization without political involvement; could aggravate the organization, but could not force independence for air arm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Force For Change</td>
<td>Internal Force For Change</td>
<td>Tactic of Resistance</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Successful Resistance?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boards and Reports</td>
<td>Suppression (Army leadership stacked the members of the internal boards with people opposed to air bombing and independent air arm)</td>
<td>Internal Army and War Department boards largely supported subordination of air arm to ground commanders; did not support independence of air arm</td>
<td>Yes – internal boards and reports bolstered organizational prioritization of ground capabilities and subordination of air capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiments and tests (including air bombing of Ostfriesland)</td>
<td>Suppression (Army leaders sought to undercut the implications of the experiments)</td>
<td>Experiments and tests gained public attention and demonstrated capabilities of the air arm</td>
<td>Yes – experiments garnered media attention, but did not achieve mission change</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational experience (World War I)</td>
<td>Ignoring the force for change (experience would rationally lead to some degree of Army-led exploration of air capabilities)</td>
<td>Army leadership continually resisted air arm by subordinating air capabilities to ground capabilities in the same manner as existed prior to World War I</td>
<td>Yes – Army aircraft proponents limited to develop capabilities without senior leadership support</td>
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**Nuclear Weapons**

In the first decade after World War II, nuclear weapons threatened both global security and the Army’s sense of mission. With its overwhelmingly destructive capabilities, nuclear weaponry appeared to mute the appropriateness and feasibility of conventional ground combat (Bacevich 1997, 314-315). The threat to the Army was not just a change in mission, it was the removal of the mission:
For to most Americans, including most of the government, the Army in the late 1940’s seemed almost irrelevant. So pervasive was this attitude that the Army itself appears to have suffered increasingly under a sense of its own irrelevance, with consequent damage to energy and efficiency. To the extent that Americans saw the Communist threat as a military threat, their answer to it was simply the American atomic monopoly. If the Communists should—incredibly—resort to overt military force, the sequel, Americans assumed, must be full-scale war; and the United States would win such a war with air-atomic power (Weigley 1984, 501).

Army leadership, however, had no intention of changing or relinquishing its mission.

This section examines the Army’s strategic resistance to nuclear weapons. In this case, the only force for change was an external force in the form of President Dwight Eisenhower. In response to this force for change, Army leadership utilized tactics of resistance including the political use of expertise, sabotage, and appeasement.

History

Elected in 1953 as one of the most famous heroes of World War II, President Dwight Eisenhower had a particular view of national security. For Eisenhower, the economy and not the military had priority in achieving the country’s security goals, as “true security for our country must be founded on a strong and expanding economy, readily convertible to the tasks of war” (Eisenhower 1955 as quoted in Parker 1994, 41).

In order to re-focus U.S. efforts on developing the national economy, Eisenhower sought to shrink the armed forces substantially, and in particular the U.S. Army.

Nuclear weapons provided the mechanism to re-balance economic priorities and minimize the sacrifice of U.S. personnel to war. Eisenhower sought to address the Soviet nuclear threat while also controlling the budget in order to facilitate domestic economic stability.

261 With the focus on the economy and the presence of nuclear weapons, it was a trade-off between the economy and conventional forces: “We cannot defend the nation in a way which will exhaust our economy…that instead of conventional forces, we must be prepared to use atomic weapons in all forms” (Eisenhower 1954 as quoted in Ambrose 1986, 224).
and growth, but he prioritized the latter (Ambrose 1984, 433-435). To accomplish these important but conflicting goals, Eisenhower sought to leverage nuclear weapons, which he believed to be a cheaper means of maintain peace than conventional capabilities (Chernus 2002, 31). Additionally, conventional warfare and the mass of personnel needed to win World War II-type conflicts were impractical against an enemy with nuclear weapons. To him, “…our most valued, our most costly asset is our young men…. Let’s don’t use them any more than we have to” (Eisenhower as quoted in Ambrose 1984, 171). In Eisenhower’s view, one strategic nuclear weapon could end a war without the need for millions of people required to wage for conventional warfare (Parker 1994, 13).

Eisenhower called his strategy “New Look,” an approach that emphasized nuclear weapons and covert operations in order to defeat the Soviet Union. However, this approach de-emphasized the middle ground of conventional operations, leaving the Army’s mission a distant second-place in importance. In order to defend against the Soviet threat, Eisenhower’s strategy stressed “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory striking power” (U.S. National Security Council Memorandum 162/2 1953, 5).

Between “massive retaliation” and covert operations (Trauschweizer 2008, 28), the president saw little need for traditional Army operations.

262 Eisenhower announced this new strategy in his State of the Union Address in January 1954, though planning had begun in the summer of 1953 (Geelhoed 1979, 100-101). Two major issues influenced this strategy: Eisenhower’s Project Solarium of 1953 and a report by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff of August 28, 1953 (Davis 2008, 17-18). Though Eisenhower did not actually use the term “new look,” he argued that “the usefulness of these new [nuclear] weapons creates new relationships between men and materiels [sic]. These relationships permit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to our situation in the world today” (Eisenhower 1954). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles further explained how “massive retaliation” fit within this strategy in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, on January 17, 1954 (Geelhoed 1979, 105). The term “new look” actually came from Pentagon public relations officials, not Eisenhower himself (Ambrose 1984, 171).

263 In regards to covert operations, NSC 162/2 directed that the U.S. “take all feasible diplomatic, political, economic and covert measures to counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control to achieve dominant power in a free world country” (U.S. National Security Council 1953, 25).
Yet, it was between these two ends of the conflict spectrum in conventional warfare that the Army operated. The basic force posture of Eisenhower’s strategy was a strong strategic air force and a small conventional ground force (Ambrose 1984, 171). The Army became an after-thought if not an impediment to Eisenhower’s other priority because of the cost associated with maintaining a large standing force. Viewed through the paradigm of massive retaliation, in the event of war, the Army’s only task would be civil defense or the maintenance of law and order (Trauschweizer 2008, 31-32), relegating the Army from the primary warfighting service to an occupation force (Bacevich 1997, 322). Its mission deemed irrelevant, the Army’s resources could be reduced in terms of both personnel and funding.

The implications of this change for the Army were enormous. In 1954, political leadership reduced the Army’s personnel strength by almost one-third from 1.4 million to 1 million personnel (Ambrose 1984, 223). The 1955 defense budget reduced the Army’s funding from $13.7 billion to $7.6 billion, and in 1957, this further dropped to $7.5 billion (Trauschweizer 2008, 29). Relative to the other services, the Army’s share of the defense budget dropped from 38% to 22% between 1954 and 1957 (Trauschweizer 2008, 29). In terms of operational combat capabilities, this cut the number of Army divisions from 20 to 14 (Trauschweizer 2008, 30). In speed and total cuts, this was an enormous reduction.

From the Army perspective, nuclear weapons were a false promise of peace. Once the Soviets and the Americans achieved nuclear weapon parity, there would be no real deterrence. Because a nuclear attack on the Soviets would immediately lead to a retaliatory nuclear attack, the deterrent capabilities became irrelevant (Trauschweizer 2008, 69). Additionally, there were

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264 In 1954 dollars. By 1960, the last full year of Eisenhower’s term, active Army strength stood at 873,078 personnel (Weigley 1984, 600).

265 By 1961, the Army was down to 11 divisions capable of conducting combat operations (Trauschweizer 2008, 35).
inherent operational challenges to actually implementing massive retaliation as a warfighting strategy: as some Army leaders pointed out, the size of the Soviet Union and China made strategically important targets hard to reach, and any U.S. or allied planes would face huge anti-aircraft defensive positions (Trauscheiwer 2008, 31). To Army leaders, men and not technology won wars (Trauscheiwer 2008, 33).

The Army and its mission were under direct threat. In 1955, General Lyman Lemnitzer wrote in The Army Combat Forces Journal, “today it seems to me that the very survival of the Army…is at stake” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 21). A retiring general officer wrote to General Maxwell Taylor, also in 1955, stating, “I am convinced that if present trends continue the Army will soon become a service support agency for the other armed services” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 20). From 1954 to 1956, over 130,000 junior officers quit the Army (Trauscheiwer 2008, 31).

As will be discussed, Army leaders attempted to protect their organization’s mission while superficially bending to the directives of their commander-in-chief. Throughout his tenure, Eisenhower maintained a stressful relationship with the services and particularly the chiefs of staff (Ambrose 1984, 225). None of these relationships, though, were more stressed than with the Army.

In the end, the democratic process and constitutional limits of two terms in office saved the Army. Eisenhower’s successor, President John Kennedy, had little faith in the ability of nuclear weapons to manage peace and the Army’s response to this change in leadership was immediate (Mahnken 2008, 11). Though the new president’s strategic concept would have important and critical influence on the Army’s activities in Vietnam (as discussed previously),
Army leadership fully supported this strategic change (Trauschweizer 2008, 118). In the end, presidential elections rather than the Army’s resistance saved the Army from nuclear weapons.

Forces for Change

In this case, only one external force for change acted on the Army. By insisting on the integration of nuclear weapons into the national security strategy, President Eisenhower served as the significant external force for change.

President Eisenhower made nuclear weapons the foundational aspect of his national security strategy. By imposing nuclear weapons on the entire military structure, he forced the technology on the Army. As outlined in NSC 162/2, the United States’ first priority in countering the threat of the Soviet Union was an “emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power” (U.S. National Security Council 1953, 5). As discussed above, this raised the fundamental question of the relevance of conventional warfare (Davis 2000, 14).

Eisenhower was a particularly powerful president in regards to his ability to control the Army. Given his military experience, knowledge, and popularity (Parker 1994, 29), Eisenhower could make great demands on the service. In December 1954, Eisenhower met with all Chiefs of Staff to express his priorities and his plan for the defense budget. According to an individual at that meeting, “The President stated this [the budget] was his own judgment on the matter. As Commander in Chief he is entitled to the loyal support of his subordinates of the official position he has adopted, and he expects to have that support” (as quoted in Ambrose 1984, 223-224). More than any other president of the 20th century, Eisenhower had the expertise and ability to serve as his own Secretary of Defense (Geelhoed 1979, 18-19), characteristics which made him a particularly strong force for change.
Strategic Resistance to Change

President Eisenhower’s insistence on nuclear weapons resulted in strategic resistance by the Army. In the table below, I have identified the features in which there is evidence of strategic resistance to change:

Table 14: Strategic Resistance to Nuclear Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Component</th>
<th>Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Features</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary Features</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions by leaders to resist FFCs?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the two primary features influenced by nuclear weapons were training and structure. In order to appear to adapt in favor of nuclear weapon capabilities (as will be discussed below), Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor directed the establishment of the “Pentomic Division,” which he personally designed (Sorley 2011, 45). The Pentomic Division included five battle groups which maximized dispersion on a nuclear battlefield, survivability, and the ability to exploit weaknesses in the enemy’s defense caused by a nuclear attack (Bacevich 1986, 103-109). The major changes to the traditional division structure were a reduction from 17,000 to 11,000 personnel, an increase in helicopters, and the incorporation of Honest John tactical nuclear weapons (Bacevich 1986, 109). The problem, however, is that few leaders and soldiers actually believed in the effectiveness of the new structure and the way in which it was designed to fight (Wilson 1998, 271; Sorley 2011, 45; Linn 2007, 178). The Pentomic Division, however, existed only as long as Eisenhower was president. In 1961,
President Kennedy directed the Secretary of Defense to “undertake a reorganization and modernization of the Army’s divisional structure, to increase its non-nuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, [and] to ensure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat” (as quoted in Wilson 1998, 291), a directive the Army was only too willing to follow (Bacevich 1986, 142). In fact, the commander of the Army’s Continental Army Command (CONARC) had already begun planning for the post-Pentomic Army in 1959 (Wilson 1998, 291-293).

Another feature influenced by Eisenhower’s insistence on nuclear weapons and a feature in which there is evidence of strategic resistance is materiel. As will be discussed in the next section, the development of tactical nuclear weapons such as the Honest John, Little John, and Davy Crockett were both a response to the imposition of nuclear technology but also a tactic of resistance. This may seem like a contradiction, given that the integration of tactical nuclear weapons would seem to indicate a response in favor of the force for change, but tactical nuclear weapons were completely ineffective against strategic nuclear weapons; their benefit was for the sake of appearances.

Finally, doctrine indicates strategic resistance to change. Given the known and recognized destructive ability of nuclear weapons during this era, an outside observer who understood military tactics could reasonably recognize that the Army’s World War II doctrine would not work on a nuclear battlefield. Yet throughout this era, doctrine continued to stress firepower and maneuver along the World War II experiences (Trauschweizer 2008, 57-58). Between 1954 and 1962, there was no update to the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations (Trauschweizer 2008, 271). In fact, some outside observers saw the 1954 manual as an attempt by the Army to undercut the morality of nuclear weapons (Bacevich 1986, 39-40).
The *New York Times* ran a front page story that portrayed the Army as attempting to establish moral superiority of conventional warfare over nuclear warfare, arguing that “indiscriminate destruction is unjustifiable in a military sense…[and] Army forces do not deliberately make or invite war upon civilian populations” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 40).\(^{266}\)

In this case, the best alternate explanation to protecting the mission is that Army leaders truly believed that nuclear weapons did not offer real protection of the country’s national security objectives. This is a legitimate argument, however if Army leaders acted solely because of the false peace of nuclear weapons, we should not have seen any action that favored nuclear capabilities, as superficial changes only buttressed Eisenhower’s insistence on nuclear weapons and his expectations of their capabilities. The fact that the Army changed to the Pentomic Division indicates that Army leaders either wanted to change just enough to appear that they supported nuclear weapons (as will be discussed) or they actually believed in Eisenhower’s nuclear strategy. In fact, there is more evidence to support the former argument.

**Tactics of Resistance**

In resisting nuclear weapons, Army leadership employed three tactics of resistance. In employing the political use of expertise, Army leaders attempted to convince the President and others of the ineffectiveness of the use of nuclear weapons in achieving U.S. security goals. Additionally, Army leaders attempted to employ sabotage and appeasement. By leaking information to the press, leaders sought to circumvent the authority of the political leadership. By employing tactical nuclear weapons and adjusting the organizational structures to use these

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\(^{266}\) In his final letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson before his resignation, Ridgway argued, “…in seeking to insure America’s security, so also we find the same threat in the increasingly significant ignoring by our planners of the consequences of omitting the moral factor in considering the use of the immense destructive capability which now exists in the world” (Ridgway 1955 as quoted in Ridgway 1956, 329-330). In his autobiography, he stated that the mass destruction caused by strategic nuclear weapons “is repugnant to the ideals of a Christian nation” (Ridgway 1956, 275).
weapons, General Maxwell Taylor resisted change in the Army’s mission by making superficial changes without having to make significant chances (appeasement).

Political Use of Expertise

In response to the use of nuclear weapons, the Army leadership first attempted to use its expertise over national security affairs. As outlined in NSC 162/2 in October 1953 and later emphasized by President Eisenhower, the NSC planning committee assumed that massive retaliation would destroy the Soviet military capability, which left the Army to serve as an occupation force (Bacevich 1986, 27; Bacevich 1997, 322). After this plan was released, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked each of the armed services for feedback. The Army War Plans Branch drafted a response questioning the assumptions of the entire strategy. They argued that nuclear attacks would destroy the political and economic stability of Europe and the Eastern European states, and that such destabilization would cause a loss of support for the United States, even amongst allies (Bacevich 1986, 28). Additionally, the destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons would make it nearly impossible for the affected states to re-start their economies in a way that met the overall goals of the United States (Bacevich 1986, 28). Later, the Army issued yet another report in December 1953. Again, the Army called for the minimum use of nuclear weapons, and if they were to be used, only against specific targets (Bacevich 1986, 28).

Following back-and-forth papers, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) met with the NSC in March 1954. In that meeting, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford voiced the Army’s concerns directly to the president (Bacevich 1986, 30-31). However, the arguments did not persuade Eisenhower, and he quickly silenced the Army’s opposition. Eisenhower stated that such rejection of the NSC’s plan “came pretty close [to questioning] the
prerogatives of the Commander in Chief” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 30), meaning that he was accusing Secretary of the Army General Ridgway and the Army War Plans Branch of nearly violating the U.S. practice of civilian control of the military.

Ridgway attempted to use his expertise to oppose Eisenhower throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff. Throughout his time, Ridgway argued for “selective retaliation,” meaning that the employment of conventional combat capabilities should depend on the security situation (Ridgway 1956, 274), as opposed to massive retaliation.\footnote{This was also sometimes referred to as “measured retaliation” (Geelhoed 1979, 126).} Ridgway, though, was not asked to stay on as Army Chief of Staff after his first two-year tenure (Bacevich 1986, 41), presumably because of his resistance to Eisenhower’s policies.\footnote{Ridgway was ultimately forthcoming about his resistance to Eisenhower. In his memoirs, he wrote, “It was already clear to me that my tour [as Chief of Staff] was to be an extremely difficult one—that my time was to be spent in the unhappy task of defending the U.S. Army from actions by my superiors which, to my mind, would weaken it, physically and spiritually” (Ridgway 1956, 271).} The departure of Ridgway, however, did not result in the end of the use of expertise by the Chief of Staff of the Army to resist the usage of nuclear weapons.

General Maxwell Taylor, Ridgway’s successor, employed the same tactic of resistance. Prior to becoming Chief of Staff, Taylor published a staff paper called “A National Military Policy” in which he advocated for a strategy that would eventually be called “flexible response” in order to meet both nuclear threats and conventional threats (Taylor 1960, 30-34; Geelhoed 1979, 125).\footnote{Taylor would discuss this strategy of “flexible response” in much more detail in his book The Uncertain Trumpet (1960). This book was a direct critique of Eisenhower’s dependence on nuclear weapons that, Taylor argued, left the U.S. vulnerable to a number of threats, particularly limited war. For Taylor, limited war was anything less than strategic nuclear war (Trauscheiwer 2008, 60-61).} Later as Chief of Staff in 1957, he testified to the same in an appropriations committee meeting in front of the House of Representatives in 1957 (Trauscheiwer 2008, 59-60). Taylor did not specifically criticize Eisenhower, except when asked directly by one of
members of the committee for his personal opinion, he stated that “the funds allocated [were] marginally sufficient to maintain the Army I have described” (as quoted in Trauschweizer 2008, 60), meaning that the Army could only “marginally” meet national security needs. To actually maintain an Army capable of meeting both nuclear and conventional needs (the latter being the focus of flexible response), he needed an Army of 1.5 million people, 500,000 more than Eisenhower budgeted (Trauschweizer 2008, 60). In using his expertise to attempt to sway Congress in favor of flexible response, Taylor attempted to resist Eisenhower’s nuclear policies.

**Sabotage**

Army leaders also attempted to sabotage Eisenhower’s policies by speaking directly to the public to convince them of the weaknesses of an over-reliance on nuclear weapons. Unlike using expertise in a political manner as discussed above, this tactic circumvented the civil-military relationship entirely.

One method of sabotage came via senior Army leadership who criticized Eisenhower’s policies directly to the public. Following his time as Chief of Staff in 1955, Matthew Ridgway almost immediately published his memoirs just a year later in 1956 (Ridgway 1956). Though memoirs are not uncommon from someone of such a senior rank, the speed at which he published and the topics discussed indicated Ridgway’s intent to publicly explain his views on national security policy (Parker 1994, 43). The last three chapters of his memoirs specifically address the inherent problems and weaknesses of nuclear weapons (Ridgway 1956, 303-321). Additionally, Ridgway published his final report to Secretary of Defense Wilson in which he
also critiqued the Eisenhower strategy, even though Wilson had originally classified the letter (Parker 1994, 43).

