

Public Diplomacy Institutional Structure: A Review and Recommendation for the
United States

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Abstract

Founded in 1953, the United States Information Agency acted as a central location for the country's public diplomacy initiatives, including both informational and cultural services. This paper addresses the repercussions of the agency's 1999 closing and of the relocation of these programs to the State Department. Section one examines the factors that influenced USIA's changing internal structure and role in foreign relations. Section two provides a literature review examining the suggestions from other scholarly work for US public diplomacy structure. Based on interviews with World Learning, the British Council, and Alliance Française, section three compares the current US public diplomacy structure to those of England and France. Finally, the last section concludes that though it's not financially viable to re-establish an information agency separate from the Department of State, privatization, the establishment of a semi-autonomous cultural diplomacy institution, the creation of a central strategic plan, and proper public diplomacy training for all Foreign Officers provides an alternative to the old public diplomacy institutional structure.

Introduction

The United States has a severe image problem. It is seen as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-absorbed by its foreign neighbors (Peterson 2003, 2). A 2002 Gallup poll found that residents of Muslim countries had an unfavorable view of the United States by a ratio of two to one (Rosen and Wolf 2008, 121). Additionally, studies indicate that anti-Americanism is a contagious attitude, no longer affecting only the United States' classic antagonists but also the populations of its historic allies (Melissen 2005, 160). There are foreign policy implications for these trends. For example, the inability for the United States military to utilize military bases in Turkey for its war in Iraq was a direct consequence of negative foreign public perception (Peterson 2003, 2). As reported by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), there are multiple reasons why the United States should care about its increasingly bad reputation with the publics of other nations. Firstly, anti-Americanism is a threat to national security. Pre-existing hostility of foreigners is cause for concern of the safety of any nation. In addition, it is not feasible for the United States to be victorious in current foreign affairs conflicts (i.e. the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) without the support of its allies. The strength of its military is not enough. Long-term aspirations, such as a healthy economy, are also threatened when a country lacks the support of other countries (2003, 3). In short, the growing sentiment of anti-Americanism disables the United States from effectively carrying out its foreign policy.

How does a nation address such a large issue? The most direct response to the problem is to nullify these undesirable attitudes. In his book, *The New Diplomacy*, Shaun Riordan emphasizes that in order to ensure agreement on policy positions by foreign

governments, it is necessary for a country to win over the foreign publics. Debate on specific policy matters is not adequate; a positive attitude from foreign citizens and civil society organizations is also necessary (2003, 123). He goes on to explain that with the increase in interactive media and public involvement in non-governmental organizations, foreign citizens matter much more in foreign policy making than they did before (2003, 123). It is not enough to bring a foreign policy to the international negotiating table at the state-level and expect it to be accepted. Instead, a favorable political environment must be in place that allows the political elite of the foreign nation to already be on the same wavelength (Riordan 2003, 122). This is where public diplomacy becomes significant. In the words of the CFR, public diplomacy is “the programs and efforts designed to explain and advocate United States values and policies directly to foreign publics” (2003, 2). Daryl Copeland gives more credit to the involvement of foreign publics by defining public diplomacy as “outwardly directed activities by national representatives aimed at identifying shared objectives and potential areas of collaboration with public groups, the media, civil society, and business and opinion leaders” (2003, 163). The Department of State gets straight to the point by describing public diplomacy as “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries” (Rosen and Wolf 2008, 124). These definitions have a similar trait: swaying the opinion of the foreign public. Public diplomacy allows a welcoming political environment to be established for the US within a foreign country. It is a central element to foreign relations in a post-modern world (Riordan 2003, 124).

A large portion of the United States’ downward spiral in the eyes of foreign publics can be attributed to the country’s neglect of public diplomacy. In a report to the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, it was asserted that this negligence began after the dissolution of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999, the United States' agency specifically devoted to public diplomacy (2009, 1). The report believes that a false sense of security following the collapse of the Soviet Union led the United States to assume that its democratic ideology had finally won and that most nations and their publics were now on board with its policies. Unfortunately, September 11th made it very clear that such thoughts were misguided (Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, 1).

Since the absorbance of USIA into the State Department in 1999, government focus on public diplomacy has suffered. Following the agency's dissolution, public diplomacy received very low priority from the White House, the State Department, and Congress (Dizard 2004, 219). Charlotte Beers was selected as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and immediately directed public diplomacy initiatives towards "branding America" (Dizard 2004, 220). In addition to this misdirection, the new structure of public diplomacy efforts became a bureaucratic hazard. Programming was split between Beers' office, which dealt with big picture planning, and regional political bureaus that worked out the details (Dizard 2004, 220). United States public diplomacy suffered from the transfer from USIA to the Department of State.

September 11th only exacerbated this problem. Suddenly, several government agencies had their hands in the public diplomacy mix. Other federal agencies began to undermine the response of the Under Secretary's office. While the actions of the CIA continued to unintentionally increase anti-Americanism sentiment in the Middle East, the Department of Defense was dropping its own leaflets and broadcasting radio message

without consultation with the State Department (Dizard 2004, 221). In addition, the Bush administration decided that it wanted to become directly involved with directing public diplomacy strategy. A task force was constructed that would attempt to coordinate propaganda efforts in the Middle East (Dizard 2004, 222). A lack of a central strategy and source of authority in public diplomacy led to diverse and often contradictory actions. However, public diplomacy did benefit from this situation by no longer being a low priority issue in the White House (Dizard 2004, 222). Despite this step forward, US government public diplomacy initiatives continue to lack full effectiveness. Wilson P. Dizard, Jr. raises the relevant question when asking, “How do we shape public diplomacy operations so that they are effective in reaching an increasingly complex pattern of audiences abroad” (2004, 229)? With the rise of anti-American sentiment, American safety is at stake (Peterson 2003, 5). It is clear that public diplomacy is needed, but in what institutional form is it most effective?

The History of the United States Information Agency

Until 1999, the United States Information Agency acted as a public face of the United States government to citizens around the world. Founded in 1953, the agency served as a central location for the public diplomacy efforts of the US for more than forty years. However, the structure and overall nature of the agency did not remain stagnant for that half-century. Many influences brought about changes in its organization and functionality over time. World events, the agency’s relationships to other governmental bodies, and the attitudes of those in power all played a part in the shape and output of USIA. This section addresses how USIA changed over time, and why.

According to USIA website, the mission of the agency is:

to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between American and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad. Specifically, USIA works:

- To explain and advocate U.S. politics in terms that are credible and meaningful in foreign cultures;
- To provide information about the official policies of the United States, and about the people, values, and institutions which influence those policies;
- To bring the benefits of international engagement to American citizens and institutions by helping them build strong long-term relationships with their counterparts overseas;
- To advise the President and U.S. government policy-makers on the ways in which foreign attitudes will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies. (USIA 1999)

More colloquially, President Clinton described USIA's mission as:

to strengthen the ties that bind us to all humankind. By increasing mutual understanding between our country and others, you not only uphold a noble ideal, you provide a foundation for international stability, and it is your work that reaffirms the essential spirit of American and provides an umbrella of hope for all. (Tuch 1994)

In order to achieve these objectives, USIA used certain public diplomacy tools.

Firstly, the agency provided information services abroad. This involved advocacy and international broadcasting. Advocacy worked to promote US foreign policy by educating foreign publics on its goals and objectives (Cull, 2008). Over the years, this has meant activities such as handing out pamphlets and creating documentaries. The advocacy aspect of the public diplomacy of USIA was reminiscent of the psychological warfare efforts of World War II. Dropping leaflets to undermine foreign morale was a key tactic during the War (Cull 2008, xviii). The assumption of association between former and current public diplomacy activities had a hurtful effect on the agency's image, budget, and ultimately its existence throughout the years.

International broadcasting was another tool that USIA used to disseminate information. The most well known example of USIA's international broadcasting is Voice of America. However, other outlets existed since World War II, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Cull 2008, xviii). VOA's ability to reach foreign publics in their native languages made it a vital instrument in educating the world on American policies and values.

USIA also used cultural programs in order to fulfill its mission statement. Through cultural diplomacy, the agency arranged music and art, and other cultural exhibitions abroad in order to create an understanding of the American people (Cull 2008, xviii). The famous Nixon and Khrushchev kitchen debate occurred in an exhibit that displayed both an American and a Soviet kitchen (Tuch 1994, 39). The overall goal of cultural diplomacy is to utilize this newfound positive understanding of the United States and its people to encourage publics to be open to the actions of the United States government.

