The United Arab Emirates: Melting Pot, Mosaic, or Neither
The Case of the Indian and the Palestinian
1. Introduction
1.1 Theories of Ethnicity and Their Application to the UAE pg. 4
1.2 Social Stratification and Power Relations pg. 8
1.3 Occupational Networks pg. 9
1.4 Framing the Role of the Indian and Palestinian in the UAE pg. 11

2. Literature Review
2.1 Emiratization pg. 14
2.2 Implementation of a National ID Card pg. 17
2.3 Immigration, Ethnicity, and the Gulf pg. 18
2.4 Women in the UAE pg. 22
2.5 Racism and Self-Identification pg. 24

3. Methodology
3.1 Surveys and Fieldwork pg. 26
3.2 Subjects pg. 29
3.3 Concerns & Constraints pg. 29

4. Evidence
4.1 Housing pg. 30
4.2 Survey Results pg. 33
4.3 Conversations With and Observations Of Female Indian Domestic Workers pg. 42
4.4 Ethnic Comparisons Between Emirati and Palestinians/Indians pg. 43

5. Conclusions
5.1 Acceptation of Hypothesis: Palestinians are More Integrated than Indians pg. 46

Works Cited pg. 50

Sample Surveys
Emirati Student Survey pg. 53
Palestinian Student Survey pg. 56
Indian Student Survey pg. 59
INTRODUCTION

“I am afraid we are building towers, but losing the Emirates,” said Emirati police chief General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim at the National Identity Conference discussing the declaration of 2008 as National Identity Year in the UAE (Chilton, 2008, par 10). His cry is not unfounded for, as the UAE announces dozens of urban development projects, millions of laborers from every corner of the Middle East and Asia are attracted to the labor market. As a result the Emirati have been reduced to a mere 20 percent of the population due to consistent immigration waves starting in the 1950s coinciding with the discovery of oil in the Gulf region. The economic potential of the Emirates has drawn people from more than 20 different Arab countries, South Asia, and even the West to the UAE. A side affect of globalization is the feeling of insecurity among the native population. This insecurity results in a hardening of group identity in the face of change. Because of the influx of people, the Emiratis cling to their ethnicity in order to preserve their wealth instead of incorporating the immigrant laborers into society.

Statistics from 2004 record the population of the UAE as 19 percent Emirati, 23 percent other Arab and Iranian, 50 percent South Asian, and 8 percent other expatriates (“Ethnicity and Race by Countries,” 2007). More specifically, 2006 population estimates record approximately 1.2 million Indians and 300,000 Pakistanis residing in the UAE, making these two groups the largest expatriate communities in the country (“UAE Population,” 2008). The gap between nationals and non-nationals continues to grow on a daily basis. A study conducted by the Research Unit at Mashreq Bank in conjunction with Macroeconomic Research Center has projected the UAE’s population will increase by 400,000 people annually until the end of 2011 when the population may exceed 6.88 million (Mcdar, 2008, par 1). Economic opportunities in Dubai alone will attract over 50 percent of the expatriates (Mcdar, 2008, par 2). The government
as well as Emirati nationals have recognized the majority of non-citizens and have started to consider potential problems arising from the large demographic imbalance. “Our future and national identity are strongly connected to the demographic structure issue, which requires collaborative efforts and teamwork,” Vice President Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum said (Chilton, 2008, par 4). The government, true to Vice President Al Maktoum’s word, has begun to develop initiatives that internally and externally strengthen local identity. 

These initiatives have affected immigrant populations differently. Two of the major immigrant groups present in the UAE are Indians and Palestinians. Due to how the immigrant groups view themselves and how the Emirati view them the question of which group has more resources and is more integrated into society, meaning faces less discrimination, hold higher jobs, and have gained citizenship arises. The way that government initiatives impact each ethnic group is one indicator of which group has more opportunity for social mobility. Currently, Palestinians appear to be more integrated into Emirati society because of a common Arab and because they are viewed by the Emirati as refugees.

**Theories of Ethnicity and Their Application to the UAE**

The primordial, constructivist, and instrumentalist camps of ethnicity can all be applied to the maintenance of Emirati identity through government initiatives. According to primordialism, ethnicity is fixed and given (a priori). Clifford Geertz in “Primordial Ties” contends that one is born into an ethnic group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p 41). These ethnic groups have congruities of blood, a shared belief in a common descent, a language, and social customs. The Emirati government has taken measures to transmit their ethnicity primordially. Sulayman Najm Khalaf in discussing the culture of the UAE cites that young Emirati men are paid if they marry a national (Khalaf, 2001, par 24). The Sheikh Zayed Marriage Fund was established in 1992 and
provides marriage grants and sponsors group weddings for UAE nationals in the hopes of balancing the demographics and restoring an indigenous majority. “Under the direction of a government-selected committee and backed by national endowments, the Marriage Fund administers marriage grants of 70,000 dirhams per couple (about US$19,000) averaging 3,000 grants a year” (Olidort, 2008, par 6). This fund merely complements a cultural norm that Emiratis will naturally marry other Emiratis because often one’s betrothed is already a member of one’s family.

Traditionally, interfamilial marriage contributed to what Middle Eastern scholar Nazih N. Ayubi calls the “asabbiya” or the degree of solidarity of the tribe (Ayubi, 1996, p 50). A tribe can be defined as a group in a geographically restricted area in which kinship is the dominant expression of organization. The members consider themselves culturally distinct and are politically unified. Group solidarity in the Arab cultures supersedes an individual and ultimately relates back to the nomadic mode of production that prevailed in the Gulf region until the colonial era. Political power is achieved from group solidarity and creates wealth by providing access to the means of production. To ensure group cohesion the marriage patterns that arose in Saudi Arabia (to which the UAE belonged until independence in 1971) were to marry into the ruler’s family (this gave access to power and wealth), and since Islam allows up to four wives men would often marry and divorce at a high rate in order to have many children. By remarrying into one’s family, the unit was strengthened and one was ensured protection by one’s kinship group, which would act as a mediator between one and the state. The modern state in the Middle East has been viewed as an oppressor that does not take care of the individual; therefore the duty to take care of the individual remains with the kinship group. “Arabian tribalism was to become politically consolidated and consecrated,” said Ayubi (1996, p 51). This illustrates how
individuals see their family as the primary source of organization and the state as secondary, strengthening the primordial argument.

Primordialists claim that ethnicity is transmitted through birth or, as Donald Horowitz states in *A Family Resemblance*, being “sons of the soil” (Horowitz, 2000, p 58). By nationally sponsoring marriage between nationals, the government sends a clear message that one becomes an Emirati through one’s lineage. In fact, consanguineous marriages are increasing. By intermarrying, families are staying in control of their fortunes in addition to upholding Bedouin values. The most common type of consanguineous marriage is between first cousins, 26.2 percent, compared to an average 3.5 percent among other populations (Al-Gazali et al., 1997). Furthermore, consanguinity increased in the UAE from 39 percent to 50.5 percent in one generation (Al-Gazali et al., 1997). This shows that the value placed on kinship groups is still high and that preserving ethnicity is of growing importance to the Emirati, as it is now institutionalized by a government program.

Emirati society adheres well to the theory of constructivism as well as primordialism. First, Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* pulls from the idea that a nation is an imagined political community that is both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1991, p 43). Constructivism would also argue that humans are willing to base their identity on myths of common ancestry as means to validate their existence. People receive get benefits from being part of a collectivity or nation, including a sense of identity and cohesion. Emirati society is largely imagined or constructed because the country was officially established in 1971 and has many similarities to Saudi and Omani culture. From a constructivist viewpoint ethnicity is transmitted through school, family, and religion and the Emirati government is utilizing these institutions to encourage nationalism.
The Emirati government is stressing Islamic faith. Ninety-six percent of the country is Muslim and most of this population is Sunni of the Maliki tradition. In fact, Sheikh Zayed Mosque in Abu Dhabi is the third largest mosque in the world after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. In order to stress faith and other traditional values the government is placing a strong emphasis on marrying other Muslims. In addition, schools receive long breaks for Muslim holidays and the call to prayer can be heard from every street corner. Family is also targeted. Because affluence has led to the use of domestic helpers the Sheikhs feel it is time to go to back to the parents as the main teachers and role models.

In addition to protecting its identity from within and strengthening Emirati pride, the UAE has been busy protecting its identity externally. There are many constraints placed upon immigrants in the country that make it difficult to gain citizenship, integrate, or establish families within the UAE. Therefore, the Emirati are also protecting their identity from an instrumentalist standpoint. Instrumentalism sees ethnicity as the means to a specific political end and as such is focused on the goals of ethnic groups, rather than their origins. Paul Brass in “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation” discusses ethnicity as competition by the elites for resources required to manipulate different symbols (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p 89). Anthropologist Abner Cohen holds a similar view that ethnicity is a type of political resource for competing ethnic groups (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p 84). The royal families in the Emirates control all symbols on a micro and macro level. Advertising, religion, foreign and domestic policy, and curfews for unmarried women are all under the direct control of the Sheikhs. The leaders employ these symbols in ways that help them maintain their power and control over society.

Moreover, systems of patronage have been prevalent in the region where a group in power will grant protection to individuals in return for loyalty. Thus, Emirati identity is not only
a tool to maintain political control as instrumentalists would argue, but a prerequisite for gaining that power in the first place. This tribal system manages to reproduce itself and makes it nearly impossible for expatriates and workers to become part of the political system. Emirati society has been constructed and relies heavily on the blood lineage of its members. Thus, instrumentalism, constructivism, and primordialism all tie together to explain ethnic relations within the UAE.