Maxwell Taylor, the next Chief of Staff after Ridgway, followed the same tactic in airing his views to the public. In the same year as his retirement in 1959, Taylor published his own memoirs (Taylor 1959). More pointed than Ridgway’s critique, the first chapter of Taylor’s memoirs focuses on “The Great Fallacy” of massive retaliation and the false peace of nuclear weapons (Taylor 1959, 1-10). Of Eisenhower’s reliance on nuclear weapons, Taylor stated:

> It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, Massive Retaliation could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of nuclear war or compromise and retreat. From its earliest days, many world events have occurred which cast doubt on its validity and exposed its fallacious character (Taylor 1959, 5).

Though rebuffed by Eisenhower, Taylor’s view on massive retaliation and his alternative strategy (which would come to be known as “flexible response”) would catch hold with the next administration.

Another group of officers below the Secretary of the Army also sought to appeal to the public in order to sabotage support for the policy of massive retaliation. Officially known as the Coordination Group, their actions came to be known as the “Colonels’ Revolt” (Geelhoed 1979, 270-271).

Ridgway sent this letter to Wilson just before resigning, but Wilson classified it (Geelhoed 1979, 124). But, an Army officer obtained the letter and provided it to the media via the New York Times (Geelhoed 1979, 124).

General James Gavin, former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II, published his own post-Army memoirs that also included a strong critique of the Eisenhower administration’s investment in strategic nuclear technology over conventional weapons. Unlike Ridgway and Taylor, Gavin, at least superficially, attributed at least some of this lack of preparedness to the Soviets:

> Our failure to provide adequate forces for limited war appears not to have been entirely our own doing. This, to my mind, is more serious than if it had been, for it suggests that our senior civilian and military leaders, whose decisions act so decisively on the weapons systems we bring into being, have not only used poor and tardy judgment, but have been led into bad judgment as well [emphasis original] (Gavin 1958, 163).

Whether Gavin actually believed that the Soviet Union was intentionally trying to manipulate the administration into investing too much money into nuclear technology or if he intended his comment to be a backhanded insult is uncertain. Of Secretary of Defense Wilson, Gavin said he was “the most uninformed man about military matters and the most determined to remain so” (Gavin 1958, 155).
These officers served as the Army Chief of Staff’s planning committee to assess needs, draft budget proposals, and work with the other services (Halberstram 1992, 473). Beginning in 1955 in an unofficial manner, the group began to draft policy papers and memorandums arguing against nuclear weapons and massive retaliation, and challenging the cuts to the Army that came as a result. Then in January 1956, General Maxwell Taylor made the group an official committee tasked with assisting “…in the development and evaluation of long-range strategic plans” (as quoted in Parker 1994, 49). Though working for Taylor, the group reported to William Westmoreland, Taylor’s chief of staff (Parker 1994, 49).

The colonels decided to take their argument directly to the public. As the challenges from Eisenhower and the other services (particularly the Air Force which had the lead in Eisenhower’s new policy) increased, the colonels decided that they needed to take their argument to the media (Parker 1994, 66). Led by Colonel Donovan Yeuell, the group came up with a plan to work with contacts in the media, the public, and Congress to wage a campaign against Eisenhower, nuclear weapons, and the administration’s failure to plan for conventional warfare (Halberstram 1992, 475). In late 1955, Yeuell and another colonel approached Taylor and outlined the plan; Taylor agreed to it but recognized the risk, saying, “Yeuell, you’re really asking me to stick my neck out” (as quoted in Halberstram 1992, 475).

With Taylor’s approval, the group began to speak more directly to media contacts. Colonel Yeuell’s brother-in-law worked as an editor at the New York Times and agreed to publish the articles (Halberstram1992, 476). Yeuell provided some previously written staff

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272 The colonels wanted to copy the “Revolt of the Admirals” of 1949 (Parker 1994, 44).

273 Lieutenant General James Gavin, then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, unofficially supported the group (Halberstram 1992, 474).
papers to the *Times*, and these formed the basis of a front-page article entitled “Military Forces Split by Conflict on Arms Policies” published on May 19, 1956 (Leviero 1956; Halberstrom 1992, 476).

The response was instantaneous. Two days later, Secretary of Defense Wilson along with all of the service chiefs held a press conference to address the uproar in the press and affirm their commitment to work together (Abel 1956). At the press conference, Maxwell Taylor specifically downplayed the Army’s activities, stating, “There is no mutiny or revolt in the Army” (Abel 1956). When asked by a reporter about who was responsible for the leaks, Taylor disavowed any knowledge:

[Reporter] General Taylor…can you explain, sir, why some of your colonels—and I have good reason to believe that they were in that category—saw fit last week to disseminate documents which they purported to be official documents representing Army views which are contrary to the accepted views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

[Taylor] First, I would like to know who the colonels are (New York Times 1956).

Under the personal execution of Westmoreland, all of the colonels were immediately reassigned (Parker 1992, 69).274 The “colonels’ revolt” was a failed sabotage attempt.

**Offering Something of Lesser Value (Appeasement)**

By superficially integrating tactical nuclear weapons, the Army was able to seem as if it were embracing the “new look” when in fact it was protecting its mission. While it may seem that accepting the technology indicates change, this action actually helped the Army to protect its mission.

Appearing to change was a means of hiding a lack of change. According to William Westmoreland, Eisenhower specifically told Maxwell Taylor that he needed to “sex up the

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274 However, none of the colonels or general officers involved in the revolt were actually fired (Parker 1994, 77-80). Colonel Yeuell received a promotion to command a division artillery unit and was selected to attend the Army War College, and he retired in 1960 (Parker 1994, 77-78). At least three of the colonels went on to promotion to general, including William DePuy, first commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (Parker 1994, 78).
Army” by integrating the new weapons and making the organization appear more advanced (as quoted in Hawkins 1991, 35; see also Trauschweizer 2008, 53). Additionally, Taylor claimed in his memoirs that Secretary of Defense Wilson directed him to “substitute requests for ‘newfangled’ items with public appeal instead of the prosaic accoutrements of the foot soldier” (as quoted in Trauschweizer 2008, 52).

By embracing the technology, Army leadership was able to appear as if it were changing when in fact it was not. Major General John Medaris, the chief of the Army’s missile program, stated to his colleagues:

> If you put all your energy and effort into justifying these conventional weapons and ammunition… I think you are going to get very little money of any kind. It is far easier to justify a budget with modern items that are popular… Why don’t you accentuate the positive and go with that which is popular, since you cannot get the other stuff anyway (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 72)?

The Army accentuated nuclear weapons, but in a way that fit within the paradigm of conventional operations.

To do this, the Army embraced nuclear weapons, but it embraced the “tactical” rather than “strategic” variety. These tactical nuclear weapons included such tactical nuclear delivery systems as the Davy Crockett, the Little John, the Honest John, and the 280 millimeter “atomic cannon,” and a variety of nuclear artillery shells designed to be fired from howitzers or artillery weapons (Davis 2008, 14). There was even an attempt to develop a man-portable Davy Crocket for infantry soldiers (Bacevich 1986, 96).

In reality, the tactical nuclear weapon did nothing to combat the actual threat brought by strategic nuclear weapons. The Davy Crocket was a 150-pound cannon that shot a small nuclear tipped mortar round just a little over one mile, a small fraction of the destruction caused by a 40 kiloton Soviet nuclear weapon. A dozen Davy Crocket weapons could do nothing to stop, deter,
or affect a single strategic Soviet nuclear weapon. Tactical nuclear weapons only maintained the traditional mission (Bacevich 1986, 65-66).

This was just the point, and in the fall of 1956, the Army requested $12 billion in the 1958 budget in order to deploy more nuclear weapons and personnel to Europe (Trauschweizer 2008, 65). However, the 1958 budget allocated only $7.26 billion to the Army; its attempt had failed (Trauschweizer 2008, 65).

The Army, though, knew that it could not effectively function on a nuclear battlefield. Beginning in 1951, the Army began to run tests known as Desert Rock in Nevada (Davis 2008, 14). In the first test (Desert Rock I), 2,000 soldiers took part to demonstrate that dismounted soldiers could maneuver safely through a post-nuclear blast area (Barrett et al. 1987, 5-18). Four years later, the Army held Desert Rock IV in 1955. In this exercise, exercise planners deployed a maneuver unit (known as Task Force Razor) composed of personnel and combat vehicles to move through a post-nuclear blast area. While the Army publicly reported a successful maneuver exercise, a classified Army report written after the exercise called it an “unrealistic maneuver” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 112). In order to prevent the nuclear explosion from affecting maneuverability, the exercise leaders pre-positioned vehicles in non-combat positions that maximized protection from the blast; turned off all equipment including radios; protected all weapons sites with tape; and maintained communication only through a back-up system that used hard-wired telephones between vehicles (Bacevich 1986, 112-113). After the blast, the maneuver unit moved in a tightly controlled formation that did not resemble real combat maneuver formations. Then, when they came within one kilometer of the blast, the unit commander ordered a perpendicular movement away from blast site because the radiation levels rose too high, thereby failing to achieve the training objective (Bacevich 1986, 113).
The most compelling evidence of the Army’s true lack of investment in the employment of tactical weapons was the quick dismissal of the entire concept upon the election of President Kennedy. With Eisenhower out of office, the Army did away with the Pentomic Division quickly (Mahnken 2008, 11). When President John Kennedy replaced Eisenhower and in turn replaced the “New Look” with his “Flexible Response,” “…the Army abandoned its 1950’s [nuclear] initiatives with almost unseemly haste” (Bacevich 1986, 142).

Thus, the Army strategically resisted nuclear weapons. The table below identifies the forces for change, tactics of resistance, outcome, and the success of the Army’s resistance.

Table 15: Strategic Resistance to Nuclear Weapons – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Weapons</th>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise (Ridgway and Taylor attempted to argue in public and before the NSC how nuclear weapons could not maintain effective deterrence)</td>
<td>Army’s budget continued to be cut, and Eisenhower continued to rely on “new look” as the national security strategy</td>
<td>No – Eisenhower was not convinced nor was the NSC; Army was still reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sabotage (Army officers attempted to leak information to the media to convince the public that Eisenhower’s strategy was ineffective)</td>
<td>Publication of articles in national newspaper caused repercussions; officers were reassigned (though not fired or relieved from duty)</td>
<td>No – Army officers discovered in role and immediately removed from positions, though not fired; public continued to support “New Look”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Eisenhower’s imposition of nuclear weapons via “New Look” Strategy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offering Something of Lesser Value – Appeasement (Army implemented tactical nuclear weapons to demonstrate superficial adaption to new security strategy)</td>
<td>Development and utilization of tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., Davy Crockett) and adjustment to the Pentomic Division Concept</td>
<td>No – Army was not able to garner any more support from Eisenhower in developing the Army’s ground combat role in a nuclear environment (adjustments were reversed when Kennedy elected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Helicopters

The Army did not resist helicopters; instead, the Army used helicopters to resist the Air Force’s attempts to prevent the Army from maintaining organic close air support. When the Army lost control of tactical air support to the newly established U.S. Air Force in 1947, it lost a technological asset that had become a battlefield requirement (Williams 2005, 49). The Army’s concern over losing control of close air support had merit. After World War II, Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz planned to establish two strategic branches within the organization but no tactical branch to support the Army, and only Dwight Eisenhower’s personal involvement convinced him to establish a tactical air command to support ground units (ibid.). Tactical Air Command (TAC), though, was a secondary priority in the Air Force, as only 150 soldiers and officers comprised the entire organization in 1950 (ibid.; see also Wolk 1997, 372-373).

Though it had in practice separated prior to World War II, the U.S. Air Force became an official agency, co-equal to the Army, under the National Security Act of 1947. It had broad
responsibility for the country’s air combat capabilities: “In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations” (U.S. National Security Act 1947, Sec. 208(f)). The Army’s air capabilities were more limited:

In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land (U.S. National Security Act 1947, Sec. 205(e)).

The issue of how to determine “such aviation…as may be organic therein” and the roles and types of operations that such aviation should conduct would be the main points of tension between the two organizations.

Nevertheless, the experience of World War II (and later Korea) left the Army with a critical demand for air support for both combat and logistical needs. While the Army’s push for organic aircraft almost immediately caused controversy with the Air Force, the Army considered air support indispensable to its mission of ground combat. Though the Army pursued both fixed wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the decades after World War II, rotary-wing proved most valuable for both bureaucratic and operational reasons.

The versatility of helicopters proved well worth any potential conflict with the Air Force. In Korea, they overcame difficult terrain and provided new capabilities in medical evacuation (Bradin 1994, 86-88; Williams 2005, 52-62). In Vietnam, they showed how the Army’s focus on conventional combat could adapt (superficially, at least) for counterinsurgency (Cheng 1994, 183-189). In a conventional conflict, helicopters demonstrated very strong potential as anti-tank
weap
ons (Weinert 1991, 164-167).\footnote{The first helicopter destruction of an enemy tank occurred in 1972 in Vietnam (Williams 2005, 168). In some of the first tests of helicopters as anti-tank capabilities by the NATO Armaments Group, the evaluators found that “…the antiarmor helicopters employing hovering fire at standoff range are extremely effective in destroying attacking enemy armor” (as quoted in Williams 2005, 207).} The Yom Kippur War of 1973 motivated the Army to look even more strongly at helicopters, as it demonstrated a type of fast-moving battlefield that the U.S. had yet to experience (Williams 2005, 207).\footnote{In that same year, Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams testified before Congress in 1973 on the need for an attack helicopter, identifying the AH-1 Apache as one of the Army’s “big five” equipment priorities (Williams 2005, 209).} On a nuclear battlefield, they (notionally) maintained maneuverability and flexibility necessary to continue conventional operations (Cheng 1994, 135-136; 185). Finally, some peculiar aspects of Army-Air Force agreements over the years made helicopters a more bureaucratically feasible option than developing fixed-wing aircraft capabilities (as will be discussed).

A number of proponents supported the development and institutionalization of helicopter technology within the Army. These individuals and groups both inside and outside the organization focused on changing promotion pathways, organizational structure, and training. This case demonstrates how proponents resisted Air Force attempts to limit the Army’s organic aircraft capabilities by institutionalizing helicopters within the Army.

History

Helicopters in the U.S. Army had a lackluster performance for their first thirty years. Beginning in 1920, Major T.H. Bane of the Army Air Service began working with an inventor named George de Bothezat to test the use of the autogiros (the predecessor to the helicopter) for Army operations. Though the Army would spend more than $200,000 on the project,\footnote{In 1920’s dollars.} the poor
performance did not convince anyone of its effectiveness and the project was cancelled by 1924 (Gregory 1944, 16-30).

However, other countries demonstrated interest in and had more success with helicopters. In 1937, the German Focke-Wulf Company produced its first successful helicopter; by 1941, it had a second-generation model and planned to produce 1,000 of them (Gregory 1944, 82; Gablehouse 1969, 86-87). In 1937, motivated by the Germans’ successes in developing helicopter technology (though not yet used in combat), Congress allocated $2 million towards testing and fielding helicopters (Weinert 1991, 4).

Beginning in 1941, the Army began to test its first successful helicopter model (Wheeler 1987, 13). Just over a year later, Igor Sikorsky’s XR-4 made its inaugural flight, and in May 1942, the XR-4 flew over 700 miles from Connecticut to Ohio (Gregory 1944, 110-118; Wheeler 1987, 13). The prototypes exceeded all test expectations and spurred the Army Air Forces to purchase 300 such aircraft between 1942 and 1946 (Bradin 1994, 58).

However, helicopters served a limited role in World War II. The first American military unit to use a helicopter in combat was the 1st Air Commando Group; in April 1944, Lieutenant Carter Harman rescued four personnel from a plane crash in the Burma-India theater (Spenser 1998, 383). Throughout the war, though, the Army Air Forces controlled all helicopters in the U.S. Army, and the Army Ground Forces commanded none.

The separation of air capabilities to the Department of the Air Force was the essential impetus behind the growth of helicopters in the Army. On July 26, 1947, President Truman approved the National Security Act of 1947 that, among other changes to the national security structure, realigned the Army Air Forces as a separate and autonomous Department of the Air Force on par with the Army and the Navy. Accordingly, Army Regulation 95-5 established the
role of Army aviation in two areas: supporting ground operations related to mobility, command and control, and logistical support; and improving mobility and force dispersion on a nuclear battlefield (Weinert 1991, 10). Even with such direction, tensions between the Army and Air Force over air roles and responsibilities continued for decades.

The Key West Agreements of 1948 attempted to clarify these roles and reduce the tension between the two services. The Key West Agreements were a series of meetings held between members of the Army, Air Force, and Navy on primary roles and responsibilities of each service. Specifically related to air operations, the Army was granted “such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein” to accomplish its primary role of land combat while the Air Force maintained “primary interest in all operations in the air, except in those operations otherwise assigned” including support to ground operations (White House 1948, 3-7). Additionally, it gave the Army responsibility for air defense operations (limited to antiaircraft artillery operations), while the Air Force took control of strategic air combat, air defense (related to air operations), air support to ground operations, and logistical movement (Wolf 1987, 151; see also Memorandum, White House April 21, 1948, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff”).

These continued disagreements between the two organizations led to another attempt to clarify responsibility for air operations just a year later. As one of a number of “adjustment regulations” regarding aircraft, Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation 5-10-1: Employment of Aircraft for Performance of Certain Missions of May 20, 1949 imposed weight restrictions on Army aircraft: 2,500 pounds for fixed wing and 4,000 pounds for rotary wing. Additionally, it allowed for the use of Army aircraft to support ground combat operations (Weinert 1991, 10; Williams 2005, 51).
This same year, some groups within the Army began to see the value in helicopters. In 1949, the Army’s Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) recommended that funds in the FY1952 budget be allocated to purchase a number of helicopters to be used for logistical transportation (Cheng 1994, 33-34). The recommendation received approval from both the Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, and the vice Chief of Staff, General Wade Haislip. However, the implementation did not happen because of disagreement from the Air Force in regards to the weight restrictions agreed to in Joint Resolution 5-10-1.

This disagreement led to yet another series of joint resolutions between 1951 and 1952. During this time, Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, and Thomas Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force negotiated a number of Army-Air Force disagreements over roles and responsibilities.\(^\text{278}\) Through these agreements, the Air Force attempted to limit the roles that Army aviation assets could conduct and limit the range to which Army aviation could fly, thus protecting the majority of air functions for itself (Weinert 1991, 18-20).\(^\text{279}\) But as a result of the 1952 memorandum, Army fixed-wing aircraft were limited to 5,000 pounds yet no restrictions were placed on the weight of the rotary-wing aircraft (Weinert 1991, 39). This gave the Army a great deal more flexibility in developing helicopters than traditional airplanes.

Despite these agreements, more arguments followed. In two memoranda in 1956 and 1957, in an attempt to settle the on-going dispute between the Army and Air Force, Secretary of

\(^{278}\) These became known as the “Pace-Finletter agreements” or the “Pace-Finletter MOUs [Memorandums of Understanding].”