Exchange diplomacy also falls under the category of public cultural diplomacy (Cull 2008, xviii). Through programs such as the Fulbright Scholarship and the International Visitors Leadership Program, participants are exposed to the United States and its citizens. The reciprocal nature of these programs is a large aspect of what makes them successful. An exchange of culture and ideas is completed on a one-to-one level, over an extended period of time. This is different to cultural services where foreign citizens are a passive receiver of ideas that the US government wishes to put forward. Cultural services include activities like the teaching of English and the production of a play as opposed to exchange programs that involve two-sided interaction. It is the hope

of exchange programs that the international visitors to the United States will bring back their positive experience to their country, and that American visitors to other countries introduce American culture to foreigners while abroad.

How the United States has utilized this arsenal of public diplomacy tools has changed throughout the years. As the outside world changed so too did USIA. In addition, the agency's relationship with other governmental bodies affected its functionality and power. Lastly, as with other government agencies, the everyday operations and even existence of USIA depended on the decisions of those in power. These factors influenced the institutional structure of United States public diplomacy, and the ways in which its goals were carried out by the United States Information Agency.

1. The Changing World

Current events had a large effect on the operations of USIA. World War II made it apparent that efforts to reach foreign populations were necessary in order to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Office of War Information was created in 1942 in order to fill this need. OWI's overseas offices, known as United States Information Services (USIS), were set up in London, Paris, Toulouse, and Lyon, following the Allies' advancing troops (Dizard 2004, 29). USIS offices produced and distributed pamphlets and items such as matchbooks and sewing kits with American slogans to foreigners. One of its largest successes was a magazine, entitled *America Illustrated*. USIS posts also set up photo exhibits, giving foreign populations a firsthand look at American life. The overseas posts of OWI were not limited to Europe; OWI set up USIS offices in the Middle East and South Asia as well, where the United States struggled with its message

of self-determination. This ideology was happily touted against Nazi rule, but countered the actions of colonial England and France (Dizard 2004, 29).

Throughout the course of the war, the policies of OWI did not stay the same. Its goals shifted from promoting the Atlantic Charter (self-determination) to psychological warfare operations meant to directly aid the invasion of Europe and Japan (Dizard 2004, 31). OWI's, and subsequently USIA's association with psywar had begun. One example of OWI's psychological warfare campaign was its black radio transmissions.

Transmissions pretending to be from German stations were broadcast using military-intelligence information to confuse foreign military and civilian populations (Dizard 2004, 31). This reputation for psywar tactics was a factor in President Truman's decision to sign Executive Order 9608, meant to wind down the operations of OWI following the war in 1945. OWI was seen as a propaganda powerhouse, and therefore it was not trusted (Dizard 2004, 23). In addition, after the surrender of the Japanese, OWI no longer had a tangible mission (Dizard 2004, 34). However, political scientist Arthur W. MacMahon convinced Truman of OWI's utility to postwar US foreign policy. It was decided that OWI's overseas activities would be transferred to the Department of State, and join with State's information and cultural programs to form an Interim International Information Service (Dizard 2004, 24). Truman defended this action by stating that its purpose was "to see to it that other people receive a full and fair picture of American life and the aims and policies of the United States government." The idea of a "full and fair picture" remained the guidelines for US overseas information programs during the immediate postwar period and onwards (Dizard 2004, 24).

In 1946, the State Department officially absorbed the information and cultural programs of the United States, and the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established (Tuch 1994, 39). The 62 USIS posts and the Voice of America were now under the jurisdiction of the State Department. OIC had five separate operating divisions: International Broadcasting, International Press and Publications, Libraries and Institutes, International Exchange of Persons, and International Motion Pictures (Dizard 2004, 27). Though an OIC representative was present at each United States embassy, the size of the office was cut back drastically from the height of OWI. Where OWI had 11,000 employees, OIC had 3,000 (Dizard 2004, 28). This marked the beginning of a long history of budget cuts in the operations of US public diplomacy. As the international situation evolved after World War II, the structure and tools used by public diplomacy shifted to fit the times.

As the Cold War heated up, the structure of the US public diplomacy model changed to accommodate the new international political climate. The United States Information Agency was established under President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 8, moving public diplomacy from the State Department to a separate agency. Education exchange programs would remain in State for another eight years (Tuch 1994, 39-40). By 1970, USIA still hadn't achieved the position of a strategic policy advisor, but was actively involved in the lower and middle levels of US foreign policy. USIA continued to press for the consideration of foreign public opinion in policy decisions. One hundred and seventy-five USIS posts were established overseas, with European posts being cut back in order to redistribute USIA budgetary resources to communism-susceptible Asia and Africa (Dizard 2004, 103). At the same time, preventing the spread

of nuclear weapons came to the forefront of USIA's policy agenda. Key events of the Cold War such as the Apollo missions also shaped USIA activities. Books, pamphlets, and press packets were created and distributed in order to publicize achievements. Films, photographs, and exhibits were arranged and held by USIS posts preceding the historic moon landing (Dizard 2004, 112). When the event finally did occur, television played a major role in public diplomacy. Billions watched the landing either live, or in almost real time. Following the event, USIA set up a 22-country tour by the astronauts of the Apollo mission (Dizard 2004, 113).

The Vietnam War also caused structural changes within USIA. USIS in Saigon was transformed into the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in order to devote specific attention to the conflict, and consolidate and coordinate all psychological operations in the area (Dizard 2004, 97). The office became increasingly involved in the propaganda efforts of the Vietnamese government. It created and distributed magazines, pamphlets, radio programs, and television programs for the Vietnamese Information Service (Dizard 2004, 98). For example, ten million greetings messages were dropping in North Vietnam during the Tet festival (Cull 2008, 270). USIA director Carl Rowan became so discouraged by JUSPAO's propaganda in Vietnam that he resigned soon after (Dizard 2004, 98). Vietnam forced a change in organization, and therefore day-to-day operations, of the USIS post in Vietnam. USIA's demonstrated ability to deal with a plethora of sensitive issues, such as civil rights, increased its credibility as a useful tool in Washington (Dizard 2004, 117). These examples show how the importance and internal organization of USIA was greatly impacted by the events of the Cold War.

It is logical to assume that because USIA was affected by the events of the Cold War, the Cold War's end also affected USIA's operations. Soviet president and Communist head of party Mikhail Gorbachev is largely credited with the thawing of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. His election in 1985 and subsequent policies made USIA operations in the USSR much easier (Dizard 2004, 208). For example, soon after taking office, Gorbachev and US President Reagan agreed to re-launch numerous cultural exchanges that had been suspended in 1980. This included exchanges in education, arts, sports, medicine, and television (Cull 2008, 447). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, USIA had to once again find its place in US foreign policy. This separate public diplomacy agency was created in reaction to the ideological challenges that communism presented to the democratic world. The end of a communist threat raised a fundamental question paramount to the existence of USIA: Where was its place in the new world order? (Dizard 2004, 212). USIA went through a series of bureaucratic changes in the years following the destruction of the Berlin Wall. Its separate media divisions were reorganized into an Information Bureau, which worked towards the electronic integration of USIA media operations (Dizard 2004, 214). In addition, the agency ceased to have a top-down hierarchy, but was instead organized into multifunctional teams (Dizard 2004, 214). Despite efforts to adapt to the changing times, the end of the Cold War marked USIA's \$1.3 billion budget as a target for cuts (Dizard 2004, 214). In the end, it was the end of the Cold War that sparked the decline, and eventual elimination of the United States Information Agency.

2. *The Relationship With Other Governmental Bodies*

The relationship of USIA to other governmental bodies also affected the structure and operations of the public diplomacy agency. The policy strategy of the White House has consistently influenced the operations of USIA. During World War II, an executive order placed the OWI under military command in theaters of war. Materials produced by OWI required the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Dizard describes it, tactical military needs were prioritized over strategic political objectives. This resulted in operations such as the dropping of 800 million leaflets over German soil in order to crack German morale (2004, 32). Another example of White House influence on the structure of USIA is the part it played in coordinating the bureaucratic nightmare of covert and overt psywar operations. Many agencies, such as OWI and the Department of War, had a hand in these operations during the war. But whose jurisdiction did they really belong to? The White House created a Planning Coordination group in order to straighten out this issue. This could have resulted in the White House clearly defining the functions of USIA. However, the agencies involved did not favor this outside interference, and the group was disbanded less than a year later (Dizard 2004, 69).