**Social Stratification and Power Relations**

Preserving Emirati identity will require more than government initiatives; every Emirati will have to be inspired by these initiatives and demonstrate his/her own commitment. The undercurrents of discrimination against expatriate groups and strong nationalist sentiment show that the government successfully inspired nationalism. Two prominent immigrant groups present in the UAE are Indians and Palestinians. Indians are the largest immigrant group and account for a growing middle class and have influence in the private sector, whereas Palestinians in the UAE are looking for a safe haven. The UAE has a strong relationship with Palestine, for it provides much support and aid to the region, bonding over a common religion (Islam is the official religion of the UAE, although it is technically a secular state). In fact, the UAE through the Red Crescent recently provided polio and other vaccinations to the Gaza strip in February 2008. About 400 million dirhams have been spent by the Red Crescent in Palestine and the organization sponsors about 10,000 Palestinian orphans (Johnson & Najami, 2008, par 13). The Red Crescent, symbolized by the Islamic crescent, is sponsored by the UAE government. Therefore, UAE is displaying itself to the world in favor of culture associated with Islam. The use of the crescent indicates Muslim ethnic dominance.

However, the concept of the UAE associating with Palestine based on Arab descent should not be overstated. The Emirati are trying to strengthen their own Emirati culture as the
country develops, not a general Arab one. Palestinians tend to have a difficult time obtaining a UAE visa because they are seen as long-term residents. Historically, the Gulf States were apathetic towards pan-Arabism led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser during the 1950s. The resistance to pan-Arabism had to do with oil profits. While pan-Arab intellectuals and leaders pushed the idea that Gulf oil was Arab oil and should benefit the entire Middle East, the Saudis and Gulf sheikhdoms rejected this idea and believed that the profits belonged to them alone. This illustrates that this region in particular has always prioritized their own economic interests over championing Middle Eastern ethnic movements.

Economic interests are what lead the UAE to start employing Asian versus Arab labor. The UAE started its development process with primarily immigrant Arab workers. However, the country shifted from the use of Arab to Asian industrial labor after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The UAE had an interest in an autonomous Kuwait, as Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The shift to Asian labor after the 1991 Gulf War helped the UAE because Asians are more compliant and cannot claim a common Arab heritage as a basis for appeal when advocating reform to the labor laws. Using imported labor from India and South East Asia is popular for economic reasons more than cultural. The labor is cheap, abundant, and easy to exploit. The immigrants that travel to the UAE from South East Asia set up economic networks which make the labor recruiters’ jobs easier because there are people competing for access to the Emirates.

**Occupational Networks**

Power in its simplest form is the ability to implement values in society. According to Max Weber, power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance (Brym & Lie, 2007, p 144). In Emirati
society the Sheikhs and royal families are in an exclusive position to implement their values. Immigrant groups have an equal non-ability to influence society politically or socially. In fact, politics are strictly forbidden to immigrants and especially non-Arabs. On the surface the UAE would seem to be a two tiered society; a privileged local population versus disempowered expatriate community. But, there are hierarchies within the Emirati and the immigrant populations. Because wealth is a driving factor of nationalism in the UAE, the esteem to which one is held tends to be based on occupation. However, the gap between the poorest Emirati and the richest immigrant is extremely wide in terms of both recognition from the government and respect from Emirati. This suggests that there are other factors besides wealth, both internal and external, for excluding the immigrant population from mainstream society.

From a Marxist viewpoint, ethnic differences are a product of social class. According to this theory if social classes were eliminated, ethnic differences would also be eliminated. However, this theory does not hold up when applied to the UAE, for poor Emirati are more valued members of society than rich foreign investors, as proven by consanguineous marriages, public policies such as the declaration of 2008 as National Identity Year, and social friendships. Another theory on how to neutralize ethnicity looks at occupational networks. The concentration of ethnicities in certain jobs can be a way of sustaining ethnicity, lifestyles, and is a means for social mobility. Often, the way that ethnicities become embedded in one sector of the economy is through family connections. However, if people enter the job market through education and obtain their jobs based on their credentials then the job market can decrease the strength of ethnicity. Many immigrants enter the UAE and obtain jobs because their family is already there. As a result there are ethnic groups concentrated in particular markets because family members use connections for employment. Thus, the UAE forces immigrants to turn to ethnic networks for
support and for upward mobility. The use of occupational networks sheds light on how immigrants’ ethnic identities are weakened or sustained during their time in the UAE.

These occupational networks are crucial because Middle Eastern economies can be defined by renteerism. A renteer state is dependent on mineral export growth and is capital, labor, and resource intensive. In addition, in this economy in order to be wealthy one needs access to the existing power structures that control the natural resource. In the case of the UAE, one would need access to the government. Since Emiratis are the only group allowed in the government the Emirati population has incentive to secure access instead of entering the private sector. This access can be secured through marriage and “wasta” (connections). Renteerism encourages ethnic networks for all members of society because it is the only way to gain access to certain markets. Renteerism also encourages a divided job market; the private sector open as the Emirati citizens are concerned with working for the government.

Where as ethnic networks and exclusion by the Emirati may be more of an internal factor that help immigrant groups retain their ethnic identity, UAE government policy is a strong external factor. The government imposes strict visa regulations and favors contract over all other forms of labor. Visas can only be obtained through ones employer or the person must have a sponsor, even if they are a tourist. A hotel or tourist agency will sponsor the visa for those coming to the UAE for leisure. All of the visas have strict time limits to ensure that people are not staying in the UAE illegally and to make it difficult to establish permanent residence.

**Framing the Role of the Indian and Palestinian in the UAE**

The information provided by Roger Waldinger in “Between ‘Here’ and ‘There’: Immigrant Cross-Border Activities and Loyalties” is extremely useful in framing the situation in the UAE. Waldinger looks at transnational immigration in terms of Latin America and the
United States, however many of the immigrant groups in the UAE can also qualify as transnational. Waldinger explains how states become involved with the movement of people across borders contributing to the maintenance of a certain ethnic identity. The state takes an interest in the movement of people for “the preferences of nationals, who believe in the idea of national community, also matter. While accepting international migration, nationals want it controlled, making sure that membership is only available to some, and signaling to the newcomers that acceptance is contingent on a transfer of loyalties from home to host state, even though residual ethnic attachments are generally allowed” (Waldinger, 2008, par 15). Factors such as immigration policy and quotas control the movement of people in and out of the UAE. Certain groups are favored over others by the government and these views of certain groups trickle down to the masses. Those who are seen as temporary residents are tolerated more than those seen as permanent residence. Thus the question of how each immigrant group relates to the Emiratis arises.

Waldinger’s study also has implications that can be applied to the UAE in terms of what causes ethnic identities to either enter society or remain on the peripheral. He makes that assertion that higher levels of education and income are associated with higher levels of participation in politics, and greater access to bureaucratically controlled resources, such as citizenship. While citizenship is extremely difficult to obtain in the UAE there are certain ethnic groups with more access to bureaucratically controlled resources, such as the Palestinians. A factor that is related to citizenship is the probability of travel home. Research based in Latin America and the United States shows that immigrants who gain citizenship in the United States over time become less likely to travel home. In the UAE the Palestinians travel home (home being Palestine) much less than other groups such as Indian workers due to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, thus becoming more settled in the UAE. When Indians travel home their ethnicity is reinforced. The continuation of new arrivals from a person’s home country can also strengthen their identity. As new Indians or Palestinians arrive they bring their culture with them, helping teach younger generations about the homeland and reminding older ones.

Finally, Waldinger offers some insight to the job market for migrants. Waldinger states, “...many migrants instead want to take advantage of the gap between rich and poorer places in order to accumulate resources designed to be used upon return back home” (Waldinger, 2008, par 48). Indian and South Asian immigrants are heavily concentrated in the private sector as business owners that sell goods to the middle class. The resources gained from this enterprise are sent back home as remittances and gifts. Retaining this connection to home monetarily and working to improve your life in your home country versus your host, facilitates a situation where your ethnicity is reinforced instead of diminished. Looking at job types and job location in conjunction with travel home and governmental restrictions can offer insight into ethnic identity in the UAE. When comparing the Palestinian and Indian ethnic groups along these guidelines there are significant differences between these two groups.

Given Waldinger’s framework Palestinians appear more integrated into Emirati society due to Gulf norms, the occupation networks to which they belong, and the context for which they are living in the country. There are multiple internal and external factors that lead to self-identification as Indian, Palestinian, or Emirati. Structural and cultural elements place constraints on Indian workers with a stronger force than Palestinians; Indians do not identify with the national religion, have not been in the country as long as Palestinians, and tend to eventually return home to India.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Emiratization

The nationals firmly control executive and administrative positions, but only by allocating huge proportions of their manpower to the task. By controlling these upper positions the nationals can maintain power. In the private sector nationals only account for two percent and without Emiratization laws that date back prior to 2005 the percentage may be close to zero. The mass Indian population has been the prominent immigrant group that has found success in employment in the private sector. According to an analysis of immigrants in Dubai by David Hirst “at the upper level, they [Indians] effectively own and run half the businesses; lower down the scale, they furnish the bulk of skilled and manual labour. They are the most easily available and affordable. Also, they - and other non-Arabs - are less likely to be politicised than Arabs would be. Politics are strictly forbidden to immigrants” (Hirst, 2001, par 6). The immigrants are supposed to come, make their fortune, and go home. The UAE has yet to officially deal with the problem of those immigrants that are staying indefinitely. However, this must be faced soon as less than 20 percent of people in the country are citizens.