\(^{279}\) On October 2, 1951, Pace and Finletter met again and agreed on another Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on aviation assets. This MOU limited Army aircraft according to the following functions: aerial observation, command and control, laying communication wire, and transportation of equipment and personnel in the combat zone. The Army was excluded from conducting aerial combat support to ground forces, aerial photography, and aerial engagement with enemy ground forces within the area of operations (Weinert 1991, 20). The MOU of 1952 also identified logistical resupply and troop movement as a primary rather than secondary Army tasks and expanded the Army tasks to include aerial reconnaissance and observation and medical evacuation. Additionally, it expanded the definition of “combat zone” from 50 miles to 100 miles, which was the area in which the Army could execute these new tasks as well as those outlined in the Pace-Finletter MOU of 1952 (Weinert 1991, 39).
Defense Charles Wilson re-imposed a rotary-wing weight limit of 20,000 pounds and prohibited the Army from conducting close air support (Wolf 1987, 303-324; Williams 2005, 78). These limits, though, proved to be dependent on who was in control of the Department of Defense. Five years later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disregarded the weight limit in recommending and pushing the Army to develop greater helicopter capabilities (Cheng 1994, 178).

Besides the administrative disagreements occurring between the Army and the Air Force, the operational experiences of the Army during the 1950’s and 1960’s demonstrated the potential of helicopters and the problems of relying on the Air Force for tactical air support. The difficult terrain in Korea demonstrated the inherent limitations of fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters played a major role in logistics and resupply (Cheng 1994, 36).\(^{280}\) According to a statement to Congress by General Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army throughout the Korean War, helicopter evacuations saved more than 8,000 personnel (Cheng 1994, 37).\(^{281}\) The Marine Corps evacuated 9,815 personnel over the course of the war by helicopter (Williams 2005, 55).\(^{282}\) But beyond medical evacuation, Air Force tactical support did not meet the expectations of Army ground commanders (Williams 2005, 52-58). Difficulties of coordination and an (apparent) unwillingness of the Air Force to send its best pilots to support the Army limited combat

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\(^{280}\) On September 21 of that year, a unit of Marines took their assigned position on an objective after an 8-minute helicopter trip as opposed to a nine-hour foot approach (Williams 2005, 55), demonstrating the first successful airmobile operation.

\(^{281}\) This number is even more remarkable considering that this was done with twelve helicopters. Operating between September 1951 and January 1953, three helicopter detachments attached to the Army medical service corps evacuated close to 11,000 personnel. When the Air Force evacuations are included, the number of evacuees totaled 21,212 personnel. These numbers do not include those who were evacuated by divisional reconnaissance helicopter units (Cheng 1994, 37). Helicopter evacuation reduced the time it took for someone to be evacuated by other soldiers on a stretcher from over ten hours to as little as five minutes (Cheng 1994, 37).

\(^{282}\) This resulted in a higher survival rate for soldiers in the Korean War than in World War II because of the speed at which they could reach medical facilities. In World War II, 4.5% of soldiers died after reaching medical facilities; in Korea, 2.5% of soldiers died (Williams 2005, 61).
capabilities (ibid.). As I discuss below, Army helicopter capabilities developed the most during the decade after the Korean War.

In Vietnam, Army helicopters cemented their value to the Army. Helicopter units were some of the first to be sent to Vietnam: in 1962, the 8th and 57th Transportation companies began supporting South Vietnamese army units (Williams 2005, 115). The 11th Air Assault Division (Test), activated in 1963 and arriving in Vietnam in 1965, demonstrated proof of concept for airmobile combat units as outlined in the Howze Board report (to be discussed subsequently) (Williams 2005, 107-112). In 1965, this test unit became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and in July 1965, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the unit to Vietnam (Williams 2005, 112). In the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division engaged multiple North Vietnamese Army regiments (Moore and Galloway 1993; Williams 2005, 126-128). In the Army’s view, the battle fully demonstrated the usefulness, importance, and combat capabilities of helicopters and helicopter-borne units (Krepinevich 1986, 169; Tolson 1999, 73-83; Williams 2005, 129). As noted by General William Westmoreland, “The ability of the Americans to meet and defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the field of battle was once more demonstrated beyond any possible doubt, as was the validity of the Army’s airmobile concept” (Westmoreland as quoted in Tolson 1999, 83). Only two years in 1968, the Army permanently established a second airmobile helicopter division when the venerable 101st Airborne Division became the 101st Air Cavalry Division (Tolson 1999, 195-198). Additionally, the Army began to deploy the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter to Vietnam in 1967 for close air support (Bernstein 2003, 10-14).

The U.S. Air Force essentially ended most of its opposition to Army organic helicopters in 1966. At this point in the Vietnam War, the Army still provided much of its own tactical

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283 While they were ostensibly sent to transport supplies and equipment, they were also used to transport soldiers for tactical operations. The first Army helicopter-borne assault was conducted in January 1962 with South Vietnamese soldiers inserted by U.S. helicopters and helicopter pilots (Williams 2005, 115).
aerial airlift with the CV-2 Caribou airplane, action that threatened the Air Force’s responsibility for intra-theatre logistical transportation. In order to reduce tensions over roles and responsibilities, Chiefs of Staff General Harold Johnson (Army) and General John McConnell (Air Force) made a deal to transfer all tactical fixed-wing air support vehicles (particularly the CV-2 Caribou) and responsibilities to the Air Force, while the Army took responsibility for rotary-wing aircraft and all related responsibilities, including close air support (McConnell and Johnson 1966). While there was still a great deal of controversy over control of aircraft, particularly in Vietnam, the McConnell-Johnson agreement helped solidify the Army’s ability to develop helicopters specifically designed for close air support (Horwood 2006, 179).284

Forces for Change

The U.S. Air Force was the most important force and only force that sought to keep the Army from developing helicopter capabilities.285 The Air Force attempted to limit the Army’s ability to develop helicopter technology in a number of ways: by forcing the Army to agree to weight limits on rotary wing aircraft, by attempting to limit the Army’s ability to use helicopters in its training events, by establishing its own board of reviews, and by imposing limits on the

284 Army and Air Force leaders struck another important deal regarding attack helicopters in 1976. Chiefs of Staff for the Air Force and Army wrote a joint letter to the House Armed Services Committee in support of tactical attack aircraft (Williams 2005, 210). In this letter, they wrote to the Chairperson of the House Armed Services Committee: We appreciate the opportunity to express our views on Army attack helicopters… It is our view that the attack helicopter is organic to the Army ground maneuver unit and is integral to organic firepower…. Because of the limited range, speed and firepower of the attack helicopter as compared to Air Force fixed wing close air support capabilities, we do not consider the attack helicopter as duplicating Air Force close air support (Jones and Weyand 1976). This support for attack helicopters was not without pretext, however. In return, Chief of Staff Weyand (Army) offered support of the Air Force’s A-10 close air support airplane: “It is our view that both the Army Advanced Attack Helicopter and the Air Force A-10 close air support aircraft are essential” (ibid.). The Air Force originally intended to use the A-10 project to demonstrate that the Army did not need an attack helicopter (Bradin 1994, 123). But when the Army ended the Cheyenne attack helicopter program in 1972, the Air Force continued working on the A-10 (Bradin 1994, 124).

285 At an aviation conference in 1956, Lieutenant Colonel O.G. Goodhand of the Office of the Director of Army Aviation characterized the Air Force’s resistance to the development of organic aviation as “one of determined and sometimes violent opposition” (as quoted in Cheng 1994, 106).
Army’s ability to use its own aircraft to provide combat air support during battles. The Army-Air Force agreements and the Pace-Finletter agreements’ establishment of a weight limit for rotary wing aircraft, followed by the removal of the weight limit, followed by the re-establishment of the weight limit by Secretary Wilson, was an attempt by the Air Force to limit the Army’s ability to develop organic aircraft (Cheng 1994, 106-111; Williams 2005, 78). In 1955 during the first Air Cavalry exercises (to be discussed below), the Air Force leadership vigorously opposed Army units using their own aircraft: the argument became so intense that the secretaries of both services became involved (Williams 2005, 72). By 1956 when contractors provided all pilot training for both the Army and the Air Force, the Air Force still sought to control the contracts and training. Eventually, Army leadership convinced the Secretary of Defense that they could manage a contract as well as the Air Force (Williams 2005, 67). In 1957, a story in the Army Times about a prototype armed helicopter brought a heated phone call to the Chief of Staff of the Army from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Williams 2005, 80). After the Howze Board convened, the Air Force established the Disosway Board in 1963 to develop new methods of close air support, presumably so that the Army would have no need to develop its own capabilities, and to illustrate the inherent strengths of Air Force fixed wing close air support over Army rotary-wing capabilities (Bergerson 1980, 113; Horwood 2006, 49-51). In 1962 during the first introduction of helicopters in Vietnam, the Air Force attempted to limit the Army’s helicopters to only defensive activities: they could not fire unless fired upon, and Army helicopter could not fire more than one minute before and after landing troops on an objective (Curry 1984, 84-85). Needless to say, the Air Force was adamantly opposed to the Army developing its own organic airmobile and close air support capabilities.
Strategic Resistance to Change

The Army’s ability to institutionalize helicopters in order to resist the Air Force’s attempt to withdraw organic air support resulted from helicopter proponents’ success in fitting the technology within the organizational mission. In a 1962 article “Air Mobility As the Army Command Sees It,” General Earle Wheeler (Chief of Staff of the Army) identified the one stipulation for helicopter development was that it would have to support land combat (Cheng 1994, 182).

Helicopter proponents recognized this need. General James Gavin’s 1954 article in *Harper’s Magazine* (“Cavalry, And I Don’t Mean Horses”) sought to imbed the idea of the helicopter within a paradigm of ground combat operations already familiar to the Army. He recognized that the new technology must be framed in a way that fit within the mission, and cavalry was well-established as a component of this mission:

Cavalry is supposed to be the army of mobility. It exists and serves a useful purpose because of its mobility differential—the contrast between its mobility and that of other land forces. Without the differential, it is not cavalry. Cavalry is the arm of shock and firepower: it is the screen of time and information…. Cavalry is not a horse, nor the crossed sabers and yellow scarves. These are the vestigial trappings of a gallant great arm of the U.S. Army, whose soul has been traded for a body (Gavin 1954, 53-54).

Helicopters, then, regained a capability—greater mobility—that the Army lost when tanks replaced horses. Gavin wanted to remind the Army of its past, not push into an unknown future. Gavin stated, “Today, even the most casual awareness of the historical lessons should suggest that in ground combat the mobility differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle. Fully combined with the armored division, it would give us real mobility and momentum” (Gavin 1954, 60). Gavin did not seek to change the mission – he sought to expand the Army’s ability to fulfill its mission.
Like Gavin, General Howze portrayed the capabilities of helicopters as a technology to help the Army accomplish its mission, not challenge it. Even when he argued in favor of a separate sky cavalry unit, he argued that this would support the Army’s mission by improving mobility, not changing the prioritization of ground combat (Cheng 1994, 137-138). Both Gavin and Howze focused on helicopters as they could help the Army conduct conventional operations against other organized military organizations rather than on how helicopters, like planes before, could change this mission.

In order to achieve institutionalization of helicopters, proponents focused on changing the three primary features of the combat branch of the Army. In examining the organizational framework used in this project, we see change in both the primary and secondary features:

Table 16: Institutionalization of Helicopters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Component</th>
<th>Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Pathways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Features</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel/Technology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions by leaders to resist FFCs?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the earliest efforts was to change the officer management and promotion systems of aviators. Prior to Aviation becoming its own branch, aviators were beholden to their home branches. But, this led to problems within the branches because there was not a clear mechanism for advancing in one’s career and because commanders were reluctant to lose their best officers to flight training (Cheng 1994, 154). Also, because flight status was an additional duty, there
were more promotion incentives to focus within an officer’s home branch, meaning that there was more incentives to focus on non-flying activities and a disincentive to focus on helicopters (Cheng 1994, 152-153). Additionally, aviators could only serve a maximum of five years at a time in flight status without returning to their original branch’s career paths (Cheng 1994, 152). Finally, the cost of training and maintaining flight status could be an impediment to a service branch being able to meet its non-flight requirements (Cheng 1994, 155).

General Ridgway sought to incentivize aviation officers through career and promotion changes, specifically through establishing a separate aviation branch, which he attempted to do in 1954. Ridgway brought together a number of general officers in that year to discuss the issue including officers of the transportation corps, field artillery, and even Brigadier General Carl Hutton, the commander of the Aviation School (Cheng 1994, 148). However, these officers wanted aviators to be indoctrinated in the concerns of ground commanders so that their focus was on supporting ground units (Cheng 1994, 148-149). Additionally, some opponents were concerned that the Air Force might try to take control of Army aviation if it were too easily identified as a separate organization within the Army (Cheng 1994, 149). Some were also concerned that like the Air Corps, the Aviation Branch might try to establish its independence over time (Cheng 1994, 150).

Ridgway reached for a middle ground. Though he did not push for a separate branch, he allowed for more control and influence by aviation leaders through the Army Aviation Officer Career Program (Weinert 1991, 104; Cheng 1994, 149). This established a mechanism within the Army Adjutant General’s office for managing and monitoring the careers of all aviators (Cheng 1994, 154). This had the dual achievement of minimizing the problems mentioned above and improving the ability of the Army to recruit new officers for aviation and pilot training.
Additionally, Ridgway allowed West Point officers to go directly to aviation rather than doing a tour in another branch beforehand (Williams 2005, 88). Ridgway’s original goal was achieved thirty years later in 1983, when Aviation did become its own branch of service.

Aviation leaders also established training programs to develop new SOPs on how infantry combat functions would adapt and build on helicopter technology. Between 1955 and 1957, Continental Army Command (CONARC) oversaw three different division-size exercises to test and evaluate the use of helicopters in different unit configurations using different tactics (Weinert 1991, 181-193; Cheng 1994, 135; Williams 2005, 70-71). As a result of these exercises, in 1957, the Army Aviation School established a sky cavalry platoon (and then company) specifically “To support…the development of tactical doctrine, organizational data, operational concepts, materiel requirements, tactics, techniques and procedures for employment of a completely airmobile combat force” (U.S. Army Training Directive 92-7292 as quoted in Weinert 1991, 163).

These training experiences and SOPs were further tested and developed in a new organizational structure. In 1963, the Army endorsed the establishment of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test). This organization was the result of on-going experiments with the sky cavalry concept and the recommendations from the Howze Board; additionally, it had strong support from Chief of Staff General Earle Wheeler (Williams 2005, 107). Under the command of Brigadier General Harry Kinnard, the 11th Division had the authority to pick officers and non-commissioned officers to serve in the new unit (Williams 2005, 108). At Fort Benning, Georgia, this unit refined the tactics and procedures outlined in the Howze Board report (ibid.).

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286 These were the Sage Brush, Jump Light, and Sledge Hammer exercises (ibid.). Sage Brush (held in 1955) focused on testing U.S. capabilities on a nuclear battlefield; it included over 100,000 Army personnel and over 30,000 Air Force personnel (Williams 2005, 71).
Finally, the Army made permanent the sky cavalry concept by adjusting its organizational structure. In July 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Williams 2005, 112). Even after President Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, the Army did not toss aside the sky cavalry organization like it did the Pentomic Division following Kennedy’s election. The 1st Cavalry Division would not be the only sky cavalry division for long; in 1968, the veritable 101st Airborne Division of World War II fame converted to become the 101st Air Cavalry Division (Tolson 1999, 195-198). The 101st continues to serve as the Army’s air cavalry division, taking part in both Operation Desert Storm (1991) and recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In this case, technology and materiel obviously changed as the Army purchased a number of aircraft during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Between 1955 and 1970, the Army’s helicopter inventory increased substantially and in 1970, the Army had approximately 9,000 helicopters (Tolson 1999, 7-8; Williams 2005, 97). These included utility helicopters, observation helicopters, cargo helicopters, and attack helicopters (Weinert 1991, 203-209). The most famous and easily recognized of these was the UH-1 Iroquois (“Huey”), which began testing and evaluation in 1955. Between 1955 and 1961, Bell Helicopters made numerous changes before delivery of its first 100 models to the Army (Weinert 1991, 205), and between 1957 and 1975, Bell produced over 10,000 “Hueys” (Roush 2010). By 1964, the Army already had 3,800 helicopters of various types (Gablehouse 1969, 161).287

However, the acquisition of helicopters did not immediately lead to the institutionalization of the technology: the Army already had a few hundred helicopters during

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287 In total, over 7,000 helicopters were utilized during the Vietnam War and 3,300 of these were destroyed either due to accident or combat (Roush 2010). By 1969, 2,349 helicopters were lost in Vietnam of which 1,008 were lost in combat (Gablehouse 1969, 149). Even with a nearly 50% loss rate in Vietnam, the Army continued (and continues) to utilize helicopters. Once the helicopter was institutionalized as part of the Army’s mission, it was near impossible to alter even with exorbitant losses.
World War II. It was only with the changes of the primary features during the 1950’s and early 1960’s (as discussed above) that the organization internalized the technology.

A number of doctrinal changes also occurred in order to facilitate the establishment of helicopter and sky cavalry capabilities. In 1956, “The Army Aviation Guidelines for the Development of Doctrine and Organization through FY 1961” published by the Army Aviation Directorate established the basic guidance for how the Army would continue to develop helicopter capabilities and concepts (Weinert 1991, 109). In 1957, General Howze worked from the 1936 cavalry field manual to develop the New Tactical Doctrine (a field manual) for air cavalry operations (Williams 2005, 76). In June 1958, the Army Command and General Staff College published FM 57-35, Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations (Cheng 1994, 76) and in 1960, the Army updated and republished it as FM 57-35: Airmobile Operations (Cheng 1994, 103).

Finally, the Army established facilities dedicated to the training and testing of helicopter operations. During the early 1950’s, the Army conducted all aviation training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, but the Artillery School located there argued that flight training interfered with artillery training (Williams 2005, 66). So in 1954, all helicopter test and training activities moved to Fort Rucker, Alabama (Weinert 1991, 199). Aviation supporters such as Major General Gavin supported this location because it was a relatively isolated post where tests and experiments could be done with less attention from opponents; plus, Rucker already had an airfield left over from the Army Air Forces days (Williams 2005, 66-67).²⁸⁸ By combining all aviation capabilities into a central location co-equal to the Infantry or Armor Centers, Army

²⁸⁸ However, leaders of the Transportation Corps fought to keep some air maintenance training at Fort Eustis, Virginia (Williams 2005, 68).
aviation was able to manage tests, training, and exercises in order to develop helicopter capabilities.

In this case, budget considerations could be an alternate explanation to the Army’s development of helicopter capabilities. From this perspective, the Army pursued helicopters in order to secure more financial resources, not because of a desire to protect its ability to conduct ground combat operations. Particularly under the Kennedy administration, the Army received more resources because of its aviation capabilities: in 1962, Congress increased the Army’s aviation budget and allocated more aviators to the Army by taking positions away from the Air Force and the Navy (Cheng 1994, 181). At least during the 1960’s, budget reasons could explain the Army’s support for helicopters.

Yet, the years of development and testing that occurred in the 1950’s offered few budgetary incentives. The 1950’s (due to President Eisenhower’s focus on nuclear weapons and his imposed cuts to the Army budget) marked a time of budget stagnation: from a high of $21.4 billion in 1952, the budget dropped to $7.1 billion in 1955 (Armacost 1969, 31), and between 1955 and 1959, the Army budget increased only $600 million (Cheng 1994, 86). Army leaders still allocated resources to helicopter development, though, a capability that existed very much in the development phase (Cheng 1994, 86-90). As Chief of Staff, General Ridgway approved a five-year plan to increase Army aircraft (both fixed-wing and rotary-wing) from 3,516 in 1954 to 8,486 by 1959 (Cheng 1994, 90). General Taylor approved another 2,000 aircraft increase in 1956 (Cheng 1994, 92). By 1961, Army aviation received 11% of the budget, the second-highest amount behind only missiles (Cheng 1994, 181).289 While budget concerns might have played a

289 Missiles were an important part of the Army’s attempt to secure more financial resources during the Eisenhower years.
role at some point in the development of helicopter capabilities, they do not explain the Army’s early commitment to the technology.