The White House's Reinvention of Government strategy was also largely responsible for the abolition of USIA in 1999. It included the White House's desire to consolidate foreign affairs agencies into the State Department in order to simplify matters, and free up budgetary resources. USIA was not the only agency affected by this strategy. The Agency for International Development and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were also slated to fall into the hands of the State Department (Cull 2008, 484). The reorganization plan was passed in October 1998, and international

broadcasting was the only element of USIA that was not transferred to State. Instead, VOA, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Marti were placed under a newly created body: an independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (Dizard 2004, 215). The reorganization of public diplomacy within the State Department included the creation of a specific public diplomacy undersecretary, putting the new bureau on at least equal organizational level as political, economic, and security concerns (Dizard 2004, 216). The relationship of the White House strategy to USIA played an integral role in the structure and capability of the functions of the agency.

The interaction of USIA with the National Security Council (NSC) also changed the nature of the agency. This is clear from the fact that it was necessary for the NSC to approve the mission statement of USIA. The NSC was established in the National Security Act of 1947. The Council included the State Department, the Department of Defense (formerly Navy and War), and the CIA. The phrasing of this Act made it apparent that the NSC was to deal with all issues that had bearing on national security, but it did not specifically mention psychological warfare (Dizard 2004, 38). Therefore it had the ability to drive a national strategy for conducting overseas ideological operations. However, it did not include a seat for an information expert (Cull 2008, 38). The exclusion of USIA from the NSC had a significant impact on both parties. Though the director of USIA would be directly responsible under the NSC, the Council forever lacked the official consideration of the attitudes of foreign publics in its decisions. At the same time, USIA continuously pursued a position of public diplomacy advisor on national security issues (Dizard 2004, 68). This lack of respect for the public opinion of foreign populations resulted in USIA taking a position where it needed to constantly be

defending its place in the foreign policy decision-making process. Over the years, this led to budgetary problems, restructuring, and eventual dismemberment of the agency.

USIA's relationship with other agencies that conducted their own public diplomacy efforts also influenced changes in operations within the agency. Confusion over jurisdiction has been a continuing plague for the public diplomacy strategy of the United States. Poor coordination of efforts goes back as far as the absorption of OWI into the State Department following the Second World War (Dizard 2004, 18). Dizard identifies as many as twelve major bureaucracies as being involved in influencing foreign audiences. Many of them had more resources than USIA, including the departments of Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture. Meanwhile, smaller agencies were known to work on cooperative projects with USIA. Examples included the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian institution, and the National Science Foundation (Dizard 2004, 134). Dizard then goes on to mention three agencies that most directly affected the structure, and therefore operations of USIA: the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department (Dizard 2004, 134).

Following the end of World War II, the responsibility for psychological warfare was transferred to the Department of Defense (known then as the War Department) (Dizard 2004, 38). However, the role of USIA in propaganda efforts became unclear, and the division between covert and over operations made their coordination difficult to maintain (Dizard 2004, 51). USIA's predecessor, IIA, worked with the Department of Defense on operations such as leaflet drops during the Korean War. The creation of USIA marked the end of the body's involvement with similar operations, as it took a stance in opposition to the use of psywar on citizens (Dizard 2004, 136). Other USIA

operations also overlapped with the Department of Defense. During the Cold War, the Department of Defense ran the largest federal exchange programs that brought foreigners to the United States (Dizard 2004, 134). In addition, the Armed Forces Network, broadcasting to military stationed abroad, presented itself as an alternative to VOA for foreign audiences (Cull 2008, 200). The overlapping functions of the Department of Defense and USIA created tension that questioned the legitimacy of USIA. Once again, USIA was on the defense.

USIA had similar problems with the CIA, but with the added obstacle of the secretive nature of CIA operations. The CIA's abundant financial and practical resources made it able to run its own international information and cultural programs (Dizard 2004, 51). These CIA programs ran parallel to, rather than working with, the operations of USIA (Dizard 2004, 139). Throughout its years of existence, USIA remained uninformed of CIA operations that affected its programs (Dizard 2004, 140). Dizard mentions mass-media operations as the programs that most often caused confusion between the two agencies. Covert media CIA projects abroad, such as newspapers, magazines, and books would slant reports to promote US foreign policy. This perpetuated disinformation sometimes infiltrated USIA writing, causing mistrust for the public diplomacy institution (Dizard 2004, 141). This reputation did not bolster the agency's popularity in Congress, affecting the health of the agency's budget, and therefore its longevity.

Finally, the relationship between USIA and the Department of State influenced the agency's organization and function. This trend goes back to the incorporation of OWI into the State Department. Though State had been given general policy oversight

over the actions of OWI abroad, it lacked the personnel to properly monitor its abundance of produced materials (Dizard 2004, 18). This meant that IIS still operated with little input from State. USIA's charter stated that the agency had the responsibility to follow State's policy guidelines in the United States and abroad. More specifically, State had the duty to monitor USIA's public media and cultural operations (Dizard 2004, 145). Dizard identifies two structural ways in which USIA attempted to make oversight from State Department a smoother process. Firstly, USIA created its own centralized policy and internally structured the agency to match the set up of State. Geographic bureaus focused on specific policy, making it possible for corresponding bureaus to work laterally together. Secondly, USIA made sure to communicate State guidelines to VOA and other media offices within the agency (Dizard 2004, 146). USIA adapted its structure and internal operations in order accommodate the change in relationship with the Department of State.

USIA's changing relationship with State was also based around another topic: managing educational exchange programs. In the early postwar years, all informational and cultural operations remained within the State Department. However, with the creation of USIA in 1953, the programs split, bringing informational programs under the responsibility of USIA, and leaving educational programs in State. This decision was based on the desire to leave educational programs untainted from the perception of propaganda that plagued USIA (Dizard 2004, 149). This structure remained in place until the programs were reunited under USIA in 1979. When the agency shut down in 1999, the programs together moved back to a single unit within State. A new bureau was established to hold these programs, headed by an undersecretary (Dizard 2004, 149).

Interdependency and shifts in responsibility indicate the importance of USIA's relationship with the Department of State.

3. The Attitudes of Those in Power

Finally, the attitudes and perceptions of those in power played a significant part in the structure and role of USIA in public diplomacy. The background and desires of the directors of USIA display the impact that one person's vision can have on a government agency. The first example of this was William B. Benton, who became the Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations in 1945, at a time when the functions of USIA remained under the State Department. Benton worked to free the former OWI from its image of secrecy and deceit in order to increase its legitimacy. Benton understood the importance of image, and instead of using the term Voice of America (a name formerly associated with propaganda), it became the Office of War Information Broadcasting and State Department Broadcasting (Dizard 2004, 26). Benton even suggested the creation of an independent VOA an attempt to make both the radio station and public opinion of its operations neutralized. Though this idea didn't game to fruition, it lived on and can be seen today with VOA remaining separate from State under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (Dizard 2004, 36). In an attempt to permanently improve domestic media relations, Benton created a State Department Office of Public Information that would later become the Office of Public Affairs (Cull 2008, 35). Benton's personal vision can be seen as a catalyst for structural changes in the predecessor to USIA.

Director Theodore Streibert can be credited with the integration of USIA into US foreign policy (Cull 2008, 101). When Streibert accepted the post, USIA's operations suffered due to its lack of cabinet rank, and its status as an observer of the Operations Coordinating Board. USIA's exclusion from a body that worked to integrate the implementation of national security policies across several agencies once again demonstrated its little influence on foreign policy matters. Within a year of Streibert's appointment, USIA was a participating member of the OCB. Prior to Streibert, USIA simply received NSC agenda papers, agreed to the documents it produced, and attended planning board meetings as an observer when topics were relevant. Under Streibert, USIA sat in at most meetings. His influence is indicated by the fact that USIA did not retain this role during future administrations (Cull 2008, 101).

Streibert also initiated internal agency restructuring. It was his vision to bring VOA securely into the newly formed USIA. VOA relocated from eight locations around New York City to Washington (Cull 2008, 102). In addition, Streibert reorganized USIA's management after visiting posts abroad. USIS officers at the embassy level of specific countries now made the day-to-day decisions about the program initiatives of USIA (Dizard 2004, 66). In order to coordinate this system, Streibert appointed an area assistant for each of the four regions: the British Commonwealth and Europe, the American republics, the Far East, and the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Cull 2008, 103). Finally, Streibert's vision of increased exchanges as the way to reach Soviet citizens sparked the lobbying of the White House to increase cultural and informational exchanges (Dizard 2004, 72). New emphasis was given to exhibits showing the American way of life. The series of large cultural shows with the Soviet Union began in

1959, and continued with great success for another 30 years (Dizard 2004, 75). Streibert used his position of power to shape the organization and operations of USIA.