In an effort to maintain control with such a small population the Emirati have made an effort to “emiratize” the nation. The process of emiratization lead by the UAE government supports Hirst’s research because the process recognizes the growing labor divide in society. Emiratization the process of replacing expatriate workers with UAE nationals and emiratization has become a priority policy for the authorities. Emiratis do not want to work in the private sector as they have better wages and shorter hours in the public sector. This is if they even have the desire to work at all. All 800,000 Emirati citizens get free education and health care, subsidized utilities, can claim free land and no-interest loans to build homes, as well as
approximately US$55,500 annually in benefits from oil profit (Brown, 2007, par 2). Matthew Brown writes in “UAE’s Drive for Emirati-Run Economy is Thwarted by Handouts” that “the handouts, based on traditions of royal patronage dating back centuries to Bedouin society, now discourage citizens from working…Expatriates outnumber Emiratis and dominate fields such as banking, law and technology. The quandary for Sheikh Mohammed is how to reduce the culture of dependence without alienating his people” (Brown, 2007, par 3). The government is indirectly encouraging its citizens to remain unemployed or participate in rent seeking behavior, and needs to create incentives for citizens to work in the private sector. These efforts thus far have been focused on employers in the private sector by establishing quotas on the numbers of Emiratis that must be employed by the business.

The 2005 International Monetary Fund report United Arab Emirates: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix records that Emiratis are actually more suited for government jobs because they do not have the skill level to make them as competitive as expatriates in the private sector. The report states “the skill levels of most national college graduates do not meet the high standards of national companies that offer wages and salaries that far exceed those offered by the government” (IMF, 2005, p 30). Therefore, as most Emirati college graduates are leaving college with a degree in arts, education, or religion, the expatriates are coming into the country with experience in engineering, medicine, and science which is what the private sector seeks. Emirati college graduates do not have the marketable skills to make them competitive with the expatriate community for private sector jobs. Thus, the government enforced quotas in private businesses for Emirati employment.

Two major sectors that have taken Emiratization seriously are the banking sector and government policies have forced secretarial positions to be emiratized, for these jobs are viewed
as requiring a lower skill set. This secretarial policy is applied to companies that have more than 50 employees, but there are certain conditions that can exempt companies such as the nature of the business (Wafa, 2006, par 4). These policies reinforce distinctions between local and non-local populations and are similar to Affirmative Action in the United States. Politicians and academics maintain that employing more Emiratis will be healthy for the country in the long term because it will involve the Emirati population in their economy. Minister of the Economy, Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi, said in an interview *The McKinsey Quarterly* that “the strategy will only succeed in the medium to long term, though, if adequate educational and training programs are geared toward creating skills among nationals to suit the demands of the private sector. But the private sector has a social responsibility too…” (Al Shahrabani & Boer, 2007, par 28). By introducing more Emiratis into the job market the government is taking the step to in the long term lower the number of foreigners in the country.

In contradiction to their emiratization programs, the UAE government is still recruiting young people into government owned businesses at a high rate. A direct example of this can be seen at the American University of Sharjah. Many government run companies sponsor graduating high school seniors by paying for their college and giving them a monthly stipend if they come to work for the company after. ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electric Authority) sponsored both Emirati and expatriate students until 2004, but in the 2005 ADWEA began to sponsor only locals. ADWEA is a government run company and therefore all college tuition fees are being paid for by the government. Other companies who sponsor students in the UAE include DUBAL (Dubai Aluminum), DEWA (Dubai Water & Electricity Authority), and SEWA (Sharjah Electric and Water Authority). Like emiratization, these sponsorships apart of the local population and are an undeniable example of an institutionalized ethnic network.
Implementation of a National ID Card

Related to Emirati guardianship of their country is the creation of a national ID card for the UAE in 2003. The card is mandatory for every national and expatriate that is 15 years and older. The card was created to deal with the rapid increase in population (security) and economy. The study by Al-Khoury for the *International Journal of Social Sciences* attempts to understand the effects of having such a program. The card is designed for both residents and non-residents, as a quick way to identify people and as a means to control immigration so that the government can provide better services for legal residents. One of the conclusions that Al-Khoury reaches is that the card places too much emphasis on security, but changing this would be time consuming and expensive. Security is a global concern, however in this case “security” can be taken more abstractly to support the idea that the UAE is trying to protect its heritage, culture, and ethnicity from the majority of non-residents in the country. The ID card is one more label on a person defining his or her place in UAE society.

According to information provided by the Emirates Identity Authority (EIDA) the creation of the national identity card is to provide decision makers with essential statistical data that will contribute to the overall development of the UAE’s society. The EIDA claims that “among the most important benefits and features of the card are enhanced sense of belonging, protection of identity, ease and convenience and providing an integral database” (EIDA, 2008, “FQA,” par 8). Even though the card may provide an enhanced sense of belonging, it will be a feeling of belonging to a hierarchy. The enrollment process for the card according to the EIDA is that first it will be issued to Emiratis and residents working for the government and then professionals and graduate residents working in the private sector (directors, consultants, specialists, doctors, journalists, financial experts, etc). After these two groups are registered the
remaining order is: private sector administrative workers and school/college students, then all house keepers, servants, farmers, transport drivers, etc., and finally construction workers and unskilled labors (EIDA, 2008, “Enrollment Strategy,” par 3). Registration follows a pattern of first the rich and then the poor. These ID cards illustrate that by holding a certain ethnic identity in the UAE you will be entitled to certain privileges. For example, UAE nationals can use the card for travel between GCC countries without the need for a passport. These cards have the potential to cement social stratification and decrease social mobility.

**Immigration, Ethnicity, and the Gulf**

An ethnography by Khalaf and Alkobaisi studied nine immigrant families in the UAE for a period of two years and the immigrants in the case study had been there for between five and fifteen years. This study gave clues into how ethnicity is important in daily life and discusses the role of the immigrant worker compared to the Emirati. The study cited that the immigrants studied (Iranians, Indians, Syrians, Egyptians, and Lebanese) returned to their home countries every year or two. This could potentially support a conclusion that a new Emirati ethnicity is not being formed as people cling to their home countries and traditions. However, if the government allowed the immigrant population to legally become citizens more immigrants may bring their families over permanently.

Khalaf and Alkobaisi discuss the case of a young, Muslim, Indian man who immigrated to the UAE in 1988 to be a domestic helper with the help of his cousin. When interviewed a first time in 1991 Hassan described how dissatisfied he was with his job as a domestic servant. He had a high job turnover rate because he was often replaced by other ethnic immigrant groups, in one case a Pilipino would work for less. When he was interviewed in 1991 he was working for an American Army officer and his family. However, when interviewed again in 1998 Hassan had
changed jobs and was an office-boy for an American company in Abu Dhabi. He received a higher salary and one-months paid vacation every year with a paid return ticket to India. He has three children and house in his home village in India, which he visits at least once a year.

Another case of an Indian worker is described in the article that has a similar life as Hassan’s. Habib, in 1998, had been in the UAE for 20 years working as a construction worker, as an office-boy for the Ministry of Defense, and finally as the caretaker of an office for a construction company. When Habib first arrived to the UAE he was there for two years before he returned home for the first time. However, when he started working for the Ministry of Defense, they allowed him a 30 day leave every year with a paid return ticket to India. In India he has a wife, four children, and a bungalow. During his time in the UAE he helped his younger brother immigrate over and find work. Now they have saved up enough money that they are going back to India to open their own clothing store and be with their families. There is also one other case study of an Indian migrant that made enough money working for the army to bring his family over. However, because of emiratization, his salary was cut and he was forced to send his family back to India.

One major pattern represented in these three Indian case studies is that all three men have families back in India and only one was able to bring his to the UAE for a short time period. One reason for this is that the UAE immigration policy makes it extremely difficult for worker men to gain visas for their entire family. Nasra M. Shah expands this issue when discussing policies implemented by the UAE government in an effort to lower the number of foreigners in the country. In his report “Restrictive Labour Immigration Policies in the Oil-Rich Gulf: Effectiveness and Implications for Sending Arab Countries” for the UN Population Division Shah contends that government policies that have been implemented to reduce the supply of
foreign labor are to raise the cost of living for migrant workers, deporting over-stayers and illegals, stricter visa regulations, and curbs on visa trading (Shah, 2006, p 4). In addition, policies have been created to decrease not only the supply but the demand. These policies include training of nationals and market based measures where financial penalties are imposed on companies who do not hire nationals (collectively known as emiratization). Immediately, the rise in the cost of living stands out, for typically Palestinians come to the UAE with more money than Indians. Therefore, Palestinians may be better able to withstand hostile government policies and these policies may have a direct effect on Asian immigrants.

Shah’s research shows that these policies have not had the effect that the government hoped for. The motivation for Asian workers to seek employment in the Middle East remains high causing the supply to also remain high. “…migration to the Gulf has come to take on significant economic, social, and political importance. In the face of low economic development and pressure for jobs for new entrants to the labor force, the governments have tried to maximize outflow of workers to relieve actual and impending unemployment at home” (Shah, 2006, p 12). Thus, since Indians, like the Palestinians, are not necessarily traveling to the UAE based on free will, but because they must to survive, they may be more likely to want to remain Indian and not reconstruct an identity based on their new country. Also, the large Indian and Asian population present can facilitate the maintenance of Indian identity.

These new policies have created problems for the Gulf as well as the sending Asian countries without making a significant difference in the number of foreigners in the Gulf. For example, since motivation and supply are still high restrictive visa policies have increased illegal immigration and human trafficking into the Gulf. This has turned badly for the GCC because the region was downgraded to the lowest level concerning prevalence of human trafficking in the US
Shah also makes the argument that the abundant supply of workers has contributed to stagnation if not decline in wages and exploitation. For example, “housemaids and drivers make the same amounts they made 20 years ago” (Shah, 2006, p 14). This oversupply of workers is making it harder for them to achieve their goal of making enough wealth to support their families, however due to lack of choice many workers have no other option. The poor working conditions though are giving exploited ethnic groups (unskilled Indian labor) the chance to coalesce and develop a class consciousness against their position in UAE society. There is evidence of this in the sporadic rioting by laborers, such as the 2006 riot at the Burj al Dubai.