Tactics of Resistance

While this case is slightly different from the previous cases examined in this project because the Army sought to internalize rather than expel something from the organization, it is still a case of resistance. While the direction of resistance may be different (bringing something into rather than keeping something/someone out of the organization), the Army still sought to resist the Air Force: Army leaders wanted to develop their own helicopter capabilities while the Air Force wanted to maintain control of these capabilities. More particularly, the Army resisted the Air Force’s actions because helicopters had become mission critical: without organic air support, the Army could not effectively conduct ground combat operations. In order to resist the Air Force, the Army’s main tactic of resistance in this case was institutionalizing the technology within the organization itself, as discussed above. Additionally, helicopter proponents in the Army employed other tactics of resistance against the Air Force including sabotage, ignoring previous agreements, and offering something of lesser value (appeasement).

Sabotage

While the Air Force leadership held implicit assumptions about the Army’s role regarding organic aircraft because of the National Security Act of 1947 and follow-on agreements (as discussed above), helicopter proponents violated these agreements while attempting to minimize the Air Force’s ability to intercede. Organizational leadership, institutional leadership (i.e., the Department of Defense), and internal boards and study groups pushed the Army to institutionalize helicopter capabilities. This institutionalization allowed the Army to sabotage the Air Force’s attempt to prevent the Army from developing organic aircraft.
Motivated by Army officers in key positions in DoD, helicopters gained support from outside the organization at the highest levels of the government. Under President John Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed the Army to develop its helicopter capabilities. In April 1962, McNamara ordered the Army to develop a study group to determine the best uses for helicopter employment (Cheng 1994, 177). In a memorandum to Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, McNamara stated,

I do not believe the Army has fully explored opportunities offered by aeronautical technology for making a revolutionary break with traditional surface mobility means…. I shall be disappointed if the Army’s re-examination merely produces logistics-oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for implementing fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility (McNamara 1962).

Also in this memorandum, McNamara recommended that Stahr establish a board of officers to examine the Army’s air mobility capabilities (the Howze Board, discussed below), and he specifically identified nine individuals to serve on the committee (McNamara 1962).

McNamara did not act solely of his own volition, as Army officers working within the Secretary’s office played an important role in the drafting of these memoranda. General Robert Williams, a key proponent of Army aviation who became the president of the Army Aviation Board and commanded the test and evaluation group which oversaw the 11th (Test) Air Assault Division, worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1962 alongside some of McNamara’s personal aides (Krepinevich 1988, 119; Williams 2005, 99). One of these aides told General Williams that some of McNamara’s staff believed in the capabilities of Army aviation (ibid.). Based on this information, Williams and one of his staff officers wrote two draft memoranda for Secretary McNamara instructing the Army to study its air capabilities. McNamara approved these letters, which then became the memoranda to Secretary Stahr.

McNamara wrote two memoranda to the Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, both on April 19, 1962, which addressed the Army’s organic aviation programs. See Shrader (2008, 329-331) for both memoranda.
discussed above (Krepinevich 1988, 119; Williams 2005, 99). Thus, McNamara’s support, or at least the impetus for his actions, came from Army helicopter proponents.

Within the Army, a number of senior personnel provided support for the development of helicopters. Chiefs of Staff Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor strongly supported their development through budget and personnel allocations during the 1950’s (Cheng 1994, 91-93; Williams 2005, 72). Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, the first commander of the Army’s Aviation Division, played a crucial role in helicopter development beginning in 1954 by lobbying various constituencies and chairing the board bearing his name (Cheng 1994, 91-92). Major General James Gavin, one of the most famous airborne officers of his day, published the seminal article “Cavalry—And I Don’t Mean Horses” in 1954 and continued to lobby for helicopters throughout his tenure in Army Operations (G-3) (Bergerson 1980, 101). Every Army Chief of Staff after Taylor supported helicopters and the air mobility concept until its battlefield operations in Vietnam beginning in 1965 through budget, personnel, and other organizational actions (Cheng 1994, 94-94; 179-182). Of the forces responsible for the successful development of Army helicopters, support from the senior-most leaders during the 1950’s and 1960’s was perhaps the most important (Cheng 1994, 179).

Another source of internal support came from boards tasked with studying the potential use of helicopters, particularly the Rogers and Howze Boards. Directed by the Army Chief of Staff in early 1960, the Army Aircraft Review Board (known as the Rogers Board) reviewed the

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291 Serving at a critical time between 1960 and 1962, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Army) was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved the recommendations of the Rogers Board (Cheng 1994, 94-95). General George Decker, Chief of Staff between 1960 and 1962, was a staunch supporter. He testified before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations: “Our greatest advances in tactical mobility and combat intelligence will be made possible by new forms of air vehicles specifically designed to live with Army forces on the battlefield...to give us much better capabilities for target acquisition, surveillance, and mobile combat operations” (Deck 1961 as quoted in Cheng 1994, 181). General Earle Wheeler, Decker’s successor, also supported helicopters (Cheng 1994, 182). In 1964, Wheeler stated: “It is our conviction that the next significant addition to mobility is through Army aircraft. We believe that there are appropriate operations for aircraft of this type in land combat situations ranging from counterinsurgency to general war” (as quoted in Cheng 1994, 182-183).
then-current state of the Army’s aviation; aviation requirements for the coming decade of 1960 to 1970; and studied recommendations for procurement to meet such requirements (Weinert 1991, 116-119). The board made a number of recommendations, including replacement of certain types of helicopters; expansion of procurement of certain helicopter models including the UH-1 “Huey” helicopter; increased development and testing of better surveillance and radar equipment; and the development of aircraft that could conduct reconnaissance and surveillance deeper into hostile territory than had been achieved through 1960. As importantly, the Rogers Board facilitated initiated the interest of civilian companies who would actually build the helicopters for the Army (Williams 2005, 90-91).

Major General Hamilton Howze led the second board. Known officially as the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, the Howze Board (established in 1962) found many benefits from the expansion of Army aircraft usage, but argued that full advantage of helicopters would come only through the employment of different tactics (Cheng 1994, 179-183). Howze called these units and their tactics “air cavalry,” and their unique skills would include seizure of key terrain, movement deep into enemy territory, pursuit, assault against logistical train and rear areas of operations, raids, deep reconnaissance, and flank protection. Prophetically appropriate for the situation the Army would face in Vietnam, he argued that such units would be useful in situations in which the enemy was widely dispersed in terrain that was difficult to maneuver through on the ground (Weinert 1991, 118-119). Howze recommended an airmobile division,

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292 Hamilton Howze had served as Director of Army Aviation from 1955 to 1958 and had previously served on the Rogers Board. During this time, he moved the Army Aviation school from Fort Sill, Oklahoma to its current location at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Most importantly, he oversaw a number of airmobility tests at Fort Rucker during this time, including testing a variety of mounted armaments (rockets and machine guns) on helicopters (see Weinert 1991; Allen 1993).
consisting of 459 helicopters able to airlift one-third of the division at a time, even though the total cost was 1.5 times the cost of a standard division (Tolson 1999, 23-24).²⁹³

Due to the findings of the Howze Board and involvement of other organizational and institutional leaders, the Army established its first airmobile division in 1963. On January 7, 1963, McNamara issued another memorandum ordering the Army to test an airmobile unit (Curry 1984, 80). Responding to McNamara, Chief of Staff Earle Wheeler directed the creation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) in 1963 to test the air cavalry concept (Bergerson 1980, 114). As discussed above, the 11th Air Assault Division evolved to become the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). When this unit evolved to become the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), helicopters became a permanent part of the organization that continues to this day in the form of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Additionally, helicopters and helicopter personnel belong to the Aviation Branch (established in 1983), a separate and distinct branch (from infantry, armor, field artillery, etc.) that represents the full institutionalization of helicopters as an Army capability.

As Army investments in helicopters increased over the years, actually stopping the Army became too difficult for the Air Force. Politically, Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy became personally interested in the technology. The operational and financial efficiency of the helicopter, which proponents argued could put soldiers into combat more cheaply and quickly than ground movement, impressed Secretary McNamara (Williams 2005, 102-103). President Kennedy allocated helicopter support to South Vietnamese forces early in his presidency, thus making the technology a centerpiece of national security strategy (Tolson 1999, 15; Tyler 2003, 32). Financially, the Army had already invested a great deal in the technology: in 1965, Bell

²⁹³ The Air Force attempted to defuse some of the impact of the Howze Board by convening its own board under General Gabriel Disosway. Instead of airmobility, the Air Force recommended the use of additional fighter-bombers (Bergerson 1980, 113).
helicopters produced 75 UH-1 Huey helicopters a month for the Army and subsequently increased to 150 per month (Williams 2005, 140). Essentially, the Army successfully resisted the Air Force’s attempt to limit organic aircraft by securing external support and investing in the technology to such a degree that it became more difficult and expensive (both politically and financially) to stop its investments than to continue.

Ignoring Force for Change

In this case, the Army ignored its previous agreements with the Air Force. The Army leadership understood, though, that it had to hide its actions to prevent the perception of overtly ignoring their previous agreements (Weinert 1991, 160-167; Williams 2005, 74). Brigadier General Carl Hutton asked Colonel Jay Vanderpool of the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker to take responsibility for the armament program without asking official permission from his superiors (Bergerson 1980, 72). Vanderpool then enlisted a group of volunteers to help him on the project, and they eventually successfully tested both machine gun and rocket employment from helicopters (Bergerson 1980, 74; Bradin 1994, 95-98; Williams 2005, 75). Sometime after the early tests of armed helicopters in 1957 at Fort Rucker, General Maxwell Taylor instructed the group to stop their tests because of pressure from the Air Force (Williams 2005, 78). Taylor told the officers in charge, “You’re getting the Army into very deep trouble putting guns on helicopters” (as quoted in Williams 2005, 78). However, Brigadier General Hutton intervened and the tests continued (ibid.). Eventually, Air Force resistance to armed helicopters lessened upon a successful Army demonstration in front of Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Kennedy at Fort Benning, Georgia where the president said the Army should have more “gunships” (as quoted in Bradin 1994, 98).
Later in Vietnam, the first helicopters assigned to Vietnam were sent under the auspices of transportation assets. In fact, these were not just transport assets in the traditional sense of the word; these helicopters were combat assets. While this imprecise identification could have been a tactic to avoid suspicion by the North Vietnamese, it was also a tactic used against the Air Force. Named the 8th and 57th Transportation Companies, these units were actually airmobile, armed helicopters. To avoid Air Force attention, the armed helicopter unit was called the “Utility Tactical Transport Company,” an intentionally bland name (Williams 2005, 117).

The development of the Cobra attack helicopter was also an exercise intended to ignore agreements with the Air Force while minimizing negative repercussions. When Bell Helicopters received a contract for over 100 Cobra gunship helicopters, both the Army and Bell emphasized that the Cobra was merely a design change to the already approved UH-1 Huey to avoid any challenges over the development of a new helicopter (Williams 2005, 120). In fact, the Cobra shared the same platform as the Huey, an action that had many benefits in reducing the time and effort necessary to train pilots and conduct maintenance (Williams 2005, 120). But, it was also a fully-designed attack helicopter; unlike the UH-1, it had no capabilities as a transport or troop carrier aircraft.

**Offering Something of Lesser Value (appeasement)**

The final saga of the Army-Air Force conflict was a trade between the two services of fixed-wing for rotary-wing aircraft. The Army wanted to continue to develop helicopter capabilities during and after Vietnam, but opposition from the Air Force persisted even during the war. This opposition is startling given that both of these organizations were deeply involved in the Vietnam War. One would expect that if organizational conflicts would ever be put to rest (even momentarily), it would be during a time of active war (as in the conflict over airplanes.
between the Army and the Army Air Forces that President Roosevelt laid to rest in 1939, as discussed previously).

By the mid-1960’s, Army leadership realized that it had to give something away to the Air Force. By this time, they already decided the potential of attack helicopters for service in both counterinsurgency and conventional battlefields (Williams 2005, 154). Additionally, the Army was convinced of the potential for the Cheyenne, an advanced attack helicopter (ibid.).

In order to appease the Air Force but maintain its control of helicopters, the Army relinquished responsibility for almost all fixed-wing aircraft. To one of his subordinates, Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson in 1966 stated, “We have had a long fight with the Air Force over arming helicopters. I believe the attack helicopter is vital to the Army. I am willing to give away the Caribou [an Army combat air support aircraft] for the Air Force promise to stop its opposition to the Cheyenne” (as quoted in Williams 2005, 152).

In that year, General Johnson and Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell agreed to a trade (McConnell and Johnson 1966). Known as the McConnell-Johnson Agreement of 1966, per this agreement the Army gave up control of its current and future fixed wing aircraft (Wolf 1987, 379). The Air Force, in return, agreed to allow the Army to pursue helicopters for close air support roles (ibid.). By giving up something of lesser value to the Air Force, the Army solidified its right to use and develop helicopters.

Thus, the Army strategically resisted forces for change that sought to prevent the Army from developing helicopter capabilities. The table below identifies the forces for change, tactics of resistance, outcome, and the Army’s success at resisting.
Table 17: Strategic Resistance to Opponents of U.S. Army Helicopter Capabilities – Forces for Change, Tactics of Resistance, and Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helicopters</th>
<th>External Force For Change</th>
<th>Internal Force For Change</th>
<th>Tactic of Resistance</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Successful Resistance?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force (attempted to keep Army from developing helicopter capabilities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sabotage – Institutionalizing helicopters in violation of previous Army-USAF agreements (developing promotion pathways, changing structures, and developing SOPs)</td>
<td>Army able to win support from within the organization for helicopter development by institutionalizing the technology within the organizational misión</td>
<td>Yes – Helicopter proponents able to win internal support for the technology, particularly from key leadership, who could then leverage influence with other internal and external constituencies as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ignoring force for change (violations of inter-service agreements)</td>
<td>Army ignored previous agreements, sometimes with cover from political leadership and sometimes not; hid activities from Air Force</td>
<td>Yes – Army able to continue developing rotary-wing aircraft even when previous agreements restricted such activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offering something of lesser value (trading Caribou for Hueys and Cobras)</td>
<td>Army won Air Force support to develop and utilize helicopters during Vietnam</td>
<td>Yes – Traded fixed-wing aircraft (a less important capability) for rotary-wing aircraft (a more important capability)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypotheses**

The Army’s resistance to technology (or the use of technology to resist, in the case of helicopters) provides an opportunity to test the three hypotheses identified in Chapter 2. First, looking across these cases, there is similarity between the tactics of resistance depending on whether the forces for change are external or internal (Hypothesis 1). Next, the Army
demonstrated more success at resisting internal forces than external forces (Hypothesis 2). Finally, as found in the previous chapters, the Army does not demonstrate learning in regards to resistance (Hypothesis 3).

**H1 – Similarities/differences in tactics of resistance?**

In regards to the Army’s response to technology, there are similarities in the tactics of resistance. Army leaders employed two tactics of resistance against internal forces for change: suppression and ignoring the force for change. Army leaders employed 3 tactics of resistance against external forces for change: the political use of expertise, sabotage, and offering something of lesser value (appeasement).

As with previous findings, the findings of these cases of technology support this hypothesis. Of the three internal forces for change that impacted on the Army in the case of airplanes, the use of suppression and ignoring the force for change matches the findings of other cases in this project. Out of the four external forces for change explored in this chapter, the employment of political use of expertise, sabotage, and offering something of lesser value (appeasement) also matches the findings of the other cases.

Unique to the case of helicopters is the development of a technology as a tactic of resistance as a mechanism to sabotage the Air Force’s attempt to prevent the Army from developing its own organic air capabilities. Though different from other cases of sabotage, the intent is the same: a decoupling of expectation from actual implementation.

The lack of internal forces for changes found in the latter two cases of this chapter may be a result of the challenges of developing and successfully supporting new technologies from within an organization. High barriers of entry such as cost, research time, and expertise necessary may prevent internal forces for change from developing new technologies. One could
expect that most constituencies (other than organizational leaders) within an organization do not have access to or control of such resources. Thus, even if internal constituencies have ideas to develop new technologies, they would be limited in their ability to deploy such technology; at best, they could make incremental changes to current technologies (and given that these technologies already exist within the organization, they probably do not threaten the mission).

**H2 – Success at resisting internal/external forces for change?**

In the case of technology, the Army succeeded at resisting internal forces for change more than external forces for change. In the case of airplanes, the Army failed to resist external political leadership but succeeded at resisting organizational insurgents. In the case of nuclear weapons, the Army failed to resist Eisenhower’s imposition of nuclear weapons. In the case of helicopters, however, the Army succeeded at resisting the Air Force’s attempt to prevent the development of organic aircraft capabilities.

In the first two cases, the major external forces for change resulted from the involvement of political leaders, which forced change on the Army. In the cases of airplanes and nuclear weapons, political leaders imposed change in both cases. Appropriately in the case of helicopters, political leaders (i.e., Secretary of Defense McNamara with the implicit support of Kennedy and later Johnson) supported the Army’s resistance to the Air Force, which further facilitated the Army’s successful resistance to the removal of organic air capabilities.

As in previous cases, the Army successfully resisted internal forces for change. The air insurgency that pressured the Army prior to World War II affected change only when supported by political leadership (as garnered from either Congress or the president). Change from the inside of an organization seems to be a near impossible phenomenon without the support of senior organizational leadership or political leaders.
$H3$ – *More skilled at resistance over time?*

The third hypothesis examines whether an organization learns to resist. This case further demonstrates that the Army does not learn to resist; although it employs tactics of resistance in order to resist forces for change, there seems to be a lack of learning.\footnote{As discussed previously, evidence of organizational learning includes assessment of previous routines and the success of those routines (Levitt and March 1988; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Amburgey et al. 1993; Barnett and Carroll 1995), or leadership’s reflection on a past experience to inform their understanding of a current situation (Argyris and Schon 1978).}

The case of airplanes offers an excellent opportunity for examining this hypothesis. From almost the very beginning of the technology’s introduction to the Army, young aviators began pushing the boundaries of the organizational mission by testing air combat power (e.g., bombing, air-to-ground machine guns, etc.). After World War I, spurred by the activities of Billy Mitchell, the Army found itself under siege from its own officers as well as from Congress and other political leaders. This back-and-forth between Army leadership (Pershing, Summerall, MacArthur, etc.) and forces that supported airplane technology lasted for almost thirty years, culminating in an institutional “truce” because of World War II.

Yet, there is little evidence of learning. We see the same tactics employed against internal and external forces during this time (e.g., suppression, political use of expertise). There is no change in tactics employed or evidence of an assessment of prior failures to stop the ever-increasing level of autonomy granted the air arm (from the Aeronautical Division, to the Air Service, to the Air Corps and finally the Army Air Forces). Additionally, the Army never stopped resisting: there is no evidence that any of the Army leadership had any inclination to grant the air arm independence. This is not to imply that Army leadership should have known that President Roosevelt would eventually order the establishment of the Army Air Forces prior
to World War II, but there is ample evidence to suggest that the organizational insurgency and pressure by political leaders were not short-term.

The case of nuclear weapons, even with the superficial changes, does not demonstrate learning, either. Maxwell Taylor’s comments regarding his recognition that it was better to comply with the president’s desire to integrate new technology, and those of Army leaders at the time, demonstrated a recognition of Eisenhower’s refusal to adjust priorities in favor of ground forces. The attempt to yield (superficially) to Eisenhower’s directions indicates resistance, not learning. As with the Army’s refusal to stop resisting in the case of airplanes, the case of nuclear weapons also demonstrates lack of learning.