Edward R. Murrow is another director of USIA whose personal attributes and outlook shaped the structure and function of the agency. Under Murrow, the morale of staff sky-rocketed due to the charismatic energy he brought to the organization (Dizard 2004, 85). At the same time, he cleansed the agency of deadweight by releasing a number of top-level employees from their posts (Dizard 2004, 86). Murrow's personal, positive relationship with the White House increased the prestige of USIA. President Kennedy was known for inviting Murrow to sit in on an increasing number of foreign policy meetings. The inclusion of USIA during the operations of the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates the high level of regard that Murrow brought to USIA. The result of this event showed USIA in a positive light, as the agency had thrived in providing operational support during a major crisis (Dizard 2004, 89). Other changes in USIA structure and operations under Murrow included a new emphasis on reaching younger audiences abroad, the opening of popular libraries in Africa, and the authorization of a Foreign Press Center in New York City. This Center accommodated foreign correspondents that the White House and State had previously ignored (Dizard 2004, 93). Overall, the budget of USIA trended upwards during the Murrow years (Dizard 2004, 90). It would be appropriate to attribute some of this budgetary success to the prestige and charisma that Murrow brought to the agency through changes in structure and programs.

Other directors who impacted the structure of USIA include Leonard Marks, who not only exposed USIA to advanced communications technologies in the future strategy

of the agency (Cull 2008, 285), but also personally lobbied to give USIA permanent career status within the Foreign Service. Prior to 1968, USIA officers had “reserve” status that made it possible for them to be let go at the end of their short contracts (Dizard 2004, 98). A stronger base of personnel made for a better platform for executing programs (Dizard 2004, 99). Director James Keogh’s decision to be open about the Watergate scandal internationally increased the agency’s respectability and trustworthiness (Dizard 2004, 109). The USIA director during the 1980s, Charles Wick, can be largely credited with upgrades to agency programs. Wick’s personal relationship with Reagan turned into a lucrative asset to the agency, doubling its budget from 1981 to 1989 (Dizard 2004, 200). As a result, VOA broadcasting facilities across the world were updated, and the WorldNet program was launched (Dizard 2004, 203). In short, individuals that held the directorship of USIA had a direct role in influencing the agency’s structure and operations.

Another group of people who influenced the structure and operations of USIA were the presidents of the United States. It was a president who ensured the transition of OWI into a permanent public diplomacy institution, and it was a president who brought about the demise of the agency. In 1950, with the goal of portraying themselves as anti-communists, Democrats began to discuss the idea of increasing information programs for foreign populations. President Truman publicly supported this idea in a speech, resulting in the White House requesting an \$89 million supplemental budget specifically for information programs. With presidential support, these programs were now in a better financial situation than they had ever been (Dizard 2004, 48). Because of its budget

increase, IIA was able to open new USIA posts in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Two years later, IIA had programs in 88 countries (Dizard 2004, 48).

The White House's legislative proposal for an independent information agency is also what led to the creation of USIA (Dizard 2004, 58). This new structure promised more efficient scaffolding from which to administrate information operations. With independent bureaucratic status, information services would become a permanent fixture in foreign policy decisions. For example, the new agency would have input on National Security Council decisions (Dizard 2004, 59). This monumental step for United States public diplomacy was dependent on President Eisenhower, who was the president that saw the most value in information services (Cull 2008, 81). He had witnessed the success of propaganda during WWII, and therefore saw value in reaching out to foreign publics (Dizard 2004, 66).

President John F. Kennedy provides another example of how the actions of the presidents directly affected USIA. With his Peace Corps and Alliance for Progress in Latin America initiatives, Kennedy refocused USIA on the developing world. Europe and Japan no longer were priority areas, and resources were shifted to newly independent nations who could easily fall to communism. At the same time, he neglected to move cultural programs from State to USIA, which would have consolidated public diplomacy efforts under one structure (Cull 2008, 195). President Kennedy is also responsible for diminishing USIA's place within the NSC. Ignoring advisors who argued for a larger policymaking role at the NSC, Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordinating Board. It was through this body that USIA had had a formal policy role. Without the Operations Coordinating Board, USIA was effectively excluded from the policy production process

(Dizard 2004, 84). Of course, President Reagan and USIA director Charles Wick's relationship must once again be mentioned here. If it weren't for their close personal relationship, the agency's budget may not have increased to such a large extent, and new programs might not have been initiated. Finally, President Bill Clinton's willingness to use USIA as a bargaining chip in a back room political deal with Senator Jesse Helms reveals his low regard for USIA (Fitzpatrick 2010, 31). It resulted in the agency's demise (Dizard 2004, 215).

Finally, Congress has played an enormous role in determining USIA's structure. This, of course, is due to the budgetary power of Capitol Hill. In the 1940's, Republicans lumped OWI operations together with the New Deal. Seen both as associated with communism and as large, unnecessary government spending, Congress cut back its budget dramatically immediately following World War II (Dizard 2004, 18). This initiated the continuing trend of budget fluctuations that plagued USIA throughout its 46 years as a result of congressional attitudes. As the Cold War unfolded, many in the GOP began to see VOA and other information programs as valuable tools to fight communist expansion into other parts of the world (Dizard 2004, 45). Indeed, it was Republican Representative Karl Mundt who introduced legislation that required information and cultural programs to become a fixture within the State Department. This legislation ensured a permanent position for public diplomacy in US foreign policy, giving the programs a positive focus in a time when it was unsure if they would survive (Dizard 2004, 46).

By 1952, Republicans saw the future USIA as a perfect place for budget cutbacks. It was considered a breeding ground for liberal Democrats. As a result, Congress cut of

36% of USIA's appropriation the following year, reducing its staff by 25% and closing 38 international offices (Dizard 2004, 64). Over the years, Republicans were not alone in targeting the USIA budget for potential budget cuts. Democrats reduced its budget and proposed a plan to put USIA's programs back under the jurisdiction of the Department of State as early as 1957 (Dizard 2004, 76). From the time USIA was established in 1953 to the time that it closed its doors in 1999, its budget was a pawn in the political dealings of Congress.

After the Cold War, USIA struggled to find itself within the new international political structure. Until this moment, the agency's purpose had been devoted to the battle against communism (Blackburn 1992, 193). As Paul P. Blackburn described the situation in 1992, "USIA must reexamine its purposes and chart a course appropriate to the present moment (1993)." USIA didn't last long enough to adapt a permanent new structure or create a new purpose. In 1999, the agency closed its doors. For the half-century that it the agency functioned, USIA and its predecessors underwent a multitude of structural changes. Programs expanded, diminished, traded hands, and were abolished. Internal structure morphed to match the structure of State, and adapted to the information area. These changes were the result of three factors: the state of international relations, the agency's relationship with other governmental bodies, and the attitudes of those in powerful positions.

The Current Institutional Structure of Public Diplomacy in the United States

The dissolution of USIA had a profound impact on public diplomacy in the United States. In particular, the institutional structure in which its programs functioned

changed drastically. An office of International Information Programs and the Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau were established under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Department of State (Zaharna 2010, 74). In addition, public diplomacy officers were stationed in various regional bureaus, departments, and US embassies. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs does not have authority over their actions (Zaharna 2010, 74). While cultural programming and some informational programs were transferred to the Department of State, international broadcasting fell under the jurisdiction of the newly founded Broadcasting Board of Governors. Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti no longer were institutionally connected to other public diplomacy programs (Fitzpatrick 2010, 32). Though much of public diplomacy was consolidated with other foreign affairs efforts by joining the State Department, some programs broke off. This precluded the programs from benefiting from being housed under the same roof. Contradicting public diplomacy efforts and coordination of programs now became a bigger issue.

Institutional difficulties with public diplomacy emerged within the State Department. Its place within the bureaucracy has been questioned since the day it entered. Former USIA employees became demoralized as they were treated like second-class citizens within the new structure. It was years before those within the agency accepted public diplomacy as an important contributor to foreign affairs (Fitzpatrick 2010, 33). In addition, public diplomacy officers had to adapt to procedures within the State Department that they viewed as cumbersome. Paperwork had to be completed and approved for any action taken. Program decisions and initiatives in the field had to be

cleared. Opportunities to advance United States public diplomacy efforts were lost due to bureaucratic procedures (Fitzpatrick 2010, 34). R. S. Zaharna asserts that 5 years after USIA merged into the Department of State, the new infrastructure offered neither a clear vision nor desired to facilitate successful public diplomacy (2010, 73). United States public diplomacy clearly suffered from its consolidation within the State Department.