KC Zachariah’s work compliments Shah’s research. Zachariah in “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Indian Contract Workers: The Case of the United Arab Emirates” looked specifically at how UAE immigration policy impacts Indian contract workers. A contract worker is one who “is officially granted permission to enter another country and take up employment in a given job, and a contract is conducted on his behalf or between him and the employer or enterprise for which he will work” (Zachariah, 2003, p 2). Most importantly, the contract migrant is expected to leave at the completion of the contraction irregardless of the work continues. During the 1990s the UAE government reformed immigration policy to address the demographic imbalance which incurred many hardships upon the working Indian population.

The Indian immigrant population suffered from these reforms because of they lacked laws to regulate working conditions, and there is non-fulfillment of contract conditions by employers. “Human Rights Watch has not been able to document a single instance where an employer was sanctioned, either by prison time or financial penalties, for failing to pay its workers. Even workers who have succeeded in obtaining judgments against their employers have
been unable to enforce them to recover their wages, much less succeed in seeing the employer punished with fines or imprisonment” (Human Rights Watch, 2006, p 12). Similarly, Zachariah states “the method of recruiting workers through sponsorship gives considerable range of misuse, exploitation of workers, and creation of illegal workers. The absence of an affective labor grievance outlet to address the issue of labor disputes has created very serious problems for Indian migrants” (Zachariah, 2003, p 10). The immigrant populations, especially Indian, suffer from a lack of labor rights which would give them more recourse in Emirati society. In addition, because of the demographic imbalance virtually no steps are being taken to naturalize the immigrants. The government, instead of granting citizenship to create balance allows periods where illegal workers can leave the country without penalty.

These policies have also contributed to a growing increase in the ratio of men to women in the UAE. Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela illustrates is an article discussing how immigration has made the lives of Emirati women worse. Because women make up only 30 percent of the population (“UAE Population,” 2008), the male majority makes it hard to gain the numbers needed to fight for social justice and change. Zachariah cites statistics by the UAE Ministry of Interior from 1995 that the expatriate population was 68.57 percent male and 38.87 percent female (Zachariah, 2003, p 40). There are government sponsored women’s groups in each Emirate, however they are headed by a princess and focused on the nationals versus expatriates. The ratio of women working to men is very low, as women still struggle to have a life long career outside the home.

Women in the UAE

In a report titled *Gender and Migration in the Arab States: The Case of the Domestic Worker* sponsored by the International Labor Organization (ILO) the situation of women workers
in the UAE is discussed and draws many parallels to Reitumetse Obakeng Mabokela’s work. The ILO discusses how there is indeed a substantial number of immigrant women in the UAE as domestic servants and that families actually will seek out a certain ethnicity because of language ability or based on stereotypes of that culture. However, while female domestic workers were once treated well and in a good light, the report states that they are now seen as a threat and often treated badly as they are exposed to the privacy of the home. Women make up 11.6 percent of the workforce in the UAE and local women, like local men, also work mostly in the public sector (Sabban, 2004, p 3). Foreign women work in the private sector, with each home having up to three domestic helpers. The domestic helpers are blocked access to integration in Emirati society as much as males are, for the families often do not allow time off and the women are treated as inferior. However, since there are large numbers of women domestic helpers they have a chance to maintain their identity by interaction with each other in the streets when they are doing errands. Gender is a primary factor when evaluating ethnicity for men and women are treated differently, especially in Islamic society.

Monica Gallant, like Khalaf and Alkobaisi, completed an ethnography of workers in Dubai. However, Gallant focused on five Emirati women. She notes that Arab society is in transition and “on one hand, women are respected and encouraged to embark on new careers; on the other there is an unwillingness to accept that this will mean a change in spheres, particularly in the area of relations within the family” (Gallant, 2006, p 24). Arabs in a process of adapting to the modern world economically and politically, however they do not want to lose their culture, including the traditional role of women. Gallant cites N. Hijab’s work *Women and Work in the Arab World* as saying “in the UAE, the influx of foreign workers and the speed of economic development have created an even greater desire to maintain the stability of traditional culture.
Many feel strongly that the ideal of the warmth of the Arabic family system and the sense of security and belonging that it can provide should be preserved” (Gallant, 2006, p 24). These feelings contribute to the exclusion of immigrant groups such as the Palestinians and the Indians, however Palestinians can relate more to an Arab family structure.

**Racism and Self-Identification**

Gallant encountered two types of racism in the UAE in her ethnography. The first was discrimination between pure Arabs and non-pure Arabs (locals) and the second was discrimination between Emirati nationals and expatriates. These two types of discrimination permeate society from family life and marriage down to what jobs are attainable. Of the five Emirati women in Gallant’s study “all of the women felt strongly about their race and all of the women felt that at times, their race dictated the type of treatment they received – sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. The women positioned themselves and others in various ways through race and family connections” (Gallant, 2006, p 36). Thus, ethnicity plays a very important role in Emirati society and there is a hierarchy of respect that the Emirati project onto each other and non nationals. Gallant noted that race and ethnic heritage appeared to be a critical element of self-identification of her subjects, which would only lead one to believe that ethnicity helps Emirati society identify and relate to others.

The Palestinian identity could fall into either category of both non pure Arab (depending) and expatriate, where as Indians would be only expatriates according to the model of discrimination that Gallant presents. One of her subjects, Fatma, noted that pure Arabs receive better job opportunities than non pure Arabs. Therefore, Palestinians according to this study are disadvantaged because they are not locals. “In the workplace there is significant racial tension and discrimination between local employees and certain foreign workers” (Gallant, 2006, p 32).
This tension is in part because of the emiratization program because “while this has increased employment opportunities for locals, it has also increased resentment against them in the workplace, particularly from foreign workers who feel their jobs may be threatened by less qualified locals” (Gallant, 2006, p 32). Here, it is plausible that a Palestine may actually feel threatened by the Emirati and not the other way around. This situation would let tension be felt on both sides, versus purely from an Emirati standpoint. One subject, Alia, commented “because I am local they do not think that I know anything and they don’t give me any attention in the meeting” (Gallant, 2006, p 33). Therefore, the discrimination by reversed, whereas those in power in the private sector- Palestinians and Indians may in fact be at odds with the local entrepreneurs.

Fatma actually faced a lot of discriminatory behavior from the Indians and justified her dislike for them with the comment “…you can hate them, you can have your feelings, but discrimination is only when you act, act, as in action” (Gallant, 2006, p 33). It needs to be mentioned that the Indians being spoken about are not the unskilled laborers, but the engineers, nurses, and doctors who Fatma would be competing with for employment. This statement also reflects a view that in Emirati may not identify as racist, when they in fact hold certain groups in a lower esteem than themselves. Gallant’s research proves that race plays an important role in social interactions and that stereotypes can have a direct influence on the job availability for a particular person. Her work also shows a new dynamic that not only do the Emirati feel threatened by the expatriates, but the expatriates also feel threatened by the Emirati creating a situation with mutual tension, for two ethnic networks challenge each other.
METHODOLOGY

Surveys and Fieldwork

*Please find sample surveys attached.

The research and analysis are qualitative in nature and focus on people’s perceptions about ethnicity. Nationality, ethnicity, and occupational experience are the three primary components examined in a survey and fieldwork. The surveys administered were written in English, anonymous, and contained five sections. Questions are directed to primarily Palestinians, Indians, and Emiratis, however a few other people of different ethnic groups were surveyed in order to see if Palestinians and Indians are having a unique experience in the UAE and so it would be easier to identify external factors. Three surveys were created; one for Emiratis, one for Indians, and one for Palestinians. The surveys all followed the same pattern of questioning; however the Indian and Palestinians were asked questions specifically on how often they traveled to their home country and Emiratis were asked their opinions of the expatriate groups.

The first section asked for general information such as age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and if the person was not Emirati how long he or she has resided in the country and who the visa sponsor is. Identifying “home” in this first section had to operationalized because many Palestinians and Indians have lived in the Emirates their entire lives, effectively making the UAE their home. Or, in the case of some Palestinians surveyed, they felt that Palestine was their home, but the person grew up and had most of their family in another country such as Syria or Jordan because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In these cases there were three countries that had to be differentiated between: the UAE, Palestine, and country X. To deal with this complexity, Palestinians were asked which country was their “primary” country, meaning where a significant
amount of time has been spent and then which country they felt most loyal to if it was not their primary country. In the surveys administered to Indians the concept of “home” was addressed in the next section travel, for the sample that was interviewed was less likely to have the external factors leading to a complex identity.

The second section of the survey for Indians and Palestinians was travel. The questions focused on how often the person traveled home/to their primary country and why. Palestinians were also asked if they had ever been to Palestine and how many times. It is important to know how the subject returned home- did they save enough money, or did an employer pay for a trip home every year? Emiratis were not asked questions about travel. The third section, career, was similar for all participants. Questions concerned what social class the person felt that they belonged to, questions about their job if they had one, and if they obtained their job on merit or connections. Questions about intra ethnic conflict was also addressed on the surface for the Indians. The participants were asked about whether or not he or she identified with or socialized with other Indians not in his or her same social class while in the UAE. These questions led to the next section, social life. Here the ethnicities of close friends were uncovered with long term plans about residence and marriage. Finally, all surveys contained a section on religion. This section asked what the person’s religion was and how often they practiced.

