U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators: What Do Petitioners Expect, and Are They Correct?
Working Paper No. 2004-17. 22 pages.
We contribute to the literature on the political economy of U.S. antidumping enforcement through two related empirical studies. First, we analyze the pattern – and macroeconomic determinants -- of country-specific antidumping petitions filed by U.S. firms against 15 countries between 1981 and 1998 (examining quarterly data). Importantly, we suggest that “learning” by petitioners about the administration – in practice -- of the U.S. trade laws has led to changes in the roles of these macroeconomic determinants over time. We then investigate the effect these same indicators have had on the success experienced by petitioners during that same time period, explaining outcomes in 473 U.S. antidumping cases by macroeconomic, country, and industry effects.