Negative attitudes towards public diplomacy were apparent following its merger into State in 1999. It took Colin Powell until after September 11th to replace Evelyn Lieberman, the State Department's first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, when she resigned in January. Charlotte Beers was eventually chosen, whose emphasis on branding policy rather than influencing policy led to criticism from within and outside of the agency. She resigned after a year and a half (Fitzpatrick 2010, 36-40). Beers' replacement, Margaret Tutwiler resigned after only six months in office. By the time this high turnover was complete, State Department public diplomacy programs had lost a coherent strategy. The attention that they originally received in response to September 11th had passed (Fitzpatrick 2010, 36-44).

Despite lack of program focus or strategy, United States public diplomacy did benefit from a new governmental emphasis on terrorism and national security. While the report from the 9/11 Commission failed to mention America's diplomacy readiness to fight ideological threats to American interests, it did speak of the need to engage public diplomacy in the "struggle of ideas" with the Middle East. The report recommended increased funding for information services, exchanges and broadcasting, especially in the Middle East (Fitzpatrick 2010, 45). Congress eventually did increase funding for public diplomacy in 2004 with its passing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act. These

resources went towards the promotion of free media in Islamic countries, scholarships for Muslims to attend American-sponsored schools, increased public diplomacy training to State Department foreign officers, and the International Youth Opportunity Funds.

Public diplomacy within the Broadcasting Board of Governors also financially benefited from the bill, using its new resources to create Radio Sawa and the Middle East Television Network. At the same time, this financial augmentation for US government public diplomacy was minimal in comparison to the increased funding for the Department of Defense (Fitzpatrick 2010, 46).

American public diplomacy was also aided by the presidential order that established the White House Office of Global Communications in 2002. The new office advised the President, heads of the offices within the Executive Office of the President, the heads of executive departments, and agencies on methods to ensure consistent messages that would most effectively promote the United States on the international level. Effectively promoting the US included avoiding and actively preventing misunderstanding, creating a support system among partners of the US, and properly informing international audiences on foreign policy (Fitzpatrick 2010, 46). This new office attempted to tackle the lack of coordination and strategy in American public diplomacy, but it was shut down by March 2005. The body was criticized for its failure to successfully facilitate any strategic coordination, or evaluation, rendering its reason for creation unfulfilled (Fitzpatrick 2010, 47). Despite its failure, the creation of the White House Office of Global Communications indicates an understanding for the need of public diplomacy reformation. By 2005, more than 30 reports had been created by governmental and non-governmental bodies addressing the problems facing United States

public diplomacy. Karen Hughes took office as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs around this time. Though she resigned after two years of service, her term was marked with the raising of the public diplomacy budget by one billion dollars and the creation of a 24-hour rapid response team. This unit increased the government's ability to respond quickly and effectively to reports slandering the United States. Hughes also worked to increase international exchange programs and encouraged the fostering of public-private partnerships (Fitzpatrick 2010, 55). Despite these advances for public diplomacy, the image of the United States continued its downward spiral in the eyes of foreigners (Fitzpatrick 2010, 56). In fact, by the time Hughes took office in 2005, it was already a common assertion that the merger of USIA into the State Department was a mistake (Fitzpatrick 2010, 50). Notwithstanding her close relationship with the President and her positive impact on Public Diplomacy, this negative view did not change.

James Glassman finished George W. Bush's term as Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Nominated in 2007, Glassman emphasized public diplomacy's role in combating ideology that conflicted with the democratic principles of the United States. The status of public diplomacy within the Department of State remained the same. Instead of being an integral part of every step in the foreign policy making process, public diplomacy remained in an advisory role. In addition, Karen Fitzpatrick describes a notable glass ceiling that has plagued public diplomacy officers and their advancement within the agency (Fitzpatrick 2010, 59). Even after nine years of it calling the State Department home, public diplomacy is the most under-represented career track in the agency. In 2007, only one public diplomacy officer had risen to the status of assistant secretary, and only four were at the ambassador level (Fitzpatrick 2010,

60). These trends indicate that though there was increased interest in public diplomacy as a viable foreign policy asset, public diplomacy officers and programs remain as unequal citizens within the State Department. The focus of public diplomacy shifted once again with the induction of the current Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, President Barack Obama-appointed Judith A. McHale. The former Discovery Communications CEO is working towards reconstructing the former network of American Centers and reinforcing American cultural diplomacy. In addition, McHale aims to create an equal balance between the Departments of State and Defense by encouraging interagency dialogue and fighting for appropriate resources to support public diplomacy efforts (Fitzpatrick 2010, 61). The effectiveness of her initiatives remains to be seen.

Past Recommendations for Changes in US Public Diplomacy Institutional Structure

Previous literature has produced an abundance of public diplomacy policy recommendations for the United States. They can be categorized under two broad titles: a renewed emphasis on cultural exchange, and institutional change. The first category will be discussed under the following headings: two-sided exchange, cultural programming, and the promotion of American values. Institutional change will then be broken into the subcategories of: changing priorities, a central strategy, and a different structure. It is in this manner that current public diplomacy policy recommendations for the United States from various sources are framed.

1. Renewed Emphasis on Cultural Exchange

Foreign policy obstacles due to cultural differences are an unfortunate reality that policymakers have to overcome. It is natural instinct to protect one's own people, and be hesitant when one sees stark differences with another's culture. This skepticism or misunderstanding can be allocated some of the blame for the growth of anti-Americanism. Public diplomacy is a tool that can be used to overcome these initial reactions, and build the trust of a foreign people despite a discrepancy in language or customs. In fact, an appreciation for the similarities and differences of cultures can come to be celebrated. Authors of previous literature argue in favor of three public diplomacy tools that can help overcome an aversion to American culture, and in result, anti-Americanism.

a. Two-sided Exchange

In the past, Americans have engaged in a public diplomacy strategy that encourages one-way conversations. They dictated speeches and handed out press releases without any forum for response. A CFR report in 2003 promotes new techniques that allow dialogue, debate, and even more fundamentally, listening (14). It goes on to explain that expressing a message is a different game when the audience is foreign. Americans must not assume that the audience has a clear concept of the American system. If it is assumed that such understanding is innate, misunderstanding or simply a lack of understanding is bound to occur (Peterson 2003, 14). If a culture is going to be accepted, it first must be understood.

Having a two-sided exchange not only ensures the comprehension of one's own words, but it is also gives others the chance to speak and for the United States to more

fully understand their actions and motivations. The CFR states in a report in 2003 that the US must improve its capacity to listen to foreign publics (10). With its current communication techniques, the United States is causing unnecessary resentment and ill-will. By not taking foreign audiences into account, the United States is coming off as oppressive. Foreign populations are feeling ignored. The CFR recommends that the United States listen to foreigners when defining its own interests or defending its actions (2003, 10). By not doing this, the United States is displaying an ethnocentrism in American culture that undermines foreign acceptance and understanding. If the flow of dialogue is not in both directions, foreigners view American public diplomacy as hypocritical (Copeland 2009, 167). It must be apparent that the United States is committed to facilitating a continuous conversation that allows a relationship to be built. The appearance of openness is not the only benefit of allowing two-way conversation. It also permits a greater understanding of the foreign public and what they are asking for (Copeland 2009, 168). A two-way flow of information is what differentiates good public diplomacy from the failed public diplomacy strategy of branding. Selling policy is not the same as selling a consumer good; public diplomacy requires listening (Copeland 2009, 170-172).

b. Cultural Programming

In order to maximize public diplomacy effectiveness, many authors insist the exchange of cultures needs to be a central element of the programs. The aim of such efforts should be the interaction of multiple cultural and political beliefs (Riordan 2003, 125). The CFR expresses this sentiment by emphasizing that creating bridges between

the United States and other societies through mediums such as art, music, theater, religion, and academia should be integrated into long-term public diplomacy strategy instead of being supplemental programs (2003, 15). Connections made through cultural interests draw out the similarities of ideas and values between societies (Peterson 2003, 15). These authors are arguing that cultural connections and understanding lead to effective public diplomacy. Dizard points out that though private bodies mostly carry out cultural operations and exchange programs, the success of past cultural exchanges demonstrates the need for government to have a presence in the field (2004, 229).