Emiratis at the end of the survey had to answer questions about the expatriate community. The questions here were very subjective and asked about the participant’s opinion of the immigrant populations living in the UAE and whether or not the participant perceived the expatriates to be taking jobs and resources away from nationals. There were specific questions on the Indian and Palestinian populations and if there were certain ethnic groups the participant would be more willing to integrate into society than others. Furthermore, Emiratis were asked if
expatriates should ever be issued an Emirati passport. As Emirati identity is strongly primordial, these groups can never be viewed ethnically as sons of the soil, but there are generations of people who have lived here their whole lives, but are not allowed Emirati passports. These questions helped gage the prevalence of prejudice and stigma by the UAE nationals toward the expatriate community.

In addition to administering surveys I was able to make observations and have informal conversations with Indian female domestic workers. Because of the language barrier with the Indian workers this sample was not able to fill out a survey and I was unable to have someone translate for me. One attempt was made, however the translator did not speak perfect Hindi or Urdu and there was a difference in dialects. The information extracted was primarily where the subject was from in India, how long they had been in the UAE, and if he or she wanted to return to India. All of the conversations were conducted informally and there was a hesitance among the subjects to reveal too much, as many immigrants have a fear of losing their jobs because of limited labor rights. Lacking the language skills to communicate held back the research process.

The survey was administered on the AUS campus in the library, in the student center, through acquaintances, and by setting up meetings with specific cultural clubs on a voluntary basis. I was not present when the participant was completing the survey, but would come back in collect it after the person was done. After collecting the data from the surveys and interviews the information can be compiled, measured, and then compared to government statistics and data. It is also important to measure the geographic density of different locations and look at the issue of segregated housing and what these mini-communities look like. This information will hopefully lead to a better understanding of the role ethnicity places in the UAE, as well as produce more questions that can be answered to obtain a more accurate and complete picture.
Subjects

Ideally, the interviewees would be from all different social classes within their ethnic group, however this proved to be difficult. It would have also have been ideal to find Palestinian and Indian workers that have been in the UAE for varying lengths of time, with various occupations, and various levels of wealth. However, my access to these research groups was limited by time, money, and travel constraints. In addition, most of the participants were male, nonetheless I was able to interact with a limited group of female workers and make observations.

Survey participants were students at the American University of Sharjah (AUS) in Al Sharjah, UAE. The ages of the participants ranged from 17 to 52, however the mean age was 21. The students represent a specific proportion of their respective ethnic populations. For example, the Indians surveyed came from relatively wealthy Indian families that valued education and could afford to send their children to this Western styled university. Furthermore, many of the Palestinians attending AUS have family that lives in the UAE. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Dubai and Abu Dhabi are the 71st and 82nd most expensive cities in the world to live in (grapeshisha.com, 2006, par 1). Therefore, it is a valid assumption that many of the survey participants are relatively affluent and are going to hold a particular view. Furthermore, the female Indian workers were all employees of Cleanco Trading, Importing & Services Establishment for AUS.

Concerns and Constraints

There were many constraints with this format of research and the results will be imperfect. First, as the researcher there may be bias against me as I am foreign, Christian, young, and only speak English. Distrust of the researcher may also affect how honestly and completely people answered questions on the survey because much of the information asked for is very
personal and perhaps traceable even though everything was completed anonymously. My lack of language skills proved to be a major draw back to who I could orally interview. There are also many constraints placed on my participants that will affect their reality compared to what they want. For example, the question on the survey about where the subject wants to live (which country) may actually be different then what he or she can actually accomplish. However, these questions are still important because they help understand how one identifies himself. Also, by doing this survey it will be one snapshot in time of ethnicity. Two years after I do the research an Emirati citizen may become sympathetic to the immigrant plight and support citizenship for non-nationals. Marriage patterns may also change and so to may social norms with future generations of Emirati and immigrant populations.

EVIDENCE

Housing

The cities in the UAE have multiethnic compositions with segregated housing areas for nationals and immigrants. Housing is then subdivided further according to class, social power, ethnicity, and nationality. Keeping people separate enforces their ethnicity and it makes it harder for a new one to form. The way housing segregation is accomplished however is very indirect. First, price is an obvious factor that will segregate people on a socio economic level. Only the very wealthy can afford to rent an apartment in Dubai. Arabs that do not live in the UAE full time, expatriates that do, and Palestinians that have made the UAE their home are the majority of apartment dwellers. Palestinian housing patterns is one factor that distinguishes them from the Indian population. Emiratis on the other hand will build houses in the suburbs of the cities because they are given land by the state. A temporary worker who is struggling in India and comes to the UAE will not be able to afford housing. Therefore, housing is often supplied by the
company that sponsors the person’s visa. Worker camps are set up miles away from where the men work and are crowded, dirty, and often with out running water or electricity.

There are other divides in society. For example, among immigrants there are hierarchical groups that have different economic and social rewards. The top tier is made of professionals and technocrats present on international contracts who have high salaries. These people are mainly American or European. The second tier is middle-range professionals like school teachers and company salesmen which is also some Europeans, Indians and Palestinians depending on their job. Finally the third tier is made of low-paid semi-skilled and unskilled workers which are primarily Indians and Asians.

In contrast, the nationals are a privileged minority who benefit from the state laws and business regulations. Emirati society has its own social hierarchy. At the top are the royal families that hold the highest political positions and power derived from their wealth and lineage. Then the merchant class, which was traditionally pearling merchants, but now sells international consumer goods, has the next amount of political influence. Third there is the new middle class which consists of professionals who have benefited from a free, state education. The free, state education could be a factor that would level out ethnic differences if everyone was to attend. However, since the immigrant working men are not allowed to bring their families, their children do not go to school in the UAE and migrant men themselves do not have time to go to school because they much work to support themselves. Finally the Emirati do have low-income groups which are represented by newly settled Bedouin nomads and former pearl divers and oasis farmers. However, this group still is more respected in Emirati society than non-nationals despite the difference in class.
Segregated housing is both a condition that is forced upon many immigrants and self-chosen. Often times the immigrants will desire to live around people who they can converse with and come from a similar background. Thus, the housing situation is a product of economic constraints and the wish to remain within a certain ethnic community. The government has also made an effort to indirectly segregate the immigrants by creating forced segregation of bachelors. Many of the “bachelors” in the country living on their own are not really bachelors, but working immigrant men that cannot afford to bring their families over. Abu Dhabi’s municipality has drafted plans to regulate their accommodation in the Emirate and has allocated plots of land for building houses for this group. Bachelors contacted the gulfnews.com with their feelings on the issue. “These houses should be in the city and not far away from our place of work, as I can't understand why bachelors don't deserve to live in Abu Dhabi or other cities across the country,” said Emad E.M., an executive resident in Abu Dhabi for six years (Salama, 2007, par 5).

This new law affects Palestinians and Indians differently. Palestinians tend to come into the country with more money than the Indians, as they are coming as refugees on their own will instead of as workers. Thus, more Palestinians have their family unit located in the UAE and may not be forced to relocate. By relocating the “bachelors” this will cause further segregation between the different minority groups from each other. If the Indians move and the Palestinians do not, then these two groups may no longer interact even if they once did.

Gulf norms also seem to support the hypothesis that Palestinians are more integrated into society than Indians. First, the UAE seems to interact with Indian workers in terms of money. These workers are cheap, there is a continuing supply, and no common heritage. The UAE interacts with Palestine on a much more regular basis than India and provides support for
Palestine in its quest for statehood. Online newspaper *The Seoul Times* quoted *The Gulf Today* reporting, “a daily UAE paper said on April 29, 2008 if Israel is serious about peace in the region, it should stop the killings first, then talk peace… ‘Hardly any day passes without the news of killings of Palestinians by Israeli army. Six people were killed in the latest Israeli raid which happened on Monday morning in the north Gaza town of Beit Hanun,’ wrote *The Gulf Today* in its daily comment” (*The Seoul Times*, par 6). A clear bias is represented in the UAE paper. The UAE also gives monetarily to Palestine, as the UAE Red Crescent Authority (RCA) currently sponsors about nine thousand Palestinian orphans, which may be raised to up to 20,000. RCA also supports many other humanitarian and charity programs in Palestine, including the iftar meal which is being provided to Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan. So far the RCA had distributed about 11,000 iftar parcels at a total cost of $250,000 (*Emirates News Agency*, 2007, par 2). The UAE helping Palestine monetarily and with tangible goods is a strong political statement about who they identify with in the Middle East and what kind of causes the UAE will support.

**Survey Results**

In total thirty surveys were collected. Thirteen were Emirati, six were Palestinian, ten were Indian, and one was Jordanian. The surveys were very telling about how the three ethnic groups identify themselves and reveal clues as to how they identify with each other. The surveys revealed that each group seems to identify themselves as ethnically before social class, which leaves less room for integration into Emirati society. In addition, the surveys suggested that the Emiratis were able to better identify with Palestinians, but only accepted their presence as long as they were refugees instead of permanent residence.
• **Social Status and Occupation Networks**

In attempting to understand the point of view and reality each respondent lived questions were asked about what social class each person identified with and questions about their either current or future careers. Five Emirati identified as upper class, two as upper middle, and six has middle. I expected most to identify with the upper class, but on reflection I realized that the upper class may be perceived as the Sheikhs and royalty. It would have been better if the survey gave an income range to circle, however many may have not felt comfortable answering the question. Palestinians and Indians were asked about their social class in the Middle East compared to their home country. One respondent was upper class in Palestine, but felt middle class in the UAE, one felt that their upper class status carried over to the UAE, three people marked they were middle class in Palestine and identified as an expatriate in the Emirates, and one person was middle class across the board. Comparatively, the majority of Indian respondents identified as upper class in India and middle class in the UAE with a few identifying as upper class in both answers. This shows that Indians tend to perceive that they move down a class when they enter the UAE. It is unclear what the Palestinians who answered expatriate mean, however expatriate is generally middle to upper middle class when it comes to other Arabs in the country. Therefore, Palestinians remain more or less in the same socioeconomic class while they cross borders and Indians appear to be demoted.