Conclusion

Technology has influenced and will continue to influence the Army. Given the rate of technological change in the past two decades, this influence may only increase. The findings of this chapter indicate that the Army’s response to these technologies will depend on whether or not they threaten the mission.

As with helicopters, the Army has embraced newer technologies that fit within its mission. Global Positioning Systems, the Future Combat System (FCS), and combat simulators all help (or had the promise to help) the Army conduct better ground combat operations. In fact, the Army pursued the FCS program at its own peril as the program went far over budget and failed to deliver products as expected; DoD officially cancelled the project in 2009 (Robinson 2009).

Yet, the Army will likely resist new technologies that threaten the mission or take significant resources away from the core branches responsible for executing the mission. Two

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295 His post-service memoir critiqued the fallacy of nuclear weapons, but this is different than public commentary made while he was still the Chief of Staff.
examples of these types of technologies are biometric and cyber capabilities. As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, biometric technology is not a necessity in conventional combat operations and thus does not support the Army’s mission (enemies wear different uniforms and use different vehicles, so there is no need to measure fingerprints or record unique differences in people’s eyes). This technology proves it value, though, in counterinsurgency operations by allowing soldiers to record and track people moving between (or infiltrating) local communities. The Army is currently DoD’s executive agent for biometrics, but in the coming years, the Army will allocate less and less money to this technology as indicated in its own budget forecasts (U.S. Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 2011). Given its lack of applicability to the mission, this is not surprising.

Cyber technology may also meet resistance by the Army. Of the cyber threat to the nation, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno wrote in 2013, “We must take full advantage of these [cyber] technologies, building our own capabilities to operate in cyberspace with the same level of skill and confidence we enjoy on the land. We will either adapt to this reality or risk ceding the advantage to future enemies” (Odierno 2013). To accomplish this goal, the Army established the U.S. Army Cyber Command in 2010, following the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009. Whether or not this will become an Army priority is yet to be determined, yet I do not believe that this will happen. Will “cyber warriors” rise to the highest levels of command within the Army? Will the Army integrate cyber capabilities into promotion pathways, SOPs, and structure of the organization? The findings of this chapter

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296 The Department of Defense identified the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for biometrics in 2000 with responsibility to “lead, consolidate, and coordinate all biometrics information assurance programs for the Department of Defense” (Biometrics Information Agency 2011, 5). In 2007, DoD received $320 million towards biometrics development as part of a war supplemental budget bill (Sprenger 2007). The Army FY2012 allocation for biometrics, however, totaled $61.2 million and the projected resources for FY2016 drop to $47.8 million (U.S. Department of the Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 2011c).
indicate that this will likely not be the case. In the next and final chapter, I will explore my three hypotheses across all cases examined in this project to develop insights into strategic resistance to change.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

In this project, I sought to fill gaps in the literature regarding intentional resistance to change among organizations. While resistance can be inertial, i.e., passive, this project focuses on understanding strategic resistance, i.e., the intentional or active type of resistance. Thus, the primary aim of this research is to begin to build understanding and examination of intentional resistance to change. In order to do this, I examined the tactics organizations employ to resist forces; whether organizations are more or less successful at resisting internal versus external forces; and whether or not organizations improve their ability to intentionally resist forces for change over time. Finally, in focusing specifically on strategic resistance to change by the U.S. Army, this project provides specific and unique insights regarding the Army and civil-military relations.

First and foremost, this research addresses the gap in the literature on resistance to change as an intentional response to external and internal forces. Though some research recognizes the phenomenon of intentional resistance (Oliver 1991; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997; Chorev 2012), the large majority of research treats resistance to change as a passive characteristic, commonly referred to as organizational “inertia” (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1984; Kelly and Amburgey 1991; Pfeffer 1997; Dent and Goldberg 1999; Weick and Quinn 1999; Ford et al. 2002; Pardo Del Val and Fuentes 2003; Lewin 2009 [1947]). While the concept of organizational inertia is well-established in the literature and is generally used to refer to all types of resistance, it is imprecise because its usage incorrectly identifies all resistance as passive. The findings of my research, then, fill the gap in theories of organizational change by adding analytical rigor to the concept of resistance by differentiating between intentional resistance and passive resistance.
Secondly, the findings of this research fill the large gap in understanding how organizations actually intentionally resist change (i.e., the tactics they use) and to what degree such resistance is effective over time. The majority of the literature on organizational resistance focuses on understanding the causes of resistance (e.g., Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Kelly and Amburgey 1991; Argyris 1993; Barnett and Carroll 1995; Van de Ven and Poole 1995; Armenakis and Bedeian 1999; Burke et al. 2009) rather than on developing theories about how organizations implement resistance, even though the latter is inherently and naturally linked to the former. Only a very few research initiatives (even within the body of research on intentional resistance) have attempted to actually identify, in a rigorous manner, the actual tactics of resistance (Oliver 1991; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997). This project helps fill this gap by identifying tactics of resistance, theorizing about why certain tactics are employed instead of others (based on the force for change coming from inside or outside the organization), and identifying potential explanations for why some tactics are successful and others are not.

Additionally, I have found no literature that examines the degree to which organizations improve their ability to resist change over time. While theories on organizational improvement and learning abound (e.g., Argyris and Schon 1978; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Levitt and March 1988; Huber 1991; Argote 1999; Senge 2006), I have found no research that focuses on examining the question of whether organizations improve their ability to resist over time. I find no evidence of the Army as an organization improving its ability to resist over time, but I do find evidence of individual learning in regards to when not to resist.

This research also increases our understanding of the Army and civil-military relations theory. Fundamentally, this research reminds us that even military organizations including the Army have their own interests and priorities and do not naturally or in all situations
unquestionably follow the guidance of civilian authority (as discussed in Wilson 1989; Feaver 2003; Nielsen and Snider 2009). Most civil-military relations theory focuses on the degree to which civilian interests and military interests agree or conflict and the extent to which there is tension between civilian and military leaders (Janowitz 1977; Huntington 1985; Feaver 1996; Bacevich 1997; Burk 2002; Feaver 2003). My research, then, informs our understanding of how a conflict between the directives of political leadership and the Army’s sense of mission may result in strategic resistance.

I tested three hypotheses related to strategic (i.e., intentional) resistance. The first hypothesis postulated that an organization employs certain tactics of strategic resistance depending on whether the force for change is internal or external to the organization. The second hypothesis stated that an organization is more successful at resisting internal versus external forces for change. Finally, the third hypothesis asserted that an organization becomes more skilled at resisting forces for change over time. To do this, I examined cases in which forces for change acted on the U.S. Army in the areas of personnel, operations, and technology. I chose these cases because they were the most likely to result in resistance that I could observe.

I demonstrate that the tactics of resistance employed against forces for change depend on whether the force is internal or external to the organization and that organizations resist internal forces with direct, forceful tactics and resist external forces with indirect, oblique tactics; that organizations resist internal forces for change more successfully than external forces; and that organizations do not become more skilled at resistance over time. Overall, I argue that organizations strategically resist change that threatens their sense of mission, and that we can understand and develop insight about such resistance by paying more attention to “how”
How I Conducted My Research

I tested my hypotheses regarding strategic resistance by utilizing the comparative case study method (George and Bennett 2005; Yin 2009). The universe of cases included all cases since 1898 in which a force for change (either internal or external) pressured the Army’s sense of mission to change. I have limited this universe of cases to events since 1898, which marked the first expression of the Army’s sense of mission (as described below) in the Spanish-American War.

I further selected the cases based on the strength of the force for change. I have chosen those cases in which the force for change had the greatest potential for affecting the organization’s mission and thus the greatest likelihood of generating observable resistance. Cases in which the force for change is the greatest are most likely to result in the strongest resistance, thereby providing the richest context for testing my hypotheses.

In each of these cases, internal forces, external forces, or both threatened the Army’s sense of mission. By “threaten,” I mean that the resulting change, if implemented, would have resulted in a significant alteration in the Army’s sense of mission regarding the norms, values, and beliefs related to the conduct of conventional ground combat operations against other professional military organizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, these forces for change take a number of forms including policy entrepreneurs, organizational leadership, mavericks, and political leadership. In the majority of cases, I explore both internal and external forces that acted on the Army.
Findings

I utilized nine cases to examine my three hypotheses. Across all nine cases examined, the evidence supports my first two hypotheses but fails to support the third. The Army does indeed resist differently depending on whether the force for change is internal or external (Hypothesis 1). It does resist internal forces more successfully than external forces (Hypothesis 2). However, it does not demonstrate improvement in its ability to resist over time (Hypothesis 3). Beyond addressing the specific research questions identified at the beginning of this project, these findings also provide insight into the nature of intentional resistance to change.

H1: An organization will resist internal and external forces for change differently.

The project’s findings support this hypothesis. Overall, my cases encompassed 20 instances of internal forces for change and 30 instances of external forces. The Army’s response differed according to the source of the force for change. This result holds true across all nine cases of resistance explored in this project, indicating a robust finding. The table below identifies the tactics of resistance used against internal and external forces:

Table 18: Tactics of Resistance and Number of Times Employed Against Internal and External Forces across all Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Forces</th>
<th>External Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>Waiting Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore</td>
<td>Appeasement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppress</td>
<td>Sabotage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moving Changes to Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army employed three types of tactics of resistance against 20 instances of internal forces for change. These tactics include ignoring the force for change, suppression, and quarantine. Throughout all cases, the primary constituency of resistance that employed these
tactics was the Chief of Staff or members of the Army Staff. The Army ignored internal forces for change such as operational commanders (i.e., officers who commanded units in the field), studies and reports, and operational experience (as in the cases of African-Americans in the Spanish-American War and John Pershing’s request for female soldiers in World War I). It suppressed forces for change including studies and reports (as in the cases of studies on the success of women and racially integrated units in combat during World War II). It quarantined mavericks and insurgents (as in the cases of organizational insurgents during Vietnam and mavericks during Iraq and Afghanistan).

In only two instances did the Army not resist internal forces for change: when the force for change was organizational leadership. While the literature on organizational change generally agrees that leadership is the most important constituency for translating changes in the environment to changes in the organization in order to improve organizational performance (e.g., Kanter 1983; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Bass and Riggio 2008; Jansen et al. 2008; and the entire research agenda of “strategic leadership”), I find that leadership’s role is critical in resisting change.

As this project demonstrates, organizational leadership is a major source of resistance, and forces for change will fail in the short-term if leadership does not support the effort. In the cases in which organizational leadership acted as a force for change, no other organizational constituency had the bureaucratic or organizational power to resist. In opposition to much of the

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297 In using the term “Army Staff,” I mean a discrete group of senior general officers (and their support staffs) who are responsible for controlling certain aspects of the Army at the organizational level, e.g., personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, communication, or finances. Within their discrete areas, these Army Staff officers are the senior-most organizational leadership, and they report directly to the Army Chief of Staff (see Hewes 1975; U.S. Department of the Army 2013).

298 This was the case of General Leonard Wood who worked to develop an office training program for African-Americans to serve in leadership roles during World War I, and General Petraeus’ conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
organizational change literature that overwhelmingly identifies resistance within the management or worker levels of an organization (for a review, see Dent and Golderbg 1999; Ford et. al 2002; Ford et al. 2008; Ford and Ford 2010), my research supports the smaller amount of literature that recognizes how senior organizational leadership can inhibit change (Patti 1974; Rumelt 1995; Spreitzer and Quinn 1996; Burdett 1999). Achieving change, then, is not just about enlisting the support of leadership for administrative, coordination, or logistical reasons; it is also about co-opting the most likely constituency of resistance. Without the support of leadership, near-term change is likely to fail; long-term change, however, may be possible even without leadership support as long as there is significant involvement by political leaders, a distinction I discuss subsequently.

The Army also employed seven types of tactics of resistance against the 30 total instances of external forces for change. These tactics of resistance include ignoring the force for change, waiting out, denial, political use of expertise, offering something of lesser value (appeasement), moving changes to the periphery, and sabotage. The Army employed these tactics against the following types of external forces: political leadership (e.g., President Harry Truman’s forced integration of the armed forces), external studies and reports (e.g., studies by RAND regarding counterinsurgency in Iraq), operational demands for personnel (e.g., African-Americans and women during World War II), the enemy threat (e.g., insurgency in Vietnam), political groups (e.g., women’s rights groups during World Wars I and II), and policy entrepreneurs (e.g., General Edward Lansdale during Vietnam).

The exception is that the Army ignored both internal and external forces. I do not believe that this finding sufficiently challenges this hypothesis as the Army did not employ any other tactic against both types of forces and because it was not the predominant tactic of resistance.
Overall, the two favored tactics of resistance were suppression (employed against internal forces) and the political use of expertise (employed against external forces).

A fundamental question raised in my research is why the Army would employ different tactics depending on the source of the force for change. Below, I offer some possible explanations about why the Army might employ certain tactics instead of others based on assumptions regarding control of the environment and understandings of civil-military relations.

The Army has much more control over the internal environment, thus it could more easily employ tactics against internal forces in order to destroy the force for change permanently. As identified in the table above, the most common tactic employed against internal forces was suppression and the most common tactic employed against external forces was the political use of expertise (an indirect tactic of resistance). Suppression is a very direct, potent tactic of resistance: it engages the force for change head-on. Direct engagement with an internal force can serve two purposes, which are to mitigate the force and to prevent the force from accessing or triggering external forces to pressure the organization. Engaging external forces, as other scholars have argued, can lead to significant organizational change (e.g., Posen 1984). Thus, given organizational leadership’s freedom in regards to its internal environment, internal mission threats can be immediately minimized (Child 1972, 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Scott 2003) along with their potential for bringing attention (and power) of external forces to bear on the organization.

Compared to the internal environment, organizations simply do not have this same level of control in the external environment. If constituencies of resistance could affect the external environment as they do the internal environment, we might expect more thorough tactics of resistance used against external forces: e.g., threatening or undercutting the authority of the
external force (e.g., openly questioning the authority of the president); attempting to take away funding or resources from external organizations (e.g., taking funding away from the Air Force); or, using the Army’s resources to directly inhibit the ability of the external force to operate effectively (e.g., suppressing the ability of political groups to influence Congress). However, the Army is simply unable to affect the external environment in this way, at least partially because of inherent limitations on its power and resources (not to mention, legal barriers).

However, in certain instances, the Army cannot outright suppress internal forces because the implications of doing so might affect how external forces would view or act upon the organization. During Vietnam, the Army could not outright suppress Generals Yarborough and Rosson because President Kennedy specifically asked that special offices be set up under commanders such as them to address counterinsurgency operations. In order to minimize their ability to influence the organization, the Army had to appear to be giving them authority without actually doing so by quarantining them. Thus, in the case of General Rosson, he had no ability to influence the combat branches of infantry, armor, or artillery even though he was head of the Joint Staff’s Counterinsurgency Office. Four decades later, the media and politicians celebrated H.R. McMaster as a new kind of leader who was one of the few to achieve any success in Iraq when most others failed. Again, outright suppression would have raised uncomfortable questions with senior leadership who wanted the Army leadership to find solutions in Iraq (Woodward 2008b). Instead, the Army sent McMaster to three concurrent non-command, staff positions following his promotion to general (U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 2012). Thus in certain instances, expectations and directions by political leaders moderate the choice of tactics employed to resist internal forces.
Alternatively, resistance directed towards external forces may also be explained by expectations of civil-military relations. A fundamental assumption of civil-military relations theory is that military leaders obey and follow the guidance of civilian political leaders (Janowitz 1977; Huntington 1985; Feaver 1996; Bacevich 1997; Kohn 2002; Burk 2002). Given that the majority of the forces for change came from political leadership, the most often-used tactics of resistance were tactics that did not overtly challenge civilian authority: the political use of expertise (12 times), ignoring the force for change (seven times), and denial (five times).

The employment of these tactics fits the need to appear as if the organization is not resisting control by external political leadership, even though they are indeed resisting such authority. Denial is a means of resisting authority by shifting the problem onto another group or organization, as was the Army’s attempt to frame integration a societal problem rather than an organizational problem. Ignoring the force for change could be attributed (by an outside observer) to lack of awareness or distraction with other issues rather than an outright challenge to authority. The political use of expertise is the most straightforward in that it directly engages the authority of political leadership, but it is indirect in that it seeks to redefine the problem rather than undercut political authority: it is an attempt to change the issue from one of authority to one of expertise. By using expertise in a political manner, for instance against the president, Army leaders are making an argument, “if you (the president) were an expert as we are, you would not exercise your authority in this way.” Thus, this indirect tactic fits the need of the Army to maintain its expected role within the established civil-military relationship (Feaver 1996; Bacevich 1997; Kohn 2002; Burk 2002) but still challenge political leaders and other external forces by re-defining the problem as one of expertise rather than authority.
Additionally, the Army has the desire to maintain its appearance and preserve the self-perception that it is a servant to the people. The Army more than any of the other services has an organizational identity connected to its service to the American people (Weigley 1984; Builder 1989). Actively appearing to, or being accused of, resisting the desire of the American public or legitimate political interest groups would undercut this identity. The perception that the organization challenges the duly elected representatives of the people undercuts such an identity, as well. Therefore, the use of indirect tactics against political leadership is a means of preserving this identity, and one I will discuss in more detail below.

\textit{H2: Organizations will more successfully resist internal forces than external forces.}

I find that the Army is more successful at resisting internal than external forces for change.\textsuperscript{299} In each set of cases as well as across all cases together, this hypothesis holds true. The table below identifies each force for change and the number of times the Army succeeded at resisting it.

Across all nine cases, there is distinctly more success at resisting internal than external forces for change. Of the 20 instances of internal forces acting on the Army, the organization successfully resisted 17 of them. Of the 30 cases of external forces acting on the Army, the organization successfully resisted 20 of them. In total, the Army successfully resisted 85\% of internal forces for change and 66\% of external forces for change.

\textsuperscript{299} As discussed in Chapter 2, I measure success of resistance according to the forces’ influence on change to the sense of mission. If the force for change does not alter the sense of mission, the resistance is successful; change indicates a failure of resistance.
Table 19: Army’s Successful Resistance to Internal and External Forces (Instances of Successful Resistance of Total Number of Instances)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Forces</th>
<th>External Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Leadership (i.e., commander in the field)</td>
<td>Institutional Competitors (i.e., Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 of 1</td>
<td>1 of 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Leadership (i.e., Army organizational leadership)</td>
<td>Threat (i.e., insurgency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 of 2</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents and Mavericks</td>
<td>Policy Entrepreneurs (individuals and groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 of 4</td>
<td>2 of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Experience (i.e., lessons from the field)</td>
<td>Studies and Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 of 6</td>
<td>4 of 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Assessments / Studies / Reviews / Boards</td>
<td>Operational Demands (e.g., demand for personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 of 7</td>
<td>5 of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 of 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Instances of Successful Resistance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Instances of Successful Resistance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17 of 20</strong></td>
<td><strong>20 of 30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This hypothesis also holds true across each set of cases. In the cases of personnel, significant change came only from external forces in the form of political leadership. In fact, internal forces (operational leadership; operational assessments; assessments, studies, and reviews) had little to no impact on the mission (I will discuss in more detail below). External forces included political leadership and political groups, yet the latter proved capable of affecting the organization only in conjunction with support from the former. In the cases of counterinsurgency, the Army succeeded at resisting both internal and external forces for change. In all three cases examined, the Army succeeded in resisting all external forces for change (threat; studies and reports) except for political leadership in the case of Iraq. The only successful internal force for change was organizational leadership, also in the case of Iraq (other internal forces included mavericks and insurgents; operational experience; and operational assessments, studies, and reviews). In the cases of technology, again, only external forces succeeded in changing the organization’s mission, which I discuss subsequently.
In nearly every case of personnel and technology, the Army eventually changed. In all three personnel cases, the Army eventually integrated these groups into the organization, even though resistance to these groups played a contributing role in delaying or preventing change in each instance. In two cases of technology, the Army failed to successfully resist: the eventual independence of the air arm and the strategic changes caused by the integration of nuclear weapons (at least under President Eisenhower). In the former case, however, the Army leadership’s resistance played a significant role in postponing air independence in the near-term. These findings provide evidence to support the proposition that organizations are indeed able to influence their environment and that lack of change can result from the intentional choice to not change rather than a failed attempt to change (Child 1972; 1997), but that other forces impact whether or not this resistance is successful over the long-run. I will examine and discuss the impact of resistance in the near-term versus the long-term in more detail in the subsequent section on implications.