Melissen argues for an increase in the funding to send American performers abroad. In 2005, the United States only spent \$3 million on performances and exhibits while in comparison, France spent \$600 million (2005, 161). This discrepancy is immense. It is apparent that France places great value on cultural exchange. American Centers used to be based in major cities across the globe, offering libraries, reading rooms, English classes, outreach programs, book groups, film series, lectures, and more. They were a place where foreigners could meet and hold conversations with Americans on a regular basis (Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, 2). This one-on-one contact is essential in creating relationships with, and therefore an affinity for, Americans. Personal experience is a vital source when forming opinions. Unfortunately, American Centers have been downsized into the presently existing Information Resource Centers (IRC's), and the threat of domestic violent attack has forced many IRC's to retreat to the confines of the American embassies. The restricted access to embassies makes them difficult to visit (Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, 2). Reports recommend that IRC's and American Centers not only be moved off embassy grounds but also operate six days a

week in order to maximize their use. In addition, they should never permanently close because of perceived threats. If they are forced to close, the facilities should always be preserved with the understanding that the Centers will eventually return (Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, 2).

Exchange programs have also been identified as a necessary asset of public diplomacy through cultural exchange. These programs have been identified as among of the most effective public diplomacy tools (The Princeton Project 2005, 11). They target our future leaders of society (students), and key influencers in society such as women, journalists, and business people. These people have the potential to share their positive experiences in the United States to a wide, diverse population (Strategic Communication 2007, 6). Programs that have a proven successful track record, such as Fulbright and IVLP, should be expanded, and new programs should be introduced (The Princeton Project 2005, 11). These programs should also emphasize public diplomacy target areas, such as Arab nations (The Princeton Project 2005, 11). The cultural understanding that results from exchange programs is incredibly beneficial to public diplomacy.

c. Promotion of American Values

Misrepresentation of American culture as having characteristics such as materialism and self-centeredness can be detrimental to public diplomacy. In addition, the classic democratic values and humanitarian aid aspect of the culture in the United States can be incredibly beneficial to the country's image. It is for this reason the United States should provide better access to information on American policies and values. As previously mentioned, American Centers are a huge benefit in promoting positive

American values (The Princeton Project 2005, 12). The good deeds of the United States should not go unmentioned. The government should promote their programs that benefit foreign publics as part of the country's core values, especially in regards to health, education, and economic development in developing countries. Embassies and other foreign agents need to make a commitment to sell the story of American goodwill (Strategic Communication 2007, 7). By promoting these qualities, foreign citizens may be able to identify with the positive overlap of American and their own values, which promotes stronger ties. If these values are associated with the American people, they become associated with American foreign policy. This creates less resistance towards American foreign policy (Peterson 2003, 11).

Riordan points to organizations such as the British Councils, the Alliance Française, and the Goethe Institutes as organizations that promote their respective country's values on a daily basis. He also focuses on the fact that the United States does not currently view these foreign institutions as a serious part of foreign policy (2003, 121). However, the United States' public diplomacy could improve from the existence of a similar institution. It is through this kind of institution that the United States could coordinate English language classes. The use of American teachers hired directly by the United States embassy would allow the State Department to have full control over the content taught in these classes (Committee on Foreign Relations 2009, 2). This could be an opportunity to further promote an appreciation of American culture and values, encourage direct interactions with Americans, and facilitate economic advancement through the knowledge of English. One study states that English language skills open job opportunities in foreign countries and as a result discourage youth from gravitating

towards extremism. English-language classes allow young adults choose an alternative, beneficial path (Strategic Communication 2007, 6). Therefore, the classes would benefit not only the student but also US national security. Institutions that promote national values through programs such as language classes and other cultural programs are successful public diplomacy tools.

2. Institutional Change

In addition to the promotion of cultural exchange, some authors and reports focus directly on the institutions that are being used to implement the American public diplomacy programs. Currently, ineffective prioritization negatively impacts public diplomacy programs, resulting in inadequate funding, a lack of training for public diplomats, and the missing of the opportunity to exploit new communication technology. Public diplomacy programs also suffer from a lack of an overall, coherent strategy. Finally, public diplomacy programs in the United States are in need of an institutional support structure that allows the programs to flourish.

a. Changing Priorities

According to many authors and reports, the current public diplomacy system in the United States is suffering due to a failure to prioritize its importance in the foreign policy process. Public diplomacy is an integral part of successful foreign policy, and should be integrated into its formulation instead of being used as a quick fix for negative foreign responses to policy (Peterson 2003, 8). Riordan makes this concept clear by characterizing the old public diplomacy as reactionary crisis management, and the new

public diplomacy as making the programs a central part of the security agenda by actively promoting the values of the United States (2003, 124). Being an afterthought pushes public diplomacy to the margins of policy formulation where it quickly dies (Peterson 2003, 6). Instead, as the CFR asserts, public diplomacy should be prioritized as a critical part of the work of US ambassadors and other diplomats. Foreign Service officers need to have the ability to make public statements, talk to the local media, and speak in the local language in order to be effective public diplomats (2003, 12).

Resources are critical to the survival of any program. Currently, too few resources are allocated to American public diplomacy. The CFR reported that one fourth of a penny is given to public diplomacy for every dollar that goes to the military, even though public diplomacy is necessary for national security (2003, 8). Public diplomacy funding was initially slashed after the Cold War, diminishing not only USIA's resources but also its stature as a foreign policy contributor (Zaharna 2010, 56). The programs continue to suffer from a lack of funding, eliminating the option of creating comprehensive US public diplomacy. In 2005, public diplomacy received only one fifth of the international affairs budget (The Princeton Project 2005, 13). Increased congressional support would increase the chances of receiving more funding. The CFR notes that underscoring the importance of public diplomacy in foreign policy and national security fosters a relationship between key Congressmen and public diplomacy, causing them to make it their own and champion the programs in the budget (2003, 16). Those in Congress need to prioritize the role of public diplomacy and protect its funding.

The United States must also show that public diplomacy is a priority by confronting the human resources problems that face its programs. Firstly, there is a

dearth of public diplomacy personnel. The Public Diplomacy Council recommends increasing public diplomacy staffing overseas by 300% (2005, 3). The Council also encourages raising the minimum requirements to become public diplomacy officers. For example, it is a huge disadvantage to the United States if those stationed overseas can't communicate in the local language. Public Diplomacy officers should be fluent in not only the language of the area, but the culture (Council of Foreign Relations 2003, 3). The more an officer is prepared for a mission, the more effective he or she will be. For example, achieving foreign policy objectives in the Middle East would benefit greatly from a public diplomacy staff that is knowledgeable of the region's language and societies (Djerejian 2003, 70). State Department Foreign Service officers would also benefit from increased professional training in public diplomacy (The Princeton Project 2005, 12). The establishment of several different bodies could fulfill this need. An Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute that was independent of the government could help recruit and train new Foreign Service professionals that incorporated public diplomacy ideas into their everyday actions. In addition, a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps could be created to recruit qualified private sector experts, provide periodic training, and provide a public diplomacy skills database (Peterson 2003, 12). Its establishment would increase the talent within public diplomacy programs. An increased number of highly qualified public diplomacy staff and Foreign Service Officers with public diplomacy skills is the prioritization that the current US foreign policy structure requires.

b. A Central Strategy

One of the challenges facing public diplomacy in the United States is the lack of a central strategy. The Department of State is not the only governmental body that is reaching out to foreign publics. The overseas actions of the Department of Defense will surely affect the attitudes towards the United States of the citizens of those regions. CIA operations also influence opinion when they become known by the public. The White House, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and USAID also consistently have their hands in the pot, not to mention a variety of private sector organizations (The Princeton Project 2005, 2). Uncoordinated public diplomacy efforts lead to contradictory messages and inevitably undesirable outcomes. The inability to coordinate and manage public diplomacy efforts undermines its effectiveness (Zaharna 2010, 57).

One method to rectify conflicting public diplomacy initiatives is to issue a Presidential Decision Directive on public diplomacy. This would allow for the creation of a clear-cut national public diplomacy strategy and rope current efforts from numerous bodies into a solid framework (Peterson 2003, 10). A cabinet-level counselor to the president could produce such a directive. The White House would then be able to take on a leadership role that would unify the public diplomacy strategies of various government agencies and eliminate bureaucratic disputes and counteractive initiatives (The Princeton Project 2005, 7). It is imperative to the success of United States public diplomacy that public diplomacy efforts of different government agencies be closely tied to a single strategy (Djerejian 2003, 69). A directive from the President would create what is needed (The Princeton Project 2005, 1).