The socioeconomic standing of an individual often determines the means that he or she has to find a job. For example, all the Emiratis with the exception of one answered that they would find a job through connections or their family. The Emirati participants also identified as being wealthier compared to Indian and Palestinian participants. Indians on the other hand mostly responded that they would find a job solely on their merit and help from AUS. Palestinian
participants were evenly split between finding a job based on merit and finding a job based on connections. There was not a connection between class and how the job would be acquired in the case of the Palestinians. An upper class individual said he would earn his job, while a middle class individual said he would find his job based on connections. This runs contrary to the pattern found with the Emiratis and Indians. It suggests that connections are not as closely associated with money in Palestinian societies as Emirati, however there is not an absence of established networks. Indians appear to have less access to the job networks that the participants want to enter after graduation which include business finance, journalism, software development, working for a multinational corporation, marketing, and working for a non governmental organization than Palestinians and Emiratis. Emiratis also displayed an interest in working in some of these fields however feel that they will be able to enter them based on personal connections. This information supports the claim that Palestinians are slightly more integrated into society than Indians based on my sample.

• **Travel**

When analyzing the responses according to travel, the Indian students travel to India more often and have more contact with their extended families than the Palestinian students. Three participants traveled to India once a year, one participant goes twice a year, one participant has been three times in her life, and one wrote “rarely, it’s been five years” (Survey 20, p 2). However, this indicates that she has been before in her life, where as some of the Palestinians have never been to the West Bank or Gaza. Three Indian participants misunderstood the question because they live in the UAE so two marked that they go home once a month and one person goes home every week. This is still significant though because these students are having lots of contact with their Indian families where Indian culture and ethnic markers such as speaking
Melvin 36

one’s native language are reinforced. Comparatively, the Palestinian students surveyed where split between those who had either never been to Palestine or had only visited once and those who had spent large amounts of time there. Two people surveyed have never been to Palestine, and one person has only been once, but sees their Palestinian family in Spain on holidays and vacations. The other half of the group relayed a different story. One Palestinian student has traveled there every summer since she was three, one lived there for three years and then has traveled to the territories ten times, and one person who is 52 and lived in Palestine until he traveled to the UAE to work twenty years ago. He now returns about once every two years. All of the subjects though marked that they feel the most loyalty to Palestine regardless of where they may actually live or how many times they have visited, therefore their identity is not based on necessarily living on the land. In comparison, the majority of Indian students make yearly trips to India.

All the Indians and Palestinians when asked why they traveled home listed their primary reason as extended family- parents, grandparents, friends, etc. This supports the primordial argument of ethnicity, that kinship groups are still important and that the subjects are reinforcing their ethnicity from within. Only one Indian and one Palestinian wrote that they travel back to India and Palestine respectively for the culture and to see the country. The Indian participant wrote that she returned home to “just to meet the family or see our ‘home’ country” (Survey 22). According to the survey results it is easy for the Indian students to travel to India to see their family and friends. A popular response was that it’s “just a matter of 3 hours flight” (Survey 23). The Palestinian students gave a mixed response as to whether or not it was easy to travel to Palestine, the group was again split, but into slightly different groups than who found it easy and who did not. The person who returns once every two years said that it was not easy because the
borders are closed most of the time. The other people who said no that it was not easy to travel to Palestine, ascribed the difficulty to political conflicts and to the Israelis. One participant answered yes that it was easy to travel to Palestine because they had an Israeli ID. One person did not comment and the other’s answer is not relevant.

Having direct access to one’s country and others of the same ethnicity can reinforce his identity. Indian students travel back to India more than the Palestinians go to Palestine. This would lead Palestinians in the UAE to perhaps identify with a larger Arab identity, which is how one Palestinian chose to ethnically define themselves. Viewing oneself as simply Arab will allow for more opportunities to integrate with the Emirati because one is eliminating the internal forces that cause you to identify nationally. External forces that define one as something other than Emirati or Arab are then what become significant in that person’s life.

• Social Relationships

Marriage, religion, and relationships in addition to occupation networks and travel can reveal the pull of ethnicity in a person’s day to day life. Seven Emiratis claimed that their close friends were also locals or at the very least Arab. Five claimed to be close friends with locals and non locals. The non local groups identified were Westerners (European, American, and Canadian) as well as Hungarian and Pakistani. All Emiratis however claim to speak their native language, Arabic, on a daily basis. Palestinian participants also all claimed Arabic as their first language and stated that they speak it everyday. In addition, all but two Palestinians wrote that their close friends were primarily Arab. The non Arab ethnicity listed by a participant was American. Indian participants had similar results to the Emirati in that the group was evenly split between those who only identified other Indians as their close friends and those who wrote other ethnicities as well. Five claimed their close were friends were all Indian and five claimed to have
close friends that were Indian and other ethnicities. The other ethnicities included Emirati, Australian, European, American, Slovaks, and other Arab groups.

The Indian participants showed a different pattern however in terms of language. Prevalent languages spoken in India include Hindi, Urdu, and Tamil, therefore it was expected that the person’s primary language listed would be one of these. However, exactly half of the group identified English as their first language and two people do not speak any other language besides limited French. These individuals have been in the UAE from three and seven years and both travel to India annually. The participant that has lived in the UAE for three years, seems to not have strong attachments to India. Besides not speaking Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, etc. she also does not identify with any of the social classes in India. In addition, when asked if she spoke to or associated with the Indian temporary workers in the UAE her response was no, yet she listed her closest friends at AUS as being only Indian. The other individual wrote that in India she was a member of the upper middle class, therefore she may be able to live comfortably only speaking English. She also wrote that she does associate with people who are the same ethnicity as her, but not the same social class and that her friends were all different ethnicities. These two subjects illustrate the identity of someone with out primordial attachments to their country or origin.

The other five Indian respondents identified either Hindi or Urdu as their first language and wrote that they spoke it everyday. Some of these participants were individuals who have lived in the UAE their entire lives. Two individuals that have lived in the UAE their entire lives and speak Urdu or Hindi as their primary language rarely travel to India, where as one person travels to India annually. Therefore, a relationship between how often a person speaks their native Indian dialect if he or she speaks it at all, could not be established with the intensity to
which they considered themselves Indian. Other factors must be more prominent in terms of what defines the person ethnically as Indian.

The majority of the group of Indian respondents said that they did associate with Indians of a lower socioeconomic status than them in the UAE, such as temporary workers. However, there were feelings of sympathy versus empathy displayed by those who answered yes that can suggest certain participants do not truly identify with this group of people. One answer was “yeah, coz most of them are good people and could use a friend” (Survey 26, p 3). Other yes answers were vague with statements about getting along with everyone and no specific mention of the Indian working class. One participant who answered no, she does not speak with the Indian workers wrote “not too comfortably. It’s easier to communicate with people who possess similar interests and problems” (Survey 22, p 3). These answers reflect a distancing of Indian students from Indian workers and shows patterns of intra ethnic class conflict.

In comparison all Palestinians responded that they associated with other Palestinians not in the same social class as them. A reason for this is that Palestinian identity is derived from high group solidarity in response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is also less of an income difference between the upper class and the lower class than in Indian society. There was similar unanimity among the Emirati that the participants associated with other Emirati not in the same social class, but there were two that responded rarely (participant identified as middle class) and sometimes (participant identified as upper class). This is significant because sometimes people identify economically before they do ethnically and sometimes the inverse is true. Most of the Emirati, Palestinians, and Indians appear to identify ethnically first and foremost.
• **Marriage and Religion**

Religion is a more important factor in terms of who an Indian person suspects to marry than ethnicity. Six respondents recorded that ethnicity did not matter in their spouse, but only two people total responded that their spouse did not have to be of the same religion. Reasons given for why religion was important included parental pressures, that it is religious law, as well as the statements “yes, although I do not believe in religion, my family and our culture call for it” (Survey 21, p 3) and “differences are hard to manage. It’s hard on the next generation too (inter-caste marriages)” (Survey 22 p 3). This pattern was prevalent in Palestinians as well. Religion was a more important factor for marriage than ethnicity and the most popular response was that Islam dictated Muslims marry other Muslims. All Emirati participants responded that they expected to marry another Emirati that they met through family or friends and that their spouse would have to also be Muslim. Three male participants cited that marrying another Emirati would be best because the woman would be able to understand them. One response was “yes because that is the norm around here and because I would be able to relate more to them” (Survey 11, p 2). Others were concerned about family pressures to marry someone of the same ethnicity and girls tended to cite that they didn’t want interethnic children. Reasons for marrying a Muslim were similar to marrying an Emirati. One person wrote “of course, because it is an obligation in my religion and maybe different religion will cause divorce” (Survey 12, p 2). In addition, participants seemed to be concerned that having the parents two different religions would be confusing for the children.

• **Emirati Perceptions of Expatriates**

The Emirati play a clear part role in defining the identity of the expatriate community. When asked if the participant felt if the immigrant populations were taking resources and jobs
from Emirati nine people responded yes and only three no. Some of the yes responses included “yes; it’s full of non locals and it’s annoying sometimes” (Survey 2, p 3) and “it is good if has a limit because a lot immigrants aren’t here for the UAE’s sake” (Survey 12, p 3) as well as “yes, especially in Dubai and the northern Emirates” (Survey 11, p 3). One person wrote that “I have a neutral point on that, yet I think the UAE locals are losing their identity and are heavily influenced by Westerners” (Survey 7, p 3). These responses represent a growing contention in society, similar to the attitudes held by many Americans about the Mexican population. These attitudes can also lead to a hardening of group identity. Two Emiratis when asked their ethnicity responded “Emirati and proud” (Survey 3, p 1) and “pure bred UAE national” (Survey 7, p 1). The people who said no acknowledge the need for expatriates for the development of the UAE and that the government still makes locals their first priority. These people are the minority of the participants.