Additionally, these findings provide insight and evidence to make initial conclusions about what tactics of resistance are more or less successful. In the table below, I have identified the number of times the Army successfully employed a tactic of resistance along with the total number of times it employed the tactic:

As discussed previously, there is a distinct difference between the Army’s successful employment of tactics depending on whether the force is internal or external. In regards to internal forces, suppression achieved the highest rate of success (10 out of 11 cases) and thus did the most work of resistance against internal forces. Suppression failed in only one case, the inability to suppress the numerous internal studies during the Vietnam-era that examined the number of women that could serve in a unit without degrading capabilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics Used Against Internal Forces</th>
<th>Tactics Used Against External Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>Waiting Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore</td>
<td>Appeasement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppress</td>
<td>Sabotage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moving Changes to Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Use of Expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2 of 2</th>
<th>1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore</td>
<td>5 of 7</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppress</td>
<td>10 of 11</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
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<td>3 of 5</td>
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<td>8 of 11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 of 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As opposed to tactics employed against internal forces, the political use of expertise had the lowest success rate against external forces (7 of 12) even though it was also the most-employed tactic. Along with denial (succeeding 3 out of 5 times), which was employed in a similar manner, this tactic had variable degrees of success. Notably, these tactics failed when the Army employed them against powerful political leadership. Such instances include President Truman and integration, President Eisenhower and nuclear weapons, President Barack Obama and allowing homosexuals to serve openly, President Bush and instituting a new strategy in Iraq circa 2006, and Congressional leaders who sought to open West Point to women after Vietnam. However, Army leaders successfully resisted when the force for change lacked power, such as when the president and Congress differed on an issue and neither side could achieve its preferred change without support from Army leaders. Other similar instances include when political interest groups tried to open up more positions for black soldiers during World War I, President Clinton’s efforts to lift the ban on homosexuals when he did not already have the full support of Congress, political groups that tried to end segregation prior to World War II, and Congressional

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300 N.b., Differences between total numbers of tactics employed against external forces versus the previous table is due to multiple tactics employed against a single external force.
members who tried to end the ban on women in combat after the Cold War without full support from the rest of Congress or the president.

Though used less often, appeasement and moving changes to the periphery also proved successful. In total, these three tactics succeed 6 of 7 times. However while these tactics proved successful, they required more effort and energy than the political use of expertise: Army leaders actually had to adjust a component of the organization in order to pacify the external force while also protecting the sense of mission. Such instances included: George Marshall’s integration of African-Americans and women prior to World War II; General Taylor’s employment of tactical nuclear weapons; and the Army’s giving up control of the Caribou airplane in exchange for control of helicopters. Again, while these were effective, they each required actual change to the organization necessitating the use of resources.

Sabotage seems to be a tactic of last resort, likely because it carries a high degree of risk if caught. As evidenced by the “colonel’s revolt” in response to President Eisenhower and General Taylor’s public claim to have no knowledge about the activities of Taylor’s officers, sabotage can cause a great deal of controversy and political liability. Like appeasement and moving changes to the periphery, this tactic can be effective due to policymakers’ lack of expertise about how policies are actually implemented, but it carries a great deal of risk.

While Army leadership ignored a number of external forces, the success of this tactic is based almost completely on the relative strength of the external force. Ignoring a force for change is the easiest tactic to employ as it takes no effort or commitment of resources, but it is also the weakest. Of the 8 times the Army successfully ignored external forces for change, these forces actually had little direct power over the the organization: political groups (e.g., women’s defense groups, African American political groups in World Wars I and II), think-tanks and
research centers (e.g., RAND’s counterinsurgency report during Vietnam), and operational demands (e.g., the need for personnel during World War I). Only when these groups could act through organizational leaders (e.g., in the case of the NAACP gaining the support of General Leonard Wood during World War I) or political leaders (e.g., the NAACP gaining the support of President Roosevelt during World War II) did they prove successful. As discussed previously, Army leaders cannot simply ignore political leaders, thus they must employ tactics such as the political use of expertise, a tactic that redefines the issue as one of expertise rather than authority.

Finally, while waiting out succeeded on one occasion, this was only by default, because President Kennedy exerted his influence on the Army for only three years due to his premature death. Had Kennedy stayed in office longer, this tactic may have proved unsuccessful, but the Army leadership was able to successfully resist while he was in office. As with ignoring a force for change, this tactic was successful so long as the external force loses interest or ability to pressure the organization. Had President Kennedy been in office longer, I suspect that this tactic would have failed.

In the overall analysis of these tactics of resistance, the tactics that require some degree of change to the organization, such as appeasement and moving changes to the periphery, seem to be the most effective. In moving changes to the periphery and appeasement, Army leadership had to utilize resources and energy in making some changes, but they were still able to protect the organization’s sense of mission. There are two possible reasons for their success in protecting the mission: either political leaders’ lack of expertise prevents them from understanding the difference between significant change and superficial change, or political leaders are actually only interested in making enough changes to satisfy their political constituents (who themselves may not be experts and therefore cannot differentiate between
significant and superficial change). Political use of expertise and denial, though employed often, vary in success relative to the power of the force for change. Ignoring a force for change and waiting out are easily employed in terms of resources, but they have little effect on a force that has any power over the organization. Finally, sabotage proves to be somewhat successful, but it carries a great deal of political risk. I will discuss these tactics in more detail in the next section, as their usage also tells us something about the Army leadership’s understanding and awareness of the power of external forces.

That the Army challenged political leadership and resisted their authority in some instances brings insight into one of the main theories in the organizational change literature. Resource dependency theory posits that organizations depend on other organizations for resources, and that organizations develop strategies to maintain control over such resources along with their own autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Hillman et al. 2009; Davis and Cobb 2010; see also Smith 2002). Organizations must constantly balance access to resources (i.e., interdependence) and autonomy (ibid.), a balance that is sometimes difficult to strike. But along with autonomy, Army leaders seek to protect the organization’s sense of mission.

But, what is the appropriate balance between yielding to political leadership and maintaining autonomy and control over the mission? How does public opinion intervene in this balance? The Army depends on political leaders for support, financial and otherwise; additionally, it depends on the public for personnel. In attempting to refuse to integrate certain groups (e.g., African Americans, women, or homosexuals) when ordered to do so by political leaders, it directly limited personnel resources and indirectly raised the chances that political leadership would withdraw other types of support. However, the Army’s refusal in these cases generally reflected public opinion: in 1948 prior to President Truman’s imposition of
integration, 63% of the public opposed racial integration of the Army (National Defense Research Institute 1993, 184), and in 1993, only 41% of Americans supported allowing homosexuals to serve openly (Gallup 1993). However, during World War II, Army leaders directly went against public opinion regarding women’s service: in January 1944, 57% of survey respondents said they would not urge their daughter or sister to join the WAC, while only 30% replied that they would do so (Gallup 1944). Yet, Eisenhower and other Army leaders pushed Congress to make the WAC a permanent part of the Army in 1948, which it did. In the case of African-Americans and homosexuals, the Army’s resistance had the support of the majority of the public, particularly in the case of racial integration. In the case of women, it did not, but the public was almost split on the issue. At least in the personnel cases, there may be a strategic trade-off between challenging political leadership when the Army leadership believes it has the support of the public, or going against public opinion if Army leadership believes it has the support of political leaders (however, in the cases of airplanes and nuclear weapons, the Army’s position was opposed to the public’s viewpoint).

Still, Army leaders surely recognize their dependence on both political leadership and the public for resources and support. By using tactics such as political use of expertise and denial, the Army can challenge political leadership without directly challenging their authority; in using such tactics against the public, such as making women in combat an issue of expertise regarding unit cohesion, then Army leaders reduce the risk of alienating public support. If the Army were to use more confrontational tactics of resistance, it might risk completely alienating either group, which could lead to withdrawal of support (or a violation of its identity as the “people’s army”). Maintaining autonomy, access to resources, and resisting threats to the mission must be balanced against the possibility of loss of support.
In regards to the organizational theory literature, the findings from this hypothesis offer a completely new area of research. Within the literature that explores tactics of resistance, I have found no project that attempts to measure the ability of an organization to resist forces or compares success of resistance against external and internal forces (Oliver 1991; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997). Thus, these findings should be tested in future research regarding strategic resistance (to be discussed subsequently) to verify their application to other types of organizations.

**H3: Organizations become more skilled at resistance over time.**

The findings of this project do not support this hypothesis. No case demonstrates improvement at resistance over time, nor is there evidence of such improvement across cases. Instead, Army leaders utilized the same tactics across cases with no change in manner or strength. Additionally, there is no indication that the Army proved more effective at resisting the same force for change in later cases than in earlier cases. I found no evidence of any of three phenomenon likely to be associated with learning: a development of new, more effective tactics over time (i.e., a significant, non-random employment of new tactics), more effective employment of standard tactics over time (i.e., more effective use of suppression, political use of expertise, denial, sabotage, etc.), or evidence that Army leadership has passed on lessons from past instances of resistance.

While I found no evidence that the Army as an organization became more skilled at resistance, there is indication of individual learning. Specifically, individual Army leaders actually learned to not resist when change was inevitable and resistance thus pointless. However, even this learning did not translate across cases or time, meaning that there does not
seem to be an institutional capability for either individual or organizational learning in regards to resistance. These findings provide insight into theories of organizational learning theory.

The strongest evidence that the Army does not improve its ability to resist over time is that in every case in which external forces sustained interest in changing the organization, as in the cases of personnel and technology, the Army eventually changed. While there was no eventual change in regards to counterinsurgency, I attribute this to the lack of interest by external forces other than learning. If the Army had become more skilled at resistance over time, I would have expected to see an ability to maintain resistance in at least one case; yet, this did not occur. However, there is the possibility that the Army does indeed improve its ability to resist over time, but it does not do so at the same rate at which external forces improve their ability (or strength) in forcing the organization to change. I will address this issue below.

Across cases, I see no evidence of the development or employment of more effective tactics of resistance over time. The Army employed the same tactics against external forces in the earliest cases examined in this project (integration of African-Americans and the Philippine-American War) as well as the most recent cases in this project (integration of homosexuals under President Obama and counterinsurgency during the Iraq/Afghanistan Wars), including ignoring the force for change, the political use of expertise, moving changes to the periphery, and denial. Nor is there more or less success in the earlier or later cases; as discussed earlier, successful resistance against external forces seems to depend more on the relative power of the force to impose change.

The Army’s lack of improvement over time provides some interesting insight into theories regarding organizational learning. A fundamental question within the organizational learning literature is whether organizations learn or only individuals within organizations learn...
In the organizational learning literature, the ability of organizations to learn, consistently adapt to environmental conditions, and improve performance, also known as “double-loop learning,” is difficult to master and can involve trade-offs between near- and long-term interests (Argyris and Schon 1978; Senge 1990; Sterman et al. 1997; Bessant and Francis 1999). Even if it is only individuals within organizations that learn, such learning can have organizational implications. Simon (1991) argues that, “all learning takes place inside individual human heads; an organization learns in two ways: (a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization didn’t previously have” (125).

In examining these cases, I do see evidence of individual learning at the leadership level. The evidence from this projects suggests that individual Army leaders—individuals at the Chief of Staff and Staff levels who are the most capable of resistance—learn when resistance is futile. One such example is in regards to the Army’s resistance to expanding women’s service in the Army during the Vietnam era. Prior to the transition to the all-volunteer force, the Army under Creighton Abrams examined its own abilities to expand the size of the Women’s Army Corps and the possibility of allowing women to serve in a much broader range of occupational specialties (though, still barring them from combat roles). Even though some other officers on the Army Staff resisted this transition, Abrams’ willingness to act in the face of likely imposition by Congress or the president (as indicated by Congress’s passing of the Equal Rights Amendment) indicates awareness of his limitations to resist, and that the expansion of women’s service was inevitable. As General Abrams noted, women’s service had become a necessity rather than an option (Sorley 1992, 352). As a result of Abrams’s support, the Army as an organization employed minimal resistance to expanding the roles for women (in non-combat
positions) during this time. Additionally, there is little evidence of extensive resistance by Chief of Staff General George Casey to President Obama’s lifting the ban on homosexuals in 2010, particularly when compared to the resistance against President Clinton (Farber 2010; Shanker 2010; U.S. Senate 2010, 155). Notably, both the majority of Congress and the public supported President Obama in lifting the ban, a very different situation than under President Clinton.

Additionally, the case of nuclear weapons is also a situation in which Army leaders seem to have recognized the futility of resistance to presidential demands. General Maxwell Taylor’s institutionalization of tactical nuclear weapons and superficial yielding to President Eisenhower’s demands to integrate nuclear weapons indicates individual learning. In fact, Taylor assumed the role of Chief of Staff for the very fact that Eisenhower fired Ridgway after two years because he refused to yield (Bacevich 1997), and Taylor recognized the implications of overt resistance. Major General John Medaris, too, recognized the futility of resisting Eisenhower in regards to choices about technology over conventional capabilities when he stated, “Why don’t you accentuate the positive and go with that which is popular, since you cannot get the other stuff anyway” (as quoted in Bacevich 1986, 72)? Like Taylor, Medaris seems to have accepted the reality that resistance to new technology was pointless. Thus, this case along with the others discussed above indicates learning in the sense that leaders realized their own limitations to resist, even if they did not improve their ability to resist.

However, this type of individual learning is not guaranteed and does not happen under all conditions. The prime example of continued resistance even in the face of inevitable change is the racial integration of the armed forces. When President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 and then established the Fahy Committee to force integration on the services, one might expect all of the service leaders to recognize that integration would happen. However, the Army
leadership held out longer than all of the other services; it was the very last service to agree to integrate its units, and it did so only after the Secretary of the Army gained approval to return to the quota system if integration proved detrimental to the organization. Even after The Chiefs of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps yielded to integration, General Omar Bradley and other Army leaders continued to resist. Thus, the case of integration compared to the cases above indicates that individual learning does not occur in every case. This makes sense, though, because individual learning should and does vary with the individual.

The Army’s failure of organizational learning in regards to resistance (rather than individual learning) raises the question, why does the organization not become more skilled at resistance over time? Why is there only evidence of individual learning and not organizational improvement of resistance over time?

It could be that the Army’s own success at resisting change precluded improvement, or that the leadership chronically underestimated the strength and persistence of forces for change. The first explanation could be that the Army’s success at resistance in the short-term inhibited the impetus to improve its capabilities to resist forces for change in the long-term, compounded by mistaking short-term for long-term success. As discussed previously, looking across the instances of resistance, the Army proved successful more often than not in discrete instances of resistance but not in overall resistance. Thus, the “success trap” of its resistance in discrete instances led Army leaders to assume that there was no need to improve, made worse by mistaking short-term success for long-term success. If, however, leadership chronically underestimated the strength and persistence of forces for change, then the hypothesis is still not supported as the Army still failed to improve its ability to resist.
Another explanation for the Army leadership’s inability to resist more effectively over time is that forces for change simply improved at a faster rate. If this were the case, the Army’s failure to resist results from the ability of the force for change to adapt faster than the Army, rather than the Army’s lack of ability to do so at all. However, if this were the case, there should still be evidence of improved resistance over time, which I do not see. The political use of expertise displayed to resist integrating African-Americans during the Fahy Committee looks the same as the political use of expertise to resist integrating women in Congressional hearings after the Gulf War. Keeping General Rosson away from significant command positions during Vietnam looks the same as keeping H.R. McMaster or David Petraeus away from significant command positions in Iraq (at least, until President Bush intervened). Ignoring political groups pushing for integration in World War I looks the same as ignoring RAND studies on counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Granted, this lack of difference and, thus, the lack of evidence for improved resistance tactics could be a result of my inability to observe and measure slight differences in improvement. However, while I recognize that my inability to measure small changes is a possibility, even if such small changes are present, they do not fundamentally change my findings because these changes are too small to affect my observations. Until a method for more closely measuring degrees of resistance is developed, I believe that my conclusion regarding the Army’s lack of improvement holds true (in a subsequent section, I will discuss the need to develop a method for measuring degrees of resistance).

Overall, I find that there is no organizational process or mechanism to improve resistance. In other words, I do not see a way by which the Army can capture, assess, and distribute the lessons of resistance for future leaders to use. Unless there is a mechanism for organizations to actually change their actions, routines, or responses to resistance, there will be
no improvement. However, such mechanisms do exist in other areas, particularly combat capabilities, which means that the Army is capable of developing learning/skill improvement mechanisms. To analyze and become more skilled at fighting, the organization has the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Center for Military History. Additionally, after action reviews (AARs) are institutionalized components of Army operations at all levels, providing an operational mechanism to assess and improve capabilities from the smallest through the largest units.

Organizational identity could explain the lack of a resistance mechanism. The Army more than any of the other services views itself as the “people’s army” in that its strength comes from the citizen-soldier ideal, and it is a servant to the same (Weigley 1984, 556). As Builder (1989) emphasizes, “If the Army worships at the altar, the object worshiped is the country; and the means of worship are service” (20). Undercutting the people’s democratically-elected leadership, at least overtly, would violate this sense of duty to the American people. Particularly, the development of an institutional mechanism to subvert this authority would be a sign to both Army members and the public that the organization did not actually believe in this duty. Such a mechanism would subvert the Army’s organizational identity.

A final explanation for the lack of a mechanism for improving resistance is found in civil-military relations theory. Fundamentally, any attempt to institutionalize improvement in the Army’s ability to resist would violate fundamental aspects of American civil-military relations regarding civilian control of the military (Huntington 1985; Feaver 1996; Kohn 1997; Burk 2002; Feaver 2003). Given that political leadership (in the form of both the president and Congress) acted as forces for change on numerous occasions, outside observers (policymakers, scholars, politicians, etc.) would likely interpret the development of better resistance mechanisms
as intent to undercut civilian authority. Thus, institutionalization of the Army’s ability to resist forces such as Congress and the president would be inappropriate, if not illegal. This is not to imply that the Army’s resistance is not already a violation of this civil-military relationship, but an institutionalized capability would be easier to identify and recognize as resistance. Thus, while the Army has resisted civilian authority in the past, and may do so again in the future, it cannot do so in a way that is apparent or obvious. The near-discovery of, and the political fallout from, the “Colonel’s Revolt” under General Maxwell Taylor in 1956 demonstrated the need to keep such resistance hidden.

Findings Not Specifically Connected to Hypotheses

While the above findings relate directly to my hypotheses, I made other observations in the process of conducting this research that provide insight to understanding strategic resistance. One unexpected finding is that there seems to be a progressive relationship between tactics of resistance. By progressive, I mean that there seems to be an order or arrangement to the way in which constituencies of resistance employ tactics. However, while this finding may indicate individual learning that has organizational implications, I do not believe that this finding indicates organizational learning, which I explain further below.