Another public diplomacy coordinating tactic is the establishment of some sort of coordinating structure. This body would act as an advisor, synthesizer, and a priority

setter for all public diplomacy actions (The Princeton Project 2005, 7). Similar to a Presidential Decision Directive on public diplomacy, a permanent interagency structure would create an overall public diplomacy strategy to guide all governmental bodies involved (The Public Diplomacy Council 2005, 4). The new structure could include members at the assistant-secretary level from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Attorney General, the Chair of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Peterson 2003, 10). By increasing interagency communication, public diplomacy initiatives would coincide with each other, rather than inadvertently work against one another (Zaharna 2010, 67). The governmental structure of the US does not naturally allow an effective attack on public diplomacy issues. The creation of an advisory board would overcome this problem (Zaharna 2010, 54). Jan Melissen describes this public diplomacy situation clearly, saying that “Without institutional support, cultural diplomacy is not systematic, but capricious and sporadic” (2005, 160). A permanent, interagency coordinating body would provide that institutional support.

c. A Different Structure

Finally, many authors suggest a change in internal structure is needed in order to maximize the effectiveness of United States public diplomacy. Firstly, they promote the utilization of the private sector to supplement government public diplomacy initiatives. An abundance of talent exists in the private sector and can be tapped into by governmental public diplomacy. Technology, film, broadcast, marketing research, and communications are all areas that are best represented in the private sector, are necessary

for public diplomacy, and can be utilized through government contracts (Peterson 2003, 6). It is difficult for the public sector to recruit enough cutting-edge, creative professionals due to its inability to secure necessary funding (Peterson 2003, 7). New ideas are a valuable resource, and it is naïve to believe that they are produced in the highest quality and in most quantity by the government (Rosen and Wolf 2008, 146). The bureaucracy of government, especially the Department of State, is also cumbersome. Any action it takes is slow and often limited, while private organizations enjoy freedom in their initiatives. In addition, public diplomacy targets a wide range of organizations and individuals, so it is natural that a diverse range of organizations is needed to reach them (Riordan 2003, 125). In short, the private sector has a larger amount of talent, can accomplish objectives quicker, and can target a wide range of audiences more effectively.

The Princeton Project on National Security also cites the lack of a measurement of success for current public diplomacy programs within the Department of State as an area for US public diplomacy improvement. Instead of a systematic and comprehensive evaluative system, evaluation is based on anecdotal evidence. This is not sufficient in measuring foreign attitudes towards, and understanding of, the United States. The Princeton Project advises that more opinion research and other evaluative methods are needed in order to identify best public diplomacy practices and build programs that most effectively work towards tangible results (2005, 11). A standardized reporting system would be the first step towards this goal. The Council on Foreign Relations suggests the Secretary of State conduct a quadrennial public diplomacy review report that would evaluate diplomatic readiness, and prioritize spending within the programs (2003, 10).

The effectiveness of public diplomacy programs need to be evaluated in order to adjust their methods to evolving needs.

Of course, there are many advocates for the re-establishment of an organization that is similar to USIA. An agency that is autonomous from the Department of State would consolidate public diplomacy resources and personnel into one location and allow for more direct control over its programs. As mentioned before, the State Department is criticized for its slow and reactive actions. The window of opportunity has often closed by the time the bureaucratic paperwork is filled out and red tape is cut (The Princeton Project 2005, 7). An agency that is free of the bureaucratic weight of the State Department could act swiftly, providing maximum effect. Public diplomacy efforts would be more effective and take effect more quickly under a consolidated body. Finally, some scholars demand the protection of public diplomacy programs from the congressional budget cycle. A strong, continuous budget is needed in order to ensure effective, long-lasting programs. As part of a long-term foreign policy strategy, public diplomacy should be protected from the uncertainty of the year-to-year budget cycle. A foundation that provides budgetary certainty by funding a large portion of exchange programs could be created (The Princeton Project 2005, 13). Overall, contracting out programs to private companies, better program measurement and evaluation, reestablishing an autonomous public diplomacy agency, and protecting public diplomacy from the congressional budget cycle would improve the internal infrastructure of United States public diplomacy programs.

A Comparison of Public Diplomacy Institutional Structure in the USA, England, and France

Public-private partnerships have been embraced as a fundamental aspect of the post-USIA model of public diplomacy within the United States. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs routinely supplies contracts, grants and builds partnerships for the facilitation of its international exchange programs. This system has allowed American public diplomacy to achieve what it wouldn't have been able to do if it only relied on governmental resources. The use of private entities to perform government functions is called privatization (Fitzpatrick 2009, 157). Kathy Fitzpatrick names four reasons for the United States government to pursue privatized public diplomacy programs. Firstly, privatization increases efficiency. As stated previously, one gripe that persists about the merger of USIA into the State Department is its lack of efficiency. Red tape and paperwork slow the entire process down. The autonomy that private companies and organizations enjoy allows them to remove themselves from bureaucratic speed bumps and complete tasks at a quicker and therefore more effective pace (Fitzpatrick 2009, 161). Privatization is also more cost efficient. Basic competition principles of the free market allow the same tasks to be achieved at a lower price. One of the criteria on which companies and organizations are hired is their ability to produce quality work at a reasonable cost. Therefore, privatization drives down the amount of resources needed to create and implement public diplomacy programs (Fitzpatrick 2009, 164).

In addition, privatization brings an expertise to public diplomacy (and other programs) that would not exist within a governmental body. As discussed before, the government does not have the resources to recruit top talent. New talent and ideas

remain outside the government, and need to be recruited. Communications firms are of particular use to public diplomacy, in addition to companies that could provide research and diplomatic intelligence. Brain drain has also been a problem for public diplomacy programs since their relocation into the State Department. The expertise that was lost when staff cuts were made and people retired from their government jobs could be utilized by recruiting them back (Fitzpatrick 2009, 162).

Credibility is another benefit to privatization of government programs. Publics tend to trust private organizations more than the government. Considering the old ties of public diplomacy to propaganda, privatization is a method that would help legitimize public diplomacy programs to foreign citizens (Fitzpatrick 2009, 162). Third parties can use this trust to curb pre-existing negative biases towards the United States by the promotion of American values (Fitzpatrick 2009, 163). Lastly, Colin Davies, Director of Capacity Building Services at World Learning, a government contractor, identifies another reason for privatization of government programs. It relieves political pressure to reduce the size of government. The history of the United States boasts a long-term desire for small government. However, too-small government results in ineffective programs. Privatization allows a more trusted, small government to remain, yet have the reach of a large government (2011). Once again, credibility is at stake, this time with American citizens.

There also exist numerous downsides to privatization. Firstly, government grants, partnerships, and contracts leave the question as to who is actually in charge. How much of privatized programs are regulated by the government, and how much are decisions by private companies (Fitzpatrick 2009, 166)? Davies sums up the situation. Grants allow

the most autonomy for private organizations. Once a grant is awarded to an organization, it has greater flexibility to achieve the goals of the program. If the organization no longer feels it is able to achieve the program goals, they can simply give the money back.

Government contracts, on the other hand, allow very little autonomy to the contract-awarded body. Government sets the standards, and though opinions from the organizations are accepted, it is ultimately the decision of the government how the programs are completed. Davies gives the analogy of hiring painters. If painters are hired to color a kitchen blue, they may personally believe that it would look best yellow, yet will ultimately accede to their client's desires. Ideally, organizations are chosen on the basis of their experience, so their opinions should be valued. However, even with contracts, the degree of autonomy that is granted varies on case-by-case basis. On the everyday level, contracted programs communicate with a government contracts officer who makes sure programs are being completed according to contract, and a government program officer who is consulted on grey areas and who closely monitors the progress of the program. Program officers have more flexibility on program completion, but will sometimes refer back to the contracts officer for clarification. This flexibility results in differing amounts of autonomy for the private company depending on particular program officers. Autonomy in public-private partnership arrangements is placed somewhere in between grant and contract situations (2011). This diversity in level of autonomy across programs leaves room for interpretation, creating the question of who actually is in charge. Accountability and the ability of the government to hide behind private organizations then becomes an issue (Fitzpatrick 2009, 167).