When asked if there were certain ethnic groups that the participant would be more willing to integrate into Emirati society than others the answer was a strong no with three participants saying maybe other GCC nationals. This response corresponded to the view that expatriates should not be granted Emirati citizenship. Students wrote that if expatriates were given Emirati citizenship the “UAE will lose its identity and there will be a mixed race, people will start to have tainted instead of pure Emirati blood” (Survey 7, p 3). This person clearly sees ethnicity as something primordial instead of constructed and this does not leave much room for either Palestinians or Indians to integrate into Emirati society. Another person shared this same view by writing “Emiratis are only supposed to be the people whose ancestors have lived and died in the UAE” (Survey 3, p 3). A few participants responded that people who have lived in the UAE their whole lives should receive citizenship, or second and third generation expatriates.
Finally, the Emiratis were asked their views of the Indians and Palestinians in the UAE and which group they identified with more. Everyone with the exception of one person wrote that the UAE is a developing country and that Indians are needed and deserve more respect. In regards to Palestinians everyone with the exception of the same person wrote that it was okay for the Palestinians to be in the UAE because their country was at war and this was a better place to raise a family. However, implicit in many answers was that Palestinians were here as refugees and that if there was ever to be peace they should return to their country. When asked who the Emiratis identify with more eight people said Palestinians because they are Arab and share a common religion and language, two people said Indians because Indians are more ingrained in daily life for the respondents, and one person answered both. The answer to this question illustrates that within my small sample Palestinians would be more integrated into the population because of a common Arab heritage, language, and culture.

**Conversations With and Observations of Indian Female Domestic Workers**

Over the course of the semester I was able to interact with the women who worked for the cleaning services in the dormitories. The few women I was able to speak to were from Mumbai and Jaipur India. They were also able to tell me that they want to return to India. There was a language barrier that I could not breach to acquire more information besides these two things. However, I was able to observe that the Arab dorm supervisors treat them very poorly by being condescending, demanding, and not accommodating to requests for breaks. According to an article in *gulfnews.com* many employees for Cleanco are afraid to speak out when they are being mistreated. “Cleaners with the biggest cleaning company in the UAE say they are too afraid to file a complaint with the Ministry of Labour because supervisors have threatened them
with dismissal if they do” (Stratford, 2006, par 1). The Cleanco women at AUS are another example of mistreated Indian workers.

In terms of ethnicity however, the women are in constant contact with each other throughout the day. They interact in their native language and cook native foods for lunch and dinner. This interaction can help maintain their ethnic identity. It appears that Indians have much more opportunity to interact with other Indians while working which reinforces their ethnicity as well as keeps them separate from the local Arab population. Palestinians on the other hand interact with other ethnicities and Emiratis more regularly. The isolation of the Indian workers allows for less integration while the relative freedom of the Palestinians gives them more opportunity to become part of the societal fabric.

**Ethnic Comparisons Between Emirati and Palestinians/Indians**

The UAE and Palestine bond over a common religion and greater Arab ethnicity that is a legacy of colonialism. Indian workers do not have a shared Arab history, though they too were colonized by the British. The survey results indicate that religion plays a very strong role in ethnicity. Religion has the ability to trump national origin in terms of who participants wish to marry. National origin often loses meaning in second generation immigrants and then people identify through religious institutions. The common Islamic mindset can allow Muslim Palestinians to sympathize if not agree with the values put in place by the ruling Emirati class, where Indians do not have this advantage. Many of the Indian participants marked that they were Hindu or Christian with a couple being Muslim, whereas the majority of Palestinians were Muslim.

The study by Khalfah and Alkobaisi demonstrates the power of social networks have to perpetuating ethnicities. In two of the three cases of the Indian male immigrants, the male had
family already in the UAE to contact on their arrival. This family helped them to find work in sectors that they were already involved in and often provided housing. Indians in fact account for a growing middle class and are deeply imbedded in the economics of the private sector. Indians start businesses in the Emirates, but to do this a non-national must have a national sponsor or partner. This is another attempt of the UAE government to control the wealth, for often the sponsor or the partner gets a cut of the profits. Nevertheless, Indian merchants are filling the material and service demand in society that Emirati citizens are due to public sector employment. When an Indian immigrant starts a business he makes it easier for his family to also migrate over and find work, whether it is with him or in a different business in the same industry. By partnering with an Emirati the Indian is also creating connections and adapting to the existing social system and may find mild success.

Many of the Indian immigrants are working to support their families in other locations and cannot bring them to the UAE, and therefore money is their number one priority instead of changing social order. If an immigrant feels secure in his job then he may start demanding more labor rights. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that there are two distinct Indian groups residing in the UAE. Those who are workers and are treated poorly in their jobs, and those who have higher class jobs and whose children have lived in the UAE their entire lives. The majority of the Indian survey respondents wrote that they want to remain living in the UAE, while the rest wrote other places besides India. Comparatively, the Cleanco women told me that they wanted to return to India. It is more likely that change will be demanded by those who feel settled and secure in the UAE. However, for the majority of working Indians and Palestinian respondents said the UAE is not “home” and therefore there is no incentive to risk your safety in a conservative society to change the social order.
The Palestinians have a different role than the Indian migrant workers and wealthier Indians and relate to the Emirati differently. First, they often come to the country as refugees and not necessarily for economic gain. Secondly, they do not return to Palestine at the rate that Indians return to India. The Palestinians also hold different jobs. According to Jim Paul and Eric Rouleau in “The Palestinian Diaspora of the Gulf” they are most often school teachers, professors, and some of found their way into the public sector which is dominated by Emirati. In the public sector they are public prosecutors and judges. They are also numerous among journalist, doctors, engineers, architects, and the management staff of private companies (Paul & Rouleau, 1985, p 14). Education is highly valued in Palestinian society and many of the Palestinians that come to the UAE are well educated. Education is also valued in Indian society, but many of the Indians that migrate to the UAE are unskilled laborers that need to go there for work.

In addition, Palestinians have been present in the UAE since 1950. In some cases they were sought out because the Sheikhs were looking for people with technical and administrative skills to progress the Emirates. Also, the Palestinians have important aspects in common with the Emirati: they are Arab, mostly Muslim, and often English and Arabic-speaking. The nation of India is becoming stronger and stronger and is often said to be a competitor with China and Brazil as a challenger to U.S. hegemony, but the Indian citizens that are migrating to the UAE are often not educated or English-speaking, all of which are internal factors that are keeping them as a separate ethnic group from the Palestinians or the Emirati.
CONCLUSIONS

Acceptation of Hypothesis: Palestinians are More Integrated than Indians

The UAE is a striking picture of contradictions. The advanced urban development is at odds with ancient Bedouin tribal values of gender segregation and religion. Components of the socio-economic structure include modernism, Islam, consumerism, tribalism, and dependence on foreign labor. The dependence of foreign labor brings people to the Emirates that do not necessarily fit in with Emirati values and culture. However, one can see that those that do, such as the Palestinians, are rewarded with jobs in the government and the presence of their families. The Palestinians have come closer than any other ethnic group to achieving parity in the UAE governmental structure, which is hard to crack open as it is dominated by royal families. Also, in the UAE culture is dictated by the government, making it difficult for any and all outsiders to assimilate. Therefore, ethnicity is a driving factor that inhibits or allows immigrant groups to become relatively assimilated into society.

There have emerged contexts in which the Palestinians and Indians retain their group distinctiveness and contexts in which the cohesion of their groups diminishes. For example, Palestinians are Arab like Emirati, but are considered a distinct group when it comes to wealth distribution. Indians, Palestinians, and other immigrant ethnic groups have retained their group distinctiveness in the UAE. The Emirati according to survey results create friendships with mainly other Emiratis as well as marry other locals. The primary source of contact for Emiratis with non locals appears to be as boss-employee or business interactions. Many of the immigrants that come to the UAE are unskilled laborers with limited education (there are exceptions with the engineers and more successful business men) and mostly only associate with members of their ethnic groups. In addition, the context of segregated housing creates group cohesiveness as well
as the networks that are created. Both Indian and Palestinians tend to come to the UAE via family connections. Employment networks are then created with Indians dominating the private sector and Palestinians spread between the public and the private sectors.

Therefore, Indians workers maintain their distinctive ethnicity from the Emirati due to religion, language, education, and occupation. More affluent Indians retain their identity through internal factors such as travel back to India to see family and passing language and ideals onto their children. Religion appears to be a major factor in group solidarity of Indians of all classes as well as the Emirati. Palestinians on the other hand tend to bond over a common struggle. When there is violence and conflict it can result in a strengthening in ethnic identity as diasporas around the world try to help with the cause of the homeland. Nevertheless, segregation of workers from the Emirati does not allow the two groups to interact on a social level including marriage and close friendship. Even when an immigrant is not forced to live in a worker camp, such as a wealthy Palestinian, their housing is still set apart from Emirati. The Emirati build houses on land given to them by the government, while Palestinians tend to live in apartments in the major cities.