This progression of tactics particularly as employed against external forces, I believe, results from a prioritization of maintaining stability and predictability in the internal environment of the organization over the external environment. As has been well established, organizations seek stability, predictability, and reliability (e.g., Scott 1961; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kelly and Amburgey 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Yet, it is also the case that while a force for change may threaten an organization’s stability, employing resistance can also cause instability. Analysis of the tactics of resistance in this project indicates that the Army prioritizes stability in
the internal environment over stability in the external environment, and the tactics of resistance employed reflects this prioritization.

The first tactic employed against internal forces seems to be ignoring the force for change, a tactic that does not cause instability to the organization, assuming the force for change eventually ceases. Additionally, unlike suppression, there is no expenditure of energy or resources in ignoring a force for change. However, internal forces for change are inherently threatening to the internal stability, predictability, and cohesion of the organization; thus, if they do not go away of their own accord, then they must be suppressed. Thus, because of the emphasis on internal stability, the organization actually employs a more energy-intensive tactic of suppression in order to maintain internal predictability and reliability if ignoring the force does not work.

However, if a force cannot be suppressed or it continues to challenge the internal stability of the organization when ignored, the next tactic employed is quarantine. In the Vietnam case, Army Chief of Staff General George Decker could not effectively suppress General Rosson’s office of counterinsurgency because the office itself was a mechanism designed to appease President Kennedy. Instead, General Decker minimized Rosson’s impact on the Army by preventing him from influencing the core branches of infantry and armor. In the case of Iraq, the Army leadership failed to suppress General McMaster so instead attempted to quarantine him. Though I did not find evidence of the employment of all three tactics by the same person, the progression of tactics employed against internal forces for change appears to follow this pattern:

Ignore → Suppression → Quarantine

The Army also employed a progression of tactics against external forces. Again, the preference is to maintain internal stability (over stability with external actors). Across all of the
tactics employed against external forces, the Army first employed tactics that challenged the external environment but maintained internal stability: waiting out, denial, and political use of expertise. But, if these did not prove effective, only then did the Army leadership employ tactics that required changes in the internal environment: appeasement, moving changes to the periphery, and sabotage. An additional consideration, though, is that within these two groups of tactics, the Army first employed tactics that require less effort: ignoring and waiting out a force for change before the political use of expertise.

I observe such a pattern across a variety of cases. In the counterinsurgency case in Vietnam, Army leadership first attempted to resist President Kennedy by waiting him out but then transitioned to appeasement and moving changes to the periphery. In the case of integration of women during World War II, General George Marshall first attempted to wait out Representative Edith Rogers and then transitioned to moving women to the periphery of the organization via the Women’s Army Corps. In the case of African Americans, Army leaders first attempted to use their expertise in a political manner and deny responsibility for expanding opportunities for black soldiers; but with President Roosevelt’s involvement, they moved changes to the periphery of the organization and appeased the president by opening more support positions but still segregating black and white units and maintaining a 10% quota of black soldiers. In the case of technology, General Taylor first attempted to use political expertise to resist Eisenhower, but he then attempted to sabotage Eisenhower’s strategy via the “Colonel’s Revolt.” While no case exhibits every tactic, making it impossible to examine transition between tactics, looking across all cases, the progression of tactics employed against external forces seems to follow this general pattern:
Waiting Out → Denial → Political use of expertise → Appeasement → Moving Changes to Periphery → Sabotage

As discussed above, this progression of tactics reflects organizational and individual priorities of the preference to maintain internal stability and careful use of resources. While waiting out, denial, and the political use of expertise challenge external stability but protect internal stability, appeasement, moving changes to the periphery of the organization, and sabotage all require changing the organization internally, which requires effort. Within these two groups of tactics, the Army first employs the easiest tactics, as waiting out requires less effort than the political use of expertise, and only if/when they do not succeed, tactics that require more effort to resist are then employed (or, in the case of sabotage, after a degree of change has already been forced on the organization and leaders are willing to take a political risk).

Nevertheless, such progression does not indicate organizational learning. As discussed in the organizational theory literature, even individual “tacit” knowledge gained through a single individual’s experience must still be processed and passed between people in order to become organizational knowledge (Nonaka 1994). Yet in each set of interactions (e.g., African Americans in World War II; counterinsurgency during Vietnam; women after Vietnam), each constituent of resistance first employed one of the easier tactics (e.g., waiting out, denial, political use of expertise) but which is also less successful overall (as indicated by the table above), and only then progressed towards one of the tactics that requires more effort but has a higher rate of success (e.g., moving changes to the periphery or appeasement).

If there were a transmission of knowledge between constituencies that led to organizational learning, there would be at least some instances in which leaders resisted external
forces by immediately employing one of the more effective tactics that required more effort but might have been more effective, overall. Therefore, this progression of tactics is an accurate finding, but it must be “re-learned” in every instance of resistance and, as such, does not reflect organizational learning.

**Applicability of Findings to Other Types of Organizations**

Broadly, these findings are relevant to organizations including other U.S. armed forces, international armed forces, other U.S. government agencies, non-profit organizations (e.g., charities, advocacy groups), and private-sector businesses, to greater or lesser degrees.

Naturally, the findings of this project are most applicable to the other U.S. armed forces. The other U.S. armed forces share a number of characteristics with the Army: they have established missions (Builder 1989), they come under pressure from similar internal and external forces, established civil-military norms and institutional processes bound them similarly, and they have similar degrees control over internal and external constituencies, resources, and capabilities by which to resist forces for change. Like the Army, they will likely resist internal and external forces in different ways; be more successful at resisting internal versus external forces; and they will not demonstrate improved resistance over time.

The findings of this project may also prove relevant for a number of international armed forces but with several qualifications. In countries where the civil-military relationship, the structure of the security institution, and the power of the armed forces (bureaucratically) are most similar to the United States, I predict that all of the hypotheses will prove applicable: such countries might include those of Western Europe, Israel, or Canada. However, in countries that either have a different understanding of civil-military norms or for which the military plays a much more direct role in society (e.g., Pakistan or Egypt), military organizations may prove even
more adept at resisting external forces because of their higher degree of power compared to political leaders. Additionally, they may have the opportunity to directly challenge civilian authority. Unlike the U.S. Army, they may learn mechanisms of resistance because such a mechanism would not be viewed as inappropriate, as in the United States.

Particularly, the second hypothesis may not apply to some international armed forces that experience a high degree of internal discordance. The U.S. Army does not have a significant degree of internal turmoil, at least to the degree that certain groups may take up arms against other groups within the organization. In some countries, this internal turmoil may be a concern (e.g., Nigeria or Sudan). If there are disparate groups within the military organization or if groups within the armed forces are willing to go to war against each other, then it may actually prove more difficult to resist internal forces for change than external forces. Thus, the findings of this project will likely prove applicable to armed forces in other countries, but dependent on the degree to which those organizations reflect the structure, norms, and power of the U.S. Army.

The findings of this project are also broadly relevant to other U.S. government agencies. Even though there are important differences between military and non-military government agencies such as size, responsibilities, and power, all U.S. government agencies are bound by certain norms, laws, and processes that limit their ability to resist political leaders but which give them significant internal authority and autonomy. Therefore, the first hypothesis will likely hold true. However, non-military organizations may find it more difficult to resist internal forces (e.g., mavericks) demonstrate more ability or willingness to enlist support from external forces. Discipline and deference to command authority are ingrained aspects of the U.S. Army, and this sense of discipline likely helps control internal forces; in organizations that do not reinforce such characteristics in their members, they may have more difficulty controlling them. Institutionally,
the U.S. Army also has its own legal code that can be used to enforce discipline, which other
government agencies lack. Still, even given these differences, I believe that all U.S. government
agencies will generally demonstrate more success at resisting internal forces than external forces.

The exception to the applicability of these findings may be U.S. intelligence agencies. More so than the armed forces, the internal workings of the intelligence agencies are opaque. Except for the president and a select group of legislative members (e.g., the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), it is extremely difficult for external forces to examine the internal workings of these organizations, a challenge that only increases the relative amount of power between the bureaucratic expert and the political authority. Additionally, even fewer (if any) political leaders have direct, personal expertise in intelligence organizations, compared to the considerable number of those who have experience in military organizations. Therefore, intelligence organizations may be much more capable at resisting external forces for change due to lack of clarity and personal experience. Thus, it would be very difficult for external forces to know whether intelligence organizations have developed mechanisms for resisting and improving resistance over time. Thus, the second and third hypotheses may not be relevant for intelligence agencies.

Finally, this project has some implications for private sector organizations, both businesses and non-profit organizations. In response to the tactics employed against internal and external forces, organizations will likely employ different tactics because of the amount of control over the different environments. While private businesses and non-profit organizations may not necessarily face the same type of external intervention (e.g., political leaders) as the Army (though, during events such as the recent financial crisis, private sector businesses may

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301 In recent decades, the one exception was President George H.W. Bush who served for a short time as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
face a great deal of political intervention for a short amount of time), they are still subject to intervention by external forces including the public, boards of directors, and political interest groups. Like the Army when faced with political forces, these external forces cannot simply be dismissed. Thus, private sector organizations will likely use different tactics depending on whether the force is internal or external to the organization, but similar to the Army, they are unlike to use overt tactics of resistance against external forces.

The degree to which a private-sector organization can successfully resist internal forces may depend on whether it is a business or a non-profit organization. Like Army leaders, business leaders have much greater control over the internal environment than the external environment. However, non-profit organizations (e.g., charities, religious organizations, political groups) may face unique challenges from internal forces because the work of their members (or groups that support their effort) may rely more heavily on willingness than either businesses or the armed forces. Unlike businesses, non-profit organizations are perhaps just as dependent on their sense of mission as the U.S. Army because it so difficult to engage support and measure success. While businesses can justify and measure changes by measuring their profitability and use the threat of firing people to control internal forces, non-profit organizations are likely to have a much more obscure measure of success and may not have the same control over employment. Thus, the second hypothesis may not prove as relevant to non-profit organizations, given that internal forces for change may be more difficult to control.

Finally, the third hypothesis may or may not prove relevant depending on the legality of the resistance. It is not inherently illegal for private sector organizations to develop mechanisms that facilitate resisting forces for change. If an organization like Coca-Cola becomes more skilled at resisting pressure from watchdog groups that claim their products are unhealthy, such
activity is not inherently wrong even if it may be unpopular. However, if organizations develop mechanisms to resist external forces overseeing legal aspects of running a business (e.g., worker safety laws), then this would be both illegal and inappropriate.\textsuperscript{302} The same is true for non-profit organizations. Even so, this does not mean that private sector organizations do not become more skilled at resistance over time. Determining the applicability of the third hypothesis to private sector organizations requires more focused research, and will likely vary depending on the specific organization and the issue under study.

Exploring how this project’s findings apply to other organizations provides opportunities for further research. First, I would like to test these hypotheses across the other military services. The other armed forces of the Department of Defense all have established missions (Builder 1989), and the literature predicts that each will protect its sense of mission. Understanding how the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps resist change that threatens their missions will provide insight into the generalizability of this project’s findings. Subsequently, these findings could also be tested across international military organizations.

An examination of how civilian government agencies that deal with national security protect their sense of mission would also expand the findings of this research. Examining how varied federal agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Department of Homeland Security (or sub-agencies within the department) protect their mission will add analytical value to the broader research agenda of strategic resistance to change.

In addition to military and other government agencies, another possibility is to expand this research to other types of organizations that have strong missions. Testing this project’s

\textsuperscript{302} For instance, a U.S. Senate investigation has accused Apple, Inc. of avoiding taxes by using non-U.S. businesses to funnel profits (Kang 2013). This type of “mechanism” of resisting the law (i.e., an external force) may prove to be illegal pending further examination.
findings across private-sector businesses such as General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, or Ford (Collins and Porras 1994) or non-profit organizations such as Greenpeace, Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross, or Oxfam (Top Nonprofits 2013) would provide insight to its generalizability. Such research could broaden the literature and scholarship of resistance and link this project to a broader research community.

**Limitations of This Research**

Though this project offers insight into strategic resistance, there are still gaps in our understanding of organizational resistance to change. One such major gap is if and under what conditions internal forces can achieve change in the absence of support from leadership. Neither the organizational theory literature (Patti 1974; Barnett and Carroll 1995; Leonard-Barton 1995; Spreitzer and Quinn 1996; Burdett 1999; Ford et al. 2008) nor the military innovation literature (Grissom 2006; Serena 2010; Russell 2010) considers this question. Additionally, my research research makes an assumption about what causes resistance to change (i.e., a threat to the organization’s sense of mission), but it does not resolve the question of the root cause of resistance (Coch and French 2009 [1948]; Giangregco 2000; Chuang 2011). Finally, the literature lacks an effective mechanism for measuring the degree or amount of resistance as it is employed by individuals or constituencies of resistance (Giangreco 2000).

There is still a gap in understanding how and if internal forces can achieve change and how they can enlist the support of leadership. In the majority of the organizational change literature, there is little effort to identify the locus of resistance other than the entire organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Kotter 1995; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Yet, even when the locus of resistance is identified more specifically, the organizational literature generally places it at the management and employee
levels rather than the leadership levels (Patti 1974; Ford et al. 2002; Ford et al. 2008). Leadership is rarely considered a constituent of resistance; they are favored as drivers of change (ibid.).

A similar gap exists in the military innovation literature. Grissom (2006) identifies four drivers of military innovation in the literature: civilian leadership, inter-service rivalry, intra-service competition, and organizational culture. In his review, he finds that every type of organizational change relies heavily on a “top-down” management of the innovation, even though there are a small number of important examples of “bottom-up” innovations (ibid.). Yet, he points out that the military innovation scholarship has been hard-pressed to identify a theory of “bottom-up” change. Though two scholars have attempted to do this in recent years regarding Army operations in Iraq (Serena 2010; Russell 2011), they focus primarily on tactical changes in rather than organizational-level innovations. While much of this literature attempts to account for barriers of change, it does not take into account the role that resistance by leadership can play in inhibiting innovation, particularly the bottom-up kind.

Given the literature’s lack of emphasis on how leadership resists change, there is still a question of whether and under what conditions “bottom-up” change may occur. Of the 20 instances of internal forces examined in this case, the Army resisted 17 of them. Of the three it did not, the source of change was organizational leadership itself (which, as discussed, is also the main constituency of resistance), and the third resulted in change because the amount of information became overwhelming (the integration of women). We are left with this question—if organizational leadership opposes an internally-driven force for change, are there any
circumstances under which this change can be successful if there is not direct support from organizational leadership? This question deserves further research.

Additionally, while my research takes a particular perspective on what causes organizational resistance, it does not help clarify the extensive theoretical debate on the causes of resistance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature offers a wide variety of explanations for the causes of resistance, usually emphasizing either internal (e.g., Schein 1990; Barr et al. 1992; Tripsas and Gravetti 2000) or external factors (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 149) but generally giving more weight to internal factors. As noted by Chuang (2011), such explanations include lack of trust in those who are driving the change (Block 1993), desire to protect established social relationships (O’Toole 1995), and fear of changing the status quo (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 154-155; Spector 1989; Kelly and Amburgey 1991, 593), to name only a few.

Given such varying explanations for resistance, which is correct? In fact, is there really only one reason for resistance to change? Are they all causes of resistance? This project makes a slightly different assumption about the cause of resistance to change than those mentioned above: if a force threatens to change an organization’s sense of mission, the organization (particularly the organization’s leadership) will resist it. However, this project does not offer any insight into whether or not this explanation is more or less persuasive than those listed above. If anything, my research simply adds to the well-established understanding that organizations resist change for a variety of reasons, and that change is difficult.

Yet, this lack of agreement on the cause of organizational resistance and its implications for my research is mediated by the question of whether or not the cause of resistance actually matters in understanding the act of intentional resistance. This project explicitly focuses on the

Or, if internal forces do not have support from external actors (for more on this in the military innovation literature, see Posen 1984).
latter, i.e., understanding how resistance manifests as intentional activity. If, in fact, the findings of this project can be verified across more cases in which the cause of resistance is something other than a threat to the organization’s sense of mission, then such findings could actually add more theoretical value to my conclusions. However, if future scholarship does indeed find that the cause of resistance leads to variation in the manner or type of resistance, then this project’s conclusions are inherently limited to those cases in which there is a threat to the sense mission.

Finally, this project further elucidates, but does not answer, the challenge of measuring resistance. Other scholars have noted the difficulty of measuring resistance to change (Giangreco 2000). As in this research, I believe that more insight regarding the overall phenomenon of resistance would be gained if it were possible to measure the degree of resistance more directly, i.e., an actual measurement of the relative amount of effort an individual or constituency employed to resist. The challenge is that resistance to change, however legitimate, is not something organizational members will freely admit to conducting nor consciously provide evidence. As Giangreco (2000) notes:

…resistance to change is a very delicate and complex phenomenon, therefore its measurement is not as simple as it may appear. On the one hand, the manifestations of resistant behaviors can be observed and listed by an external observer but, on the other hand, the building of a self-assessment scale requires some precautions…[due to] the social desirability issue that is connected to resistance to change. Here, it is not plausible to argue that an individual would give an honest answer to questions like: ‘Are you slowing down activities? Have you reduced your performance levels? Are you sticking with old ways of doing things?’ These questions are limited in being too obvious and predictable, therefore people are able to identify the issues that are being explored, and answer according to the way they think the social system would like them to respond (23).

While the findings of this project do not necessitate an understanding of the degree of resistance, an ability to measure resistance would be of value in understanding resistance.
These gaps in research also provide an opportunity for further research. Articulating a theory for bottom-up change (and innovation) in the absence of leadership support would be a valuable addition to scholarship, if such a phenomenon is even possible. Testing whether or not strategic resistance, or the tactics employed in order to implement such resistance, depends on the cause of resistance will also offer valuable insight. Lastly, developing a mechanism or model for measuring the degree of resistance as employed by individuals or constituencies would prove extremely useful. Along with this project’s original hypotheses, all of these topics offer valuable avenues by which to further explore strategic resistance to change.

**Implications of These Findings**

This research has a number of implications for our understanding of resistance to change. First, this project offers to fill the gap in the literature on resistance to change as an active phenomenon. Second, this project offers insight for both policymakers who seek to overcome resistance to change and those constituencies who might seek to resist change. Finally, this research offers some insight into the question of the degree to which strategic resistance to change matters in preventing overall policy changes within an organization.

The most obvious implication of these findings is recognition that organizations actively and intentionally resist change. Intuitively, anyone who has been a part of an organization and attempted to change an organization from the inside or outside would recognize this as an obvious statement. Yet, such a recognition is nearly absent from the literature except anecdotally (Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997; Dent and Goldberg 1999; Dent et al. 1999). As discussed previously, the fundamental implication of this research is a re-orientation of the organizational resistance research agenda to include an understanding and awareness of resistance as an intentional act. More research on intentional resistance will buttress other research that examines
inertial resistance, thereby providing a more robust understanding of organizations (Child 1972, 1997; Recardo 1995; Agocs 1997). That this topic has not been the focus of more research is perplexing, given that the challenge of changing a large organization is a typical experience of anyone who has worked in organizations as varied as the military (Pape 2009), government agencies (Wilson 1989), private business (Lawrence 1969; Weick and Quinn 1999; Pardo del Val and Fuentes 2003; Coch and French 2009 [1948]), non-profit organizations (Salipante and Golden-Biddle 1995), and even medical schools (Bloom 1988).