Privatization also puts the mission of programs in question. Would the overall mission of public diplomacy be compromised by an increased role of the private sector? There are added complications when private companies and organizations have their own missions to uphold. Tension can arise when missions and goals conflict. Private companies are often driven by a profit bottom line. The government often engages in programs that have objectives other than making money. In addition, outside entities know less about government structure, motivations, and policies (Fitzpatrick 2009, 167). Any misunderstanding could mean inefficient program implementation and compromised public diplomacy mission statements. The current United States public diplomacy method of privatization has both advantages and disadvantages.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the public diplomacy privatization model, it is necessary to investigate the success of the programs. Davies describes this as a difficult process in the case of World Learning. Firstly, indicators of success must be in place from the beginning of the program. According to Davies, this is only possible if the organization has control over all parts of the program. Some programs have offices abroad that take part in the selection process of exchange programs and the follow-up on the impact of the program. Most organizations do not have these resources. Participants are nominated by outside sources, and it is difficult to follow up with them after the completion of the program. In addition, in some cases it is years before the full impact of the programs is realized. For example, though programs that promote studying in United States universities can be evaluated their programs by completion rates of degrees, it may be years before it is known whether or not those students tangibly benefit from the program and have received employment related to their field (Davies 2011). Due to lack

of control, evaluating the success of public-private public diplomacy programs is challenging and often imprecise.

The British engage in a different kind of public-private public diplomacy partnership. All international cultural relations programs for the British government occur through one body, the British Council. However, the British Council maintains its autonomy of operations from government influence. The British Council is technically a charity in some countries, and a non-profit in others. According to Tim Rivera, the Executive Assistant to the Director at the British Council in Washington, DC, the British Council carries out no decisions made by the British government. Instead, the British Council works to complete its own mission by creating opportunities to build trust between the people in the United Kingdom and the world. An Executive Board and a Board of Trustees, rather than the government, create an overall strategy for the organization (The British Council 2011). New projects and programs that further the stated strategy can be initiated from field offices, but must be signed off on in London (Rivera 2011). Though the British government's foreign policy hypothetically benefits from the relationships and understanding built from the cultural services that the British Council provides, employees maintain that there is no obligation for them to take on government-endorsed projects.

Despite this high level of functional autonomy, the British government does provide 211 million pounds in grants to the British Council each year. 201 million pounds come directly from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, indicating the benefit of the British Council to UK foreign policy. Grants for the government make up a little less than one third of the funding that the British Council brings in over a year. The rest

is produced from its commercial programs, such as the British plays that it puts on in each country and by donations from private sources (The British Council 2011). With a large portion of its income coming from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a certain amount of accountability to the government does exist. Similar to the BBC, the British Council is required to create annual reports that indicate the use of government funds. Parliament is kept up-to-date on the programs of the British Council through the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Committee is made up of MPs and Peers who not only report to the rest of Westminster, but also give advice on the long-term strategy of the British Council (The British Council 2011). Day-to-day, there is a lot of communication between the British Council and the British government. This is especially true in Washington, DC where the British Council resides within the British Embassy compound. Several joint agendas can be underway at one time. Collaborative projects include a play series entitled, "The Great Game," which features a plot about the history of Afghanistan. Programs such as this directly coincide with the foreign affairs strategy of the British government, leading them to provide additional support (Rivera 2011).

In the end, the British Council retains its programmatic autonomy from the British government. It reports its use of government funds to Westminster and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office every year in order for it to be determined that they are appropriately using public resources, but it is not responsible for promoting government policy agendas. The Council evaluates its programs every quarter in order to ensure that its programs are effective (Rivera 2011). Once again, it is difficult to monitor and evaluate public diplomacy programs. The desired outcomes of cultural services are often intangible and long-term. How does one determine if a relationship is being built

between the British people and the world as a direct result of British Council activities? Quarterly reports include numbers such as the income produced from programs and numbers enrolled in English classes (Rivera 2011). However, this does not effectively evaluate the Council's success in achieving its mission.

The French government also has an autonomous body that acts as its cultural services wing: The Alliance Française. This organization acts as a French education and cultural center, providing opportunities for those interested in French culture and language to become more involved. Projects target the highbrow crowd with wine and cheese events, and those that are typically not exposed to French culture through programs such as street theatre and hip-hop concerts. In addition, French language classes are the staple of the Alliance Française programming, catering to both new learners of the language and young professionals who want to keep up their skills (Bounds 2011). Similar to the British Council and the British government, the activities of the Alliance Française are supposed to have long-term benefits for French foreign policy. The French government has distinct interest in the success of the Alliance Française programs. However, it has even less influence over programming than the British government does over the British Council programming. The Alliance Française in Washington, DC receives two grants from the French government each year. However, they are project-based grants, targeted to specifically expand the library and cultural resources only of the DC Alliance. The rest of its funding comes from private donations and the revenue produced by its programs and classes. In fact, not only is the Alliance Française autonomous from the government, but it is autonomous amongst its offices. Each office secures its own funding and sets its own agenda. A federation of Alliance Française

offices in North America does exist, but members mostly bounce ideas off one another rather than make program decisions that affect all offices (Bounds 2011). The structure of the Alliance Française ensures a lot more autonomy in public diplomacy than both the American public-private partnership model, and the British Council model.

The Alliance Française also has methods to measure the success of their programs. By simply monitoring enrollment in classes and registration for events, it can determine if attendance is on the rise or if programs need to be adjusted. Classes are adapted to fit the interests and needs of the students. For example, if a specific time of day for class is shown to have the highest attendance or students find business French particularly useful, each Alliance Française office has the ability to adapt their classes (Bounds 2011). Accountability only to itself is an institutional structure that allows the flexibility to pursue the most successful programs. However, how this translates over to a successful public diplomacy effort for the French government is another question. A low accountability of cultural programs to the government results in a less direct impact on foreign policy objectives. Instead, the French government, similar to the British government, is placing its faith in the theory that relationships built through all cultural services advance foreign policy goals. This is dissimilar to the United States model that awards a certain amount of autonomy to private organizations to complete its cultural and educational programs, while keeping them on a short leash through contractual accountability methods.

Recommendations and Conclusions

Many lessons on how to improve the United States' public diplomacy model can be learned from history, from the recommendations of previous scholars, and from the

British and French models. Trends in foreign public opinion indicate that public diplomacy's place within the Department of State is not achieving its objective of fostering foreign goodwill towards Americans and their foreign policy. Public diplomacy had more resources, more autonomy to complete effective projects, and more respect as a contributor to foreign policy while under the structure of USIA. The public diplomacy programs benefited from having all programs, including international broadcasting, under one roof. It is difficult to argue public diplomacy programs did not suffer when they merged into the Department of State.

However, today's budgetary situation and overall national affinity towards small government will not allow for a re-emergence of a separate, public diplomacy institution. No extra resources will be found to create a new USIA, especially when policy is trended towards small government. Also, if implemented correct, foreign policy initiatives should benefit from having public diplomacy under the same Department of State umbrella. It should be integrated into every level of policy making. In short, it isn't possible to create a new, separate public diplomacy agency and it's theoretically beneficial for the Department of State to be exposed to public diplomacy every day.

Therefore, public diplomacy programs must take advantage of privatization. This model that the United States already largely has in place has numerous benefits that should be capitalized on. Privatization decreases costs, making the public diplomacy programs less likely to be cut altogether. In addition, privatization increases more talent that provides fresh ideas and numerous skills. Not only does privatization make functionality cheap, it provides it at a better quality.

The United States should also consider adopting cultural diplomacy institutions similar to those in England and France. The British Council and the Alliance Française greatly benefit from their autonomy from their governments. They are much more trusted by foreigners. For example, unlike the British Embassy, the British Council wasn't asked to remove itself from Egypt during the Suez Crisis (Rivera 2011). The United States can use public-private partnerships to build this trust between foreigners and American values and goals. In addition, elements of programs would be completed more quickly than in the bureaucratic State Department. However, the United States should not pursue a completely autonomous cultural body like the British and the French. This is because low accountability (in this case, to taxpayers) results in limited results for foreign policy. It's difficult to monitor and evaluate any kind of progress from these organizations.

Despite these ideas on how to rejuvenate United States public diplomacy, old difficulties identified by other scholars still must be addressed. Specifically, a coordination of overall public diplomacy strategy must be created. Not only including the Department of State, but also amongst other agencies that engage in public diplomacy. An advisory board made up of representatives from these agencies and a President who then declared an overall strategy would be particularly effective. This is especially needed if the US pursues increased privatization of public diplomacy because it adds an extra layer of coordination issues and opportunity for conflicting public diplomacy amongst agencies.

In addition, public diplomacy training amongst State Department officials must be carried out in order to maximize the positive effects of public diplomacy efforts.

Privatization fixes the issue of deficient public diplomacy talent, but all Foreign Service Officers and Ambassadors should also be able to converse with foreign publics in a manner that advances foreign policy. Public diplomacy is an integral part of foreign policy creation, and should be respected and integrated into every step. These underlying issues must be addressed in order for a new public diplomacy institutional structure to be effective for the United States.

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