Palestinians have to a small degree become more cohesive within Emirati society than Indians because the Palestinians do not frequent home and some according to surveys indicate that they feel more comfortable in the UAE than in Palestine. Palestinians have more luck getting family into the country than unskilled Indian laborers. The Indian men raise their families back in India and always plan on returning. In terms of Gulf norms, the UAE sympathizes with the Palestinian cause and has closer religious ties. This is a minor detail but contributes to a context that allows for more Palestinian integration and cohesion into Emirati society.
Major external factors that contribute to the distinctiveness of the two ethnic groups within the UAE are created by the national government. For example, the immigration policy is not designed to make it easy to gain citizenship and the government does not encourage immigrants to integrate into society. There are a very small number of immigrant women in the UAE, but none the less the government offers money to Emirati men to marry Emirati women. These governmental influences also contribute to the strengthening of ethnic ties as people feel discriminated against.

The situation in the UAE relates to many other situations of ethnic conflict and development around the globe. First, there are other locations with segregated housing that adds to ethnic conflict. Israelis and Palestinians share the same territory, but do not live together. This segregation as well as ethnic differences, has led to violent conflict. While there is not violent conflict within the UAE the segregated housing has led to discontent among the working classes. The Israelis and Palestinians have engaged in a dialogue of violence, whereas in the UAE there are only occasional uprising and property damage. Ethnic groups in the Emirates coexist due to accommodation policies created by the government.

In many cases of comparative ethnicity one can see and almost pinpoint an area where multiple factors converge to create a social context of conflict. Many components of ethnicity that are apparent in all research are social class in relation to education, social class in relation to religion, and social class as a derivative of economic opportunity. It is extremely hard to pick out one factor as the “it” factor for why ethnicity matters because ethnicity changes with context and with time. However, it is apparent that ethnicity matters in the competition for resources whether those resources are money, land, power, or a combination of all three.
There have been many limitations to the current research including a limited access to statistical data by the government about visas granted and to which ethnic groups, as well as data about where different ethnic groups are concentrated and information about the segregated housing. Even when traveling to the country there are going to be limitations due to my gender, ethnicity, and language skills. However, the research now would suggest that maintaining the identity of your home-land is both self-imposed and imposed by the Emirati government. However, as the UAE first identifies itself as an Arab country, it is seems to be easier for Arab immigrants to exist in the country comfortably compared to non-Arabs. Therefore, I accept my hypothesis that Palestinians are more integrated into society because of Gulf norms, occupations, and context for being in the UAE in the first place.
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Emirati Students*
*Not indicated on the actual survey given to participants

Survey on Ethnic Identity and Indicators

Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between different ethnic groups residing within the UAE and particularly how well each ethnic group is integrated into society. This survey is expected to take less than 20 minutes. You may abstain from answering any questions that may cause discomfort, and should you wish to cease participation for any reason, you may do so at any time. If you have any questions please feel free to contact the principle researcher (Kendal Melvin) at 056-604-2464 or kendal.melvin@gmail.com

*The more completely you answer the questions depending on the time you have available, the more valid my research will be.

Please circle: Age:

Male Female

1. How long have you lived in the UAE?

2. How do you identify yourself ethnically?

3. Where in the UAE are you from? i.e. Dubai, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi

Career

4. What social class do you identify with? Upper, Middle, Lower, etc.

5. Do you have a job? If so, what is your job and what ethnicity are your coworkers? How long have you worked there?

6. If you do not have a job what do you hope to do after you graduate?

7. Are any companies sponsoring your education at AUS? If so, who?
8. Do you expect that you will obtain your job solely on merit, or do you expect that you will have help finding a job through connections? Who will help you find a job? i.e. family, friends, AUS, etc.

Social Life
9. What ethnicities are your close friends?

10. Are you friends with people of other ethnicities, especially non-Arabs?

11. Do you associate with people of the same ethnicity that are not necessarily in the same social class as you?

12. Do you expect to marry someone the same ethnicity as you? Why or why not.

13. How do you expect you will meet your future spouse? i.e. through family, friends, school, etc.

14. Do you expect to marry someone the same religion as you? Why or why not.

15. In the long term do you want to reside here in the UAE or somewhere else and why?

16. What is your first language? What other languages do you speak?

17. How often do you speak your first language while here in the UAE? i.e. everyday, a couple times a week, etc.

Religion
18. What is your religion?

19. Do you actively practice your religion?
Expatriate Community

20. What is your opinion of the immigrant populations living in the UAE? Specifically, do you feel that they are taking jobs and resources?

21. Are there certain ethnic immigrant groups that you are more willing to integrate into Emirati society than others?

22. Thus far Emirati nationality is based on lineage and family ties, as one can only get a passport if his or her parents are both Emiratis. Do you believe that expatriates should ever be allowed to carry an Emirati passport? What about non-Emiratis that have lived here their entire lives?

23. What are your views toward the working Indian class?

24. What are your views towards Palestinians living in the UAE?

25. Which group do you identify with more (Indians or Palestinians) and why?

Other comments:

Thank you for your time!

Confidentiality: Any data that you provide will be used for research purposes only. Only the researchers involved in this project will have access to the information you provide. Your name and/or identity will never be associated with your responses.

*More room was left for participants to answer on surveys handed out
Palestinian Students*
*Not indicated on survey given to participants
Survey on Ethnic Identity and Indicators

**Purpose and Procedure:** The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between different ethnic groups residing within the UAE and particularly how well each ethnic group is integrated into society. This survey is expected to take less than 20 minutes. You may abstain from answering any questions that may cause discomfort, and should you wish to cease participation for any reason, you may do so at any time. If you have any questions please feel free to contact the principle researcher (Kendal Melvin) at 056-604-2464 or kendal.melvin@gmail.com

*The more completely you answer the questions depending on the time you have available, the more valid my research will be.*

Please circle: 

**Age:**

**Gender:**

Male  Female

1. How long have you lived in the UAE?

2. For what reason are you living in the UAE? i.e. work, school, tourism, research, etc.

3. How do you identify yourself ethnically?

4. What is your nationality (which country issued your passport)?

5. Which country do you consider your “home” country (i.e. one may be Palestinian, grew up and has family in Britain, and holds a Jordanian passport. For the use of this survey Britain would then be “home” because it is where a significant amount of time has been spent)?

6. Which country do you feel most loyal to (if different from question 5)?
7. Who is the sponsor of your UAE residence visa?

Travel

8. How often do you visit your “home” country (country in question 5, granted it is not the UAE)?

9. Have you been to Palestine? If so how many times.

10. Is it easy for you to travel “home”? Why or why not (again, granted it is not the UAE).

11. For what reasons do you return “home”? Please write all reasons that come to mind.

Career

12. What social class do you identify with when you are in your “home” country?

13. What social class do you identify with while here in the UAE?

14. Do you have a job? If so, what is your job and what ethnicity are your coworkers? How long have you worked there?

15. If you do not have a job what do you hope to do after you graduate?

16. Do you expect that you will obtain your job solely on merit, or do you expect that you will have help finding a job through connections? Who will help you find a job? i.e. family, friends, AUS, etc.

Social Life

17. What ethnicities are your close friends?
18. Do you associate with people of the same ethnicity that are not necessarily in the same social class as you while you are here in the UAE?

19. Do you expect to marry someone the same ethnicity as you? Why or why not.

20. Do you expect to marry someone the same religion as you? Why or why not.

21. In the long term do you want to reside here in the UAE, in your “home” country, or somewhere else entirely and why.

22. What is your first language? What other languages do you speak?

23. How often do you speak your first language while here in the UAE? i.e. everyday, a couple times a week, etc.

**Religion**

24. What is your religion?

25. Do you actively practice your religion, if so do you find it easy to practice while in the UAE? Why or why not.

**Thank you for your time!**

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*More room was left for participants to answer on surveys handed out*
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between different ethnic groups residing within the UAE and particularly how well each ethnic group is integrated into society. This survey is expected to take less than 15 minutes. You may abstain from answering any questions that may cause discomfort, and should you wish to cease participation for any reason, you may do so at any time. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me (Kendal Melvin) at 056-604-2464.

Please circle:

Male  Female

Age:

1. How long have you been in the UAE?

2. What is the reason you are in the UAE? i.e. work, school, travel, etc.

3. How do you identify yourself ethnically?

4. What is your nationality?

5. Is AUS your sponsor to be in the UAE? If not, who is? i.e. family, a company, etc.

6. What is your first language? What other languages do you speak?

7. How often do you speak your first language while here in the UAE? i.e. everyday, a couple times a week, etc.
**Travel**
8. How often do you travel home?

9. Is it easy for you to travel home? Why or why not.

10. For what reasons do you return home? Please write all reasons that come to mind.

**Career**
11. What social class do you identify with when you are in your home country?

12. What social class do you identify with while here in the UAE?

13. Do you have a job? If so, what is your job and what ethnicity are your coworkers? How long have you worked there?

14. If you do not have a job, what do you hope to do after you graduate?

15. Do you expect that you will obtain your job solely on merit, or do you expect that you will have help finding a job through connections? Who will help you find a job? i.e. family, friends, AUS, etc.

**Social Life**
16. What ethnicities are your close friends?
17. Do you associate with people of the same ethnicity that are not necessarily in the same social class as you while you are here in the UAE? i.e. Do you talk to any of the immigrant workers? Why or why not.

18. Do you expect to marry someone the same ethnicity as you? Why or why not.

19. Do you expect to marry someone the same religion as you? Why or why not.

20. When older do you want to reside here in the UAE or in your home country and why.

Religion
21. What is your religion?

22. Do you find it easy to practice while in the UAE? Why or why not.

Thank you for your time!

Confidentiality: Any data that you provide will be used for research purposes only. Only the researchers involved in this project will have access to the information you provide. Your name and/or identity will never be associated with your responses.

*More room was left for participants to answer on surveys handed out*