Particularly, organizational change research must include a greater awareness of the role that organizational leadership can and does play in resistance. Both implicitly and explicitly, the locus of resistance within the literature is assumed to reside in the workers and middle-management personnel that make up the organization (Dent and Goldberg 1999; Dent et al. 1999; Ford et al. 2002; Ford et al. 2008; Ford and Ford 2010). Overwhelmingly, the literature gives preference to organizational leadership as the driver of needed change rather than the inhibitor of such change (Bass 1985; Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Virany et al 1992; Bass and Avolio 1993; Boeker 1997). The role of who actually resists is not rigorously explored. For example, Kelly and Amburgey (1984) state that resistance occurs because “…organization members seek to maintain the status quo that protects their interests” (593), a statement which seems to imply that “members” is a different group than leadership. In this and other work on organizational resistance (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1984; Armenakis and Bedeian 1999; Weick and Quinn 1999), there is little effort to understand leadership’s role as constituents of resistance. Intuitively, if members strive to protect the status quo, it is logical that leadership is the most hesitant to resist change because individually they have the most to lose: leaders typically have

304 “Only executive leadership has the position and potential to initiate and implement strategic change” (Tushman and Romanelli 1985, 209).
the most power, earn the most money, and have the most personal investment in the organization (material and otherwise). Re-orienting the scholarship to include the role of leadership in resisting change as my research has done will extend our understanding of the phenomenon of resistance.

Additionally, this project has implications for policymakers in understanding how to recognize strategic resistance and what to do about it. First, policymakers should recognize that change that threatens an organization’s mission will almost surely result in resistance—expecting such resistance is the first step in recognizing and addressing it. Second, to deal with the political use of expertise (the most common tactic of resistance), policymakers must ensure that they have a mechanism for closing the gap between their lack of expertise and the expertise held by organization leadership—they must understand what kind of organizational change is actually possible given the organization’s resources and capabilities. Posen (1984) argues that change is accomplished by mavericks providing expertise to civilian policymakers, but there is a much more extensive community of individuals, groups, and organizations that can help close this divide. These include research organizations like RAND, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Center for Naval Analysis, and other federally-funded research organizations; the Congressional Research Service (CRS); academic institutions and individual researchers; and think-tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Brookings Institution. Understanding “what is possible” as evaluated by the organization and outside observers will provide policymakers with insight into whether there are organizational shortcomings or if strategic resistance is to blame for the lack of change. Additionally, policymakers should be aware of the tactics identified in this project—denial, political use of expertise, moving changes to the periphery, sabotage, etc.—and how the Army has employed
them in the past so they can understand and address them. Policymakers must be very specific in dictating the nature of the change and, in some cases, implementation to overcome strategic resistance.

If policymakers encounter strategic resistance, they must be willing to take strong counter-measures against instigators—they must be willing to fire (or relieve) senior leaders from their leadership positions. In some cases, if given enough time, organizational leadership will end its strategic resistance, as with the integration of African-Americans and women. However, if a policymaker desires to overcome strategic resistance in the near-term, he or she must be willing to remove the most likely and most powerful constituency of resistance, which is the organization’s leadership. While policymakers have used this tactic to assert leadership over the armed forces in a variety of scenarios, considering doing so is particularly necessary if the change threatens the organization’s sense of mission.\(^\text{305}\) In the case of nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower fired Matthew Ridgway by not extending his tenure as Army Chief of Staff. President Johnson removed General Westmoreland from command in Vietnam by promoting him to Army Chief of Staff. Similarly, President Bush removed General George Casey from command in Iraq six months early (also, by promoting him to Army Chief of Staff) in order to put David Petraeus in position to execute a new strategy. Replacing organizational leadership can be a politically difficult tactic particularly if the president lacks military credentials,\(^\text{306}\) but it is the only short-term tactic that can overcome strategic resistance.

\(^{305}\) During the first decade of the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used this tactic in numerous ways. With the support of President Obama, Secretary Gates fired General David McKiernan because McKiernan did not support the president’s strategy in Afghanistan (Tyson 2009). During his tenure, Secretary Gates fired at least seven generals because of failure to perform or their unwillingness to follow his or the president’s guidance (Schachtman 2010).

\(^{306}\) For instance, President Clinton did not fire General Powell when he resisted the lifting of the ban on homosexuals, and President Clinton had a poor reputation regarding national security and military issues.
Besides having insights for those who might attempt to overcome resistance to change, this project has lessons for those who might seek to resist change. If the president or Congress has the commitment and power to enforce change, organizational leadership should consider a tactic of moving changes to the periphery or appeasement rather than trying to use political expertise or waiting out—this provides the opportunity to control how change is implemented while at the same time preserving energy, effort, and political capital. For instance, when political forces attempted to force the Army to integrate women and African-Americans prior to the beginning of World War II, General George Marshall agreed to change but was able to control the impact of change by moving forces to the periphery of the organization. Thus, by agreeing to change, he was able to control the impact on the organization’s mission (at least, until President Harry Truman re-engaged with the issue).

However, constituencies of resistance must also recognize when resistance would be useless. If the president and Congress (or at least, a majority of Congress) are united in achieving change (as in the case of homosexuals, airplanes after World War II, and African-Americans) or if the president has the willingness and political capital to exert influence over defense issues (as in the case of nuclear weapons and airplanes just prior to World War II), there is very little chance to successfully resist. Thus, the best strategy is to properly prepare the organization for the change so as to minimize any possible instability (as in the case of lifting the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, for which the chiefs of staff had almost a year to prepare).

Finally, a fundamental question raised by this project is the degree to which strategic resistance matters to organizational change. To answer this question, strategic resistance must be considered against other major factors that influence overall organizational change including political leadership, public opinion, the international security environment, and budget shortages.
Though I did not specifically test for the situations in which strategic resistance is most important, strategic resistance seems to play the most important role in preventing change when political leaders are not fully engaged with or unified on a particular issue.

In the table below, I have identified the degree to which resistance matters. If other factors such as political leadership or public opinion support the change but resistance still prevents change (or if there is no other type of barrier to change), then I have identified the Army’s resistance as a “key factor.” However, if these other factors push the Army in different directions (e.g., if political leadership supports change but public opinion opposes it), then I have coded resistance as a “contributing factor.” Finally, if the Army’s resistance is present yet has no effect on preventing organizational change, then I have identified the resistance as “present but immaterial.”

Looking across all cases, the Army’s resistance is a key factor in affecting organizational change particularly when there is no powerful political leadership involved or if political leaders are divided on an issue. In the personnel cases, strategic resistance was a key factor in the case of homosexuals during the Clinton administration. In the counterinsurgency cases, resistance has been a key factor given the lack of focused political pressure. In the helicopter case, though slightly different, resistance was also a key factor: without direct political intervention, the Army successfully resisted the Air Force and thus kept control of helicopter capabilities. In the case of nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower’s ability to impose his will on the Army made resistance all but immaterial. For the remainder of the cases (African-Americans, women, and airplanes) the Army’s resistance played a contributing but no less important role in preventing organizational change. However in the case of women, the Army’s resistance may change to a key factor given recent policy changes ordered by the Secretary of Defense. In all of these cases,
these other factors do not explain away the Army’s strategic resistance: rather, they contributed to the overall lack of change along with strategic resistance.

Table 21: To what degree does strategic resistance play a role in preventing organizational change?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Factor</th>
<th>Contributing Factor</th>
<th>Present but Immaterial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-Americans</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine-American War</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Afghanistan Wars</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to the Army’s policies towards African-Americans, both political leadership and public opinion played roles in affecting the Army’s lack of change. The public generally opposed integration of the armed forces prior to President Truman’s actions: a month before Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, a Gallup poll found that 63% of the public opposed integration while only 26% supported it (National Defense Research Institute 1993, 184). Given the Army’s sense of organizational identify as the “people’s army,” this opposition likely did play a contributing role along with strategic resistance in preventing change.

Political leadership also played a role in the lack of change in Army policy regarding integration. Many political leaders prior to World War II, in fact, opposed integration. President Theodore Roosevelt, though he personally served with and commended black soldiers during the Spanish-American War, made no effort to expand their opportunities after the war. Just a decade
later during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson removed Lieutenant Colonel Charles Young (an African-American officer) from command because of the complaints of a white officer who would have served under him (Nalty 1986, 110-111). Just prior to World War II, motivated by a political challenge from Wendell Willkie who supported greater civil rights for African-Americans, President Roosevelt expanded opportunities for black soldiers in the Army but well within the boundaries of segregation and quotas preferred by the Army leadership (Nalty 1986, 137-142). President Roosevelt demonstrated a willingness to force the Army to change only enough to ensure his defeat of Willkie but not enough to fundamentally challenge Army policies.

Given the influence of public opinion and political leadership, the Army’s resistance contributed to preventing change in this case. Even of the Army leadership had supported integration and the lifting of quotas prior to World War II, it is likely that politicians would have opposed, at least until President Truman assumed the presidency. Recognizing that other factors played a role in influencing the overall policies towards African-Americans, though, does not negate the impact of the Army leadership’s resistance, as the Army’s resistance was still an important and relevant factor in delaying change.

As with policies regarding African-Americans, political leadership has limited the degree of organizational change regarding women, particularly in combat positions. During World War II and afterwards, political leaders opposed women’s role in the Army: only when General Eisenhower and other senior officers lent personal support for a permanent role for women and the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) did Congress eventually pass the appropriate legislation in 1948, almost two years after the Army asked Congress to make the WAC a permanent part of the organization (Treadwell 1991, 733-746; Morden 2000, 35-61). In hearings after the first Gulf
War, Congressional leaders had differing opinions on the role of women in combat operations, with few members publicly supporting women in combat (U.S. House 1991; U.S. Senate 1991). In 2005 during the most recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, a group of U.S. House of Representative members threatened to pass an amendment that would have removed women from forward operating bases (FOBs) that put them at many of the same combat risks as many men, but they withdrew their amendment after current and retired Army officers raised opposition (Tyson 2005b).

Along with political leadership, the public has until recently been ambivalent about women’s service, particularly in combat positions. As of July 1943, 45% of survey respondents supported women in the WACs, but 48% opposed their service (Gallup 1943). By 1944, a larger segment, but not a majority, of the public supported women replacing men in non-combat positions during World War II in order to allow men to serve in combat positions: 47% in support versus 44% opposed (Gallup 1944). In June 1946, 42% of respondents supported peacetime service by women, but 45% disapproved (Gallup 1946). By 1954, public support for women in non-combat positions (serving during a time of war) increased to a majority of 54% (Gallup 1954). However, support for women in combat positions has increased over the past two decades, and in 1991, 81% of survey respondents believed that women should have the choice to serve in combat positions (Gallup 1991). This support has maintained steady throughout the past two wars (Gallup 2007). Given public support for women in combat, the Army’s resistance to women in combat has been a contributing factor to the lack of change.

Unlike the cases of African-Americans and women, the Army’s resistance prevented policy change regarding homosexuals under President Clinton. Even though Congressional leaders opposed lifting the ban, President Clinton committed personal and political capital to
doing so. It is likely that General Powell’s involvement in 1993, which led to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, allowed a certain amount of political space for Congress to oppose President Clinton. The counterargument to this claim is that Congressional leaders would still have had the political power to oppose both President Clinton and Army leadership even if Powell had supported Clinton. An important factor in this argument is that opposition came from Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat, and during this time, the president’s own Democratic Party maintained strong majorities in both the Senate (with 57 Democrats) and the House of Representatives (with 258 Democrats). Would Army support have been enough for President Clinton to convince his own party to support his preferred policy? Almost forty years earlier, President Truman had faced a similar schism. Given Democratic control of Congress and the example of integration, I believe that President Clinton would have succeeded in lifting the ban on homosexuals had he received support from Army leaders.

During President Clinton’s administration, though, public opinion did not support lifting the ban. As of 1993, the majority of Americans still opposed allowing homosexuals to serve in the military (Gallup 1993). But, this changed only a year later. In fact, since 1994, Gallup polling has found that a majority of the public has supported allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the armed forces (Kiefer 2004). The percentage increased significantly over the next decade, as those in favor of homosexuals being allowed to serve openly increased from 41% in 1993 to 63% in 2004, 69% in 2009, and 70% in 2010 (Gallup 2013a).

However, given the emphasis President Obama and Democratic Congressional leaders placed on ending the DADT policy, the Army’s resistance proved immaterial. This recent instance of resistance demonstrates that significant change can occur when political leadership
(in the form of a president who has the support of a majority of Congress) imposes it on the organization.

In regards to the counterinsurgency cases, neither political leadership nor public opinion have prevented the Army from institutionalizing such capabilities. While presidents have promised limited U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency operations following Vietnam and recent conflicts, these promises do not preclude the development of counterinsurgency-specific capabilities, such as greater emphasis on liaison skills, training indigenous forces, building civil governance capabilities, civil policing, information operations, etc. Neither the Nixon Doctrine nor President Obama’s recent strategic re-orientation towards the Asia-Pacific region preclude such action.\footnote{In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. forces commitment to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces when possible” (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 6).} In fact, the president’s recent guidance stated that U.S. forces must maintain the skills and experience gained in recent operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2012, 6).\footnote{President Nixon stated that the United States would still provide advice and assistance: “Well, there is a future for American counterinsurgency tactics only in the sense that where one of our friends in Asia asks for advice or assistance, under proper circumstances, we will provide it. But where we must draw the line is in becoming involved heavily with our own personnel, doing the job for them, rather than helping them do the job for themselves” (Nixon 1969). Though unspecified as to which organization would take responsibility for “such advice or assistance,” the Army was the most likely.}

Additionally, Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, which is still current official DoD policy, directs all of the services to develop such capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense 2009).

Nor does public opinion inherently prevent the Army from developing such capabilities; in fact, greater success at counterinsurgency in the past might have led to greater support for these war efforts, overall. Even though the Army came under scrutiny from political leaders and the public in each case due to accusations of misconduct (e.g., the “water cure” and the Lodge
Committee in the Philippines, My Lai in Vietnam, Abu Ghraib in Iraq), such scrutiny is not the same as active political intervention to prevent the establishment of promotion requirements, training requirements, or an organizational structure that would institutionalize counterinsurgency capabilities. Would the public have opposed operations in the Philippines, Vietnam, or Iraq if U.S. forces had been more successful in such operations? If greater success led to reduced American casualties, achievement of the stated strategic goals, and less deployment of troops, I believe it is safe to argue that the public would be as supportive of this type of conflict as any other war, assuming that U.S. forces intended to liberate rather than permanently occupy the country in which they operated. In the recent operations in Iraq, public opposition to the war peaked in early 2008 when 63% of Americans believed the war was “a mistake,” yet this number had declined to 55% by summer 2010 and 53% by spring 2013 (Gallup 2013b). While some of the increased support could be attributed to the U.S. withdrawal, there is a correlation between increased support of the war and success (ibid.).

Additionally, while the international security environment in each of these cases might have harbored conventional threats, such threats did not prevent the need for counterinsurgency capabilities. After the Philippines, political leaders wanted the Army to take on similar operations in Latin America, responsibilities that Army leaders successfully transferred to the Marine Corps (Birtle 2004, 181-182).\(^{309}\) After Vietnam, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 demonstrated the danger of a more technologically advanced form of conventional warfare, but insurgencies linked to the threat of Communism still loomed (Fearon and Latin 2003, 7-10; Gompert and Gordon 2008, 376; Connable and Libicki 2010, 160-162; 199-201). Today, while some analysts consider China or Iran to be the most dangerous threat, insurgencies and “hybrid

\(^{309}\) An argument might be made that because the U.S. Marine Corps did in fact take responsibility for such operations, the Army did not need to assume responsibilities for conducting such operations. However, this transfer of responsibility was in and of itself an act of strategic resistance (Millet 1980, 162-165; Birtle 2004, 181-182).
threats” in Mali, Colombia, and other parts of the world also threaten U.S. security interests (Sanborn 2011; U.S. Department of the Army 2012a, 5-10). In all of these cases, the state of the international security environment did not preclude the need for or ability of the Army to develop greater counterinsurgency capabilities.

In the case of airplanes, both political leadership and the budget played a role in preventing change, though not public opinion. Public opinion greatly supported airplanes and air power technology particularly after World War I, partly as a result of the Air Corps publicity in “flying circuses” and flying competitions (Maurer 1987, 17-25). Two decades later, by the spring of 1939, nine out of ten Americans supported greater air capabilities for national security purposes (Shiner 1997c, 156). Political supporters, too, pressured the Army even prior to World War I to place more emphasis on air capabilities, holding at least fifteen commissions, hearings, and boards between the world wars (Copp 1980, 294-299; Shiner 1997a; 1997b; Tate 1998).

Lack of funding due to the Depression and political leadership’s view of military spending did slow change. President Calvin Coolidge stood firmly against military build-up and spending of any kind. Instead, he believed that controlling spending of all kinds was necessary to achieving a healthy economy (Tate 1998, 39-46). By supporting and signing into law the Air Corps Act of 1926, President Coolidge imposed a certain relationship between air and ground forces within the Army that could not be changed without further Congressional action (Correll 2009, 65). Additionally, lack of funding minimized the degree to which Army leaders could conduct large-scale maneuver exercises, which inherently limited the ability of air advocates to demonstrate the combat potential of air power and air-ground operations. Had the Army leaders been able to see such successes (for instance, had they had the opportunity to conduct more
exercises along the lines of the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941), perhaps they would not have resisted air power as strongly.

It is fair to ask, however, whether Army leadership would have continued to resist greater air technology and emphasis on air power had there not been a budget shortfall. Only with President Roosevelt’s personal and direct intervention after the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 did the air arm gain the independence necessary to fully develop its air capabilities (Shiner 1997c, 154-155). Given the Army’s actions towards air power advocates, increasing the budget would not necessarily have been enough to end the Army’s resistance in this case, even if it might have muted it somewhat.

In regards to nuclear weapons, the Army’s resistance to President Eisenhower did not play a significant role in preventing organizational change because its resistance proved ineffective. The Army’s resistance could not overcome Eisenhower’s popularity, personal expertise in all issues of military readiness, or familiarity with the organization, nor the public’s perception of the primary role of nuclear weapons in future conflicts (Geelhoed 1979, 18-19; Weigley 1984, 501; Parker 1994, 29). Thus, the Army’s resistance in this case was immaterial because President Eisenhower proved so successful in imposing his will on the organization.

Finally, the Army’s resistance to helicopters strongly affected organizational change. Without the Army’s actions, the Air Force would have dominated all air capabilities. Through the Key West and other memorandums of agreement during the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, the Air Force leadership attempted to assert dominance over both fixed-wing and rotary-wing capabilities and allowed Army control of air power in only the most limited circumstances (While House 1948; Wolf 1987, 15; Weinert 1991, 10-39). Even during the Vietnam War, Air Force leadership attempted to limit Army air capabilities even when they directly supported
troops on the ground that were under enemy fire (Currey 1984, 84-85), thus even war itself was not enough to end the disagreements between the two organizations. Without the committed resistance of Army leaders, including Generals Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, James Gavin, and Harold Johnson, the Army would not have institutionalized and protected the helicopter capabilities that remain a vital part of the organization’s combat capabilities today.

Overall, then, strategic resistance matters the most when there is no significant, unified political power directed towards an issue. In the case of homosexuals, President Clinton’s lack of power allowed the Army’s resistance to tilt the balance in favor of Congress against the president. In the case of counterinsurgency, no force for change has been able to exercise enough political power to force the Army to change, not even President Kennedy. In the case of both airplanes and helicopters, external forces for change did not have the political power to impose change. Thus, the lesson from this project in regards to the overall importance of strategic resistance is that it is a key factor in preventing organizational change when external forces do not have sufficient political power to impose change.
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